May 8, 1980
Page 10703
SECRETARY OF STATE MUSKIE
HON. DON EDWARDS OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, May 8, 1980
Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, I was pleased to see the overwhelming vote in the Senate to confirm Ed Muskie to be our new Secretary of State. I have always had a high regard for Mr. Muskie, and believe that he will bring a needed balance to our foreign policy planning.
An article in today's New York Times presents some interesting thoughts on Mr. Muskie's new position that I think my colleagues would be interested in reading. As a Senator, Ed Muskie has been a forceful advocate for arms control and for the SALT II agreement. In these troubled and uncertain times, I think we very much need a renewed commitment to achieving arms limitation.
I share the hope of the author of this editorial that Secretary Muskie will use his new position to encourage the ratification of SALT II.
The article follows:
FOR MR. MUSKIE'S OPENING NUMBER
A rescue mission is overdue for another American hostage to fortune, the SALT treaty. If Senator Muskie wants to make good his vow to be a "political" Secretary of State in the finest sense, he would defy conventional wisdom and lead a daring effort to save the arms control pact.
President Carter's preoccupations with Iran and Afghanistan, though justified, have obscured the even larger danger of the resumption of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union.
This being an American election year, the chances for avoiding that danger now seem small. But the chances of repairing the damage after election, when Moscow will be moving toward a change of leaders, seem smaller still. One more urgent effort ought to be made, and the arrival of Secretary Muskie — soon to meet with Foreign Minister Gromyko — may offer a last opportunity.
Mr. Muskie has headed the arms control subcommittee of the Senate and probably knows that subject as well as any foreign issue. And he knows better than anyone in the Administration how to maneuver the Senate toward one more try at ratification. Ronald Reagan would oppose it, but that may make it all the more attractive to the Democrats and President Carter. Propelling them and the country should be the knowledge that failure to ratify SALT this year will destroy the pending treaty and perhaps even the arms control negotiating process.
Mr. Carter has wisely drawn back from linking SALT ratification to Soviet conduct in Afghanistan. The treaty is even more important in a period of Soviet-American tension. SALT II is not a favor the United States does for the Soviet Union; it is a mutually beneficial pact and, on balance, more beneficial to America.
The American and Soviet Governments are abiding voluntarily by the unratified limitations of SALT II and the expired limits of SALT I. But why obey treaties without also getting their benefits of certainty? Holding voluntarily to these ceilings will surely become difficult as the time approaches for dismantling older weapons to make room for replacements. A first test may come this month, when Moscow launches a new missile submarine that will push the Soviet arsenal above the SALT I ceiling. The United States faces a similar test in September, with the start of sea trials for a new Trident submarine.
Replacements aside, SALT II requires the Soviet Union to dismantle 104 missiles or bombers immediately and 150 more by the end of 1981, when the United States is committed to reduce by 33. All of this would have to be renegotiated if Congress defers ratification to at least the middle of next year.
Delay would also unravel other elements of security policy. NATO's approval of American mid-range missiles in Europe was conditioned on negotiations in the next treaty, SALT III, to limit them and comparable Soviet weapons. If those issues become entwined with SALT II, the pending treaty will be delayed for many years. And it is highly unlikely that either side would abide voluntarily by the SALT limitations until that time.
Moscow is even now adding 1,000 multiple warheads to its big missiles each year. SALT II limits those missiles to 10 warheads each, instead of the 30 they could carry, and to a total of about 10,000. But those ceilings won't be voluntarily observed forever. At about 14,000 such warheads, Moscow would have tripled the "threat" to America's contemplated mobile MX missile, which is supposed to make our land-based deterrent invulnerable again. America could always build more MX shelters, but the Soviet Union could add still more warheads, faster and cheaper.
A world without SALT may not be the worst of all worlds, but it could come close. The instabilities in an uncontrolled arms race would be even greater than the economic cost of losing the treaty — at least $30 billion over ten years. What better issue for an election year debate, and for a Secretary of State's debut?