March 13, 1979
Page 4825
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I am sure that any comments by me at this point following the clear and lucid analysis of this amendment by the distinguished manager and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and my colleagues, Senators STONE and CRANSTON, is not necessary. However, it seems to me as an opportune time for me to indicate my support for the pending legislation as well as my opposition to this amendment.
On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced that effective January 1, 1979, the United States would recognize the People's Republic of China. At the same time he asserted that the American people and Taiwan "would maintain commercial, cultural and other relations without official basis."
Since President Nixon signed the Shanghai Communique in 1972, a U.S. policy goal has been to work toward normalization of ties with mainland China. This was difficult to achieve due to our recognition of a strong alliance with the Republic of China. Both Taiwan and mainland China take the position that there is only one China, but that each considers itself the sole legitimate government of the Chinese people.
Recent U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate Government of China now precludes our Government from dealing with Taiwan on an official basis.
The legislation before us assures the continuation of full commercial, cultural, and other relations between the United States and the people of Taiwan, on an unofficial basis. U.S. relations and interests with Taiwan will be handled by the American Institute of Taiwan, a private organization funded by the U.S. Government, established expressly for this purpose. The institute will be the channel through which most U.S. agencies and departments will carry out programs, transactions, and other relations with Taiwan. The institute will conduct its business with Taiwan through a similar private institution established by the people of Taiwan which will represent their interests.
Mr. President, let me emphasize that this legislation is independent of the President's decision to recognize the People's Republic of China. This legislation cannot affect that decision and no amendments to it or rhetoric about it can change that fact.
This legislation is important to Taiwan. It is important to American interests in Taiwan. It is the only vehicle available to legally assure a continuing commercial, social, and military relationship with Taiwan.
I know that some of my colleagues who disagree with the recognition of the PRC are frustrated by the fact that there is no legislative vehicle available to overturn the President's decision to culminate the policy initiated by President Nixon to normalize relations with China. I know, too, that some of my colleagues would like to amend this legislation so as to create a political issue — though obviously not a partisan issue.
But, Mr. President, the fact is that this effort and this amendment smacks of biting off one's nose to spite one's face. Taiwan needs this bill. America's interests in Taiwan need this bill.
Conversely, I suggest the People's Republic of China might be pleased to see this bill die.
This amendment would have as its sole effect the denial of all of the benefits which S. 245 would confer upon the people of Taiwan. The entire thrust of this bill is the protection of the relationship with the United States and the people on Taiwan, their eligibility for programs and relationships, the standing of Taiwan's authorities and people in the U.S. courts, the applicability of Taiwan's laws in U.S. courts, the continuation in force of treaties and agreements with Taiwan, the protection of Taiwan's assets, the security amendment, and so on.
The administration has not made the continued relationship with the United States and the people on Taiwan contingent upon the PRC's conduct.
For Congress to do so would be completely inconsistent with its desire to protect the people on Taiwan.
We may wish the Chinese would issue a statement formally renouncing the use of force. There is no reason to believe they will do so.
To make our continued relationship with the people on Taiwan contingent upon the PRC taking an action that clearly it has no intention of taking will simply punish the people on Taiwan.
I would hope that each of my colleagues would bear this in mind as they consider amendments to and final passage of this legislation. With this in mind, Mr. President, I would like to address the bill in specific terms.
For purposes of U.S. domestic law, this legislation views Taiwan as a country, absent the official sovereign status. It extends to those representing Taiwan interests, all privileges and immunities necessary in conducting business with our country. Thus Taiwan will continue to be eligible under such statutes as the Arms Export Act, the Export-Import Bank Act, and the Atomic Energy Act. All existing international agreements, with the exception of the Mutual DefenseTreaty, made between the United States and the People's Republic of China will continue in force notwithstanding the changed status of Taiwan.
This legislation also details the close relations between the American Institute of Taiwan and the U.S. Government.The Institute is authorized to enter into new agreements as necessary. Such agreements will continue to be subject to congressional approval and consultation, pursuant to U.S. law.
The basic structure of the bill as submitted by the administration remains intact. However, the committee has clarified and specified some of the provisions to guard against legal loopholes or questionable application of U.S. domestic laws which would have the effect of undermining American-Taiwan relations.
TAIWAN AND THE SECURITY QUESTION
One of the most discussed issues of the bill has been the nature of our defense ties with Taiwan. The committee decided to add a section to S. 245 under which the United States would continue providing defensive arms to Taiwan and would assist the people of Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, whether through the provision of arms or other means. This section also directs the President to immediately inform Congress of any threat to Taiwan's
security or to U.S. interests related to Taiwan. Any U.S. reaction to such threats would be carried out within the confines of U.S. law and constitutional processes. These confines include the provisions of the war powers resolution which insures congressional consultation by the President before any U.S. Armed Forces are committed to hostilities. U.S. law and constitutional procedures precludes any absolute security guarantee for Taiwan or any country.
IMPACT OF U.S.-PRC NORMALIZATION ON TAIWAN AND THE ASIA REGION
Normalization of relations between theUnited States and the People's Republic of China provides for a more cooperative relationship between our Government and their Government and enhances the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. The Mutual Defense Treaty which will be terminated in January 1980 has not and cannot in itself guarantee a peaceful future for Taiwan. This in no way diminishes our continued concern for the welfare of Taiwan. We have made it very clear to the People's Republic of China that our relations with them rests on the expectation that the Taiwan question be peacefully resolved.
During my trip to the People's Republic of China in the latter part of November 1978, the Chinese made clear to the congressional delegation their commitment to the "four moderizations," China's plan for large scale economic development. They frankly stated that China's access to U.S. credit, agricultural commodities, and technology is a key to their country's development priorities. Furthermore the People's Republic of China seems far more preoccupied with Soviet influence in many parts of the world than with a forced takeover of Taiwan. Their trade interests with the United States coupled with their concern over Soviet expansionism are incentives for the People's Republic of China to seek a peaceful coexistence with the people of Taiwan.
Likewise U.S. normalization of ties with the People's Republic of China reduces the likelihood of a confrontation between China and the United States in the Asia region. This is especially significant for our Asia allies. Our coinciding interests in the Soviet role in Asia will also diminish possibilities of China precipitating political and economic upheaval in the region.
This bill is vital to our future relations with Taiwan, as it lays the groundwork upon which commercial, cultural, and other relations between our country and Taiwan will continue on an official basis.There is no reason to believe that this new basis will hamper our bilateral relations.
On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that our relations will flourish and expand. Under a similar arrangement between Taiwan and Japan, established a few years ago, trade between them has actually increased.
I am sure my colleagues here share the same deep concern that the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committeefelt during their deliberations on S. 245: That the United States will not abandon Taiwan. With this concern very much in mind, the committee held extensive hearings on this bill, carefully considering wide ranging views including those of the State Department, legal experts, business interests, congressional members, and defense experts. At the same time the committee was careful to avoid including language in the bill which would risk undermining or disrupting relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. Such provisions would not safeguard Taiwan's future or our relations with them. Rather such provisions could only jeopardize Taiwan's future. I appeal to my colleagues to not be misled by amendments that may seem to strengthen our ties with Taiwan, but which actually undermine them and thus place in jeopardy the entire purpose of this bill.
Quite simply if this legislation is not passed, our relations with Taiwan go down the drain. We should waste little time in passing S. 245.
There are risks involved in this new policy toward the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, but I believe that this new policy is of such mutual interest to the People's Republic of China and to the United States and other countries whose future is of concern to us in the Western Pacific that the end result will be stabilization of the situation in the Western Pacific. Such a stabilization will work to achieve what this amendment seeks to achieve explicitly, but which it cannot, given the realities, achieve today on the Senate floor.
For that reason, Mr. President, I support the position taken by Senator CHURCH and others of my colleagues in opposing this amendment and supporting the pending legislation.
May I say I particularly appreciated the observations of my good friend from Florida (Mr. STONE) with whom I had the privilege of visiting and touring through the People's Republic of China last November.
We returned just 3 weeks before the President's historic decision, and I think, at least so far as I am concerned, that I am assured the Chinese at this point view it as in their interest to begin and continue an open relationship with the West. and that that objective would be inconsistent with the use of force directed toward Taiwan.
In the pending legislation, as Senator STONE has so articulately said, we have made it eminently clear to the People's Republic of China that we would regard it as against our interest for them to use force against the people of Taiwan. So I am delighted to have followed, and am prepared to follow, Senator STONE'S comments on the pending amendment here this morning.