June 14, 1979
Page 14846
SALT II: WILL THE UNITED STATES BE BETTER OFF WITH OR WITHOUT A TREATY?
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, whether we like it or not, America belongs to the world. We must have the oil of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Much of the world must have our food and our technology.
We are called a "superpower," and the term is appropriate. The free world looks to us for economic leadership and for global security.
Inescapably, we are a key part of an interdependent global society.
Our global interdependence extends well and dangerously beyond the questions of energy supply and economic stability. All of us depend on the willingness of each country to maintain military restraint. And nowhere is this more true than in the case of the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.
On my recent trip to Portugal, Spain, NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Poland, and West Germany, every leader was concerned with three issues: Energy, the strength of the United States' economy, and SALT II. It is the last issue which I would like to explore today. I believe that the process which generated this treaty and which may lead to future arms control agreements is as important as any activity in which this country is involved.
Shortly, the President and Soviet leader Brezhnev will sign a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty — SALT II. This treaty and the process which led to it has been the subject of national debate since Lyndon Johnson initiated the SALT process in 1967.
It is a debate of immense importance — nationally and internationally. Its ultimate resolution will affect the lives of every American and of every person in the world.
And it is an immensely complicated debate — there are no black and white differences — no right or wrong answers. Instead there are uncertainties and questions. Ultimately, it will involve difficult balancing judgments dealing with such serious questions as these:
Will the agreement reduce or alter the likelihood of nuclear war;
Will the treaty accelerate or slow down the arms race;
How large the budgetary costs of our strategic forces will be with the agreement, compared to the costs without;
Will the agreement increase or reduce political tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union;
Will the agreement increase or decrease the stability of Europe, both NATO and Warsaw pact countries;
Will the agreement be effectively enforced-verified; and
Will the agreement, in fact, enhance the security of the United States.
Each of these questions, as well as highly technical questions involving a comparison of our respective nuclear weapons systems must be carefully weighed by each Senator before he votes.
When the final text of the treaty is available I hope the people who have developed it can make the case for ratification. The President, Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, and the arms control negotiators have begun that effort. But they have a great deal yet to do. A great majority of the Senate is still undecided.
The question of verification of Soviet compliance is still very much open to debate.
As importantly, many Americans may doubt the validity of an arms control treaty that appears to accelerate arms investments.
I suspect some people in the Soviet Union are asking similar questions. A recent article by a former Nixon-Ford administration official in the Los Angeles Times analyzed SALT II from the perspective of Russians who are concerned about Soviet security.
The following is a typical excerpt:
To the Russians, SALT II is a treaty of prohibition. They must reduce bombers and missile launchers by 250. They cannot deploy their already tested mobile missile, the SS-16. They must count all SS-18s as missiles with multiple warheads, even though some don't have multiple warheads. They must stop their current program of deploying additional missiles with multiple warheads by about 1982. They must not deploy any additional heavy missiles. They may deploy only one landbased missile, even though they may have several on the drawing boards of their four competing design bureaus. They may not increase the number of warheads on existing missiles, even though they are capable of carrying more. SALT II restricts the Russians.
Here is another excerpt:
SALT II equates Russia's strategic nuclear force and America's strategic nuclear force. Yet Russia is threatened by three other potentially hostile nuclear weapons states — Britain, France and China — while America is not now threatened by any other nuclear weapons state. The nuclear capabilities of Britain, France or China are formidable. For instance, just one of the four British Polaris submarines could destroy 20% of Russia's industry and kill 10 to 15 million of its people.
Like the Soviets, we have our hardliners. They find equally critical reasonsto challenge the agreement. They, too, are preoccupied with the question of security.
It is their judgment that this treaty creates a significant imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union, which could make us vulnerable to nuclear blackmail.
Second, they argue that the Soviet Union covertly benefited from SALT I and thus gained a significant strategic arms advantage. They say that SALT II freezes America into a position of inequality.
Third, because of the Soviet Union's active efforts to destabilize the politics of such countries as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, the Yemen, and Angola, they argue that ratification should be linked to Soviet expansionism.
Fourth, they argue that the Soviet Union simply cannot be trusted. They are building up their military with real spending increases of 4 to 5 percent per year, and will continue to do so. And there is no reason to believe they will not break out of the agreement and deploy nuclear weapons.
Finally they argue that the agreement will make our ICBM's increasingly vulnerable to attack; thus, we stand to lose our best weapon system.
Of course, there is much more detail to these allegations. But you can perceive the breadth and the emotion of the debate from the perspective of American hawks and Russian hawks.
Who, then, supports the treaty? The President, two former Presidents; the leaders of Western and Eastern Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, and an overwhelming majority of the American public. They believe the agreement will reduce the likelihood of nuclear holocaust.
They advance a number of argumentsfor the treaty, including, most importantly, the need to continue the process of arms control which will lead to a SALT III and IV and to other efforts such as mutual and balanced force reductions and the comprehensive test ban treaty.
They point out that the agreement will:
Place limits on all types of strategic delivery vehicles, bombers, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles.
Increase the confidence level on both sides by clearly defining the capability of both sides.
Reverse the arms race and call for reductions from existing force levels. The Soviet Union will have to destroy about 250 of its strategic weapons.
Put an overall ceiling on the total number of warheads each side can have. This will put finite limits on the size of the threat to our land based missiles in the Midwest. And it is warheads, as Henry Kissinger often reminded us, that kill.
Put restraints not only on the numbers but the qualitative arms race as well. Each side is limited to testing and deploying only one new type of ICBM, for instance.
Be sufficiently verifiable by using satellite photographs and other methods to insure that no signification violation of the treaty is possible.
Establish many new procedures to assist verification and remove uncertainties as to the strategic threat facing each nation.
Hold down the deployment of Soviet strategic forces well below that which they could deploy by 1985 absent an agreement.
Not affect our forward based systems in Europe.
Reduce uncertainty in strategic planning. Allow the United States flexibility to continue current strategic programs and avoid the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars otherwise required without certainty and flexibility.
I have raised the major arguments presented by opponents and proponents. I believe the majority of U.S. Senators support the arms control process as I do, but will not become finally committed to this treaty unless and until very basic questions are answered.
The most basic question is this: Will the United States be better off with or without this agreement?
Will we be more or less secure?
Will our arms costs be greater or less? And what will the Soviet Union do if there is no treaty?
However most Senators resolve the basic question — there remain political problems involved in any ratification attempt. Few Senators — though there are now more than in my memory want to be identified as opposed to arms control.
But some Senators intend to so change the treaty that either it will lose support in the Senate or become unacceptable to the Soviets. They intend to do this in such a way that they are not held politically responsible for the consequences of a SALT breakdown. This is a dangerous course.
The Senate cannot constitutionally negotiate a treaty, though it can and should be consulted as the process evolves. It can and should try to affect the outcome of the negotiating process. It can and should express reservations and interpretations about the final document.
But to substantially amend that document — to alter the text — so as to say they are in favor of arms control — when in fact they intend to kill it is politically irresponsible. Each Senator must resolve whether or not the treaty is, on balance, an acceptable accord in the best military, political, and economic interests of the United States.
And each of us, having participated in the debate — having established whatever interpretations on which we and the negotiators can agree—should vote for or against that treaty.
To do otherwise is to so politicize our foreign policy as to make our negotiators sterile — is to convince both our allies and our adversaries that our bargainers have no credibility.
We can reject this treaty. And if it is against our national interests in the minds of one-third plus one Senator, we will. We can approve this treaty, if in the minds of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate, it is better to have SALT II than not to have it. In that case we should.
But to cripple the treaty solely to avoid voting against arms control is to cripple the process. That is against the best interests of the United States, and likely to take us down the road of unlimited arms construction.
The debate over SALT II may be one of the most momentous debates of our time. All sides agree the outcome will affect the course of history.
The world spends hundreds of billions of dollars each year on arms. They are an escalating threat to peace. Moreover, such expenditures dilute the world's ability to feed the hungry, to meet the needs of the world's poor — in short to eliminate the inequities and tensions which lead to war.
That age-old dilemma has been ours to face since the beginning of time.
The SALT process may be a chance to change direction. Whether or not it meets this test is the question which we must resolve.