December 4, 1979
Page 34430
(During Mr. MUSKIE's remarks the following occurred: )
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MORGAN) . The time of the Senator from Maine has expired.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, do I have an order at this time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator does have an order for a period of time not to exceed 15 minutes.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield my time to the distinguished Senator from Maine.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MUSKIE. I thank the distinguished majority leader for his courtesy.
SALT II
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, SALT II, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union, has been reported to the Senate by the Committee on Foreign Relations. I voted to report the treaty. I support its ratification.
President Carter has said that SALT II reduces the danger of nuclear war. But how?
Each side has more than enough nuclear weapons to destroy the other side. Each side is spending many billions of dollars to make its weapons even better, even more accurate, even more deadly.
SALT II will not stop these developments, but it will slow them down. It will make them less costly. More importantly, SALT II attacks a fundamental notion which has propelled the arms race for 35 years — that we will be safe only if our nuclear weapons are superior, greater in number, better in quality, more accurate.
For as long as there have been nuclear weapons, we have been encouraged by our leaders to stay ahead in the arms race. The Russians have committed themselves to catching up. It is a race neither side can win. SALT II proposes that we run the race side by side.
The treaty attempts, for the first time, to make the nuclear arsenals of both of the superpowers roughly equal in size and deadliness.
The treaty allows the United States to build the forces our experts say we need to maintain this equality. The treaty enhances our own ability to monitor what the Soviet Union is doing, and, because it is a step toward more effective control of nuclear weapons in the future, this treaty makes war less likely.
The Soviet Union is building new weapons at a rapid rate. SALT II will slow them down, cutting by one-third the number of missile launchers and bombers they could have produced by 1985 had they continued to build at the present rate.
The number of warheads and the size of missiles will be limited. The Soviet Union will have to destroy or dismantle some 250 nuclear weapons.
The United States will not be forced to reduce its arsenal. But the other limits will apply to us, as well, they will not, however, block, or even limit, any of the weapons we now plan to build. With or without the treaty, we must modernize and strengthen our own strategic forces. But SALT II makes that task easier and less expensive.
For example, if SALT is not ratified, we would certainly be forced to spend billions more in making our weapons safe from the destructive force of their weapons. They would respond with new weapons and so on down the same road we have followed in the past.
We can build the MX — a missile we can move regularly so the Soviets will never be certain of its location. Our missiles will thus be safer from attack.
SALT I imposes no limits on our armies and allows us to continue our efforts to build up and modernize NATO forces.
Some months ago, as the Senate began to consider this treaty, I asked a series of questions about SALT. I said the answers would determine my vote.
All those questions aimed at one basic issue: Will SALT II enhance the security of the United States? My conclusion, after long hours of careful study, is yes, the treaty will enhance U.S. security in a number of important ways.
First, the treaty imposes equal limits on the total number of bombers and missile launchers for both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Second, each side is limited to one new type of missile. Any technological modifications of more than 5 percent in the major characteristics of any existing missile are prohibited.
Third, the treaty prohibits deliberate interference with the steps we take to verify Soviet compliance. It prohibits concealment measures so we can be more certain of what the Soviets are doing than we would be otherwise. The same restraints apply to us.
Fourth, the Soviets have given up their option to develop the SS-16, a large new mobile missile so advanced that our experts say its production would have forced a new round of improvements on us.
Fifth, the United States will be free to move ahead on its strategic modernization programs to increase the survivability of our land-based and sea-based missiles. We are free to continue cruise missile development and upgrading of our bomber forces.
Sixth, by limiting the number of missiles and warheads, SALT II allows both the United States and the Soviet Union a degree of certainty about the destructive ability of each arsenal. For the United States, this means we can protect our own new weapons, like the MX missile, more easily.
SALT II, Mr. President, is a more modest step than we would like it to be in the direction of arms reduction. But it is a solid step. Why, then, is there opposition?
One fundamental reason goes back to the concept of essential equivalence. By accepting SALT II, both the United States and the Soviet Union accept the idea of a rough balance in strategic nuclear forces.
By essential equivalence, I mean that each country will continue to have the means to destroy the other, even after a major surprise attack. This retaliatory ability will mean that there is no advantage in a surprise attack. And that, in turn, means a more stable world.
Many Americans and the current leaders of the Soviet Union accept this idea. Others on both sides do not. There are those in both countries who believe strategic equality is unacceptable.
There are those in the Soviet Union who believe that only through unquestioned nuclear superiority can the Soviet cause be advanced throughout the world. And, there are those in the United States who believe that only with unlimited nuclear superiority can we check adventurism. There and here, those people are wrong:
First. Superiority in nuclear forces is not useful in managing the activities of either country. As long as each side can certainly retaliate with enough force to inflict unacceptable damage on the other side, the price of nuclear war will remain too high. Superiority becomes meaningless.
Second. The plain fact is the United States does not have any meaningful superiority today and is not likely to achieve superiority in the future even if this treaty is rejected. The Soviet Union is in most respects now equal in strategic force to the United States and without this treaty will continue to build at whatever rate is necessary to maintain or improve its position.
Third. The price of rejecting SALT II and attempting to achieve some form of superiority is unacceptable, both in terms of proper use of our Nation's resources and in terms of the instability it would create among the nations of the world.
And rejection would mean a new arms race, with its enormous costs and greater security risks. As a world leader, most of us know we must not lead the march to worldwide destabilization.
Mr. President, a number of less global issues have been identified in the debate, and have sometimes clouded the debate.
The first is that the treaty is unequal and favors the Soviets. This is simply wrong. The treaty establishes equal levels of strategic forces for both sides. While the Soviets do lead in some measures, we lead in others. Our major advantages are in our submarines and bombers that constitute about 75 percent of our force, and in the new cruise missile. Our submarines are far better than Soviet submarines. They are invulnerable to attack. Our bombers are less vulnerable to attack than missiles based on land. They will carry the cruise missiles. The cruise missiles are small, deadly, and hard to destroy.
The major Soviet advantage is in land-based missiles which constitute about 75 percent of their force. They are vulnerable. So are ours. I certainly would not be willing to trade our submarines and bombers for their land-based missiles.
The second argument is that we were out-negotiated by the Soviets. Let us examine that allegation.
The United States gave up the idea of nuclear superiority — which I have already described as unacceptable — but retained the right to continue all of its weapon development programs.
We accepted limits on our force levels, but we are under the limit now. We will not have to give up any existing forces. We can replace our old weapons with new ones according to our current production schedule.
What about the Soviets?
They accepted our cruise missiles even though they regard the cruise missile as an important and dangerous new weapon.
They agreed to prohibit any testing, production or deployment of their long-range intercontinental mobile missile, since we insisted this weapon could not be distinguished from their intermediate-range mobile missile.
They conceded to the development of our MX missile.
They agreed to equal force limits, even though it meant the elimination of some existing forces and even though they still have to cope with Chinese, British and French strategic forces.
They agreed to leave out of the treaty the nuclear forces we have stationed in Europe, even though many could reach the Soviet Union.
By any measure, the Soviet concessions were significant.
We are also told that the treaty should be rejected because it did not require elimination of Soviet "heavy missiles" — it did not limit the Backfire bomber — and it could not be verified.
I call the heavy missile the "small is beautiful" argument. The heavy missile is large. And it is heavy. It is also no more a threat to the United States than smaller Soviet missiles that can deliver the same number of warheads.
As a matter of fact, the heavy missiles have the disadvantage of concentrating their power in a small number of missiles that are vulnerable to U.S. attack. Moreover, because we never planned to build heavy missiles in the first place, we agreed not to build them as a part of SALT II.
At the same time, so long as the number of warheads on each missile is restricted by the SALT II treaty, our M-X is as devastating as the Soviet heavy missiles.
The Backfire bomber is essentially a tactical aircraft, like many of our own bombers. It is designed to be used in a war in Europe or China or for coastal defense. It could get here, but the trip would take a minimum of 10 to 12 hours and the Soviets would be unlikely to use it in this role.
We have similar bombers based in Europe and the Far East, as well as in the United States. If we insist on controls on the Backfire bomber, it is virtually certain the Soviets would insist on controls on our theater weapons.
I am convinced that it would be a serious mistake to risk the progress of SALT II for this issue.
Verification is a particularly difficult question. Put another way, the question is: "How positive can we be that the Soviets are not cheating?" I am satisfied that our resources are adequate to detect any significant cheating. Moreover, I am certain that, absent a treaty, we would be less able to monitor the Soviets. And even if we knew every step they took, the information would be worthless, since we would be facing unlimited escalation and greatly increased risk of nuclear war.
Beyond these questions regarding the treaty itself, broader "linkage" issues have been raised. One is that the treaty should be rejected because of the Soviet Union's activities in other parts of the world.
I believe it would be a serious mistake to link ratification to Soviet behavior. The treaty is in the interests of both countries and we should not abandon those interests because we disagree in other areas.
The list of people who have argued against this kind of linkage is a distinguished one. It includes the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Secretaries of State and Defense; Henry Kissinger; two former U.S. Ambassadors to Moscow; official NATO representatives; and numerous Soviet experts.
We and the Soviets will pursue our respective national interests as we perceive them — with or without SALT II. That pursuit will find us in competition with each other for influence, for resources, for trade, for strength and all the other goals which nations seek. We cannot resolve them all in this one treaty.
Moreover, that competition can develop sharp edges, which could raise the risk of confrontation and conflict. Is it not better to face such possibilities by rationalizing the arms race and limiting its dangers?
SALT II can reduce the level of risks. Its rejection could raise it. The other linkage argument is that SALT ratification should be linked to significant increases in defense spending.
The proponents of this position believe we have fallen behind the Soviets in both nuclear and conventional forces, and they argue that we must make a firm commitment to a 5-percent annual rate of real growth in defense spending before the treaty is ratified.
I believe it is a mistake to link desired defense spending levels to treaty ratification. I have shown how rejection of the treaty could lead both to instability and to defense spending that would not otherwise be necessary. Given these facts, I do not see the logic in simultaneously being for increased security and against the treaty.
I cannot believe that people dedicated to the defense of our country could oppose the treaty because they are dissatisfied with our level of defense spending. If they are so concerned about our security, they could improve our security by supporting the treaty and still pursue increases in defense spending.
I believe that the case for ratification of the SALT II treaty is solid. The treaty does reduce the chance of war. It does improve our national security. It certainly means that we will have to spend less on strategic nuclear forces than if there were no treaty.
Finally, and in the long run, ratification will preserve the SALT process. This process, this dialogue between the leaders of the two countries, is more important than any single treaty.
On this basis, I intend to vote to ratify the treaty.
With SALT I we began to talk to the Soviet Union. With SALT II we have defined equality with an adversary and together have rejected nuclear superiority.
So we have not reduced the arms race. But we have a process that can move us in that direction, if we can keep that process alive. The superpowers are talking to each other — and SALT is our chief line of communication.
Real arms reduction remains our hope and our goal, whether in a SALT III, or SALT IV, or even later. It will be possible only if we continue to talk — and only if we recognize some realities:
We must accept the Soviet Union as a neighbor on this planet whatever its political philosophy — a neighbor with rights, hopes and fears. And we must acknowledge that our journey toward real arms reduction is a journey of many steps. SALT II is just one of them. Neither reality compromises legitimate American interests.
If we accept these realities We can, in the decades ahead, slow down, stop and reverse the arms race.
Mr. President. on November 9, 1979, I voted in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to report the SALT II treaty to the Senate. I ask unanimous consent that the remarks which I made at that time be printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
SENATOR MUSKIE
It is clear that this is not the end of the debate. It is not even the beginning of the end. I am not sure that it is the end of the beginning.
But, in any case, because I, for reasons all members of the committee understand, have not been as fully in attendance as other members, I am reluctant to spend as much time characterizing my views.
However, I have followed the work of the committee closely, as closely as one can without always being present. I think I have gotten the flavor of the debate and so I do have a position.
Senator Helms outlined in some detail the magnitude of the destructive power which the Soviet Union "enjoys," if that is the word. The point is that we also have the power to destroy the Soviet Union several times over. This, of course, is the reason why arms control and arms limitations are so important.
It is not a one-sided capacity to destroy civilization that exists. It is a two-sided capacity.
There are two strong points of view with respect to this treaty. Lest it be misunderstood, each point of view, if it prevails, would bear a heavy responsibility for the consequences of prevailing.
Those who oppose the treaty, if they prevail and if the result is a destruction of the SALT process, if the result is not renegotiation but an end to negotiation and an end to the prospect for a treaty, would bear a heavy responsibility for those consequences.
Those who support the treaty, if the treaty is ratified, if it prevails, if it leads to the kind of Soviet superiority which the opponents have described as the basis for their concern and opposition, if the result of that is U.S. vulnerability in terms of our survival as a society, a democratic society, and our interests around the world, then they would bear a heavy responsibility.
So, it is no easy vote. To oppose the treaty and prevail is a heavy responsibility; to support the treaty and prevail is a heavy responsibility.
Senator Sarbanes has suggested that the responsibility of negotiating the treaty is a complicated one. We have asymmetrical societies. We find ourselves, the Soviet Union and the United States, in asymmetrical geopolitical situations. We have asymmetrical defense needs, and so, understandably, we have asymmetrical defense systems.
I could suggest that the only way, really, to achieve equality of arms is, first, to negotiate absolute symmetry of arms, an absolute symmetry with respect to these other imperatives, which drive us both. But this, obviously, is impossible.
So, it is not difficult to identify a particular provision of the treaty and say, as to that provision, that the treaty is unequal with respect to the United States and the Soviet Union. One must look at the totality and make a judgment. Those judgments are not easy.
The second point I would like to make is that as I have followed the debate of the committee — and I compliment my colleagues on the quality of that debate and the thoughtfulness and the effectiveness — there are many useful proposals that might well have been included in the treaty. There is no question about that. I cannot conceive of a treaty being negotiated, even if the negotiation were conducted by the opponents of this treaty, which would produce a treaty immune to useful suggestions for improvement. I simply cannot conceive of it. I have been in the legislative process too long to believe that any group of my colleagues is capable of producing a significant, policy-making document, whether it is legislative or a treaty, that would be immune to improvement.
We concluded one last night which was approved by the Senate by an overwhelming vote. I find many flaws in it. There are many things that I would change if I could write it myself.
The fact is, of course, that a treaty of this kind involves tradeoffs. It cannot be otherwise. We cannot expect to produce a treaty totally in our favor, totally negative with respect to the Soviet Union. Surely the Soviets could not expect the reverse.
And so, we are confronted with this question: Is it conceivable that a better set of tradeoffs from our point of view could be negotiated? Considering the nature of this treaty as a step in a process aimed at further reduction, a goal which Senator Helms expressed so eloquently, perhaps the first meaningful reduction in arms, is there a better set of tradeoffs which conceivably could be negotiated if we reject this treaty?
The opponents of this treaty have offered a long list of points, each of which they insist should be a part of the treaty.
Now one looks at the cumulative total of those points which they regard as essential to a treaty, the cumulative total. Really, what is the prospect that one could defeat this treaty, go back to the Soviets, and say we must have not just one of these points, but all of them, included in a new treaty or we will not ratify it?
All of us have been involved in the legislative process. What is the credibility of an argument that we could renegotiate the treaty and get everything that the opponents of this treaty have insisted are essential? They have indicated no willingness to trade off the points that they have advanced, one for another. They have insisted on all of them. Unless we get all of them, they say,we have been out-traded and our national security interest and our survival are in jeopardy.
I just do not see that as a viable alternative. If this is the case, then it seems to me that we must look at what we have, acknowledging its shortcomings — and each of us may have a different set of them — but we must look at the overall package.
At this point I would like to associate myself with the excellent statement of my colleague, Senator Sarbanes, who covered points that I would cover if I felt disposed to take more time.
So, Mr. Chairman, I am going to vote for this treaty because I think the threat to mankind that is posed by the explosive power so eloquently described by Senator Helms, which both sides possess, is such that we must take a step now. It may not be the best time, it may not be the best step, but I prefer it to no step at all. I simply believe that whether or not ultimately a new treaty might be negotiated, a new treaty would not develop in time to prevent another escalation in the arms race that would find us at a higher level, a more complicated level, a more difficult level to develop tradeoffs than the level at which we find ourselves now. I simply do not think we can afford to waste that time.
This does not mean that we should vote for a bad treaty. I will certainly credit my colleagues who oppose the treaty with the highest motivation. They are going to vote against it because they believe it is not in our country's interest. But I happen to believe, with its shortcomings, it is a step we must take at this time.
RESPONSE TO PRESS REPORTS
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, recent reports in the press indicate that Members of this body believe the treaty should not be ratified "because it does not provide for equality between the United States and the Soviet Union." Supporters of this view have three principal arguments. Let me address each of these arguments in turn.
According to these arguments, the first reason for opposing the treaty is that the treaty "confers on the Soviet Union the right to deploy modern, large ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, a right denied to the United States."
This is a restatement of the hackneyed argument that the United States should be allowed to build a heavy ICBM even though it has no desire to do so. There are three principal reasons why this argument is inadequate as a basis for rejecting the treaty:
First, as I just said, the United States has no desire to build a heavy missile. Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who seldom miss an opportunity to buy a new weapon, have rejected this one. They rejected it because we can obtain the same capability from a smaller missile — the MX. Indeed, the MX will be equal in capability to the Soviet heavy missile so long as the Soviet heavy missile is constrained as it is by the treaty to no more than 10 warheads. In addition, the MX will be considerably more survivable than the Soviet missile, because it is mobile.
Second, the Soviet heavy missile, particularly when it is constrained by the treaty to no more than 10 warheads, provides the Soviets no unique capability. The Soviet threat to our land-based missiles is as great from other types of Soviet missiles. In other words, a Soviet heavy missile is not necessary to threaten our existing land-based missiles. All Soviet land-based missiles threaten our land-based missiles. What is important is that the treaty limits total Soviet land-based missiles and the warheads on those missiles.
Third, a revision of the treaty to allow the United States to build a heavy missile would be a serious mistake. This is so because the Soviets would demand some concession from the United States in return for permission to build a heavy missile. Since we have no intention of ever building a heavy missile, we would be giving something for nothing. Certainly U.S. stature in the international community would suffer if we were to make any meaningful concession to the Soviets in return for permission to build a missile we have no intention of building.
The second argument made by treaty opponents is that the treaty should be rejected "because it permits the continued deployment outside the treaty ceiling of a Soviet bomber, the Backfire, that has the capability to operate over intercontinental distances against targets in the United States.)
I believe omission of the Backfire bomber from the treaty was appropriate for two reasons:
First, as Gen. Russell Daugherty, former Commander of the Strategic Air Command, made clear in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, the Backfire bomber is essentially a tactical aircraft. It is oriented toward NATO and China and toward anti-ship operations. Although it has a minor strategic capability, the Soviets would be unlikely to use it in this role.
In other words, the former Commander of the Strategic Air Command, the man who was directly responsible for maintaining our land-based missiles and our bomber forces, does not believe the Backfire bomber is a threat worth worrying about.
Second, the omission of this aircraft from the SALT treaty was a trade for Soviet concessions such as the elimination of the SS-16 mobile ICBM, the agreement to leave forward-based nuclear systems out of the treaty, the acceptance of U.S. cruise missiles, and the acceptance of equal force limits. The importance of each of these concessions far outweighs the importance of the Backfire issue in reducing the total threat to the United States and in protecting U.S. interests.
Because of the limited threat from the Backfire and because of the other Soviet concessions that justify its omission from the treaty, I see no reason to reject the treaty on this basis.
The third argument made by treaty opponents is that the treaty should be rejected "because it permits the Soviets to deploy more warheads on their strategic missiles than we are permitted to deploy on ours."
This is an interesting argument and, among the three, is the only one I have never seen before, notwithstanding the long months of hearings and markup in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Perhaps the reason I have not seen it before is that it is so mistaken. As stated on its face, the argument is clearly wrong.
Because the treaty provides equal limits on the number of missiles and the number of warheads per missile, the treaty limits both sides to the same maximum number of warheads. At the present time, however, neither side has reached its maximum and the United States has considerably more warheads than the Soviet Union. We will continue to have an advantage in the total number of warheads throughout the life of the treaty.
The only advantage the Soviets have is in the number of land-based warheads. The Soviets have this advantage because they have placed 75 percent of their capability into their land-based missiles. We, on the other hand, have only placed about 25 percent of our capability into land-based missiles. The other 75 percent of our capability is in our submarines and bombers.
The only advantage that this imbalance conveys to the Soviets is a greater capability to kill land-based missiles and other hardened targets. This advantage might be important if we, like the Soviets, had placed the bulk of our capability in vulnerable, land-based missiles. Since the bulk of our capability is in our submarine and bomber force, this is not a reason to reject the treaty.
Indeed, even if you believe that this is an important imbalance, it is no reason to reject the treaty because the imbalance could very likely be worse without the treaty than with it.
That concludes my statement, Mr. President
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator yield?
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield to the distinguished majority leader.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I rise to compliment the distinguished Senator from Maine on the thorough, cogent, persuasive speech that he has just made in support of the SALT II treaty. I think that he has very carefully analyzed and addressed the arguments in opposition to the treaty in a very forceful way.
I would like, if time permitted, to comment on several of the points that he made, but time does not permit that. I do however, want to mention one or two of the points.
He indicated that to reject the treaty would be to "lead the march toward destabilization." I think that is an accurate quote. I wish to comment on that statement.
Mr. President, this country entered into a nonproliferation treaty some years ago, and I believe that, under article VI of that nonproliferation treaty, this country along with the Soviet Union and the other powers that presently possess nuclear weapons, pledged to take actions to reduce these arsenals. We made that pledge in order to secure pledges of other countries which did not then, and do not now, have that capability. And the assurance was that we would make efforts to reduce our arsenals if they would sign on, with the understanding that they would not even begin to go down that road.
Next June, there is going to be a nonproliferation treaty conference. All of these nations will gather to discuss the progress made under that treaty. If this country in the meantime has rejected the SALT treaty, not only will this be one of the greatest propaganda victories the Soviet Union could possibly achieve, but, moreover, the other signatories to the nonproliferation treaty in June are going to be able to point the finger at us and say: What a poor example of living up to the nonproliferation treaty. What a poor example. Why should you, Mr. Uncle Sam, expect us to deprive ourselves of this protection — if they choose to use that word — why should you seek to deprive us from going down this road when you yourself have set such a deplorable example?
You rejected the SALT II treaty. You have, therefore, not lived up to article VI of the nonproliferation treaty. You have not lived up to your promise.
What position are we going to find ourselves in when these countries begin to criticize us for our failure to ratify SALT II? Even worse, what position are we going to be in when nuclear weapons begin to proliferate among these smaller countries?
Can we imagine what the situation would be today if Iran had nuclear weapons? How would we like to see nuclear weapons in the hands of. Ayatollah Khomeini and his crowd?
How would we feel about that?
And there may be other situations in the future in which we would all be better off to keep potential conflicts localized, but, if smaller nations acquire such weapons, those potential conflicts which might otherwise be kept localized or regionalized could escalate into nuclear exchanges and could conceivably bring on the final and ultimate nuclear exchange that would end in world holocaust.
I think this is a very important point the Senator made. Approval of the treaty tends to stabilize, rejection of the treaty will destabilize, and it will make more unpredictable and uncertain, to our force planners, what potential they are up against. The treaty, if it is approved, will mean that our force planners will not have to hedge against this possible suspicion or some other, because they will know what the limits are and our force planners will be able to make plans accordingly. There will be greater dependability, predictability, and certainty. So the SALT II treaty will be stabilizing rather than destabilizing.
But what a position our country will be in next June if we reject this treaty, and what a position the world would be in if some of these smaller countries were to get a signal from the U.S. Senate that our Nation is not willing to keep its commitment under the nonproliferation treaty by virtue of rejection, by the Senate, of the SALT treaty.
What a signal to send to the world. The smaller countries, many of them, today have the capability — I understand that 12 or 15 of these lesser countries have the capability — right now to proceed to go the nuclear weapons route were it not for the fact that they are signatories to this treaty, and if they should proceed who knows where they will go.
But I just leave for the RECORD this question: How would we like to see nuclear weapons in the hands of an Ayatollah Khomeini and his band of international outlaws, and where would we be then, and where would we be if other countries in that area of the world develop or procure nuclear weapons? There can be future Irans.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the distinguished majority leader makes a very important point which I will not seek to embellish, but I would like to add another thought to it. The situation in Iran and in other parts of the world is a demonstration of the fact that there are too many areas of the world that are tending toward anarchy not only internally but externally as between nations.
When such a long-held international principle of law as the immunity of diplomats and diplomatic missions can be flouted with impunity by a nation like Iran, what the world needs is a strong impulse toward world law.
If the two superpowers, with the supreme weapons at their disposal, are unable to set an example of countries with often conflicting goals and policies being able to pursue their competition in an expanding regime of international law, particularly with respect to strategic weapons, why should lesser powers, beleaguered by the internal pressures generated by the disadvantaged peoples within their own borders, frustrated by the division of affluence (unequally and unjustly divided amongst world powers and the people of the world) do anything but move toward the edge of confrontation and conflict in pursuit of the aims of their people?
So we have this responsibility as superpowers generally and, as the distinguished majority leader has said, specifically with respect to the mandate of the Nonproliferation Treaty.
In closing, I would also like to add my compliments to the distinguished majority leader for the thoroughness with which he has examined these issues and the strong leadership position he has taken in pursuing ratification of the SALT II treaty. He has my compliments and my heartfelt support.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the distinguished Senator. I thank him for his statements.
RECOGNITION OF SENATOR CRANSTON
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON) is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.
SALT II
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I believe I have 15 minutes. First of all, I yield such time as may be needed to the majority leader.
I would like to say that I think the majority leader made a very important point that, all Senators and all our people should consider. The danger, if we reject SALT, is we set a terrible example for other countries we are trying to persuade to exercise restraint in the development and potential use of nuclear energy for military purposes. The threat to our Nation's security and to the world, and to the people of the world, if people like the ayatollah become possessed of nuclear weapons should be starkly obvious to the American people presently, and that is an issue that is very much at stake in the consideration of SALT at the present time.
I yield to the majority leader such time as he may require.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I had wanted to comment on another point the distinguished Senator from Maine raised, and I will proceed to do that briefly.
The distinguished Senator spoke about linkage, and he touched upon various areas in which linkage has been suggested, for example, the area of Soviet misbehavior and also the area of defense spending.
Mr. President, there is no question but that we should be concerned about Soviet adventurism in any part of the world, but I join with the distinguished Senator — I do not think the SALT treaty is the answer to that. I think we have to judge the treaty on the basis of its merits — I see it as being beneficial to this country — and I do not think that rejecting SALT would change the Soviet behavior except, perhaps, to exacerbate it.
There ought to be some other strategy developed for dealing with Soviet adventurism in other parts of the world, but we should not attempt to make the SALT treaty the hostage.
If we were considering SALT II purely as a favor to the Soviet Union, it would be quite a different matter. Then we could say, "OK, if you are going to proceed to use Cuban troops here and there, and stir up mischief, we will just reject SALT."
If we were doing SALT only as a favor to the Soviets — and many of the arguments I hear leave me to draw the inference that we are — I would subscribe to that view of linkage supposed to be doing the Soviets a favor by adopting the treaty.
On the other hand, as the matter now stands, I suppose the Soviets might adopt the same tactic and say, "OK, Mr. Uncle Sam, you are improving your relations with the People's Republic of China, how about linking that to SALT?"
I do not think linking the treaty with Soviet misbehavior elsewhere is going to change one iota their misbehavior except to exacerbate it if SALT is rejected.
Now, I support increased defense spending. The reason I am so strongly for it is because I have read the hearing transcripts on the treaty, and I am convinced thereby that we need to improve our capabilities in connection with not only strategic central systems, but also conventional weapons, and theater nuclear forces, but entirely aside from increasing defense spending, I think we should proceed with the treaty, and here is where I do link the treaty with defense spending, but in a reverse sort of way.
As the distinguished Senator from Maine pointed out, without the treaty or with the treaty we are going to have to spend more money for national defense, but we will spend more money for national defense without the treaty than with the treaty, because if the treaty is rejected, then the limits are off strategic nuclear delivery systems. The Soviets have the momentum, and we are talking about items that require long lead times. For example, the MX will not begin to be deployed until 1986, and will not be fully operational until 1989 — 10 years from now.
These items, these weapons, require long lead times, so one has to develop a momentum over a period of several years before the weapon proceeds from the design stage to the testing stage to the production stage to the deployment stage. It takes years, and the Soviets already have that momentum going. We do not. They can proceed not to have just 308 SS-18's by 1985, but 500. They have the momentum.
Now, if the treaty is rejected we are going to have to spend a higher percentage of the total defense dollar on strategic central systems which, in turn, means a bleeding away from the conventional forces of the additional funding that we may need with which to deal with just such a situation as we are seeing occur right now in Iran. Nuclear weapons are not a deterrent to situations such as we see in Iran because we are not going to use strategic central systems against Iran. These strategic central systems cannot be used to deal with localized or regionalized dangerous situations, but conventional forces might have to be used.
So there is the linkage as I see it. Reject the treaty and, as a result, spend a higher percentage of the defense dollar on strategic systems in order to try to catch up with the Soviets in the face of the momentum they already have, and bleed away from the conventional forces the money they so direly need, and bleed away from the theater nuclear forces in Europe the money they need.
We need to have essential equivalence with the Soviet Union in the strategic nuclear field, yes. But we must also be able to deal conventionally with localized situations that may arise to threaten our national security interests. If we bleed away defense funds from conventional forces, we are going to be caught like the five foolish virgins — without oil in our lamps when the bridegroom cometh.
There is the true linkage. If we approve the SALT treaty, we have more predictability in strategic systems, in planning, and in funding, and this country will not then have to spend as much of its defense dollar for strategic sensor systems, and can thus allocate more money, a higher percentage of the defense dollar, to conventional forces. These are what we will need to protect our interests here, there, and in other places around the globe, because the Soviets, you can bet, will have the mobility to move their conventional power or to use surrogates.
So I make that link. Approve the treaty, so that we can indeed turn to the conventional forces and improve these capabilities, and at the same time have more of the total budget to spend on needed social programs than we would otherwise have.
Again I thank the distinguished Senator from Maine. I appreciate very much his statement today, and I hope that every Senator will read it. I would even presume to mail it myself to other Senators, but I think he is the Senator who should do that, and I hope he will do it.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I will be glad to do that. I express my appreciation to the distinguished majority leader, not only for his approval of the speech, but for adding to it the remarks which he has just concluded.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I wish to express my admiration for the very fine, thoughtful remarks, based on a great deal of experience, study, and thought, by the distinguished Senator from Maine. He made out a very effective case for ratification of SALT, and cited the grave liability to our country and indeed to the world that would lie in rejection of the treaty.
I would like to address one question to the Senator relating, in part, to the remarks that he made. It relates also to his particular field of expertise as chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, with all the careful thought that the Senator is required to give and does so generously give to our budget, the level of expenditures, and the effect of all that on our economy.
One might point out that while I think it should not be linked to SALT, it is rather obvious that we are going to have an increase in defense spending if SALT is ratified, probably about a 4- or 5-percent increase annually for a while, after inflation. He also made plain that we would have to have a larger increase in defense expenditures as a result of the instability and the hostile situation in relation to the Soviet Union that would probably occur in the wake of Senate rejection of SALT.
I would like to make the point that it is possible, if SALT II is ratified and if we move on to a SALT III with relation to deep cuts, that some of the expenditures that will occur even after SALT II is ratified may ultimately prove to be unnecessary, if we work out in SALT III the deep cuts, on a mutual basis, that would make unnecessary the increase of expenditures that would otherwise occur.
I would like to ask the Senator if he is able to give any dimensions in terms of dollars or percentages to the sort of increase he feels may come about if SALT II is rejected, and what he feels that would do to our efforts to balance our budget, to restrain spending, perhaps to curtail taxes at some point, and finally to halt inflation.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I think the Senator has raised an appropriate question. It is more difficult to frame an answer.
The other day, in connection with the debate on the windfall profit tax, I undertook to present to the Senate an analysis of budget demands in the 1980's. That analysis, unrelated to the windfall
profit tax as such but simply to put it in context of what other demands in the 1980's could be, included the assumption to which the Senator has referred, of an increase in defense spending that was voted by the Senate earlier this year in connection with the first budget resolution. That is 3 percent in 1980, 5 percent in the 2 years following, and thereafter it is speculative as to what the rate would be.
In the hearings before the Budget Committee and also the Armed Services Committee, which the majority leader has indicated he was strongly influenced by, I think the figures used with respect to potential additional spending that would be required if SALT II was rejected would be on the order of $30 to $40 billion. My own view is that that would be conservative, because it seems to me that rejection of this treaty, especially on the wide range of terms that were insisted upon in the Foreign Relations Committee markup by opponents of the treaty, would surely trigger a massive effort on the part of the Soviet Union to take advantage of our failure to ratify the treaty.
The Soviet Union, in the last 10 to 15 years, has demonstrated an enormous capacity to build up its strategic arms. It has been so successful as to achieve rough equivalency today, and, as the majority leader has pointed out, it has enormous momentum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. MUSKIE. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for another minute.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Are there any other special orders, Mr. President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The last special order is to add 15 minutes to the leadership time in behalf of the minority.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am happy to yield a minute to the Senator from Maine.
Mr. MUSKIE. I thank the Senator. So my feeling is that the kind of momentum the Soviets are capable of achieving would involve an arms race in a new dimension, that would make even $30 or $40 billion over a decade look like small potatoes compared with what we would otherwise have to consider.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator very much for his fine response.