November 9, 1979
Page 31882
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, in a moment I would like to yield to the Senator from New Hampshire.
I want to say before I do that I wish everyone in America could have heard the speech from my colleague from Minnesota. He really identified the problem and the solution. I thank him for his participation.
Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining under the time agreement?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 52 minutes and 49 seconds.
Mr. ARMSTRONG. I thank the Chair. I yield to the Senator.
Mr. STENNIS. May I say that I just indicated to the Senator from Maine that he would go next, but since he is not here—
Mr. ARMSTRONG. I am happy to yield some time.
Mr. STENNIS. I would like to yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Maine since I had asked him to come to the floor at this time.
Mr. MUSKIE. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I am not sure, so may I ask the distinguished Senator from Colorado, I have two speeches here, one addressed to his amendment as introduced, and another to his amendment as I am told it may be modified by an amendment to be offered by my colleague from Maine (Mr. COHEN) .
I see no point in making both. Would the Senator be in a position to enlighten me as to which I should address myself to at this moment?
Mr. ARMSTRONG. I am very happy to do that.
Mr. President, the Senator from Maine (Mr. COHEN) intends to offer an amendment which will simply make the pending amendment effective January 1, rather than October 1.
While, of course, each of those who are sponsoring the amendment would be on their own as to how they feel about it, I think it is a reasonable idea and will support it because it will be nearly January 1 by the time this is enacted.
So I think the Budget Committee chairman would be correct in assuming that that is the way it is likely to be resolved, although perhaps the Senator from Hawaii also would like to comment on that.
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator from Colorado intends to accept that amendment?
Mr. ARMSTRONG. I do, for my part, although I have not had an opportunity to discuss it with Senator MATSUNAGA.
Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I do intend to join the Senator from Colorado in accepting the amendment to be offered by the Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. I want to indicate to my colleague from Maine that if this amendment is accepted, it will reduce the cost to the Treasury to $472 million, rather than the $700 million which is currently proposed.
Mr. MUSKIE. I understand the budget implications of the amendment of my colleague from Maine, as well as that of the Senator from Colorado. I will address myself to the Cohen substitute which apparently is acceptable to the Senator from Colorado.
Mr. President, as chairman of the Budget Committee, I constantly find myself in the position where the Congress has adopted budget ceilings, overall budget aggregates, functional aggregates, and then I have to hold the Senate's feet to the fire in protecting those aggregates.
What is involved in this amendment is not just function 050, national defense spending, but the overall aggregates of the budget which the Senate approved just this week and the details of which the House of Representatives approved yesterday.
This is not always a joyous or pleasant responsibility. Even if I liked this amendment and wanted to vote for it, I could not do so and at the same time discharge my responsibilities as chairman of the Budget Committee.
Yesterday, the distinguished Senator from Colorado and I had a brief colloquy. He opposed the conference report on the second budget resolution because he said it projected spending that was too high and a deficit that was too high. He said that if the budget process does not work. he was going to press for a constitutional amendment to limit spending.
The most recent amendment of that kind to which I have been exposed is one which would limit spending to 20 percent of GNP. Under that limit, if it were in place today, this amendment would be out of order — I repeat out of order.
I said to the Senator from Colorado yesterday that it is not budgets that spend money, it is people.
Here we have this very attractive proposal that is sure to attract votes in the Senate, applause out in the military, and applause throughout the country.
It is a non-loser in political terms. I have learned to detect these kinds of non-losers. They are primarily responsible for the high level of Government spending in our budget today.
If this amendment is adopted, there will be another non-loser following on its heels — a proposal to spread this largesse, this 10.4 percent increase, across the board, throughout the Defense Department to all its civilians at the very least: Then a third non-loser would appear and it would spread the largesse across the entire Federal establishment.
If those two things happen, they are going to have just as much sex appeal, just as much attraction, and just as much clout as this one. Whether it is farmers on one occasion, or disaster victims on another occasion, or the recipients of school lunch programs on another occasion, I have learned that I can detect them all — the non-losers for which a case is made that justifies breaking the budget, ignoring spending ceilings, and abandoning discipline.
I know that I probably am on the losing side of this amendment, but setting this example, which could spread throughout the Federal budget, is no service to the people who would benefit from the amendment.
I listened to the sponsors of this amendment, and what was the very heart of their case for it?
Inflation. Inflation. I was temporarily Presiding Officer and listened to both sides. And it was a good vantage point to hear each side. Inflation.
There is a built-in inflation in this budget: First, with military pay; then, with civilian pay in the Defense Department, I have no doubt; and then with Federal pay across the board. That is what I see ahead of us, and I am helpless to stop it.
So, Mr. President, I oppose the Armstrong amendment, as it will be amended by the Cohen amendment, to increase the 1980 pay raise for military personnel from 7 percent to 10.4 percent on January 1, 1980.
This 50 percent increase in the pay raise just granted 40 days ago violates the congressional budget, discriminates unfairly between Defense Department civilian and military personnel performing the same job and will lead through legislative or legal action to an equal pay increase for every civilian employee in the Government.
The actual cost of this amendment will not be the $600 million its authors suggest, even though that would break the budget. The actual cost — counting its inevitable extension to the whole Government — will exceed $1.5 billion per year and could add to the deficit by as much as the $1.5 billion.
Before addressing the specific problems, I want to make my support clear for a realistic, accurately targeted solution to the problem of military compensation and retention.
No doubt, many of these problems in recruiting and retention are dollar problems. All Government employees pay has been at well below the rate of inflation in recent years — all of it. Minimum wage increases have reduced the attractiveness of military pay to junior enlisted personnel. There is no doubt about it. The depreciation of the dollar places a severe strain on our servicemen overseas. There is no doubt about that.
Congress and the President must seek to rectify these and other related real problems, like recruitment scandals and inadequate housing and medical care, if we are to recruit and retain the all-volunteer force and avoid returning to conscription. There is no doubt about it.
These real problems will not be solved by a well-intentioned but simplistic proposal that raises all military pay from seamen and privates to generals and admirals. This problem cannot be solved simply by throwing money at it — a device that often is attributed, on the floor of the Senate, to supporters of social programs.
This amendment is a very expensive but not necessarily an effective way of dealing with the causes that undermine our ability to recruit and retain the people needed to provide a strong defense capability. Instead, we should focus on the specific problems causing our manpower troubles. We do not need to increase generals' and admirals' and other career officers' pay to encourage recruitment and retention of the personnel who are really suffering the hardship this blunderbuss approach addresses. Those at the bottom of the pay scale in the military establishment will get only $15 a month out of this amendment; $15 a month.
Surely, this pay increase, which would come on top of the 7 percent $4.2 billion increase of just 40 days ago, is premature. The Department of Defense has just completed a study of its current manpower problems. That study is now being evaluated by the Secretary of Defense and the military services for submission to Congress. It recommends selective pay raises for the really critical personnel areas within the Armed Forces. These selective pay raises focus on entry-level recruits and junior level officers and also on special areas such as pilots and physicians. The Department of Defense has endorsed that approach and has written to Senator STENNIS, chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, opposing the 10.4 percent pay increase amendment.
Mr. President, the Armstrong amendment would cost $600 million in budget authority and outlays. If the amendment were extended to cover the civilian employees of the Department of Defense, the cost would increase to $1.0 billion in budget authority and outlays. And, if it were further extended to cover all Federal civilian employees, the cost would escalate to $1.5 billion in both budget authority and outlays.
And that is not within the budget resolution. That is a budget buster.
If it were possible for the agencies involved to apply the same absorption rates to this proposal as were assumed for the 7-percent pay raise in the second budget resolution (25 percent for DOD military and civilian employees: 40 percent for Federal agencies other than DOD) , the costs would be somewhat less, but still considerable.
Mr. President, that would require a historically high absorption rate in the Department of Defense. To absorb at that rate becomes more difficult when the size of the pay increase grows. So absorption of 25 percent which is assumed in the budget is a very difficult proposition.
The Armstrong amendment itself would cost $500 million in budget authority and outlays. The cost would rise to $800 million in budget authority and outlays if the amendment were extended to include civilian employees of the Department of Defense. And the cost would be $1.1 billion in budget authority and outlays if all Federal civilian employees were included.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the RECORD a table showing these amounts.
with absorption cost.
[Table omitted]
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, this pay increase amendment should be rejected for a number of reasons.
The amendment violates the congressional budget figures which have been agreed to by both Houses. Even though final conference action on the budget resolution is not complete, both Houses have approved budget totals which would be violated by this amendment. This same amendment was expressly rejected by the Budget Committee in its markup of the budget and no mention was made of it on the Senate floor at the time of the debate on the budget resolution.
Its adoption now would mean that money initiated by the Hollings-Nunn 3 percent growth amendment would be diverted from readiness expenditures to pay. Moreover, in light of the amounts already provided in the pending defense appropriation bill and foreseeable total defense spending requirements, such as the military construction appropriation, this bill will violate both the defense ceiling in the budget resolution and the budget resolution's aggregate totals as well. It will deepen the deficit to that extent and drive the deficit over $30 billion.
The pay increase proposed in this amendment will add between $470 and $640 million in both budget authority and outlays to defense spending levels. And these costs do not include the additional $900 million necessary when similar civilian pay increases are granted. And we are almost certainly going to be forced to extend these raises to civilians once this pay difference is created between military and civilian employees, many of whom perform identical work, side by side, in the same office or facility.
The cost of this amendment, added to the current estimate of other known defense funding requirements, will breach the defense spending ceilings by $140 million in budget authority.
If we assume that the historically high 25 percent absorption rate for defense pay raises assumed in the second budget resolution would reduce the total of the amendment to $470 million, the amendment would then fit within the defense ceilings. However, this does not include the hidden cost of added civilian pay.
Thus, it is likely that the potential cost of the amendment will break the budget ceiling for the defense function. Further, the defense ceilings assume that the Congress will achieve strategic stockpile and future personnel savings.
I must add that the chief sponsor of the amendment is seeking to reduce some of these personnel savings. If he is successful, the pressure on spending ceilings will be even greater.
These potential violations of the defense budget ceiling will add directly to the deficit. There are no compensating budget areas which might be raided to pay for this amendment. In fact, it presently appears that the Appropriations Committee will have to substantially shortchange other priority areas to stay within the budget totals unless already enacted appropriations are reduced. The possible appropriations excess presently stands at more than $1 billion in budget authority and about $2 billion in outlays. These amounts assume that potential savings in the defense function can be applied to other areas of the budget.
And the amendment contains a second, even larger hidden cost, because it would open the floodgates for added pay increases for Federal civil service and wage board employees. This would add another $900 million to the budget and to the deficit. This is the cost we face when sooner or later this increase must also be given to the Department of Defense civilian employees and the employees of the rest of the Government.
I have no doubt that Federal unions favor passage of this amendment and will immediately demand in Congress and the courts that we honor the existing law which requires comparability between military and civilian pay.
Which of us will be able to explain to civilian Defense Department employees from our State why a major doing the same work in the next office gets more pay? How can we give a pay increase to 2 million military personnel while we deny a comparable increase for the first time in many years to civilian Government employees?
The amendment also erodes our efforts to control inflation through wage guidelines. It abandons the need for Government to set examples for restraint in wages and spending.
Establishing inequality in pay among Government employees is not the solution to recruitment and retention in the All-Volunteer Force. Let us face the problems of the All-Volunteer Force head on. We are not solving them here with this kind of proposal. Why kid ourselves otherwise?
Is it fair to give a full colonel in the Pentagon with 18 years of service a 10.4-percent raise when the GS-3 civilian family man who cleans the colonel's office at night gets only 7.0 percent?
The Armed Services Committee and the Department of Defense should be given the time they need to work together on solutions for curing the ills of the All-Volunteer Force. We cannot do that by creating new, budget busting pay inequalities.
The answer to specific manpower problems involves selective solutions. If there are enlisted personnel problems — address them. If there are junior-level officer problems — address them. If there are problems overseas because of the dollar problem — address them. For example, there are 400,000 Armed Forces personnel overseas and 1.6 million in the United States. Only 20 percent of military personnel may be affected by the dollar's problems.
Rather than remedying the real problems of the personnel overseas, this amendment would dilute its benefits among those who are stationed here at home.
A comparison of selected examples of regular military compensation and general schedule civilian pay indicates that military pay already exceeds that of civilian pay at comparable levels. This amendment would only serve to create more disparity between military and civilian pay levels.
In closing, Mr. President, Congress must admit that there are manpower problems and pay problems within our Armed Forces. We must address these problems and how they affect the All-Volunteer Force. We must address them soon.
Defense manpower problems must be confronted jointly with the administration. I believe that the fiscal year 1981 defense budget will offer solutions that are reasonable. It is too soon to panic. The Congress must assert itself toward the objective of fiscal responsibility. Rejection of this amendment moves in that direction.