July 12, 1979
Page 18193
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I would like to address the military construction authorization bill which the Committee on Armed Services has reported. I support the bill from a budgetary standpoint. I oppose the provision within the bill that waives the requirements of the Davis- Bacon Act in regard to military construction activities.
Regarding the cost implications of the bill, it proposes an authorization level of $3.7 billion in budget authority. Fiscal year 1980 outlays resulting from the bill are approximately $1 billion. Both of these amounts represent slight reductions from the levels of the administration's request.
Mr. President, this military construction authorization, if appropriated at the levels discussed here, fits within the assumptions contained in the national defense targets of the budget resolution.
I extend my congratulations to my friend, the chairman of the Military Construction Authorization Subcommittee and the distinguished Senator from Colorado, Mr. HART. He has devoted a great deal of effort to this important legislation in order that our military facilities satisfy the military and housing needs of our Active and Reserve Forces. He has brought a military construction bill before the Senate that is fiscally responsible from the standpoint of the first budget resolution for fiscal year 1980. He serves as a valued member of the Budget Committee, and I thank him for his support in that regard.
STATEMENT ON LORING
Mr. President, the military construction authorization bill contains the funding necessary to assure that adequate facilities are available for military housing and military operational needs. I have stated that the bill is consistent with assumptions regarding the first budget resolution.
There are many significant provisions covered in the bill and I would like to address one that has a profound impact on the strategic capabilities and flexibilities of our forces and the economic viability of northeast Maine. I am referring to section 809 of the bill that prohibits the proposed realignment of Loring Air Force Base.
In March 1976, the Air Force initially announced the decision to realign the base. In March of this year, the Air Force announced that it had reconfirmed its earlier position and that the base strength would be reduced by 83 percent and Loring would become a forward operating base.
Since the March 1976 announcement, I have probed continually for an answer from the Air Force as to the grounds for such a decision. Unfortunately, no answer has ever been forthcoming that can stand up to objective analysis of all aspects of the realignment.
In discussions with top Department of Defense officials and in detailed evaluations of the Air Force environmental impact study and other so-called Air Force justification documents regarding the realignment, the case against Loring has never been remotely made.
Mr. President, Loring Air Force Base is crucial to the operational effectiveness of our strategic and tactical forces. It is impossible to imagine why the Air Force would propose to phase down the base which is the most ideal SAC base from the standpoint of supporting logistics operations to European and Middle East contingencies and supporting possible strategic operations aimed at Soviet targets.
Loring is 200 miles closer to these locations than other SAC bases located in theUnited States and I do not believe that we can afford to relinquish this advantage. Further, it seems militarily unwise to realign the base prior to decisions affecting future strategic options associated with the cruise missile program, the potential follow-on bomber program to the B-52, and air defense basing alternatives to counteract potential Soviet Backfire capabilities.
Mr. President, I feel very deeply that the Air Force decision to reduce Loring Air Force Base is unsound, inconsistent with our national interest and an economic injustice to the people of northern Maine.
I have not come to my position lightly. I recognize that base realignments can be necessary actions if we are to have an effective structure for our national defense. I have demonstrated in the past that I can accept reductions in my own State where the case can be made that reductions are necessary in the national interest.
I do not believe, and the people of Maine do not believe, that our basing strategy ought to be dominated by economic factors. We are interested in an effective, efficient defense structure. But, in the process of developing a sound defense structure, there is room to consider other Federal priorities.
Environmental policies, local economic impact, and regional equity are all important Federal policies that should come in to play. I am sure there are those in the Department of Defense who resent the application of many or all of these concerns. Nevertheless, it is one of the responsibilities of Defense officials to assure that the broader social and economic policies of our country are respected, even as we pursue the critical goal of providing for the defense of our country.
In the case of the realignment of Loring, two specific directives require the Department of Defense to examine the broader implications of the realignment. Section 612 of the Military Construction Authorization Act of 1976 and its successor statute, and a directive from President Carter in the spring of 1978, require the Department of Defense to consider the economic implications of a realignment at Loring.
I will not speak at length today on the economic consequences of the Air Force proposal. I will state that it would be devastating. Estimates indicate that unemployment in the Loring area could reach 23 percent; there would be a loss of 30 percent of the area's total personal income and at least a 20 percent loss in retail sales. The alleged savings of approximately $13.5 million a year claimed by the Air Force for the first years of a Loring phase down would be offset by an estimated $100 million cost to other Federal agencies over the initial 5 year period. So, contrary to the stated position of the DOD, there are no savings associated with a Loring phase down. The Government would pay and it would pay heavily.
Therefore, Mr. President, for both national security reasons and economic reasons, I strenuously oppose the Air Force's decision on Loring. I stated most of the basic points of my position in a letter to President Carter, dated May 23 of this year. I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C.,
May 23, 1979.
Hon. JIMMY CARTER,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR Mr. PRESIDENT: Since you and I last discussed Loring Air Force Base two important events have occurred: (1) the Secretary of Defense announced a decision for a phased reduction of the base; and (2) the Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing to evaluate the proposed reduction of Loring.
As to the latter, the Committee members present at the hearing and myself were impressed that the Air Force could not justify its decision. We were amazed by the admission that they had not performed the thorough analysis necessary to meet the terms of your commitment of the requirements of law under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 2687, Base Closings and Realignments.
The inadequacy of the Air Force rationale in the Loring decision was again revealed at the Armed Services Committee hearing. The reduction of Loring jeopardizes a valuable strategic asset (to preserve support operations elsewhere), places a devastating burden on the people of the area for cost savings which, at best, are marginal to the DOD, and under the only complete analysis available imposes costs of approximately $100 million on the Federal Government. Some of the significant information provided at the hearing supporting these views included the following:
(1) Testimony that Loring is the prime U.S. base for refueling aircraft for NATO and Middle East contingencies. Further, because Loring is 200 miles closer to key Soviet targets than other U.S. SAC bases, it offers range and target flexibilities for multiple strategic options. These advantages are particularly significant when considering options for future bomber/cruise missile missions and the force limitations established by the proposed SALT II treaty.
(2) Rebuttal of Air Force testimony that Loring's vulnerability to the Soviet SLBM threat is significant since 9 of 11 SAC bases closer than Loring to the SLBM threat will be recipients of aircraft from Loring.
(3) An independent estimate that 5 year socioeconomic costs to non-DOD Federal agencies as a result of the Loring proposal may exceed $100 million while the Air Force estimates these costs at only $25 million. No attempt has been made to resolve the wide disparity in these estimates, the sum of which exceeds projected DOD cost savings for many years.
(4) A failure by the DOD to comply with Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 2687, Base Closings and Realignments, which requires that the Secretary of Defense submit estimates of fiscal, local economic, and other consequences of proposed closures or realignments.
(5) A refusal by many non-DOD agencies to quantify the costs anticipated because of the Loring action.
(6) Suppression of a letter from the Regional Director, Region 1, of the Small Business Administration which states that the proposed Loring action would devastate Aroostook County in Maine and that "SBA's support of retention of Loring as a major facility would be the single most important action that we (SBA) would take in the state of Maine for years to come."
All the information suggests the Loring decision is unwise from a military perspective and unsound from an economic one. There is no military case for phasing down. For these reasons, I believe our national interests dictate the continuation of the base in a fully operational bomber/tanker status.
With warm regards.
Sincerely,
EDMUND S. MUSKIE,
U.S. Senator.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I would like to state my support of the position of the Armed Services Committee and of the military construction bill before us. The committee held hearings.
It listened to the arguments on both sides of the issue. It reached the only logical conclusion that could be reached. The committee's report accompanying the bill states that it "has become convinced that there are cogent strategic reasons not to dismantle this installation (Loring) ."
I believe the committee should be congratulated for making its decision. The adoption of the Loring provision enables the Congress to accept its proper role, whereby, in conjunction with the executive branch, decisions are made regarding military missions and priorities. These types of decisions are rightly those of the Congress. The decision sets a precedent — but it is a precedent with which I am in total agreement. Ordinarily, I support the Department of Defense in the process of determining the U.S. base structure. However, the strategic and tactical logistics mission advantages provided to our forces by Loring Air Force Base cannot be overlooked — and discarded. For this reason, I congratulate Senators STENNIS and TOWER for the full committee, and Senators HART and THURMOND for the Military Construction Authorization Subcommittee, for their decision to prohibit the closing of Loring and to preclude the loss of a very valuable asset of our strategic capability.
In conclusion, I would like to ask the distinguished chairman of the Military Construction Subcommittee a few questions regarding the committee's position on the Loring matter, to make certain the intent of the provision is clearly understood.
The language of the Loring provision refers to the March 1979 Air Force decision and then states that no funds authorized to be appropriated in the Military Construction Act or any other act shall be obligated or expended for the purpose of realigning Loring Air Force Base.
First, is it not true that the mention of the March decision is to merely refer to a point in time when a decision had been announced on Loring — and that the intent of the Loring provision is to prohibit the realignment of the base?
Mr. HART. My colleague is correct on both points. I will state that the purpose of the Loring provision is to prohibit the realignment of that base. The committee was very concerned about strategic implications associated with Loring and, until such time as critical decisions are made about future strategic alternatives for our forces, the committee believed it would be impractical to realign Loring.
Mr. MUSKIE. I thank my good friend for his eloquent explanation of the Loring provision and the excellent job he has done on this military construction authorization bill.