June 26, 1979
Page 16595
SENATOR JOHN GLENN DISCUSSES U.S. POLICY IN ASIA.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, our distinguished colleague from Ohio, Senator JOHN GLENN, spoke recently to the Council on Foreign Relations on U.S. Policy in Asia. As chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senator GLENN is uniquely qualified to give a congressional perspective on the key economic, social, and political issues in the region.
Each of us, of course, have ideas about the region and U.S. relations in the area, but I think all of us will find Senator GLENN's comments informative and useful.
One particularly interesting proposal Senator GLENN advanced is for the United States to encourage establishment of an institution through which Asian nations can coordinate efforts to solve their region's economic problems.
To share his speech with my colleagues, I ask that his remarks of June 8, 1979, to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, be printed in the RECORD.
The remarks follow:
U.S. POLICY IN ASIA: A VIEW FROM CAPITOL HILL.
(By Senator JOHN GLENN)
No one in this room tonight will be surprised . . . when I say that the United States' involvement in East Asia and the growing importance of this region in our foreign policy is an inescapable reality. We need only remind ourselves that America's last three wars began in Asia, and that the only foreign attacks on American soil since 1812 have taken place on our Pacific, not our Atlantic flanks. So in some sense I am preaching to the choir . . . but I'm sure you also appreciate that recognizing this reality and developing a coherent and successful Asian policy are two entirely different matters.
In formulating our policy we must consider a multitude of national actors and the region's wide diversity in culture, attitudes, and politics. An important element of the equation is our relationship with the Soviet Union. We both are involved because we physically are Pacific states, with fundamental security and superpower interests at stake in the region. Similarly, the major regional powers — China and Japan — as well as the other nations in the area have their own vital interests to protect. But of course these security issues are not our only concern. We still must factor in the whole array of economic, political, cultural and humanitarian interests of all involved — 19 countries the last time I checked. This underscores my belief that Asia is the least homogeneous of the world's major regions.
Although Asia today is an arena of complex interaction among the various actors that has elements of both competition and cooperation, we are in Asia to stay and have a major role to play in insuring that peace and prosperity, not war and famine, are maintained.
What I would like to do tonight is to review in a general fashion the present situation in East Asia, some of the problems I see frustrating our hopes for the future and then to offer some policy suggestions from the perspective of American interests in the region.
THE REGION: AN OVERVIEW
The post-Vietnam period in Asia has been in many ways an "Era of Uncertainty." Peace and stability in the region have proven elusive. This period has seen the emergence of:
The perception by friend and foe alike of the U.S. disintegration from Asia, that we lacked the resolve to meet our remaining commitments;
The Soviet Union eager to play a more active role, but vulnerable due to its own Asian nationalities problems and heavy handed tactics;
China — despite its new normal relationship with the .U.S. — faced with heightened threats in its northern and southern borders and simultaneously struggling to modernize its economy.
A bellicose and expansionistic Vietnam dominant not only in what was formerly South Vietnam, but also now in Laos and Cambodia;
The ASEAN countries attempting to cooperate where possible, hopefully a counterweight to Vietnamese and Soviet activities in the region;
Continuing tension on the Korean peninsula where Kim Il Sung remains intent on expanding his military might;
Australia and New Zealand with new doubts concerning the U.S. connection, steering a more independent course; and
The region's economic giant, Japan, reestablishing ancient ties with China and playing a more active diplomatic role in regional affairs.
In sum, there is at present a constantly shifting equilibrium in Asia that will require adroit diplomatic maneuvering in order to create and maintain balances and minimize the danger of military conflict.
NATIONAL ACTORS
As I mentioned earlier, each of the major Asian actors has its own unique position and interests in the region. Let me highlight some of the major elements in each case:
China. China is a focal point for Asian developments, if only by virtue of the central geographic location which from the earliest times led the Chinese to regard themselves as the "Middle. Kingdom." The sources of China's modern power and influence include its vast population — 960 million by the Chinese" own latest estimate — its three million man military establishment and substantial nuclear capacity, as well as its great if still largely undeveloped, economic potential.
China's policy in Asia and its relationships with other states of the region are heavily influenced by its desire to limit Soviet influence. The recent period has seen China adopt a relatively more flexible approach to the non-communist states, particularly the five Southeast Asian states of ASEAN, and an openly hostile posture towards its strongest Southeast Asian communist neighbor, Vietnam. The improvementof US-PRC relations brought about by normalization does not eliminate continuing US-PRC differences, but it does restore maneuverability In U.S. foreign policy decisions in this area.
China's other interests in the region include economic modernization, the attraction of capital for its development program, and a general interest in the welfare and the cultivation of ties with the large overseas Chinese communities In the area.
Soviet Union. Unlike other powers in the region, the Soviet Union's almost sole currency in East Asia is military might. The Soviets are unable to translate military power into political influence and are not well regarded by most Asians. For the Soviet Union, traditional Russian interests in securing control over the vast and sparsely populated territories of Russian Asia form a backdrop to its continuing nervous confrontation with China along their extended common border. In direct support of its interest in containing Chinese influence in Asia, the USSR is actively engaged in consolidating its relationships with Vietnam. The Soviets also hope to call on Japanese capital and technology in the development of the natural resources of eastern Siberia.
The Soviets have suffered periodic reverses in their relations with the non-Communist Asian states, most dramatically in the aftermath of the unsuccessful communist coup in Indonesia in 1965. But the Soviets are doing whatever they can to nurture these relationships, and the states of the region are generally willing to deal with them as a balance to China and a hedge against the possibility of declining Western support. Yet, China, Japan and the United States now present a formidable obstacle to Soviet and Vietnamese expansion.
Japan. Japan, the region's dominant economic power and increasingly an important global actor, is now feeling the burdens of its success. Although Japan's eschewing of security responsibilities in the region has properly meant that Japan is not a military factor, Japan's increasing prosperity has inevitably led to pressures on Japan to assume more varied responsibilities in the region. I, for one, would welcome a much greater Japanese role in such matters as handling refugee problems. Japan now faces the potentially painful process of adjusting its keen competitive instincts, developed out of the deep seated economic insecurities of a resource poor island nation, to account for the responsibilities toward the rest of the region that come with its hard won preeminence.
For Japan, and the United States, close mutual cooperation remains essential. Both are also beneficiaries of the lack of a similar degree of cooperation between the communist powers in Asia. Japan will undoubtedly continue its efforts to improve its relations with the Soviet Union, but it is unlikely to shift from its current relative emphasis on broadening and deepening its relationship with China.
United States. Finally, the United States has in the past decade been undergoing its own sometimes painful process of readjustment from the era in which America's military and economic dominance granted it an undisputed leadership role to the far more ambiguous and complex circumstances of the post-Vietnam period.
U.S. POLICIES
U.S. diplomacy, particularly at the beginning of President Carter's administration, moved at high velocity through a staccato series of events. Rapid, seemingly disjointed policy initiatives disturbed our friends and caused them to question our willingness to honor our commitments. In truth, the President inherited many problems, and the end of the Vietnam war obviously signalled the need for some changes, but I think we went too far. and cast grave doubts about our intentions and role in East Asia when we for example :
Unilaterally declared our intent not to send military forces into the Indian Ocean area;
Conducted a nuclear debate with Japan, the nation least likely to develop nuclear weapons;
Announced a withdrawal of American ground troops from Korea based on an arbitrary time schedule without due regard to the balance of forces;
Publicly cast doubt upon the role of bases in the Philippines; and
Assailed our allies, but not our foes, over human rights.
I am glad to acknowledge that since 1977 these doubts have receded somewhat as our policy has become more coherent. We have turned the corner and are on the right track. And let there be no doubt we will fully honor our treaty commitments and executive agreements with Japan, Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, ANZUS and Taiwan. We have vital interests in the region and intend to remain an active partner for constructive growth and change.
In the security sphere, like Britain of old, we cannot allow a hostile power to dominate the region. Our relationship with Japan is clearly of crucial importance. With its economic might, Japan can help build a congenial regional order or, if hostile, can threaten American security.
Indeed, an alliance of Chinese manpower and Japanese managerial and technical skills would produce a truly formidable opponent. Likewise, a resurrection of a Sino-Soviet alliance, although extremely doubtful, would be severely troubling. Korea's proximity to China, the Soviet Union and Japan, coupled with our own role there, means that any conflict on the Korean peninsula would threaten the present uneasy equilibrium in the region. This demands a continuing high priority to the deterrence of renewed conflict in Korea.
Politically, the U.S. has well-established friendship in East Asia, as well as the reciprocal responsibilities that inevitably accompany such relationships. We perhaps began the decolonization movement in East Asia when we promised independence to the Philippines in 1935. The ANZUS alliance cements a tie originally forged in war. Japan has become a true success story of democratic government and of the transformation of enmity into firm friendship.
We are likewise striving to develop more cordial ties with other more recent adversaries in the region. Significantly, for the first time since the 1930's, the U.S. does not now have to make a choice between relationships with China and Japan. Continued attentiveness to all these relationships is of no small importance to our overall interests and position in the region.
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS
Economically, however, Asia faces a variety of perplexing problems:
The region is caught in a grim race between population growth and food supply. The twin terrors of flood and drought insure the perpetual insecurity of food production. Existing food stocks are plagued by inadequate storage. The net result is an ever increasing potential for widespread malnutrition. In a real crisis, palliatives would be quickly exhausted and we would be faced with human misery on a vast scale, graphically visible in full color on our living room televisions. And yet, morally acceptable fundamental solutions remain elusive.
Economic development is now the nearly universal goal of the region's governments, and the measure against which those governments are increasingly judged by their peoples. But in much of the region performance still lags far behind the promises. Capital accumulation remains limited due to low income levels. Human skills are not fully developed. And decades of study and investment have yet to produce the alchemist's stone of economic development, the crucial formula for changing attitudes and social structures.
Growing trade imbalances have the potential for disrupting political relationships in the region. Asian states fear a continuing surge of protectionism in Western markets, the Chinese loom as future competitors, the U.S. suffers from a massive trade deficit, and the tremors of change are shaking the Japanese economic system. Differences of view over trade practices and the appropriate degree of government support for private enterprise, over how to approach stabilization of commodity markets, and over the necessity for basic industrial adjustment to changing trade patterns are all potentially disruptive issues if permitted to fester.
East Asia is also critically — if not uniquely — vulnerable in its sources of energy. Japan is dependent on the Persian Gulf for 80% of its oil; the other growing economies of Asia are in an analogous position. Although regional sources of oil do exist — Indonesia, Malaysia and at least in a potential sense Chinese and offshore fields — the sea lanes through the Malacca Straits will remain the strategic energy lifeline for East Asia for the indefinite future. Should Persian Gulf supplies be cut off at their source, or should the sea lanes be blocked, the economy of Asia would face death by strangulation. Resource insecurity was an important contributing factor in the outbreak of the Second World War in Asia; a further cataclysm trigged by the denial of critical resources cannot be considered beyond the realm of possibility.
And finally, continuing upheavals in the region are producing population movements which threaten to have a profoundly destabilizing impact on many countries. Refugee flows in East Asia are now running at a rate of over a third of a million people annually and are still growing.
These flows are producing increasing problems for the neighboring states which bear the immediate brunt of the exodus and for others, such as the United States, which provide the ultimate haven for so many of the refugees. Clearly we must continue to meet the immediate humanitarian requirements of this situation. Yet the disruptive potential of this problem will not be defused until the causal problems are dealt with and ways are found to induce the countries which are the source of these waves of refugees to face up to their own responsibility to provide tolerable conditions of life for all their people. This in turn would appear to be impossible in the absence of a concerted approach by all the region's powers, but thus far all concerned have reacted to this problem on a highly individual basis, in accordance only with their own views of their immediate interest and responsibilities.
In another sense, these upheavals in the region also reflect the basic fact that nationalism remains a driving force in the minds of Asians. The wounds of Western imperialism still persist. As the Burmese leader Ba Maw said in 1943, "My Asiatic blood has always called to other Asiatics."
This same view was reflected in the 1955 Bandung Conference, the founding of ASEAN, and President Marcos' 1975 Peking speech. No superpower is immune. Conversely, the danger of political anarchy also threatens all these states. The family is still the pillar of Asian society; the Philippine barrio is more important than the national government. Racial minorities, the Chinese in Malaysia, the Koreans in Japan, the Uighurs of Sinkiang Province in China, illustrate the wide ranging potential for further disorder from this source.
Despite the continuing development problems plaguing parts of the region, East Asia is the world's most dynamic growth center. It is the only region in the world that has averaged a real growth rate in the 8 to 10 percent range over the past decade. U.S. two way trade with East Asia currently exceeds $70 billion annually and has exceeded our two way trade with Europe since 1972.
U.S. direct investment in the region now exceeds $18 billion. Thus, our economy is intimately tied into Asia. Indeed, the U.S. trade deficit with the region in 1978 was about $20 billion. Likewise, access to the U.S.market is vital to Asian prosperity, particularly that of Japan.
Economically, East Asia is a major source of raw materials, finished goods, and a potentially vast market containing fully a third of mankind. The United States, however, must gear up its export potential to offset our deficit and Japan, in particular, must invest more in the U.S., or trouble looms for all.
COOPERATION. AND COMPETITION
The relationship between the interests of each of the major Asian actors contain possibilities for both cooperation and potential conflict. All the powers clearly share an interest in the avoidance of conflict. Thus, the most unsettling aspect of the recent Chinese incursion into Vietnam was the evident danger of direct Soviet counteraction in support of its Vietnamese ally. One suspects that a recognition of this potential was a fundamental reason for the vocal Chinese insistence throughout this episode that their action was purely "educational" in nature, was not directed at the acquisition of territory or permanent damage to Vietnam, and would be of a strictly limited duration. Further, because all of the powers are interested in continuing economic expansion in the region, there should be room for complementary economic policies.
Regrettably, however the common interests of the major states in conflict avoidance and economic expansion are continually held hostage to the many differences between them. On balance, and for the foreseeable future, I believe we will have to live in Asia with an uneasy multiple balance of power in which the mutuality of interests will only serve to define the outer boundaries of otherwise largely competitive relationships. For example, even though we have achieved, and I have strongly supported, normalization of our relations with China, this development in no way alters the fundamental dedication of the Chinese leadership to increasing China's global power and influence. As China succeeds, it will become all the more imposing as a competitor in both the political and economic spheres. The historic example of Japan is instructive in this regard. Overall, the midterm future seems likely to be marked by more, not less, superpower competition in East Asia, including ideological, geographical and national tensions between communist states.
The major current potential for conflict in the region is the continuing confrontation between China and Kampuchea on the one hand and the Soviet/Vietnamese alliance on the other. The next Sino-Vietnamese war — and I for one do not at all rule out the possibility that there will be another round in this conflict — could easily reach the level of global politics. It is dangerous fallacy to assume that regional conflicts can be contained or capped indefinitely. Unless resolved, local crises in East Asia have an uneasy historical habit of global infection. The example of the Korean War in producing direct great power conflict is certainly more indicative of the potential in this regard than the more recent experience of our involvement in Vietnam.
This in turn is yet another reason why the U.S. must not appear to "tilt" towards either of the competing communist powers. To do so would be to play with fire, in my view an act of irresponsible folly.
TOWARD REGIONALISM
In this context, one might well ask how can the states of the region promote their own collective interest in peace and economic progress? My response to that question starts with another — how are these states now going about addressing their various common problems? The short answer is they generally aren't, or, at least, aren't doing so very well or in any very systematic way. Bilateral talks are of little assistance in East Asia with its great cultural diversities, its uneven stages of economic development, its varying degrees of alliance with external powers. Yet East Asia is the world's most rapidly growing region; by the year 2000, the region will have experienced the world's greatest economic surge in less than forty years.
It is my judgment that this situation strongly suggests the need for some sort of mechanism to facilitate communication among the states of the region. Such a mechanism alongside and supplementing existing more restricted or specialized channels such as bilateral consultations, ASEAN, or the Asia Society's Williamsburg meetings, could be a key building block for regional
peace and progress. A truly regional forum would offer the opportunity to talk in an integrated manner about the complex dynamics of East Asia and reduce the odds of conflict through misunderstanding or miscalculation.
I believe that it is also time that the United States began to devote more concerted attention to the various economic problems which have accumulated in the region — such problems as economic development, trade and investment practices, and industrial adjustment. The development of a regional forum would provide a mechanism through which the best thinking of all the countries of the region could be devoted to finding solutions to these problems. I believe that an effort is in order to stimulate this process.
Of course, I am not here speaking just of an American effort. This idea cannot be mandated by Americans alone, or be a creature of U.S. policy. It can only develop on the basis of broad regional interest and acceptance. But there is already a considerable degree of interest within the Asian Pacific region in the development of a regional consultative mechanism. This is particularly true in Japan and Australia. Prime Minister Ohira of Japan for one has expressed enthusiasm over the possibility of improved cooperation within the Pacific Basin area. I had the opportunity to hear his views on the subject personally when I met with him in Tokyo in January.
One of the most detailed proposals along these lines, which has gained considerable currency in Asian and American academic circles, calls for the creation of a Pacific BasinTrade and Development Organization as a general umbrella under which work could be done on a number of the specific economic problems facing the region. Obviously there would be difficulties in any effort to form a new international institution in the Pacific, including questions of membership, structure and how to avoid the creation of yet another expensive, cumbersome international bureaucracy which could as easily impede progress as stimulate it. Nevertheless, a permanent, formal structure may well become advisable at some stage down the line. I will shortly be releasing a thought provoking analysis of this concept done for the Library of Congress by two distinguished economists, Hugh Patrick of Yale and Peter Drysdale of Australian National University. I plan also to hold hearings in the near future in which these ideas can be considered in some detail. But the really immediate requirement, in my view, is to initiate some kind of practical multilateral consultations, of whatever degree of formality, in which the urgent substantive problems of the region can be addressed on a constructive, mutual basis. Without such an effort, the problems will continue to fester. Inevitably, they will also over time become intermixed with and exacerbate superpower competition in the area. It requires little imagination to foresee the potentially dire effects of this process on the interests of all of the states of the region including the United States. The only real question is: do all concerned have the political will to take the action necessary to alter the present course of drift?
The United States is a Pacific power. We have extricated ourselves from what was a military overcommitment in Asia. Our policies now should be designed to stabilize the region, dampen the negative impact of inevitable superpower competition, make clear our own enduring commitment, and help the states of the region address its very real economic and political economic problems. In particular, I believe we should give a strong impetus to the present tentative movement in the region towards an improved consultative process. Given imaginative policymaking, true consultation and cooperation, .and sustained effort, I am convinced that the present "Era of Uncertainty" in the Asian Pacific region can yield to an "Era of Opportunity", an era of stability and prosperity in which a genuine Pacific Community may at last begin to emerge.