October 11, 1978
Page 35458
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The conference report on H.R. 11445 is the pending business.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, this is the SBA conference report. I will not ask fora rollcall vote.
Mr. President, I object to the report, for reasons that I will try to outline briefly, because I think they are serious reasons and it is important that we made a record.
At the outset, I say to my good friend from Connecticut, Senator WEICKER, that I understand that, in the conference, he fought the good fight on the principal issue in this bill. What I have to say about that issue here is not a reflection upon his efforts, because I understand that he was in total sympathy with what I have tried to do with this SBA report. So I do not want him to take what I am about to say as a personal criticism at all.
Mr. President, I must rise in protest against this legislation. In its present form the bill is inconsistent with the fiscal 1979 second budget resolution, and would establish in permanent law a costly and wasteful policy for disaster loans.
If the bill as reported from conference passes the Congress, I will strongly urge the President to veto it. SBA programs are already authorized for fiscal 1979, so a veto would not interrupt any existing SBA program, including the disaster loan program.
Mr. President, what has come back from conference is a bill much worse than the bill the Senate passed several weeks ago. There are numerous features of the conference agreement that are objectionable, but I am particularly disappointed and disturbed that a key Senate provision on disaster loans was given up on the very first day of the conference.
Mr. President, this is not a time when it is particularly prudent for the Senate and the Congress to support legislation that encourages inefficiency in Federal programs and wastes the taxpayers' money. Yet that is exactly what the controversial disaster loan provision of this bill does. In view of this, there is only one explanation I can think of for the action of the conference in abandoning a provision that was approved by a specific vote of the Senate. The explanation is that a majority of the conferees, excluding my good friend from Connecticut, simply did not understand or appreciate the issue involved. Rather, it seems that they viewed the issue as one that is basically trivial in its significance to anyone not directly concerned with the Federal budget.
Mr. President, I wish the issue were trivial. If it were, then I would not have to be here now protesting the conferees' report.
Because there is an obvious lack of understanding of the issue, I would like to take a little time here today to explain it in more detail than has been discussed in the past. Even if this particular piece of legislation is enacted — and I hope it is not — the issue will not go away. I therefore feel it is worthwhile to set forth for the Senate an explanation of why the issue is significant and must at some point be dealt with in a responsible manner.
I will begin by explaining what the issue is not. This too is apparently necessary, because I have found that whenever disaster assistance programs are discussed in the Senate, there is a tendency for Members to immediately describe the plight of a family that has lost everything in a tornado or an earthquake, or the problems of a community whose essential businesses have been destroyed by an unforeseeable disaster. The issue here is definitely not whether Federal assistance should be available under these circumstances. That kind of disaster assistance is a proper expression of our compassion as a Nation. I have said before that it is the purpose of the budget process to allocate scarce resources to real needs such as these. I have consistently voted for assistance to disaster victims before, and I fully expect to continue to do so. That is not the issue.
Mr. President, the real issue is whether we are to have responsible legislative design of Federal disaster assistance programs. During my career in public office, I have become convinced that most waste in Government comes from programs that are intended to address a legitimate need, but are designed in such a careless way that spending is much higher than really necessary, benefits go to many who are not really in need, and tax dollars go for purposes that are not really essential. It is poor design that I strongly object to in our present disaster loan programs. And that is the issue here.
Mr. President, the conference agreement now before us would continue deeply subsidized interest rates on Federal disaster loans for at least 4 more years. The agreement would establish interest rates for damage to homes or personal property at only 3 percent for the first $55,000, and would permit amounts above that to be loaned at only 6⅝ percent. The conference report would also keep rates on loans for losses to business property from rising above 5 percent for the first $250,000.
While these provisions would drive up the costs of SBA's disaster loan program, another provision would hide some of those costs from the public. Section 111 of the agreement would remove from the law the requirement that the SBA disaster loan fund pay interest to the Treasury for outstanding loans. That means that the budget for SBA would no longer show the costs of financing its own program. An estimated $0.3 billion of the SBA costs would be shifted to the accounts of the Treasury.
This gimmick, of course, would not save one dime of the taxpayers' money. Its only effect would be to make it more difficult for Congress and the public to learn the true cost of this program.
Mr. President, I will now explain my reasons for opposing the disaster loan interest rate provisions. The first reason is that deep interest subsidies would drive up demand for disaster loans and would very likely lead to a major breach of the fiscal 1979 second budget resolution ceilings for function 450, community and regional development. As was made very clear when the second resolution was considered in the Senate, the budget ceilings assume that SBA disaster loans in fiscal 1979 will be provided at the Government's cost of capital, as is provided in existing law.
If the interest rate is reduced for fiscal 1979, as provided by this conference report, then we can expect the budget ceilings in function 450 to be exceeded by at least $0.2 billion.
Mr. President, there is an element of irony in this legislative invitation to bust the function 450 budget ceilings. It has been only 2 weeks since the Senate and House finally managed to reach a conference agreement on the second budget resolution, after being deadlocked for days on the question of the function 450 ceilings. The specific issue was whether an allowance could be provided in function 450 to fund the so-called soft public works initiative. The House conferees finally accepted the Senate's figure, an amount which reflected CBO's estimate of the expected cost of disaster assistance in fiscal 1979 assuming existing law, and which left no room for a public works initiative.
The House budget conferees agreed to the Senate's figure only because they were convinced that legislative reforms of disaster loan programs would reduce the expected costs of those programs substantially below the levels estimated by the CBO. In anticipation of these savings — savings that have now vanished — the House of Representatives then assumed that there could be enough extra room in the Senate's function 450 ceilings to accommodate funding of a new local public works initiative in fiscal1979.
Now we find that, far from proposing cost-saving reforms, the Small Business conferees are recommending legislation that would make the disaster loan program even more costly than would be expected under existing law. If there were any remaining question in anyone's mind as to whether the congressional budget could accommodate the President's proposed public works program, that question is now answered. And the answer is "No." The only question now is which programs can be cut below the assumptions of the budget resolution in order to accommodate this new extravagance in the disaster loan program.
Mr. President, the second reason I oppose this conference agreement is that it makes a major break with past disaster loan policy by establishing extremely deep interest subsidies as a continuing, permanent feature of Federal disaster assists nee.
The history of disaster loan interest rates should be kept in mind. When the Farmers Home emergency loan program was enacted in 1949, interest rates were set at 3 percent; at the time, 3 percent was a rate that was substantially above the Government's cost of money.
The SBA disaster loan program was initiated in 1953, with interest rates also set at 3 percent, but at that time it was a rate calculated to be above the Government's cost of money.
Through the mid-1960's, the interest rate on both Farmers Home and SBA disaster loans remained very close to the Government's cost of money.
Throughout this period, therefore, the subsidies to the borrowers and the costs to the taxpayers of operating the program were extremely low.
In the late 1960's, private market interest rates rose sharply. and the fixed 3 percent disaster loan interest rates began to provide very attractive benefits to borrowers and heavy costs to the Government.
To correct problems resulting from that situation, and to reestablish desired disaster loan policy, the Disaster Relief Act of 1970 raised the Farmers Home emergency loan rates, beginning in 1972, to a rate again close to the Government's cost of money. In 1973, the interest rates on both SBA and FmHA disaster loans were raised to 5 percent. In 1975, the SBA's rates were further raised to equal the Government's rising average borrowing cost.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point a fact sheet (exhibit 1) that compares SBA interest rates with the Government's borrowing cost since fiscal 1953.
There being no objection, the fact sheet was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
EXHIBIT 1
DISASTER LOAN INTEREST SUBSIDIES ARE AT RECORD HIGH LEVELS
When the SBA Disaster Loan program was established in 1953, disaster loan rates were set higher than the Government's cost of money. The policy was to provide disaster victims with a ready source of credit at reasonable rates that reimbursed the Government for its borrowing and other costs.
However, this policy changed as the Government's borrowing costs increased over time, but disaster loan rates remained fixed by law. As a result, since fiscal 1957, disaster loans have provided Government subsidies, which have fluctuated at generally increasing levels.
The Federal subsidy rate hit record high levels in fiscal year 1978, as shown in the following table:
[Table omitted]
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President this sheet demonstrates clearly that congressional policy generally has been to keep disaster loan interest rates close to the Government's cost of borrowing to finance them.
There have been only two striking instances when Congress did not follow that approach, and in both cases the deviation produced some extremely undesirable results.
Deep disaster loan subsidies were intentionally enacted in 1972 and again in 1978. In 1972 low interest rates, loan forgiveness, and other benefits were enacted in response to Hurricane Agnes. However, the heavy loan demand and the widespread program abuses that resulted led Congress rather quickly to increase loan rates and tighten the program in other ways.
In 1978, deep subsidies were again enacted, but only as a temporary, emergency response to disaster, in this case major flooding. At the same time, widespread drought and the resulting strains in the agricultural credit markets brought pressure that resulted in crop damage being declared eligible for SBA disaster loans. As we now know, in consequence of these changes SBA disaster loan volume shot up from an annual average of $0.2 billion to a record $2.5 billion for fiscal 1978. Farmers Home emergency loan volume also rose precipitously, from an average annual level of about $0.7 billion to $3.4 billion for fiscal 1978. That is a total of $5.9 billion for the two disaster loan programs, more than a sixfold increase that no one had anticipated and that caused enormous problems for our efforts to reduce the Federal deficit and achieve a balanced budget.
In the wake of runaway spending in a program under their jurisdiction, the Small Business Committees of the House and Senate have refused to lead the Congress in a careful, thorough, and effective review of disaster loan legislation. They have made no effort to tighten control, no effort to sharpen program objectives, no effort to reduce costs, and no effort to target aid on those really in need.
Instead, they now propose to extend on a permanent basis the deep interest subsidies which have caused problems in the past. Interest subsidies to businesses would be extended at a level that has been higher in only 4 years since the program's inception. Interest rates on large loans to homeowners would actually be reduced below the deeply subsidized levels of fiscal 1978.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point a second fact sheet (exhibit 2) showing the interest subsidies that would result in fiscal 1979 from enactment of this bill.
There being no objection, the fact sheet was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
EXHIBIT 2
THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT ON H.R. 11445 WOULD MAINTAIN FEDERAL SUBSIDIES ON SBA DISASTER LOANS AT VERY HIGH LEVELS RELATIVE TO PAST PRACTICE
Under the conference agreement on H.R. 11445, the Government's subsidy rate on disaster loans to businesses is projected to be at a level that has been exceeded in only four years since the program's inception in 1953. On home loans, the subsidy is projected to be higher than in any year since the program's inception, except fiscal 1978.
Further, the conference agreement on H.R. 11445 would reduce interest rates on large disaster loans to homeowners below the deeply subsidized levels of 1978. Thus, in fiscal 1978 a homeowner borrowing $55,000 under the SBA Disaster Loan program would have paid 1 percent on the first $10,000 (18% of the loan), 3 percent on the next $30,000 (55% of the loan), and 6% percent on the remaining $15,000 (27% of the loan) for an effective interest rate on the whole loan of 3.6 percent, as shown below.
[Table omitted]
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I am certain that no one in this Chamber would argue against providing Federal assistance to help needy victims recover from the effects of unforeseeable natural disasters. However, I am convinced that fixed, deeply subsidized interest rates are precisely the wrong way to offer that aid, and I would like to highlight a few of the reasons that is so.
First, at any given volume of Federal loans, the lower the interest rates, the more the public has to pay. Some would have us overlook the cost of these programs by claiming that the money is just being loaned and will be repaid. In fact, however, deeply subsidized loans are very costly. The SBA disaster loans made in fiscal year 1978 alone involve Federal subsidy grants of about $550 million. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a fact sheet and table analyzing disaster loan subsidies be printed in the RECORD at this point (exhibit 3) .
There being no objection, the fact sheet and table were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
EXHIBIT 3
In FY 1978, SBA Disaster Loan volume will reach a record high of $2.5 billion, which involves record high interest subsidies equivalent to about $0.6 billion in outright Federal grants.
A subsidized loan actually combines a loan and a grant. In a true loan, a lender exchanges funds for an equally valuable financial asset, a note in which the borrower promises to pay the lender at a rate that fully reimburses the lender's costs. When the government makes a subsidized loan, however, it receives a promissory note that is worth less than the funds given the borrower. Wealth is thus transferred from the taxpayers to the borrower when a subsidized loan is disbursed, and part of the loan proceeds is in effect an outright Federal grant.
The subsidy grant can be calculated for each subsidized loan based on the Government's cost of borrowing, the interest rate charged the borrower, and the loan's size and term to maturity. For example, when the private market is willing to lend the U.S. Government funds for ten years at 8.1 percent, a Federal agency could make a ten-year loan at 8.1 percent and sell the note in the private market at full face value, if the government continued to bear the risks of default and costs of administering the loan. Thus, the note on a $55,000 loan would be worth $55,000.
However, if the Federal agency loaned the funds at only 5 percent interest, no private investor would buy the note for more than $47,873. The government has thus given the borrower, as a subsidy grant, $7,127 more than his low interest note was worth.
The following table shows SBA disaster loan volumes and subsidy grants for selected years since inception of the program.
[Table omitted]
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, that table shows that the costs of the loan subsidies exploded in fiscal 1978 to a record level — a level that is 50 percent greater than the previous record that hit the fiscal 1973 budget and 30 times greater than the average level experienced in recent years. Moreover, interest subsidies are only part of the direct costs of this lending. When the costs of program administration and normal default losses are properly taken into account, this program is seen to have involved the outright spending of more than $650 million of Federal funds in fiscal 1978 alone. I do not believe we can continue to sustain such costs, for the drain they make on scarce budgetary resources cannot but reduce the funding available for other pressing national priorities.
Second, such subsidies drive up the volume of Federal lending. Excessive Federal disaster benefits build pressure on public officials to have a wider range of unfortunate occurrences declared Federal disasters. Deep subsidies also encourage many to apply for disaster loans who do not really need them. The deep subsidies create strong incentives for those eligible, especially those who ordinarily use credit, to borrow as much as possible under a Federal disaster program. And why not? Subsidized loans provide the borrower with the equivalent of loan forgiveness grants. And the subsidies proposed by the Small Business conferees would provide very substantial subsidy grants indeed.
Just as an example, under the proposed conference agreement, a $55,000 10-year loan at a 5 percent interest rate would provide the borrower with the equivalent of an outright forgiveness grant of over $7,000. A similar loan at a 3 percent interest rate would involve a Federal grant of more than $11,000. And a private business receiving a $250,000 10-year loan at 5 percent would receive the equivalent of a Federal grant of over $32,000.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point a fact sheet (exhibit 4) describing the forgiveness grant equivalent of an interest rate subsidy.
There being no objection, the fact sheet was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
EXHIBIT 4
Federal loans with subsidized interest rates provide borrowers with the equivalent of outright Federal grants.
Congress has in recent years refused to authorize loan forgiveness as a provision of disaster loan programs. Under loan forgiveness, a portion of a loan is considered to be a grant, and only the remainder needs to be repaid with interest. Authorizing committees have learned that loan forgiveness is a bad form of assistance that provokes widespread abuse. Borrowers who did not really need assistance applied for loans just to get the grants.
In fact, the same argument should be made against loans with subsidized interest rates. These loans are virtually the equivalent of loans with forgiveness grants. The equivalent outright grant increases directly with increases in the size of the loan, the depth of the interest subsidy and the length of the loan term.
Consider two cases. Firm A receives a loan with a forgiveness provision. The firm keeps a portion of the loan as a grant from the government and repays only the remainder in monthly installments over ten years at an interest rate equal to the rate the government has to pay to borrow those funds for ten years (about 8.1% in 1978). Firm B receives a loan of an equal amount, all of which is to be repaid over the same period at an interest rate of 5%.
As shown below, if Firm A had $7,127 of its loan forgiven, then the real cash flows — the initial receipt from the government and the monthly repayments — would be identical for the two firms. That is, receiving a $55,000 loan at 5% is the equivalent of receiving a $55,000 loan at the government's cost of capital but having $7,127 of the loan forgiven or provided as an outright Federal grant. Only the bookkeeping conventions differ in these two cases, with the accounting approach used for Firm A explicitly showing the Federal subsidy at the time the loan is made.
The conference agreement on the SBA Amendments of 1978 (H.R. 11445) would authorize 3% loans for homes and personal property in amounts up to $55,000. One $55,000 loan would provide the equivalent of an outright Federal grant of $11,417.
The conference agreement would also authorize 5% loans for businesses in amounts up to $250,000. One $250,000 loan would provide the equivalent of an outright Federal grant of $32,397.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, obviously, at 3 percent or 5 percent any eligible borrower could make money by borrowing under the disaster loan program and putting the proceeds in his local bank. No wonder one expert said anyone would be a very poor businessman if he did not find ways to borrow as much as he could from the Government, for as long as he could, at those rates. The Government should not create that kind of incentive for abuse, and the taxpayers should not be asked to pay for it.
Third, Mr. President, I believe that fixed interest rates on disaster loans make little sense whatever their level. This is because there can be no unchanging interest rate that will always be the right rate. A particular interest rate may make a loan program consistent with congressional intent under one set of economic conditions. But then, as changing economic conditions bring a change in market rates of interest, that fixed interest rate will produce erratic changes in benefits provided to borrowers. And these in turn will be translated into both incentives and disincentives that Congress did not intend.
As an example, for a number of years SBA disaster loans have been made at a fixed rate of 3 percent. In June of 1956 that rate equaled the Government's cost of capital and thus provided no Federal subsidy to a borrower. However, in December, just 6 months later, the Government's cost of money rose and that same rate suddenly provided a subsidy grant equal to 3 percent of every loan.
With changing economic conditions, the subsidy provided by a 3 percent rate has changed erratically. In 1960, the subsidy grant was up to 7 percent of every loan. The following year it fell to 4 percent. In 1967 the subsidy grant was back up to 8 percent of every loan. Just 3 years later, in 1970, it had risen to 18 percent. The next year the subsidy grant fell back to 15 percent. None of those changes reflected changing congressional intent. Today, the subsidy grant on a loan with a 3 percent interest rate stands at an all time high of 28 percent of the face value of the loan.
Clearly, the benefits provided with tax dollars should reflect congressional intent. Therefore, the rates charged on Federal loans should vary in response to changing economic expectations. A strong case can be made that disaster loans should be made at an interest rate equal to the Government's changing cost of money. It should be remembered that the rate at which the Federal Government borrows is much lower than the rate at which private parties must borrow. So Federal loans made at the Government's cost of money still provide very substantial benefits to borrowers.
The Administration estimates that those eligible for SBA disaster loans may have to pay about 14 percent interest on comparable loans from private lenders. If the Government made 10-year disaster loans at 8.1 percent, or the same rate the Government now pays to borrow funds for 10 years, a private borrower would be provided with substantial savings — on a $10,000 loan those benefits are equivalent to a grant of $2.150 or 22 percent of the loan. Borrowing at a 3 percent interest rate provides savings over private lending equal to a striking 38 percent of every loan.
Mr. President, I point out that President Carter has already taken a leadership role on this issue. He has proposed a reasonable framework that deserves but has not received serious consideration by Congress.
He has proposed to reform disaster loan policy so that SBA and Farmers Home disaster loans carry comparable terms, and so that only Farmers Home makes loans for crop damage. Under the President's proposal, loans to repair or replace damaged homes or personal property would be made at 5 percent with no "credit elsewhere" test. Loans for income producing property would be made only to borrowers who do not have access to credit elsewhere, and they would be made at a rate equal to the Government's own cost of money.
Mr. President, on October 1, existing law returned disaster loan interest rates to the Government's average borrowing costs. I believe that existing law should remain in effect until a full review and revision of disaster loan programs can be completed along the lines proposed by the President. I believe it would be irresponsible and wasteful to enact the permanent subsidies included in this conference report.
Finally, Mr. President, I conclude by saying that our recent experience points to the need for a comprehensive, long-term national disaster policy — a policy whose costs the taxpayers can bear. Congress and the administration must give these issues much more attention than has been provided thus far.
First, we must determine more precisely the conditions that justify Federal disaster assistance. There has been a disturbing tendency to consider a growing number of unfortunate occurrences to be national disasters requiring Federal spending. National policy should identify the responsibilities of State and local governments, as well as those of the private sector, toward victims of disasters.
Second, we must develop ways to target aid on those individuals who have the greatest need and on those purposes that really involve a national interest. Eligibility requirements have been drawn in a way that makes disaster programs seem unfair. National policy should focus aid on those losses that threaten public health and viable community life.
Third, we must determine how interest rates, credit elsewhere tests and other elements of program design alter the effects of disaster loan programs. Typically, over the years, disaster assistance programs have been hastily designed. They have been ad hoc, emergency responses to the plight of those hit by major catastrophes. National policy should carefully tailor these programs so that changing economic conditions do not create unintended incentives to abuse the programs.
Fourth, we must more fully understand how disaster assistance programs can affect economic decisions in the private sector. Our national economy is shaped by millions of individuals and firms making decisions based on calculations of the risks and opportunities facing them. When Federal policies bring ill-considered distortions to those calculations, the result can be unacceptable impacts on both the budget and the economy. National disaster policy should make certain that the Federal Government does not assume risks that should be inherent in particular economic activities.
Fifth, we must bring to light unnecessary competition and overlapping of responsibilities among disaster assistance agencies. State and local governments, individuals and firms in many instances have been able to "shop around" for disaster assistance. This makes it difficult for individual agencies to enforce reasonable conditions on disaster aid, and it tends to force all programs to adopt the most generous provisions in each even if they are unreasonable. National disaster policy should allocate responsibility among Federal agencies so that well-defined purposes can be carried out effectively, efficiently and without undue abuse.
Mr. President, if the Congress sets its mind to accomplish these tasks, then we can have a rational disaster loan program that helps those who are truly in need and does not unnecessarily soak the taxpayers. I am convinced, however, that enactment of this conference report would frustrate the legislative review that is necessary to reform this program, as well as greatly increase the strain on the fiscal 1979 second budget resolution. That is why I am so strongly opposed to this conference agreement.
I harbor no illusions about the outcome of the coming vote. To mount a serious challenge to a small business conference report this close to election time is essentially impossible, as I am sure the conferees are aware. Nonetheless, I will vote against the conference agreement in order to underscore my dissatisfaction. Should the President veto the bill, which I encourage him to do, I will do what I can to help sustain his veto.
Beyond that. I look forward to continued involvement with these issues in the next Congress. I remain hopeful that the authorizing committee will recognize its responsibilities to the taxpayers and the Senate. Because the budgetary impacts are so great. I intend to make my own requests to the GAO and the CBO so the Congress can assess which reforms in the disaster loan program are most desperately needed.
With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor, and again I thank my good friend from Connecticut for the support that he gave to the actions of the Senate — and I suppose indirectly to me — earlier this year with respect to the interest subsidy issue.
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President. with the exception of the distinguished Senator from Maine's opposition to the conference report, I want to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Maine. I might add that, although perhaps not stated as eloquently, they were the thrust of my arguments in the conference.
So I really have nothing in the way of rejoinder, except to remind the Senator from Maine that numbers are what prevail in conferences; and whereas I think the logic of his argument, as well as the facts of it, should have prevailed, the numbers were otherwise.
Therefore, we have the result before us, which was to raise, in some small measure, both the interest rate on homeowners' loans and the interest rate on business loans. But this in no way meets head-on the problems and issues raised by the Senator from Maine.
There is no question as to how this disaster loan program has grown. There is no question but that it requires a thorough review. There is no question but that the costs of the program are hidden the way the situation now stands.
I would hope that during the course of the next year this matter will be thoroughly ironed out, prior to the next conference.
I admire the courage of the Senator from Maine. It is very easy to step up and demagog an issue. We are in this program giving ease to those caught in the unfortunate maws of disaster. That is not, of course, what the Senator from Maine is attacking. But what he is saying, and I agree with him, is that if we are going to make this kind of commitment, we should understand what the price tag is. I am not sure that for most of us that is the situation.
I still think the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin and the Senate conferees did the best job they could on the overall bill, and even made some headway on the interest rate problem. But that in no way derogates the force of the arguments of the distinguished Senator from Maine.
Even in the light of his arguments, I hope the conference report will be agreed to.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, over a year ago, the conference report H.R. 692, the Small Business Amendments of 1977, on page 20 stated that the small business committees of the House and the Senate planned to conduct a broad study of Federal disaster assistance.
A searching review is certainly needed, and I would hope that will be done in the next year. I trust that the Senator from Connecticut will support that kind of endeavor, because he has demonstrated that kind of commitment. I am sorry it was not possible to do it this year in the broad sense I think is needed, but I hope we can put this together.
Mr. President, I do not know whether we ought to have a quorum call before the voice vote, or vote now.
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I am prepared now to go forward and request the adoption of the conference report.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Do the Senators yield back their time?
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. WEICKER. I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All remaining time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the conference report.
The conference report was agreed to.
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the conference report was agreed to.
Mr. STEVENS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.