February 28, 1978
Page 4872
Mr. MUSKIE. Prior to the colloquy I just engaged in with the distinguished Senator from Alabama, I had concluded a review of the grants which the Republic of Panama had made to us in the 1903 treaty.
These included, among other things, significant portions of their sovereign right to impose taxes and customs duties.It included the first choice of their waterborne and rail transportation system. It included an important part of their waterpower resource.
I would like to remind Senators that students of American history will note that our new Government's power to levy tariffs was the key to financing our new Nation in 1789. There was no income tax. There were no sales taxes. But the right to impose tariffs was the source of national revenues. We took those rights from the Republic of Panama in 1903.
Students of American history will also know that the modernization of transportation moved our country from an agrarian to a commercial economy. In Panama, we asserted our claim, in perpetuity, to take that country's transportation options.
Students of American history will also remember that our national and physical resources brought foreign investment to and trade with the United States.
The Republic of Panama granted to us important resources, important sovereign rights, that have a lot to do with a country's ability to build its infrastructure, to tap its resources for the benefit of its people.
These were significant grants; they were not casual grants. They were at the heart of the country's future prospects. In effect, we denied them — if we did not give them fair compensation for what they granted us — important tools for nationhood. In return, we paid them $10 million, plus $250,000 a year. In contrast, we paid $40 million to a private French company for the rights to the canal, rights that were going to expire in 1904, records Cornell University historian Walter LeFeber in his study on the canal.
In 1921, we paid Colombia $25 million in "guilt money" for backing the Panamanian revolution. All we did not get in 1903 were the deeds to the land, agreeing, instead, to a yearly rental of $250,000. The treaties now before the Senate, Mr. President, have been called a "giveaway." In fact, the great giveaway was the treaty of 1903. The Panamanians were the ones who gave.
The intervening years have only made matters worse.
The United States imported laborers from Asia and the West Indies to the zone, undermining Panamanian wage rates and denying employment to the Panamanians. We established separate wage scales for Americans and non-U.S. citizens, reserving the best-paying jobs for our countrymen.
In the 1936 treaty, we pledged to work toward greater employment equality for Panamanians, yet legislation was passed reserving all high-paying canal jobs for U.S. citizens.
Following World War II, the War Department's two-tier hiring practice became official U.S. policy. Thus, we established and maintained a system which was both separate and unequal.
In the 1955 treaty, we agreed to increase the number of Panamanians permitted to help operate the canal and to raise our annual payment to Panama to $1.9 million. If that sounds like generosity on our part, in real dollars, the new payment amounted to no more than the $250,000 payment adjusted for inflation. This "largesse," incidentally, occurred only a year before the United States prevented England from intervening to protect what it felt were its rights to the Suez Canal.
Over the past 75 years, Mr. President, we have paid Panama about $70 million or, on the average, less than $1 million per year for the use of these resources. During this time, our relations with Panama have been a festering sore. Never have we treated this nation as a sovereign entity, as an equal partner in a cooperative enterprise.
We often intervened in internal Panamanian affairs, shaping policies and even fomenting changes in government.
In short, Mr. President, we acted as if we owned the place.
That attitude is what has most rankled the Panamanians.
The record shows that the people of Panama remain second-class citizens in their own country — a country where virtually every important political and economic development for most of this century has been influenced by someone else, usually the United States.
Clearly, in fairness to the people of Panama, a new arrangement is long overdue.
But Mr. President, what about fairness to ourselves?
I have always believed that Americans are fundamentally fair minded. We want our foreign policy to reflect our beliefs and our ideals as well as our interests.
But, the current arrangements not only pose a direct challenge to our ideals, they are inconsistent with our long-range political, economic, and military needs.
The Republic of Panama is engaged in a struggle to respond to the legitimate needs and concerns of its people. The question the Panamanians are asking us is, will we continue to stand in their way?
They and other nations of the Third World are waiting to see if we will be responsive to their aspirations — or if our promises are good only when we need their help.
Perceptions of acceptable behavior by and among nations have changed dramatically since the beginning of the century.
In 1903, the industrialized world was very much caught up in a colonialist fever. If such attitudes did not entirely justify our cavalier treatment of Panama, they certainly made it more acceptable in the eyes of the major powers.
Anti-colonialism is now the order of the day. Over the past 30 years, we have encouraged many major allies to respond to the growing voices of nationalism within their empires. Ironically, we are now being asked to respond to a similar voice ourselves. And the entire world is watching to see what we decide.
Among those paying closest attention are our good neighbors to the south who see the canal issue as symbolic of U.S. intentions toward Latin America as a whole.
These, then, are the factors which must be weighed while considering the treaties before us.
How do they fit in with what must clearly be the central question for all legislators: "Is it in our national interest?"
In this situation, our dilemma is defining our national interest. I agree with those who have said that as far as the Panama Canal is concerned, our national interest is to be able to have certain and safe use of that historic waterway.
MILITARY BENEFITS
The interest of the U.S. military is to continue to use the canal.
During World War II, there were 6,400 transits of the canal by United States and allied combat vessels and some 10,300 by other military vessels. The Governor of the Canal Zone reported to Congress afterward that such unfettered transiting saved the United States an estimated $1.5 billion, not to mention countless American and allied lives.
In the peak Vietnam war period, 49 percent of all cargo heading for Southeast Asia transited the canal. In any NATO scenario, according to the Defense Department, use of the canal would improve the availability of warships and logistical support by 15 to 21 days.
Aside from our 13 giant aircraft carriers, our surface Navy can and does travel easily through the canal. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the United States maintains a two-ocean Navy with separate fleets as well as adequate contingency forces.
Therefore, they have testified to various congressional committees that in the future, the canal would be very important in moving most of our combat, support, and cargo ships in the event of an outbreak of hostilities in Asia or in Europe.
They also have argued that in the best of all possible worlds, U.S. security interests would be ideally served by our retaining control of the canal.
But, they acknowledge, we do not live in such a world. Admiral Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations, testified that "the Panamanians don't want us there."
The Chiefs have pointed out that the canal is impossible to defend against any nuclear attack, missile attacks, and acts of terrorism.
In a hostile political environment, even under the current treaty arrangement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff state that they are unable to guarantee the canal's continuous operation. They believe U.S. security interests will be best served by a new treaty, one in which Panama is a willing partner, not an unwilling foe.
"It is easy," Secretary Brown told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "to damage a lock so that the canal's operation is shut down for a brief period. It is easy to do that over and over again."
(Mr. ANDERSON assumed the chair.)
Mr. MUSKIE. What do we want? Do we want a situation where we may have to use force over and over again in order to preserve the operability of the canal, or do we want a situation where the people of Panama see themselves correctly as having an important stake in keeping the canal operating? Well, clearly, the latter is the preferable situation.
It is unrealistic, Mr. President, to expect to operate the canal when the local people are opposed to our role. To do so requires a large military force which would be an affront not only to Panama, but to all our Latin American friends. Admiral Zumwalt, the former Chief of Naval Operations, summed up the situation:
It would not be feasible to defend the Canal if the Government of Panama did not cooperate.
Beyond the canal's immediate military value, the United States has utilized the zone for the operations of the U.S. Southern Command which is headquartered there.
ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL BENEFITS
Mr. President, there is no question that the Panama Canal has served American economic and commercial interests well. The availability of the canal improved communications and transportation between our developed east coast and the developing West. The canal certainly hastened the development of our Nation.
One reason was simple — the distance from East to West by sea had been cut by weeks. Also, the terms of the 1903 treaty allowed us to determine what to charge for an essentially Panamanian resource. Thus we could, and did, determine what rates would best suit American policy. We could, and did, subsidize the canal, and we also, in effect, worked out an arrangement whereby Panama subsidized the canal, as well.
While our expansionary goals were well served by the canal, so were our commercial interests. There is no way to accurately put a dollar figure on even the direct benefits of the canal to American business. Certainly, it is in the billions of dollars. Especially if we add the benefits to the world's shipping fleets, some 70 countries in all, and the world's consumers have benefited from the cheaper rates.
In 1973, the United Nations was able to quantify the dollar cost of closing the Suez Canal from 1967 to 1975. The U.N. put the yearly cost at $1.7 billion. Surely, that is an order of magnitude that gives us some clue as to the value of benefits generated by the Panama Canal.
Another way to assess the value of the canal is to estimate its commercial value. Last January 20, United Brands Co., in testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, supported the treaties. The company official estimated that United Brands paid $15 million last year to the Panamanian Government for the use of 47 square miles of land. We paid $2.3 million last year for the use of 647 square miles, including offshore areas. If we paid the same per acre cost as United Brands, our yearly payment would be not $2.3 million, but $207 million.
It becomes apparent, Mr. President, that our use of Panama's geographical resource was obtained at rock-bottom price.
Let me underscore that point. In 1903, we bought a resource. Just as in my home State the rivers and coastline were for centuries Maine's most valuable resources, Panama's geographical location was and remains its most important asset.
The United States bought rights to it, just as private timber companies buy rights from the U.S. Government to cut timber on Federal land. We pay a royalty to Panama. But we pay far less to the Panamanians than we charge American companies for the privilege of enjoying our Federal timber resource. We pay less than oil companies pay for exploration rights. Less than coal companies pay for mining rights. In fact, the U.S. Government collected $4 billion last year in royalties for just two resources, oil and uranium. Yet, we pay Panama only $2.3 million.
It should be recognized that the canal itself is not now as critical to U.S. economic interests as it once was. The largest supertankers and our 13 aircraft carriers cannot use the canal. There are many transportation options which are economically competitive. But no one denies that the canal is still valuable.
That is why I am fascinated by the supposed logic of those who argue that on the one hand the canal remains vital to U.S. commercial interests, but on the other hand, are unwilling to pay the Panamanians what the canal is worth.
This line of reasoning is based perhaps on a desire to continue the policy of economic bargain- hunting we foisted on Panama in 1903, or on a fear that if rates are raised, the canal will lose its value to American commerce.
Unfortunately, rates will not remain frozen no matter who operates the canal. American rate- setting for the canal still amounts to a commercial subsidy. The State Department estimates that in 1937 dollars, the per ton fee for use of the canal has declined from $1.31 in 1914 to 29 cents in 1976.
The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations compares Panama Canal rates with Suez Canal rates:
Current toll rates in Panama are $1.29 per PCT (Panama Canal Ton) for laden ships, and $1.03 per PCT for ships transiting in ballast. In contrast, the Suez Canal toll rates are $1.61 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)— ($1.98) per Suez Canal ton (generally equivalent to one PCT) for bulk cargo and tankers, and $1.77 SDR ($2.17) per ton for general cargo.
Canal Company profits have been declining for most of the past decade, and the Company is in the black now only because of the North Slope oil bonanza. Rates will go up.
BUDGETARY AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
In my role as chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, I have studied closely the budgetary and financial implications of the Treaties.
My committee experience has taught me that economic projections are at best estimates which are based on certain assumptions about the future. I am unable, as is each Member here, to predict the world economy 5 or 20 years from now or the way in which Panama will manage its affairs.
I do know for sure that costs are escalating for operating the canal and alternate routes are more and more attractive. Tolls will have to be increased, with or without the treaties.
The budgetary implications of the treaties reflecting the change in the U.S.role in Panama fall into several categories. Let me summarize.
First. There are two kinds of retirement payments to be made. Workers in the Canal Zone can ask the United States to turn over retirement payments we have been holding in trust in the civil service retirement fund. A smaller payment would be made on behalf of Panamanians being employed by the military in the Zone. Payments would be made to a Panamanian social security fund in both cases.
The second retirement payment would be a direct offer of early retirement for American employees of the canal enterprise. The Government of Panama gains nothing from any of these payments.
Second. There are budgetary implications associated with our continued military presence. One such is the consolidation of defense facilities. Another would allow the DOD to assume operation of schools and hospitals. A small expenditure to develop new recreational and other base support facilities would be a further cost.
The Panamanian Government gains nothing from these payments.
Third. Relocating the remains of Americans who are buried in the zone may also require new outlays.
Fourth. Then there are contingent liabilities to the U.S. Government. At the present time, the Panama Canal Company has a line of credit with the U.S. Treasury of $40 million. If the canal showed a temporary operating loss, the company under the present arrangements could borrow to continue operations until tolls could be raised and repay the loan from canal revenues.
Under the new treaty, the Panama Canal Commission, a U.S. Government agency, is expected to require similar borrowing authority as a matter of prudent management.
We also promise, Mr. President, to turn the canal over "free of liens and debts." Opponents who argue that this is a blank check for the Panamanians use a fascinating bit of logic, as I understand their arguments. This provision of the treaty represents our promise to turn over a canal in operating order and not a worthless piece of junk. It is also our promise that the new Panama Canal Commission, as an agency of the Federal Government, will be a competent, efficient group of men and women who will run the canal as wisely as they can.
In both cases, to promise otherwise is not to promise at all. And those who complain about this section, it seems to me, would have us apply a different set of principles than those all Americans use in their daily commerce.
Fifth. Obligation to continue the current level of assistance to Panama is nothing more than our promise to continue our current policy toward Panama, a policy developed in light of American security and economic interests and approved separately by this Congress.
Mr. President, the distribution of revenues from the canal is another question. Opponents have tried to claim these as costs of the treaties. They are nothing of the sort. They are simply agreements on how to distribute revenues. There might be a net revenue loss to the Treasury as a result of canceling "interest payments" which the United States unilaterally began to charge in the 1950's to siphon off profits from the canal. The Government of Panama would, of course, benefit from these distributions of revenues, and it should. It certainly has not until now.
While projections are difficult, my best estimate is that over the next 21 years the reduction of the U.S. role in Panama will cost us $34 million a year more than under existing arrangements.
Of course, if the United States were a private company like United Brand, we would already be paying upwards of $200 million a year more than we now pay for using the zone. But we are a government, so we are getting a bargain.
This $34 million is less than we now pay more fortunate allies for similar considerations. For instance, the Spanish base treaty alone costs the United States $35 million per year in direct payments. The still incomplete base arrangement with Turkey, if approved by Congress, will cost $50 million annually. The package of credits and loan guarantees to be made available for Spain and Turkey, in concert with these base arrangements, will amount to $120 million and $200 million per year, respectively.
In my discussion of the costs of the treaties, Mr. President, I did not attempt to place a value on the canal and related facilities as assets of the Government.
This was not an oversight on my part. Our Federal budget lists no capital assets. We use a unique accounting system which routinely puts no dollar value on our public buildings, aircraft, ships, tanks, typewriters, or paper clips. We do not hold depreciable assets as a government.
One reason for this decision might well be the very difficulty proponents and opponents are having in estimating the value of the canal. I have seen estimates ranging from $230 million to $10 billion. In fact, my staff has made estimates in that range, and the numbers depend on the accounting system which is chosen.
Those numbers are no more relevant than would be the sum total of assets abandoned in Europe after World War II, or assets abandoned whenever the military decides to close an airbase or Army fort. I am fighting a decision to cut back an airbase in Maine, and I would very much appreciate having that kind of accounting weapon at my command, for I could then argue that the Air Force must write the capital loss off on its balance sheet.
When military bases are closed at various times and places in our country, no one would call the price paid by DOD for leaving the local community "a good deal" to the people now left with a piece of barren real estate and vacant old buildings. The Panama Canal's value is in its use, not in its standing as a monument. The Panamanians cannot sell it, and we are not going to allow it to be placed on the international auction block.
The fact is that decisions to abandon governmental capital assets are made regularly. The canal is not being abandoned, in fact, but will continue to be just as much of an asset to American commerce as it has been for the past 75 years.
These treaties are no giveaway. They are a change of command. Panama will not want to sell its chief asset for scrap metal.
There is another part to the cost equation. I began my statement by discussing whether we have been fair to the Panamanians over these past 75 years. I think it is appropriate to bring the subject up again at this point.
The United States has not been the sole contributor to the building and operation of the canal.
The Panamanians have shared the burden. Their contribution has been less tangible than ours, but just because we cannot attach a dollar value to it, it is no less real.
To begin with the most obvious — Panama has contributed its unique geography and its valuable real estate so that nations of the world could improve their commercial positions. Granted that the location of the isthmus in Panama is a geographical accident. But so is the location of a large share of the world's oil in the Middle East an accident. Our friends in the Middle East expect to get properly reimbursed for their prime national resource. So do the Panamanians.
As Dr. Milton Eisenhower reported to President Eisenhower in 1958 on what a Panamanian patriot had told him during a fact-finding trip:
You in the United States inherited vast mineral wealth — Africa was given gold and diamonds. The Middle East is rich in oil. God gave Panama nothing but a waterway. We must make a living from our resources, as others have from theirs.
One can make all kinds of guesses about what might or might not have happened in Panama if the United States had not built the canal. I suppose it is conceivable that Panama would have remained undeveloped; however, I doubt it, and the plain fact is that the Panamanians gave up to international usage 647 square miles of property — about 60 percent the size of Rhode Island — right through the middle of their country ,which could have been used for domestic purposes. Indeed, to this day most of the Canal Zone remains undeveloped jungle.
Incidentally, there is only one means for Panamanians to travel from one part of the country to the other, a single bridge at one end of the canal. That is the economic tie that binds the two halves of Panama together. Panamanians traveling from one part of their country to another pass through a foreign zone subject to foreign laws.
The Panamanians have also contributed their major river system and its fresh water to the operation of the canal. Every year there are about 13,000 transits. Six hundred billion gallons of fresh water are needed to send all those ships through the canal. That's a tremendous amount of fresh water — two to three times the amount of water in Lake Ontario. Our colleagues from the parched Western States must appreciate how large a contribution that represents.
The canal has provided the people of the 70 or more nations which use the shortcut annually more than six decades of commercial benefits. Once ships were saved the expensive and arduous route around Cape Horn, transportation costs for raw materials and manufactured products were cut dramatically. It would be difficult to put a price tag on what an increase in tolls could cost the consumer, much less put a price tag on the billions of dollars the world consumers have saved since 1914 and are still saving.
As I stated when I began my discussion about the budgetary and financial implications of the treaties, I felt it my responsibility to address the question of what the new arrangements would cost the taxpayer. Having analyzed the direct, one-time, and recurring costs, plus the contingent liabilities, I added the direct costs and found that the difference between the current arrangements and those proposed in the treaties averages about $34 million a year. The Congressional Budget Office and the administration corroborate these calculations.
The Panama Canal treaties are not cost free. They do not, however, have a significant budget impact in a $500 billion budget. And in no way are we issuing the Panamanians a blank check.
We all have to make up our own minds as to whether we think we can afford to pay $34 million a year — an amount equal to 1 week's farm income support payments or the annual grant to supply the Nation's Capital with a mass transit system — to continue to have safe and certain use of the Panama Canal.
Though $34 million is a good deal of money to my constituents and yours, I myself believe we can afford that cost a lot better than we could to spend untold millions to repair the damage caused by sabotage to any of the locks or to Lake Gatun. Or a lot better than we could afford the millions of dollars it would take to support the 100,000 troops General McAuliffe testified would be needed to protect the canal against a 10,000-person guerrilla force.
I am aware from having listened to the debate over the last few weeks that some of my colleagues have cited a variety of problems they have with the treaties. I hope I have clarified some of the points, and I urge my colleagues not to turn these treaties down for financial reasons.
Frankly, the figures I have discussed lead me to conclude that the cost argument is a red herring.
As chairman of the Budget Committee you do not often hear me saying this — but I think $34 million per year is a fair price to pay for what we would gain from these treaties: assured, continued use of an essential waterway.
In the context of the historical evolution of our relations with Panama, our commercial and military interests in the canal, and our international position, it is clear to me that the advantages of these treaties to both the United States and Panama far outweigh the costs involved.
In consenting to the ratification of these treaties, we will not lose the canal. On the contrary, we are taking the steps necessary to gain and maintain safe and certain access to this international passageway.
Americans have always taken great pride in the building and operation of the Panama Canal — and rightfully so. It was a brilliant technological and medical feat.
Today, we are being called upon to redefine the status of this important waterway, a symbol of economic and political independence for a friendly neighbor to the South.
These treaties are an opportunity to reaffirm our strength while standing by our ideals and our interests, because in this case, they coincide.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the Budget Committee staff's cost table, plus the views of the Congressional Budget Office and the administration about this table, so that Members of the Senate may have access to the details underlying the budgetary conclusions which I have stated in my prepared remarks.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
Total payments to Panama for property rights land use, and water rights under the treaty of 1903
Title and treaty rights:
Millions
Payment to Republic of Panama $10.0
Payment to individual property owners 4.0
Madden Dam area land rights, 1924-32 0.4
Payment to Panama for annuity:
1913-20 (capitalized as construction costs) 2.0
1921-51 (dollar value in gold changed, 1933) 11.0
1952-77 (dollar value in gold changed, 1973 and 1974) 45.9
Total payment to Panama for property and water rights 73.3
[FOOTNOTES OMITTED]
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, D.C.,
February 25, 1978.
Hon. EDMUND S. MUSKIE,
Chairman, Committee on the Budget,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your request of February 23, 1978, CBO has reviewed the estimate of costs associated with the Panama Canal Treaty as prepared by the staff of the Senate Budget Committee. To expedite a response, the attached table retains the format and methodology developed by the staff of the Budget Committee with suggested adjustments in estimates and foot-notes.
The concept of cost used is similar to the estimated costs used in CBO Section 403 cost estimates. It is not an estimate of required appropriations. No attempt was made to spread costs by fiscal year or to inflate costs using current economic assumptions.
The estimate assumes the Treaty payments to the Republic of Panama will be paid out of canal revenues and the Canal Commission will be self-sustaining. The Canal Company has authority to seek appropriations to cover operating losses, and similar authority may be sought for the new Commission. We are continuing to review Administration studies concerning the financial viability of the canal.
The attachment contains some changes from our letter to the Foreign Relations Committee. It contains our best estimate of the cost items and their magnitude available at this time, subject to the above limitations and assumptions in the footnotes. Should you so desire, we would be pleased to provide further assistance.
Sincerely,
ALICE M. RIVLIN,
Director.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C.,
February 25, 1978.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter of February 23 on the economic aspects of the Panama Canal Treaties. We find the staff's estimate to be within the general range of cost estimates noted in the letter from Secretaries Vance, Brown and Alexander of February 10 to you and other Senators. The staff's summary has been discussed with the Department of Defense, and they have made certain specific observations which are contained in the enclosed memorandum.
We would like to offer the following comments on the summary:
Listed among the "one-time" costs is the transfer to the Panama Social Security System of Civil Service Contributions of Employees of the Canal Enterprise, a figure of $3–17.5 million. This amount represents the Panama Canal Company/Canal Zone Government contribution to the U.S. Civil Service Retirement fund that will have been deposited on behalf of employees during their employment with the Canal enterprise. The funds therefore represent a refund of deposits already made by the Canal enterprise for employee retirement rather than fresh expenditure. These funds have come from Canal-generated revenues.
Also, the withdrawal of these retirement funds from the Civil Service System may result in diminishing liability for payment of future benefits.
Another "one-time cost" in the summary is the $40 million net borrowing authority which the Administration will propose for the Panama Canal Commission. This figure, of course, does not represent a new cost to the Government but rather a replacement for the $40 million net borrowing authority of the present Canal Company. We therefore suggest that item 19 not be labeled "new" borrowing authority. Item 19 might be deleted and footnote "1" refer to item 22. I should also note that if the borrowing authority were used, we would expect that the Commission would be required to repay the loan, with interest, from future revenues.
Discontinuing the interest payment or net investment to the U.S. Treasury is listed as a "recurring cost" which would amount to approximately $433 million over the lifetime of the Treaty. It will be the Administration's recommendation in implementing legislation to discontinue this payment in order to provide maximum benefit to world shipping. Interest payments were not made prior to 1951. Nevertheless, the Treaty does not specifically prohibit the payment of interest, and the Congress could require interest paymentsto be continued. It might therefore be appropriate to break down item 21 into an estimate of appropriated funds and an estimate of the forbearance of the annual interest payment to the Treasury, since each is a different category of cost.
We believe that the Budget Committee staff cost estimates, taking into account our observations and those of the Department of Defense, represent the best available information on the budgetary impact of the implementation of the new treaties. However, the exact budgetary impact cannot be measured by the Administration until the legislation implementing the new treaties has been passed by Congress.
Should you require any further information regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to let me know.
With best regards.
Sincerely,
DOUGLAS J. BENNET, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.