February 28, 1978
Page 4876
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a few questions and comments I would like to make?
Mr. MUSKIE. Yes, I yield to the Senator from Illinois.
Mr. PERCY. First, I think the penetrating analysis that the distinguished chairman of the Budget Committee has given once again proves the value of the work the Senator from Maine and I did years ago, several years ago, working on a budget committee, that we ought to have such a process in the Senate, that we ought to have our own body of experts, so that whenever a matter involving budgetary considerations comes up we would have available expert staff and the Senators who have been disciplined and trained in that particular area.
I think the value of this has now certainly been proven in any number of cases that have come before us, but here dramatically in an area involving our relationships with an ally abroad.
As I listened to my distinguished colleague I could not help but think of the number of times in some 30 years' business experience I have seen, been witness to, the fact that two business organizations that had a contract that had been outmoded by time have had to come together to redo that agreement to make it something that both could live with.
I think one principle any businessman would soon discover is that you cannot really, in a sense, hold someone to a contract that has proven totally disadvantageous to one of the parties, and so grossly unfair that all the advantage ran to the other party. Individuals know that in employment contracts. Companies know that, and so, too, even in a labor negotiation with management, we learn that contracts constantly have to be redone, renegotiated, and certainly the problem we are having now in the coal mining industry indicates that until both parties are reasonably satisfied, or at least equally happy or unhappy, we are not going to have a settlement.
So, too, when people ask, why should we do this, I would only refer them back to many of the eloquent statements made by our distinguished colleague as to the gross unfairness, in the year 1978, of this particular treaty of 1903. And really, of the 75 witnesses the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had before it, I never heard a witness say we could cling to that 1903 treaty. They all admitted that, in some form or other, it had to be changed and modified. So the question is as to the degree of change. I commend our distinguished colleague from Maine on his analysis of what changes were necessary, and why.
If we agree in principle that certain changes are necessary, I would like to concentrate for a few moments on several aspects of references made by our distinguished colleague from Maine.
First, the security interests. Would our colleague indicate his judgment as to whether the security interests of the United States are now protected by the new treaties, at least to the year 2000, and that the military security of the Panama Canal Zone for at least the next 2 years is insured, and in a sense guaranteed, to the extent that we can do so, by the new treaties before the Senate?
Mr. MUSKIE. I have been persuaded that that is the judgment of the current Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am aware, of course, that there is some disagreement on the part of former generals and admirals. From public and private testimony, it is that the current military leadership of the country is delighted with getting us the kind of assurance provided by the treaties before us.
Mr. PERCY. The Senator from Illinois had concluded that our security interests were protected, but came back from the Panama Canal Zone with the conclusion that an understanding or reservation would be needed with respect to our unilateral right to intervene, and that I would vote against the treaties as signed by the President and General Torrijos unless there was an actual amendment to the language of the treaties themselves, to make it absolutely clear that we had that unilateral right to intervene militarily at any time we felt the security was endangered after the year 2000; and that obviously the right to go to the head of the line whenever it is in our national security interest should be protected by actual amendment to the language of the treaties themselves. Is that the same position that the distinguished Senator from Maine has taken?
Mr. MUSKIE. I applaud the addition of that language to the treaties for the same reasons stated by the distinguished Senator from Illinois. I think that both of us were cosponsors of that language.
It clarifies the point that the United States, without consulting anybody, can take the steps necessary in its judgment to protect the canal. I think that clarification is very useful.
Mr. LAXALT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Who has the floor, Mr. president?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine has the floor.
Mr. MUSKIE. I will be happy to yield.
Mr. PERCY. I would like to come back to my colloquy.
Mr. LAXALT. Certainly. I commend the Senator from Maine for what I consider to be his very fair statement on the subject we have been discussing. I must say that the Senator from Maine comes out somewhat differently than the Senator from Nevada on the matter of costs, but that can be straightened out.
With respect to the point the Senator from Illinois raises, the treaties also provide, do they not, that in this process this country will be precluded from intervening in the internal affairs of Panama? Does that present, in the mind of the Senator from Maine, a conflict, as it does in the mind of the Senator from Nevada?
Mr. MUSKIE. Not at all. I ask unanimous consent that pages 6, 7, and 8 of the committee report be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the excerpt from the report (Ex. No. 95-12) was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT OF INTENT
The Committee's intent in recommending the adoption of these two amendments to the Neutrality Treaty is that the Carter-Torrijos Joint Statement of October 14, 1977, be made an integral part of the treaty with the same force and effect as those treaty provisions submitted to the Senate initially for its advice and consent.
The Committee had originally voted to include the Joint Statement in a single amendment which would have added as a new article IX to the treaty. Upon being advised by the State Department — contrary to previous advise — that this placement could require a new Panamanian plebiscite. the Committee voted to reconsider the proposed article IX and voted instead to recommend the addition of that same material, in two parts, to articles IV and VI. This did not represent a "flip-flop"; in each instance the substantive wording was identical to that of the Joint Statements, and each provision — whether placed in one article or in two — would have had precisely the same legal effect, being equally binding internationally. The difference is purely one of cosmetics. If a negligible change in form, with no change whatsoever in substance, could obviate the need for a new plebiscite — an eventuality which could complicate vastly the ratification process — then the Committee concluded that it would happily oblige.
The meaning of these amendments, which together constitute the entire Joint Statement, is plain. The first amendment relates to the right of the United States to defend the Canal. (It creates no automatic obligation to do so. See p. 74 of this report.) It allows the United States to introduce its armed forces into Panama whenever and however the Canal is threatened. Whether such a threat exists is for the United States to determine on its own in accordance with its constitutional processes. What steps are necessary to defend the Canal is for the United States to determine on its own in accordance with its constitutional processes.When such steps shall be taken is for the United States to determine on its own in accordance with its constitutional processes.The United, States has the right to act if it deems proper against any threat to the Canal, internal or external, domestic or foreign, military or non-military. Those rights enter into force on the effective date of the treaty. They do not terminate.
The above-described rights are not affected by the second paragraph of the amendment, which provides that the United States has no "right of intervention ... in the internal affairs of Panama,"and which prohibits the United States from acting "against the territorial integrity or political independence ofPanama." The Committee notes, first, that these provisions prohibit the United States from doing nothing that it is not already prohibited from doing under the United Nations Charter, which proscribes "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state"(article 2(4)). The Committee never supposed that the United States, in entering into the Neutrality Treaty, intended to obtain powers that it had previously renounced.The Committee thus does not believe that the provision in question substantively alters Panama.
Second, the prohibitions set forth in the second paragraph do not derogate from the rights conferred in the first. The Joint Statement recognizes that the use of Panamanian territory might be required to defend the Canal. But that use would be for the sole purpose of defending the Canal — it would be purely incidental to the Canal's defense; it would be strictly a means to that end, rather than an end in itself; and it would not be carried out for the purpose of taking Panamanian territory. The concepts of the territorial integrity and political independence of Panama are, in short, an integral part of the treaty, so that action directed at preserving the regime of neutrality set forth in the treaty would never be directed Against Panama's territorial integrity or political independence.
For these reasons, use of Panamanian territory to defend the Canal would clearly be permissible under the portion of the Joint Statement incorporated in Article IV. This is made clear in an opinion presented to the Committee by the Department of Justice (hearings, part 1, p. 332) :
"A legitimate exercise of rights under the Neutrality Treaty by the United States would not, either in intent or in fact, be directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of Panama. No question of detaching territory from the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Panama would arise. Nor would the political independence of Panama be violated by measures calculated to uphold a commitment to the maintenance of the Canal's neutrality which Panama has freely assumed. A use of force in these circumstances would not be directed against the form or character or composition of the Government of Panama or any other aspect of its political independence; it would be solely directed and proportionately crafted to maintain the neutrality of the Canal."
Finally, even if a conflict were somehow to arise between the two paragraphs, because the United States has the right to act against "any ... threat directed against the Canal", there is no question that the first would prevail. The rights conferred therein are stated in absolute terms and must therefore be construed as controlling.
The meaning of the recommended amendment to article VI is equally clear. This provision — extracted verbatim from the Joint Statement — confers upon United States warships and auxiliary vessels the right to go "to the head of the line"in an "emergency".
What constitutes an emergency, and when one exists, is for the United States and the United States alone to determine. The provision could hardly be more explicit.
Like the recommended amendment to article IV, this amendment, if adopted by the Senate, will become an integral part of the treaty, of the same force and effect as all other provisions. The Committee is informed by the Department of State that the Government of the Republic of Panama has concluded that no new plebiscite will be required for the approval of the two amendments. Together, they comprise the verbatim text of the Joint Statement, which was read by General Torrijos to the people of Panama live on national television three days before the October 23 plebiscite. (See p. 478 of part 1 of the hearings for a list of Panamanian newspapers in which the Joint Statement appeared prior to the holding of the plebiscite.) It thus is clear that the Panamanian people were fully apprised of the Joint Statement prior to the plebiscite, and were accorded a full opportunity to consider its provisions before approving the treaties.
Mr. MUSKIE. I think it is very clear. Let me read this much from it:
What steps are necessary to defend the Canal is for the United States to determine on its own in accordance with its constitutional processes. When such steps shall be taken is for the United States to determine on its own in accordance with its constitutional processes. The United States has the right to act if it deems proper against any threat to the Canal, internal or external, domestic or foreign, military or non-military. Those rights enter into force on the effective date of the treaty. They do not terminate.
With respect to the point the Senator raises, the committee report, on page 7, says this:
use of Panamanian territory to defend the Canal would clearly be permissibleunder the portion of the Joint Statement incorporated in Article IV.
Then the treaty makes clear, in the other language to which the Senator refers, that use of the territory of the Republic of Panama for the purpose of defending the canal cannot be converted into intervention in the internal affairs of Panama.
In other words, it is quite conceivable, as in Europe in World War II, for one nation to use the territory of another nation in order to combine in defending the common interests, without, in the process, threatening or jeopardizing the sovereignty of the nation whose territory they used. We used the territories of France and Britain in World War II to defend the West. It was always clear, of course, that we did not do so with the view of challenging the sovereignty of those nations, and the same kind of arrangement would hold in the case of Panama.
If we had to use the territory of Panama, this treaty makes it clear that we would have no standing under the treaty or in the court of world opinion to convert that use into an actual challenge to the sovereignty of the Republic of Panama.
So I view the second paragraph, not as denying the use of the territory of the Republic of Panama for the purpose of defending it, but as denying a right to the use of the territory of the Republic of Panama to interfere in its internal affairs.
However, according to the Foreign Relations Committee report the prohibitions set forth in the second paragraph of the amendments I have cosponsored do not derogate from the rights conferred in the first.
The language is on page 7. I read this language from the committee report:
Finally, even if a conflict were somehow to arise between the two paragraphs, because the United States has the right to act against "any ... threat directed against the Canal", there is no question that the first would prevail. The rights conferred therein are stated in absolute terms and must therefore be construed as controlling.
Mr. LAXALT. Let me, if the Senator from Illinois will indulge me, review this arrangement, which I have substantial concern about.
During the initial period of some 23 years, I think probably our interests are fairly well protected, due to the fact that we have a military presence there, even though somewhat reduced.
But in the year 2000 we abandon our military presence entirely. What is the situation at that time, if we really do not have harmonious relations with the people of Panama, if we have difficulty with them? How can we then enforce realistically the points that are being asserted?
Mr. MUSKIE. The point to bear in mind is that the United States, with this language that is being added, reserves the right to make its judgments unilaterally.
Mr. LAXALT. I understand that.
Mr. MUSKIE. If in 1999 circumstances developed which to the United States would at least be interpreted as a threat to neutrality, I assume that the Government of the United States at that time would take into account the rights reserved to us under this treaty and exercise whatever judgment those situations required. If I could assume a scenario which would trigger the operation of this language of the treaty, the reserved right is there.
May I say in further response to the Senator, that the right to intervene is limited to the defense of the canal against threats against its neutrality. The treaty itself is consistent with United Nations and OAS charters which would preclude intervention in domestic Panamanian affairs.
Mr. LAXALT. But on this point, let us assume a scenario, because we have probable or possible results downstream when we evaluate these treaties. Let us assume that in the year 2000 we are out of Panama, there is no military presence, and we have difficulty with the Panamanians. How do we realistically safeguard and enforce our rights to protect American interests and at the same time stay out of the internal affairs of Panama?
Mr. MUSKIE. Here is a question which would be reserved for those who are on top of the situation to answer. Their right to make those decisions is what we establish in these treaties. I am simply not farsighted enough to make judgments on a hypothetical threat at that time. If it exists in 1998 or 1999, or 6 months in the last year of the century, then I would expect whatever means necessary would be taken.
Mr. LAXALT. The only point I want to make is that it is clear to me that, in the course of these debates, the conflict that we have now which I mentioned is almost irreconcilable. It seems to me that if we have difficulty with Panama we might as well understand it now. If we have to enforce and safeguard the rights which are being protected under the terms of the so-called leadership amendment, we are necessarily going to have to intrude upon the internal affairs of Panama.
Mr. MUSKIE. The only point I would make is that we and the Panamanians were both engaged in the conflict of World War II and are both aware of the capability which developed during the war and since to protect our interests overseas in hostile territories, at great distances. General Wilson testified before the Armed Services Committee that Marines can be landed by amphibious assault in 10 minutes. By the year 2000 I take it, if present planning evolves, our Navy will have smaller aircraft carriers which V/STOL aircraft and helicopters would use. I do not conceive of our being unable to apply whatever military pressure may be required. We cannot prevent acts of terrorism and sabotage, but we would be in a hard position to do that under the present treaty.
With respect to moving an effective military force into Panama I have no doubt, on the basis of our Nation's experience in the last 50 years, of our ability to apply the requisite military force to the Republic of Panama without having troops in force.
Other illustrations of that point could be made.
Mr. PERCY. Will the Senator permit me to ask a question?
Mr. LAXALT. I will in just a moment. It is the judgment of the Senator from Nevada that the matter of a continuing military presence in Panama is absolutely essential for the protection of the canal, not only from the standpoint of the interests of the Panamanians but our interests as well. We have debated this from the standpoint of the Allen amendment. It is my continuing concern that if we abandon a military presence within the canal itself in time we will live to regret it as a country. I think, too, that the Panamanians should understand that they may well live to regret it also.
It has been postured here, I think entirely too often, that the interests of Panama and ourselves in relation to the defense of the canal are somehow opposite interests. I do not share that view. It seems to me we have had common interests for the last 75 years. If somehow we can safeguard the interests through these treaties with a continuing military presence, it will be to the best interest of all concerned. That is all I wanted to say.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. MUSKIE. If I may make one further point, in the 20 years I have been in the Senate we have been constantly changing our defense posture around the world. We have changed the size of our military forces in hundreds if not thousands of spots. We have reduced our overall troop numbers from 3.5 million to less than 2.1 million. We have closed bases in this country and elsewhere. We have changed the nature and character of our forces in being.
If we were to take the position that once in place our troops should never be moved without risking our national interest, we would have to increase our troop strength substantially above what it presently is. There is more than one way to protect our national interest.
In World War II, of course, our presence around the world reached a peak. No one argued we should not maintain that presence. There have been arguments in this body about whether or not we ought to draw down our strength in Europe for one reason or another. We have drawn it down at times and built it back up at times. It is constantly changing.
I dispute whether the situation in Panama is so critically different from other places where we have changed our defense posture to require that forever after, from now on, we must have "x" number of bases in Panama, occupied by"x" number of troops. I just do not think that our military capability is that inflexible.
Mr. LAXALT. I did not mean to indicate that at all. I know that our military policy must necessarily be flexible for the reasons the Senator mentioned. But the Senator in a clear statement indicated that there is a conflict of opinion among respected military authorities in this country concerning the strategic and security importance of this canal. That being the case, I think to that extent it is unique. It is unlike the closing of a base here in this country and perhaps some adjustments in our NATO position.
Mr. MUSKIE. I think it would be more unique to find a situation where there was not disagreement.
Mr. LAXALT. I think that is possibly correct.
Mr. MUSKIE. We can look at Korea, situations in Panama, and Europe. There is disagreement among the military minds in every one of those areas. Does that mean we are never to make the change because we cannot obtain unanimity from all those involved in the Armed Forces who are holding office today or are retired? Somehow or other we have to make a judgment.
Mr. LAXALT. Precisely. My only concern is this: If we have a conflict of opinion here concerning the strategic importance of this canal, and if our continued military presence would be beneficial to hemispheric security and our own, we should far better be on the side of caution in this whole situation. I personally am of the belief that this is a vital, strategic waterway and asset. I base that not on my own opinion, being wholly inexpert, but from listening to people who are expert, I firmly believe that the Panama Canal is a vital, strategic asset. We should control it and operate it, and after the year 2000 we should have a continuing military presence there. That is the only point I make.
Mr. MUSKIE. Let me make one further point. Admiral Holloway, who is the present Chief of Naval Operations and whose military judgment I would guess is valuable whether or not one agrees with him, had this to say in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee:
If I can give my view which I think is representative of the Chiefs, we had two choices: One essentially was no new treaties, which could cause us to withdraw from the canal in the next 5 years under adverse conditions, or we could, with new treaties, provide for the future security of the canal. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one point; I think that there was no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a stronger conviction than myself of the national need for the use of the canal for our defense purposes in the future, and I was seeking the best solution to give us the highest assurance that we would be able to use the canal in the future.
It is for those reasons that Admiral Holloway supports these treaties, because he thinks they are consistent with the security interests of our country.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an unclassified statement on the Panama Canal have stated:
In a hostile environment, even under the current treaties, continuous operation of the canal cannot be guaranteed.
I understand the Senator is stating his opinion and the opinion of those experts in whom, presumably, he has greater confidence than he has in the present Joint Chiefs, which includes Admiral Holloway. Well, we cannot choose between black and white. We concede that all the Chiefs are qualified, all of them have a legitimate point of view. But those who now bear the responsibility in office, I submit, have to face the consequences of a wrong judgment more clearly than those whose responsibilities have been left behind. It is one thing to have a judgment on a matter this serious when one has the responsibility of decision; it is another if one develops an opinion on the sidelines. However valid and outstanding the experience, the immediacy of the decision making responsibility is what I look to.
I might have preferred to have a General Pershing make this judgment, but he is not in office now. I might have preferred to have a General Eisenhower's opinion, but he is not in office now, or a General Marshall's, but he is not in office now. The people in office now are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of whom Admiral Holloway is one, and they are in agreement that these treaties serve the defense interest of our country.
I yield to my good friend from Illinois.
Mr. PERCY. I would like to thank our distinguished colleague from Nevada for raising an extraordinarily important point, one that bothers a great many people; there is no question about that. It behooves us to try to answer those and look ahead.
The Senator from Illinois feels that there are economic, political, and military reasons for the use of the canal, and that is what we are really concerned about. We are not interested in just a piece of jungle property. We are interested in continued use of that canal, which is in the national security interests of the United States. How can we best insure that?
It would seem to the Senator from Illinois that, first of all, from an economic standpoint, we have to create a climate through new treaties that will give an economic advantage to Panama to want to continue to put whatever its presence can put behind the continued use of the canal behind that effort. Economically, these treaties, without any question, are now favorable enough to Panama to create a true partnership. They feel that economically, though they would like to have had even more revenue from it — and I think they are concerned about whether or not, by the year 2000, it is going to be a really viable, paying operation. We warned General Torrijos many times when there that the cost of maintaining it is going to go up every single year to keep it absolutely in top-flight shape and they should not overestimate the potential revenue they expect to get from it.
Certainly, their economic interests will be way ahead under these treaties as against the old treaties, when they have no real economic stake whatsoever. For the rights we enjoy there, $2.3 million is almost laughable. No one could defend that today in the light of the circumstances as we see them.
I would think, also, from a military standpoint, we are in a much better position if they have an economic interest and from a political standpoint, we are stronger if they have an economic interest, because politically, a government would be stronger if it protects that source of revenue coming to it, which would be an important source of revenue.
Therefore, politically, they would want to be with us. But there is nothing, as I see it, under the new treaties that would prevent Panama, when the year 2000 comes, and if they have been overly ambitious in feeling that they could be prepared at that stage to protect the canal militarily and unilaterally, from saying to the United States, "We would like you to continue your presence here."
The difference would be that we would continue at the invitation of the Government, as we are in some places around the world, rather than by a treaty that they feel is grossly unfair and which they did not even sign in 1903. But there is nothing that would prevent their looking at their obligations after the year 2000 and saying to the United States, "Our partnership is a viable and a good one. You have fulfilled your end of the bargain, we have fulfilled our end of the bargain. We think it is better for you to stay at our invitation, if you would be willing to do so, and keep your presence here."
Maybe we would not build anything on those bases, or, if we did leave them, we could make it very easily possible for us to go back if it were in our joint partnership interest for us to do so.
That is what we are trying to do, establish a relationship with Panama that is honorable, that is decent, and that is viable and advantageous for both parties. That is why, in the private sector, hundreds of thousands, millions of transactions are entered into, generally speaking, and held to because they are viable and fair and justifiable for both parties. Today, so many of us in the United States, and virtually everyone in the world, admits the 1903 treaty is not fair, viable, or just to the Panamanians as it now stands, and it has to be changed.
Finally, I think we can go to the military authority, and I would say that Gen. Louis Wilson, Commandant of the Marine Corps, when he testified, was saying what he earnestly and honestly believes is militarily viable. He said:
I do not believe, however, that successful defense of the canal is dependent upon continued United States military presence in Panama. With the capability of the Navy and the Marine Corps to provide an amphibious task force to steam within a few miles of either end of the canal, a meaningful United States presence, for all practical purposes, is assured.
I shall be very happy to yield to my distinguished colleague from Nevada, who raised this very good issue. I think it has been satisfactorily answered by our political judgment as well as our economic and military judgment.
Mr. LAXALT. Unfortunately, not to the satisfaction of the Senator from Nevada. The whole argument that has been posed here and, I think, the essence of the remarks by the general would indicate that this presupposes a continuing harmonious relationship with the country of Panama. Obviously, if we have no difficulties with Panama in the ensuing years and the year 2000, in all probability, they would and should, at least, invite us to be there to help protect the canal. That is not the source of concern of the Senator from Nevada and many of my colleagues on this side of the aisle. My problem stems from the fact that it may well be that we do not get along all that well with our respective partners. Partnerships have been known not to flourish in all circumstances between individuals as well as between nations.
It has been explained by Senator STENNIS here that on economic arrangements alone, Armed Services has defined, and Senator MUSKIE would know this as chairman of the Budget Committee, within the financial areas alone, there are about seven major areas that are sources of future discontent and serious disagreement with Panama, separate and aside from all the other political considerations.
Where are we in the year 2000, without any military presence, in the event we have difficulty with the Panamanians? That is the source of concern. Where is our protection? I cannot help but believe that our interests and the interests of this country and the interests of the hemisphere would be better protected if we had a continuing military presence within the zone itself, without having to rely upon amphibious help from the outside.
That is the source of concern that I have, I say to Senator PERCY.
Mr. PERCY. This is simply a value judgment that we all have to come to. I think certainly the Senator from Illinois has concluded this: If we reject, out of hand, these treaties or impose conditions upon Panamanians that they themselves reject and find unacceptable, we are guaranteeing an atmosphere of hostility and bitterness and nothing but trouble ahead.
Furthermore, the moral force of literally the entire world would be with Panama. We would be isolated.
We would be isolated. It is the United States against the whole world.
Now, maybe we feel we can slug it out with the rest of the world. Maybe we can defy the rest of the world. Maybe we can continue to look like hypocrites in the colonization of this particular area and our refusal to move along in accordance with what so many of us feel is uncharacteristic of America's greatness and lacking confidence in our ability to work out a relationship with a small country that is honorable, decent, and just.
I think, therefore, we move into a known area of hostility, into an area where, I would admit to my distinguished colleague from Nevada, we have no guarantees, any more than we can guarantee that the contract estimates that will be signed between the miners and the operators in the coal situation will guarantee harmony and peace in years ahead.
But what we can do is try to create conditions which will appear to make both parties probably satisfied and insure that we have established a new basis for moving ahead, rather than knowing we are creating a condition of hostility that could lead to nothing but trouble in the future and would jeopardize the use of the canal by the 70 nations, including the United States, that now enjoy the use of it and want to continue enjoying the use of it in the future.
Mr. MUSKIE. I might say in response to my good friend from Nevada, whom I know is motivated entirely in the debate by his real concerns, so I would like to engage in the discussion; that if what one looks for at the point of deciding whether or not to enter into a treaty arrangement with another country is: the absence of ambiguity, the assurance of future friendship and not hostility, the stable relationship from now on into the inevitable future, we are not ever going to enter into a treaty arrangement.
For instance, our enemies of World War II — Japan, Germany, and Italy — are our staunchest allies of today. If we were contemplating treaties with Japan, Italy, and Germany and we are moved by the fear that they might become hostile again in the way they were in World War II, I suppose we would not enter into any agreements with them.
As for ambiguities in written documents, whether they are constitutions, or treaties, or legislation, or private contracts between parties, ambiguities are almost unavoidable.
Mr. LAXALT. The Senator must be—
Mr. MUSKIE. If the treaties become a rationale for a confrontation and hostility, there is not much we can do about it. But if we enter into the treaty hoping to establish an amicable relationship, a healthy relationship, then presumably we have set the basis for an amicable resolution of ambiguities.
It is impossible to anticipate everything that may arise. In the budget process, I find it almost impossible to anticipate what will happen next year in the terms of programs, demands on the Federal Treasury, and so on. It is a very difficult thing to do.
So we try to anticipate and resolve, or provide a means for resolving, as many ambiguities as we can, knowing full well, human beings being what they are, there will be differences of opinion, unanticipated problems that will have to be dealt with. If by that time our relations have deteriorated to the point where they produce confrontation, we will have to live with that as it comes.
But I share Senator PERCY'S view that if we do what I think these treaties do, meet the Panamanians halfway, attempt to establish a new relationship, a healthy relationship, a cooperative relationship, a relationship in which their needs are considered as well as our own, we have laid the basis for a better relationship. And some of these problems can be resolved in that context.
But not all will be resolved today. The Treaty of 1936 did not resolve all of the problems that arose under the 1903 treaty. The 1955 treaty did not resolve all the problems that were known at the time of the 1936 treaty.
So there is no way, I believe, of putting together treaties or a treaty, that will demonstrably anticipate every conceivable problem that might arise.
Mr. PERCY. If my colleague will permit to observe one thing, the question raised by the Senator from Nevada is how do we know what the situation is going to be 22 years from now? We can sometimes gage the future by the past.
All we do know, if we look back 75 years, despite the fact that since the day the treaty was signed by a Frenchman and the Secretary of State, patriots, by our own testimony here, our own Secretary of State, would find many provisions in that treaty objectionable.
They have objected for 75 years. Only once — only once — did violence break out — in 1964, quickly settled, with the cooperation and support of the Panamanian Government, at which time they sat down to negotiate a new set of treaties that would remove all of those grievances they felt for so many years.
But have those grievances caused Panama to not be a good partner, a fine ally, and good friend of the United States in the meantime? No.
They point with great pride that at times of crisis they always stood with us. The most critical period in our history, probably, Pearl Harbor, when we were struck on December 7, 1941, they point with pride to the fact that the United States waited from Sunday to Monday to declare war on Japan. Panama called its Parliament together Sunday afternoon and unilaterally declared war on Japan.
Have they proven their friendship through the years? Yes.
Have they failed to uphold their end of the bargain, even though grossly unfair as negotiated against them? They have lived up to their end of it.
Why then, when we now have a set of treaties that are looked upon generally as fair, are ratified by a plebiscite by 63 percent of their population, why then would we have reason to question whether they would abide by those treaties and the spirit and terms of them and form a fine partnership with us when they have maintained their end of a very bad bargain for 75 years, and done so with tremendous patience, and then negotiated for 14 years to find a new basis for a treaty?
I think we have to judge the future by the past. That is why history is so helpful as we try to forecast the future.
Let us look back and see if it does not give us what we ask.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. PERCY. Yes.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that debate on the amendment by Mr. SCOTT be limited to 30 minutes beginning at 2 o'clock p.m. today, 30 minutes to be equally divided in accordance with the usual form, and that a vote, up or down, occur at the expiration of the 30 minutes on the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the Senator.
Mr. LAXALT. May I make this point to the Senator from Illinois? I do not want to interrupt the colloquy he is attempting to have with the Senator from Maine, but what he has said, the observations each Senator makes, underscore my concern, because we have had a situation with the Panamanians, regardless of our differences on the historical origins.
I happen to feel the interests of the Panamanians were well served. We emancipated them from the Colombians, which they had attempted to do for 50 years. We gave them magnificent facilities, a fine source of income, and all the rest of it.
But, be that as it may, what we are being asked to do is, and I mean by "we" the American people are being asked, to give away a facility of great value, indefinite, as the Senators indicated, for the reasons mentioned, and trading what has been a stable, predictable situation, serving everybody well, for one that has every indication of being unstable and unpredictable. I am not willing to make that exchange.
That does not mean, I say to Senator MUSKIE and Senator PERCY, that neither I nor the other Senators here who are opposing these treaties are insensitive to the needs of the Panamanians. Not at all. I have a suspicion that the $2.3 million presently paid is woefully inadequate. It probably is. That does not mean at all that we cannot sit down and negotiate some new and more equitable economic terms.
But the tradeoff that the Senator from Nevada is not willing to make is to trade off a vital, strategic utility and asset to a regime that may not be stable.
We have had evidence on this floor — and it has been deemed irrelevant — that the present Government of Panama may be engaged in drug trafficking, may be corrupt, may be unstable. I do not know what the answer is to that. I just am not willing to get into these unknown areas.
(Mr. NELSON assumed the chair.)
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. LAXALT. I yield.
Mr. MUSKIE. Drug trafficking, if there has been drug trafficking, has taken place under the 1903 treaty. It has not taken place under the new treaties. So if the old treaty has produced this drug trafficking, perhaps that is added reason to support the new treaties, not oppose them. I find it very difficult to understand the argument.
Mr. LAXALT.Let me try to explain it—
Mr. MUSKIE. Second, I say—
Mr. LAXALT. May I explain my concern?
Mr. MUSKIE. Just let me finish.
Mr. LAXALT. This is my view: I have been somewhat disappointed to hear a number of my colleagues tell me that a prospective partner which may be engaged in drug trafficking, which may be corrupt, is irrelevant. To me, it is highly relevant, because the fact is that we are being asked, under the terms of these treaties, to enter into what is tantamount to a partnership situation. Is that correct?
Mr. PERCY. That is correct.
Mr. LAXALT. It seems to me that the stability of our prospective partner is highly relevant. I hope the Senator from Illinois does not share the views of many colleagues I have heard here, to the effect that drug trafficking and perhaps corruption are irrelevant, in terms of a prospective partner. He does not share that view, does he?
Mr. PERCY. The Senator from Illinois does not share that view at all.
Mr. MUSKIE. Drug trafficking takes place in this country. Does that mean that other countries should not enter into treaty arrangements with us because we have drug traffickers? I suspect we have more of it than almost any other country on Earth. Is that a reason to suspend civilized arrangements and negotiations with other countries and not intended to be a moral judgment of those who run that country?
Mr. LAXALT. Precisely. It is a little country of 1.3 million people.
Mr. MUSKIE. If I may finish—
Mr. LAXALT. All right.
Mr. MUSKIE. What about the 1903 treaty? If ever a negotiator of a treaty was in a conflict of interest situation, it was Philippe Bunau-Varilla. If the "unclean hands" doctrine which the Senator is espousing here is a reason for the United States not to enter into a treaty with the Republic of Panama until somebody else heads that country then is it not reason to abrogate the 1903 treaty? We benefitted from the fact that Panama's representative in 1903 — who was a Frenchman — was demonstrably serving his own financial interests.
Mr. LAXALT. And I think at the same time was serving the interests of the brand new, little country of Panama.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, who has the floor? I should like to finish my reply.
Mr. LAXALT. I do not mean to interrupt. Go ahead.
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator says that because the head of the Government of Panama may be involved in drug trafficking, we should not enter into a treaty — not with him, but with the Republic of Panama. If we apply that standard, then, on the basis of Philippe Bunau-Varilla's connection with the 1903 treaty, we should unilaterally abrogate that treaty. Is it a different standard in 1978 than it was in 1903?
Mr. LAXALT. I think history will reveal, whatever version one wants to accept, that the negotiator for the then spawning country of Panama was authorized to negotiate for that country. When that treaty eventually was negotiated successfully, it was met with great acclaim and acceptance within the country of Panama. In addition, the terms of the treaty were ratified by not only the Federal but also the local governments in Panama.
So I do not think that the situations truly are comparable.
My only concern is this, without beating the point to death: It seems to me that whether or not a small country which is ruled by an admitted dictator may be engaged in drug .trafficking — I think Senator BAYH, to his great credit, conceded that, and conceded the fact that members of Torrijos' family and close associates are engaged in that trafficking; conceded, further, that the general himself is aware of it and has not done much about it — is of great relevance in determining whether or not we should enter into this treaty.
To me, it is just basic, in an effort to try to determine if you enter into a partnership concerning a valued facility, the Panama Canal as to whether that government is stable. To me, it is just basic.
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator says that the treaty was hailed in Panama. I do not think the basic facts and the history of that negotiation are in dispute, notwithstanding what the Senator has said.
Bunau-Varilla was serving his own interests and the interests of the French-owned New Panama Canal Company, which at that time held the French rights, long since abandoned, as a practical matter — they had given up the challenge of building a canal — and he was a stockholder in it. He was not a Panamanian.
Second, while the Panamanian delegates were en route from New York to Washington on the train, to participate in this negotiation, Bunau-Varilla, fearful that they might tie his hands in ways he did not want them tied, and Secretary of State Hay hastily signed one of Bunau-Varilla's two treaty versions.
Here is a description of that treaty, written by Dennison Kitchell, the author of the book "The Truth About the Panama Canal." He is opposed to these treaties. The book has forewords by Senator GOLDWATER and Representative JOHN RHODES. This is how he described that treaty:
There never was such a one-sided treaty. If it had been written at the conclusion of a war between the United States and Panama and the money payments had run the other way, it would have served as a document of unconditional surrender.
That is on page 57 of Mr. Kitchell's book. That is the description of an opponent of the present treaties. That is his description of the 1903 treaty.
For the Senator to suggest to me that that kind of one-sided deal was hailed in Panama at that time, I find that an incredible observation.
Mr. LAXALT. I will provide for the Senator historical references establishing that very fact.
Mr. MUSKIE. I would be glad to read them. I would be glad to know if Bunau-Varilla wrote them.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. LAXALT. I yield.