May 15, 1978
Page 13702
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, that most volatile and vital part of the world, the Middle East, once again claims our attention. Our challenge is to strike a balance between our bilateral interests with key countries and our overriding interest to activate and advance a Middle East peace process whose purpose is to achieve a just and lasting settlement among the traditional contestants. The sales of American jet aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia are reasonable and responsible only if they fit into the framework of those interests.
The essence of present-day U.S. policy in the Middle East is to advance the prospects of peace. This objective is shared by Israel and by Egypt and other Arabs of good will. History, however, has bitterly taught us that there is no clear and obvious road which will take us to the day when Jews and Muslims can co-exist without the daily threat of military conflict or terrorist attack.
The sophisticated nature and enormous capability of the weapons systems being debated today underline the need for each side to give if each side is to gain the goal that has eluded the region for so long a time.
The obstacles to peace in the Middle East seem insurmountable — more often than not. From one perspective, additional arms, of the kind we are debating, may add to those obstacles, rather than reduce them.
That risk should not be ignored.
On the other hand, these sales may, ironically, advance the peace process and add to regional stability.
We cannot be certain which of these risks will materialize if these sales go forward: They do not guarantee that the negotiations between Israel and Egypt will move off dead center, but they give the new bilateral relationship between Israel and Egypt a longer period of time to gestate and work itself out.
They do not guarantee that the multitude of anti-Sadat Arabs will stop berating the Egyptian president for his efforts to come to terms directly with the Israelis, but the F-5E's demonstrate that the United States recognizes his historic mission and believes that his approach toward settling differences with Israel can achieve some concrete results.
It is clear that disapproval of the sales will send a negative signal to the Arab world and perhaps to Israel as well. Moderation and realism a la Sadat in dealing with Prime Minister Begin and his cabinet members will be challenged. The Saudi pro-American course of action will be subject to ridicule in the Persian Gulf area. Close United States-Saudi relations will be at serious risk.
Mr. President, the U.S. relationship with Israel is based on deep and long standing moral and strategic/political interests. American cooperation with Israel has been, and as far as I can foresee, will be extremely close and mutually beneficial. Our two countries must strive together to achieve the reality of recognition by Israel's neighbors of its enduring existence as an essential part of the region, as well as advance a settlement with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and eventually Syria in every possible way.
This is of critical importance. The continuing Arab/Israeli conflict has proved to be impervious to long-term stabilization by means of war. A new war, no matter the outcome, will not improve the chances of a political settlement.
The question for the United States., then, is how to improve Israel's security in the decade ahead.
Four factors must be weighed as we consider these sales:
First is the quality of Israel's armed forces. Israel considers control of the air to be its key to survival. The sale of F-15s and F-16s will provide sophisticated replacements in the 1980s for its aging fleet of A-4s and F-4s. Israeli pilots are among the best in the world. In their hands, the F-15 will be an extremely effective air superiority fighter. The F-16, with its superior ground- attack capabilities, will be able to provide effective combat support for Israel's armored forces. The F-16 is capable of delivering the full range of precision-guided munitions. The numbers involved — 75 F-16s and F-15s — with an additional 20 F-15s at a later date meet Israeli requests for deliveries through 1983.
Second is the nature of the threat which Israel faces. Egypt represents the greatest potential military threat to Israel's security. It is extremely important that Egypt not turn back to the Soviet Union as its main military supplier. Sadat has courageously broken with the Soviets both politically and militarily, and is turning to Europe and, to a lesser degree, the United States, for Egypt's military needs.
Sadat depends on the support of the armed forces, and evidence of American willingness to help Egypt defend itself is of great importance in resisting pressures to return to the Soviet fold. In 1970, some 15,000 Soviet advisers were in Egypt and Soviet pilots flew combat sorties against Israeli aircraft during the war of attrition. It is not in Israel's interest or ours to allow such a situation to develop in the future. Third is the U.S. commitment to Israel's security. Israel requires economic and military assistance from us. In fiscal year 1979, it appears that Congress will provide $1 billion in foreign military sales and $785 million in security supporting assistance. On the basis of decisions already made, Israel will receive into the 1980's an uninterrupted supply of advanced American weaponry. The Carter administration has pledged not to use the supply of military equipment as a form of pressure on Israel. I know that this is very much the intent of Congress as well.
Fourth is the achievement of a peace settlement. Such an accomplishment with Egypt, and, hopefully, with Jordan and Syria, would greatly enhance Israel's security. For peace to be reached, Sadat's overture must not be allowed to fail. Sadat has many enemies in the Arab world, and it is clear that the Soviets would be delighted to see him replaced.
Saudi support is essential to Sadat's ability to stick to a course of direct negotiations. Egypt's long-term future requires a peace settlement, as well as close ties with both the United States and Saudi Arabia. To enlist Saudi Arabia in the peace effort, it is in the U.S. interest to be responsive to Saudi inter-Arab security requests, particularly in the case of the F-15's, where a prior commitment exists.
Mr. President, I know from my discussions in recent weeks with Israeli leaders that military planners in Tel Aviv are wary about the F-15's to be sold to Saudi Arabia: However, these risks must be weighed against the situation that would prevail if the F-15's were not provided.
Saudi Arabia will acquire a modern air defense capability. The French Mirage F-1 is the likely alternative. It is less effective as an interceptor, but it has greater ground-attack capability. It will also be in the inventories of several other Arab States — Iraq, Syria, Libya, Morocco — all of whom could provide pilots or technicians to make use of Saudi F-1's.
By contrast, no other Arab pilots will be able to fly the F-15. It cannot be transferred easily to any other country. U.S. technicians will be involved in its maintenance, and U.S. officials will be able to monitor carefully its basing and any possible misuse. Indeed, we in Congress may want to write this requirement into legislation.
Equally important, Mr. President, if the Saudis are rebuffed at this time, many voices in the Arab world will question the value of cooperation with the United States. Sadat will become more vulnerable. The Soviets could easily exploit the situation. The best chance for a peace settlement in 30 years could well be lost.
In that event, Israel's security will be jeopardized and the probability of another round of conflict will increase. The fact that Israel could prevail militarily in any future confrontation is no reason for complacency.
Mr. President, it is in the U.S. interest to pursue and cultivate a prudent and close relationship with the Middle East's most important Arab countries, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The United States has crucial interests in these nations as it does in Israel.
Good sense tells us that the pursuit of these interests now and in the years ahead requires good relations with the Israelis and Arabs simultaneously and the accommodation of their principal respective concerns as well as our own.
We want foremost to avoid the serious consequences of confrontation and the tragedies of war.
We want Arab recognition of, and normal economic and commercial intercourse with, Israel.
We want to be sure that Saudi Arabia has the capacity to defend its borders from increasing Soviet pressures — not only the influence of the Russians in Iraq and Syria — not only the existence of Cuban soldiers in South Yemen — but also the pressure which the Soviets are exerting on the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia has reason to be concerned and we have reason to share her concern.
We want to prevent the reassertion of Soviet influence in Egypt's peace efforts. We want President Sadat to succeed in his peace efforts. We want to encourage the Egyptian Government to focus on its country's ailing economy and on the unmet needs of its creative, but fast-growing, population.
We want to insure the uninterrupted flow of Arabian oil to ourselves, Japan, and our NATO allies.
We want to secure Saudi Arabia's cooperation in restraining the rise of oil prices.
We want our private citizens to participate in the Egyptian and Saudi modernization planning and project implementation.
We want to strengthen American financial interests in exporting civilian goods and services to oil-rich Arab countries.
We want, in turn, not to weaken Arab financial interests in America.
Since 1973, the Saudi Kingdom has pursued an increasingly important regional and international role. This obviously stems from its central position regarding oil. It also reflects a more assertive use of its economic power.
Saudi Arabia contains the largest known reserves of oil in the world. This presently amounts to at least one-quarter of the world's known oil reserves. Further exploration will almost certainly reveal additional reserves.
The Saudis' ability to expand production rapidly provides them the ability to prevent a price rise by artificial manipulation of supply shortages. This threat has kept OPEC members from following a completely cartel-like policy of extracting the highest possible price on the lowest volume of production.
On oil prices, the Saudis have helped to hold the line on prices since 1974. At the last OPEC meeting in December, the Saudis supported a price freeze throughout 1978. This has meant a decline in the real price of oil in the past 2 years.
The Saudis have used their financial and political resources in support of moderate regimes in the Middle East and Africa.
Egypt. Saudi financial support may be as much as $2 billion annually. The Saudis now finance most of Egypt's military purchases in the West. They have quietly thrown their diplomatic weight behind Sadat's initiative. Sadat's willingness and ability to break with the Soviets was in large part due to the Saudis.
Syria. The Saudis, although troubled by some of Syria's actions, have worked hard to keep Syria from total dependency on the Soviets.
Somalia. As much as anyone else, the Saudis persuaded Siad Barre to expel the Soviets from Berbera. They provide significant economic assistance.
Jordan. A large portion of Jordan's defense spending is covered by Saudi Arabia, including the cost of the F-5E's that we have sold to Jordan.
South Yemen. The Saudis have been trying to turn the regime in South Yemen away from the Soviets, thus far with only limited success. The South Yemenis have, however, virtually ended their support for the rebellion in Oman.
North Yemen. This chronically poor but populous country is virtually a client of Saudi Arabia.
Sudan. The second largest, potentially agriculturally rich Arab country, is of great strategic concern to the Saudis and to Egypt. The Saudis have participated in funding economic/ development activity.
A number of other African countries — Niger, Chad, Zaire — have profited from Saudi largesse, as have international lending institutions, The Saudis devote a much larger proportion of their GNP — approximately 10 percent — to foreign assistance than we do. Since 1974, the Saudis have committed through bilateral and multilateral channels well in excess of $10.0 billion in economic assistance. As we find it increasingly difficult to raise capital for foreign assistance, the possibility of wedding Saudi capital to U.S. technology may provide the best hope of development for many of the poor countries.
It should be pointed out here that, as President Sadat has often avowed, the successes the United States has encountered in advancing American interests in the Arab countries have rested decisively on our especially close and abiding relationship with Israel. It is imperative, therefore, to preserve that relationship and to strengthen our ties with those in the Arab world who continue to seek the good will of the United States.
Achieving this objective can be realized only in the context of an effort to achieve a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The proposed jet sales are intended to cultivate this delicate but potentially fertile garden. But because they are also high-risk tools, when Congress approves their transfer into Israeli, Egyptian, and Saudi hands, there must be diligent follow through to care for and to seek tangible progress in the peace process.
The Sinai accord in 1975 demonstrated the need for American diligence and American instruments of diplomacy; only after the United States induced Egypt to take another step forward, and then induced Israel to close the remaining gap, by providing it with the added security and other assets it sought in exchange for the Sinai passes and the oilfields, did the process succeed. That is our goal again.
In summary, Mr. President, I shall vote for these sales. I know there are inherent risks involved, but I expect the United States, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to gain more than they lose by them. These are the objectives:
First, that. the United States increase its diplomatic influence and leverage in the region.
Second, a resumption of face-to-face negotiating efforts by Israel and Egypt in the near future.
Third, the United States-Israeli bilateral relationship to be as special and strong in the future as it has over the last 30 years.
Fourth, the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia also to remain close and strong.
Fifth, that the Soviet Union will not be involved in the peace process. Moscow has demonstrated it has no positive role or willingness to play. The Russians consistently refuse to risk their necks on behalf of reconciliation and rapprochement.
Sixth, that tangible support of Sadat will begin paying off within Egypt, between Egypt and Israel, and within the Arab world. Hopefully, with our support, the Egyptian approach will be viewed as more productive than the Syrian approach.
And seventh, that the whole Middle East will receive the strong political signal that the United States is deeply involved and will remain that way with those forces who share our objectives and who actively support countries which share our objectives. In turn, the United States is prepared to consider and meet their respective needs.