February 1, 1978
Page 1718
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, it is evident from the debate I have listened to for the last 20 to 30 minutes that there are strong feelings on both sides of this issue, even emotional feelings on both sides of this issue, and as one who has demonstrated a capacity for righteous indignation myself in debate on the Senate floor, I can sympathize with those who are righteously indignant, whether they are for the B-1 or against it.
But some statements have been made, as I have listened in the last few minutes, to which I would like to make some brief comments before I get into my prepared remarks.
Incidentally, I rise to speak as chairman of the Senate Budget Committee. We have concerns, budgetary concerns, about the B-1 which ought to be taken into account, as well as the merits of the weapon system itself.
But the distinguished Senator from Utah, Senator GARN, has spoken of the President's unilateral cancellation of the B-1. Well, what can be unilateral about a decision which is occupying the time of the Senate today, and has many times over the last 2 years, and which has occupied the time of the House? Are we debating a decision on which we have no influence? Is that what the Senator means by a unilateral decision? We are participating in the decision. The President has taken the responsibility, which is his, of submitting a recommendation. The Senator chooses to refer to that as a unilateral cancellation.
I regard that as an exercise of responsibility on his part as to which we have the final word. Otherwise, I do not know what this debate is all about. I do not understand why the distinguished Senator is venting his indignation on the President. If he truly believes that the Senate has no power to influence the decision which he has described as unilateral, then I can understand why the Senator is venting his indignation, but this is not the case.
It is not a unilateral decision; it is a decision on which the President has taken the leadership. Whether it is right or wrong, it is wholly appropriate for us to debate, but it is not a unilateral decision.
Mr. GARN. Will the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator would not yield to me earlier, and this was the very point I wanted to talk about.
Mr. GARN. The Senator is misinterpreting my point about unilateral decision, and that is the only reason I wanted to ask the Senator
Mr: MUSKIE. The Senator can expand on his understanding of that later. I would like my remarks to have some continuity in the same way he wishes his remarks to.
The second point I would make is the Senator vents his indignation against the President as a violator of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act. Well, Mr. President, as to the Budget and Impoundment Control Act, it vests in the Comptroller General of the United States the responsibility for defending the act in behalf of the Congress. It is Mr. Staats, who has this role in the Budget Act, who, in the letter dated January 18, has said there had been no violation of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act with respect to this decision by the President.
Why then does the Senator not vent his indignation against Mr. Staats? The President's insistence that he has not violated the act could be self-serving, I concede that. But it is not his opinion to which Senator GARN referred. It is to the position of Mr. Staats, who is our guardian of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act, who has said there has been no violation.
If, after the Congress should decide to go forward with the B-1 bomber, and the President should choose then not to spend the money, then the Budget and Impoundment Control Act would be triggered. If the President violated the act, I would join the Senator in righteous indignation against such a step because he could implement such a decision on his part only by using the procedures of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act.
So, if Mr. Staats believes there has not yet been a violation of the Budget Act, we either agree with him or we do not. If we do not agree with him, then it is to him that we should address our indignation.
I have heard over and over again on another point, Mr. President, I refer to the argument that Defense somehow has a vested right in a certain percentage of the gross national product; that from now on Defense should have a certain percentage of the gross national product, whatever that may be, 24 percent, 25 percent, 26 percent, and that as GNP goes up, Defense ought to automatically get additional dollars to maintain that percentage, whatever the merits of its proposals to spend the money.
If that is the budget principle we are going to use in setting in place the budget for the Department of Defense, how do we deny it to the other functions of the budget? Why should not any function of the budget come before us and say, "We are entitled to some historic percentage of the GNP," regardless of wherever GNP goes, however high, and whatever new needs and priorities we may have to consider as a rational legislative body?
I simply do not buy that argument. But if the argument prevails, then there is absolutely no need for the Budget Committee, for the CBO, or even for a Senate. We simply pass the final appropriation act in this session, which will hold forever, guaranteeing to every function of the budget its current percentage of GNP, or whatever percentage we, as a group, may decide is right for 1978.
Then, we say, whatever is right for 1978 obviously ought to be the same percentage in 1980, ought to be the same percentage in 1985, ought to be the same percentage in 1990.
I doubt very much that any Senator in this body would agree to any such budgeting principle.
Now, with respect to what has happened to defense spending in the year since the budget process has been in force, I hope to put in figures before I finish showing that there has been real growth in defense spending under the congressional budget process. I found myself defending that growth last year in the conference with the House on the first concurrent resolution, under circumstances in which the House had voted for some $4 billion less for defense than had the Senate. So I do not buy the argument that we have not permitted growth.
That we have not permitted growth as some would like is true, but we have done that same thing with every function of the budget. If we were to permit budget growth for every function of the budget in accordance with the most extreme assessment of what that ought to be, I assure the Senator that last year's budget would have been at least $40 billion more than it was.
So if we permit the growth in defense in response to the strongest views of what our minimal defense requirements are, then I suspect we would be bombarded by similar requests from those who are interested in education and from those who are interested in health — and, you know, when we talk about national health insurance, we are talking about an annual budget cost of $150 billion.
I wish to say again to the Senator what I have tried to say, not always very persuasively, for the last year: That making budget choices is not a matter of weeding out the obviously unworthy requests. Those are pretty much weeded out by the Appropriations Committee, and hopefully the Budget Committee makes some contribution to it.
The really tough budget decisions have to do with choosing between proposals and programs all of which have merit. That is tougher. It is a lot easier when you are talking about health, or veterans, or farmers. I suggest that Senators look at the votes on farm legislation last year.
When you talk about any of them, it would be a lot easier to yield to the demands of the most articulate, most emotional, and most insistent groups without argument; and believe me, almost every function of the budget has such constituencies to make more difficult the task of those who must decide, well, this worthy project can be supported and that one cannot. And that kind of argument can apply to the defense budget just as much as any other function of the budget.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes have expired.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield the Senator 5 additional minutes.
Mr. MUSKIE. I have not even gotten to my speech yet. I apologize.
Mr. STENNIS. That is all right.
Mr. MUSKIE. The distinguished Presiding Officer at the moment (Mr. ABOUREZK) understands what I mean when I say that.
Mr. President, to get down to the basic issue before us, supporters of the defunct B-1 bomber are asking the Senate today — and I am talking about the budget — for almost a billion dollars to continue a program for which there is no strategic, budgetary, or commonsense justification.
Mr. President, as chairman of the Budget Committee, I support the position previously taken by the Senate — a position supported by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) and the distinguished Senator from Iowa (Mr. CULVER) — in agreeing to the rescission of the B-1 production program.
Let us be clear about what the issue before us really is. Backers of the B-1 program state that denial of the rescission merely means keeping the B-1 production lines going and options open for the manned penetrating bomber.
I do not see this as the issue at all. This is a first step in pressuring subsequent Congresses to reverse this tough decision made by President Carter to make room in the defense budget for
spending which has higher priority and greater defense capabilities. We are not voting on two aircraft, but the possibility of 240. We are not voting on a $460 million item, but one that costs a billion dollars, and could go as high as $60 to $75 billion if the full B-1 program investment and operational costs are considered.
Mr. President, we do not need a new manned penetrating bomber under this Nation's defense strategy. The supplemental appropriation which was passed in December provides a less costly alternative which performs the mission intended for the B-1. The supplemental includes $400 million for acceleration of the cruise missile program, B-52 modifications, and a wide-bodied cruise missile carrier. The President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have said the cruise missile can do the job. We do not need the expensive B-1 option to perform this strategic mission.
Mr. President, the Senate position on this issue has been affirmed not once, but twice : First, when the second budget resolution for fiscal year 1978 assumed enactment of the rescission, and second, when the Senate version of H.R. 9375, the supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 1978, specifically included the rescission.
President Carter's decision to stop production of the B-1 bomber was prudent and courageous from both a defense strategy and a budgeting standpoint. It should be supported by the Congress. Wasting a billion additional dollars to produce two aircraft does not make sense.
The President's position effectively continues the Triad defense concept of the United States. We are moving ahead with cruise missiles which are significantly less costly, but equally effective, options to the B-1. They are evidence of the President's commitment that the United States maintain a defense capability second to none in the world.
Mr. President, I urge that in the emotional atmosphere — may I have another 5 minutes?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes, I am glad to yield the Senator 5 more minutes.
Mr. MUSKIE. That in the emotional climate that exists today, we not begin to question each other's commitment to a strong defense. We have differing opinions, obviously, as to what that constitutes, but I have no doubt in my mind that all Senators in this body are committed to a strong defense.
Let us be clear about what is happening. Four B-1 aircraft, including the defensive avionics package on the fourth plane, will be completed. By going forward with the completion of these R. & D.activities on the B-1, the President has kept open options for a manned penetrating bomber in the future, if the option is ever needed.
A vote with the House against the Senate position is to spend $1 billion for two airplanes for which no legitimate strategic need exists.
Moreover, there are very serious budgetary reasons for supporting the President. A primary input into the President's decision to cancel the B-1 centered on the significant costs associated with the program. At a cost of over $105 million per plane and a 25-year total systems cost of at least $60 to $75 billion, including armament for the system and maintenance and support activities, the program would have taken a disproportionate share of funds that are urgently needed for other defense improvements. From a simple economic standpoint, it is impossible to envision spending enormous sums for the B-1 and, at the same time, upgrading our conventional and other strategic forces. The costs for improving conventional forces, particularly those for maintaining European stability, are estimated at over $70 billion for major procurements alone during the next several years and the costs for procuring the Trident program, including the possible startup of the Trident II and 20 year operating costs, are estimated at $50 billion.
I would like to remind my colleagues of another budgetary problem associated with the decision on the B-1 rescission. If the Congress does not support the President regarding the B-1 program, the deficit for fiscal year 1978 will grow by $190 million. The current estimate of the deficit, as reflected in the Senate budget scorekeeping report dated January 16, 1978, is $59.1 billion. So, if the decision is to buy the fifth and sixth B-1 aircraft, the Congress adds another $190 million to the fiscal year 1978 deficit.
Furthermore, there will be an impact on the deficit projected for fiscal year 1979. The President's budget report estimates a 1979 deficit of $60.6 billion. Well, supporters of the B-1 program would add another $140 million to this projected deficit. The $140 million would not provide adequate funding to complete fabrication, buy spares and ground support equipment, test the aircraft, and train personnel for the B-1 activity. It would probably be necessary for the President to submit a B-1 supplemental to cover the full costs of completing and testing the fifth and sixth aircraft. This supplemental could add another $30 million in outlays to the budget in fiscal year 1979 and consequently to the deficit. In sum, the projected deficit for fiscal year 1979 could rise another $170 million.
These are just a few of the difficult budgetary problems ahead for Congress.
Mr. President, my good friend from Oklahoma, Senator BELLMON, and I were queried by a number of our Senate colleagues about whether the Budget Act was being circumvented by the Senate's action in handling the B-1 rescission. We assured our colleagues that there was no inconsistency between the Senate's action on the B-1 and provisions contained in the Budget Act. We replied that we did not believe the use of this supplemental appropriation bill to repeal the previously enacted fiscal year 1977 budget authority for the B-1 presents such a case of circumventing the Budget Act. On the contrary, repeal of those funds and the use of a supplemental appropriation for that purpose are completely consistent with the Budget Act. It is also impelled by the second concurrent resolution on the budget, which assumes this fiscal year 1977 budget authority (which would outlay in 1978) , if committed, will be repealed.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter from Senator BELLMON and me, responding to our colleagues on this matter, be printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C.,
October 18, 1977.
Hon. S. I. HAYAKAWA,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SAM: Thank you for your letter of October 7 raising the question of whether use of a supplemental appropriation to rescind previously enacted budget authority is consistent with the budget process. We appreciate the concerns you raised in that letter. You know we have insisted that the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act and the Congressional budget process formulated pursuant to it should beobserved, both in letter and in spirit, and have consistently opposed Congressional actions which would circumvent or subvert the budget process.
We do not believe the use of this supplemental appropriation bill to repeal the previously enacted FY 1977 budget authority for the B-1 presents such a case. On the contrary, repeal of those funds and the use of a supplemental appropriation for that purpose are completely consistent with the Budget Act. It is also impelled by the Second Concurrent Resolution on the Budget, which assumes this FY 1977 budget authority (which would outlay in 1978), if committed, will be repealed.
We have no doubt of the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee to recommend repeal of previously enacted budget authority. Section 404(b) of the Budget Act spells out the jurisdiction of the Senate Appropriations Committee and reiterates Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate. Under Section 404(b), the Appropriations Committee has jurisdiction over "rescission of appropriations contained in appropriations acts (referred to in Section 105 of Title I, U.S. Code)."
Section 105 simply defines the necessary title for general appropriation bills indicating that September 30 is the end of the fiscal year. The jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee to "rescind" appropriations is simply analogous to that of any committee to repeal authorizations which exist in law by virtue of prior enactments. This jurisdictional statement has been recently confirmed in the Senate's adoption of S. Res. 4, which revised Rule XXV and reaffirmed this statement of the Appropriations Committee's jurisdiction therein. The legislative history of Section 404(b) leaves no doubt that Congress intended to confirm the inherent jurisdiction of the legislative branch to repeal prior appropriations action.
The Budget Act confirmed this jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee wholly apart from any consideration of impoundment, and before the impoundment control title to the Budget Act was formulated. You will recall that the report of the Joint Study Committee on Budget Control, published on April 18, 1973, recommended that Appropriations Committee jurisdiction to recommend rescissions of budget authority be confirmed (p. 29) in order to enhance Congressional control of the budget. The original Budget Act legislation, introduced in both Houses, contained provision for confirming this jurisdiction in the Appropriations Committee.
Neither version contained an impoundment title at that time. Although the legislation reported by the Committee on Government Operations, which first reported the Budget Act in the Senate, and the Committee on Rules, which perfected it in largely the form in which it was adopted, also confirmed this jurisdiction in the Appropriations Committee to recommend repeal of previously enacted appropriations, neither contained an impoundment title. The impoundment title was first added in the House proceedings on the Budget Act bill. In the Senate it was added to the already- passed Budget Act in the course of going to conference. Although the conference adopted a Title X to the Budget Act, it is explicitly denominated as a separate enactment, the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The conference did not, in the course of adopting Title X, further amend the already stated jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee regarding rescissions. There was no intention on the part of the conferees in recommending the enactment of Title X to reduce the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee from that confirmed by original Senate passage of the Budget Act at the time impoundment control was not contemplated as a part of it.
In other words, even if the Budget Act had never been enacted, the Appropriations Committee would have had jurisdiction to repeal budget authority previously enacted. The Budget Act, before it became linked with impoundment, confirmed that jurisdiction. The subsequent addition of the impoundment control title did not change the ability of the Appropriations Committee to recommend such repeals.
Title X, the impoundment control title, was added to the Budget Act to constrict Presidential ability to impound funds. It was never intended to constrict the Constitutional power of Congress to repeal appropriations which it had already enacted. The 45-day period prescribed by Section 1012 of the Budget Act is a limitation on the President's ability to withhold the expenditure of funds Congress has appropriated. It is not a limitation on Congressional power to repeal appropriations it has enacted. Title X was intended to limit the power of the Executive to impound appopriated funds. It was never intended to hamstring the Congress in working its will with regard to appropriations. Nothing in Title X precludes the Appropriations Committee from acting in a general or supplemental appropriation to repeal appropriations enacted in earlier legislation.
It would be as ironic and as unacceptable as it is inconsistent with the facts if Congress had left itself in the position, in adopting the Budget Act, of being able to repeal appropriations only if the President requested it. An interpretation of Title X which would preclude Congress from rescinding earlier appropriations, unless the President requests such rescissions pursuant to Title X, would be inconsistent both with the basic power of the purse vested in the Congress pursuant to Article I to the Constitution and the Congressional control of the budget process, which is a basic purpose of the Budget Act.
A colloquy which occurred during Senate consideration of the conference report on the Budget Act between Senator McClellan, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and Senator Ervin, Chairman of the Senate conferees on the Budget Act and of the Government Operations Committee which originally formulated and reported it, underscores this point:
Mr. MCCLELLAN. What would be the effect if, by the end of the 45 days, Congress had not completed action on the bill, but within a few days thereafter it did complete action? It would be legislation, the President could sign the bill, and the rescission would then become law.
Mr. ERVIN. Oh, yes, I think so, because under the legislative authority given to the Congress by article I of the Constitution and also by the necessary-and-proper clause, even though Congress does not act in the 45 days it could act thereafter.
Mr. MCCLELLAN. It could. There is nothing to keep Congress from acting upon it.
Mr. ERVIN. No.
Mr. MCCLELLAN. That does not prevent or preclude Congress from rescinding thereafter.
Mr. ERVIN. I might say that the 45-day provision is placed in the bill for the purpose of spurring speedy congressional action, but with recognition of the fact that Congress cannot deprive itself of any other power it has under the Constitution.
So we are unable to agree with you that use of a supplemental appropriation bill to repeal the unexpended balance of FY 1977 B-1 funds for this program, which Congress has determined should be terminated, subverts the budget process. Moreover, we believe that repeal of these funds is required by the Second Concurrent Resolution on the Budget which we adopted last month.
As you will recall, the President's decision to cancel the B-1 program was affirmed by the Congress in passing the fiscal year 1978 Defense Appropriations Act. This Appropriations Act eliminated any funds for further production of the B-1 in fiscal year 1978 or later years.
Subsequently, the Second Concurrent Resolution on the Budget which Congress adopted three weeks ago contains limitations for the national defense function of $116.4 billion in budget authority and $110.1 billion in outlays. This outlay figure explicitly assumed the rescission of the 1977 funds which would have had an outlay effect in fiscal 1978. You will also recall that in formulating those totals, in a rare line-item vote, our Committee voted to delete the B-1 funds from the defense ceiling. Should this rescission not take effect, the outlay ceiling for FY 1978 would be exceeded by $190 million.
Under these circumstances and regardless of our personal feeling on the merits of the B-1, we believe the Budget Committee should support rescission of these funds by the Appropriations Committee. It is clear that the Appropriations Committee has authority to add a provision to the 1978 Supplemental Appropriations bill which would rescind authority for the B-1 and related weapons systems previously enacted by Congress.
We hope that you will give this matter further consideration and continue to support the agreed-upon levels for the national defense function in the Second Budget Resolution.
Sincerely,
EDMUND S. MUSKIE,
Chairman.
HENRY BELLMON,
Ranking Minority Member.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, as I stated earlier, the issue is not two planes, but 240. It is not a half- billion or a billion dollars, but $60 to $75 billion. There are five basic reasons for supporting the Senate's position on this matter. These are:
First. The U.S. defense posture does not need a new manned penetrating bomber under present defense strategy. The supplemental appropriation which has been passed provides an initial $400 million for acceleration of the cruise missile program, B-52 modifications, and a wide-bodied cruise missile carrier, as an alternative to the B-1 bomber. It is also less costly than the B-1 option. We do not need the expensive B-1 to perform this particular strategic mission. How long will the pressure be exerted on the Congress to buy a weapon system we do not need?
Second. The $462 million involved in the rescission is only the beginning of further substantial funding requirements for the B-1. It is my understanding that up to $500 million above the $462 million would be needed to complete fabrication of the fifth and sixth aircraft, buy spares and support equipment, and pay training and test costs. Thus, the next two planes would cost close to a billion dollars — not just the $462 million in the rescission.
Third. The estimated cost for the fully armed 240-plane B-1 program is roughly $60 to $75 billion. It is entirely inevitable that if the President's decision on this rescission is not agreed to by the Congress, the next step of the B-1 advocates will be on the full program and a spending level of this amount.
Fourth. The second budget resolution assumed the B-1 rescission, and it means close to $200 million in outlay savings in fiscal year 1978.
Fifth. Failure to support the President adds $190 million to the deficit in fiscal year 1978 and could add $170 million or more to the projected fiscal year 1979 deficit.
Mr. President, the vote on the B-1 bomber squarely confronts the Senate with the issue of whether we can afford all the defense weapons systems we find attractive and all at the same time. We face the same problem frequently in regard to the domestic budget.
The simple fact is that we cannot afford to commit the Federal budget in every direction at once. In defense and in domestic affairs, we must make choices among attractive alternatives. Otherwise, we will become bankrupt as a nation and imperil our defense altogether.
So we must make choices. And for me, as it was for the President, his Secretary of Defense, and his Joint Chiefs of Staff, that decision is clear in the case of the B-1. We should terminate the B-1 program with the four R. & D. planes and a $5 billion investment, and concentrate on less costly and equally effective weapons systems like the cruise missile.
We should not follow the opponents of the President on this issue down a path whose only end is the expenditure of at least another $60 billion to build 240 aircraft which are not required under our national defense strategy.
I yield so I shall not further delay my good friend from California.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.
I want especially to thank the Senator from Maine. He went to extra trouble this morning to appear here on this matter. I commend him very highly for the points he made, including the point that I never have bought the idea that any department is entitled to a certain percentage of the national budget. I think that would be the beginning of a calamitous end in the course of time. I am certainly not impelled by that. I push the other way.
Another thing, Mr. President. On this weaponry matter, all these weapons sound mighty good taken alone. They are very attractive. They have the strongest kind of point. But the Senator is so correct: We have to make some kind of final decision on a priority basis. It is choosing between weapons, any one of which or all of which are good.
Again, I commend the Senator for his very fine knowledge of the fiscal affairs of our Government. I am proud of him.
Mr. GARN and Mr. HAYAKAWA addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NUNN). The Senator from Utah.
Mr. GARN. May I have 4 minutes, I ask the Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. YOUNG. I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Utah.
Mr. HAYAKAWA. May I make a unanimous consent request?
Mr. GARN. I yield, Mr. President.
Mr. HAYAKAWA. I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Ernest Garcia, of Senator DOLE's staff, may have the privilege of the floor during consideration and vote on this measure.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is ordered.
Mr. GARN. Mr. President, I would appreciate it if the Senator from Maine is able to listen to some of my replies to some of the things he said.
First of all, I compliment the chairman of the Budget Committee, because what he said is true. In my limited experience in the Senate — 3 years — he has tried very hard, not just in the military but in the social area, to hold things down. I congratulate him for that and compliment him and the whole Budget Committee for doing this. However, I do not compliment everybody in the Senate for that. I think he knows that on many matters, I have supported him. On the farm bill last year — and I have farmers at home, too — and on the supplemental, I pretty well supported the Budget Committee's recommendations on funds in those controversial areas. But I am a little puzzled by a few of the things he said.
As to the unilateral matter, I may have misstated myself, but what I was referring to was not just the President, but we collectively made a unilateral decision to give up the B-1 without regard to the Soviets' Backfire bomber. That is what I meant, that we should have insisted that they give up the Backfire if we gave up the B-1. I did not want the Senator to misunderstand that point.
Mr. CULVER. Will the Senator yield on that?
Mr. GARN. In a couple of minutes, I shall yield. I want to finish up a couple of points.
Mr. MUSKIE. If the Senator will yield on that point, I appreciate that clarification, that he meant we unilaterally—
Mr. GARN. No; I did not mean that the President had done it unilaterally. Obviously, he had the consent of Congress on the 1978 budget.
If the Senator from Iowa is on that point, I shall yield on that.
Mr. CULVER. I do not have the control. Will the chairman yield on that one point briefly?
Mr. GARN. I am happy to yield on his time.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have begun to run out of time. I have a lot of promises out already.
How much time does the Senator want?
Mr. CULVER. I shall only take 2 minutes.
Mr. STENNIS. All right, I yield 2 minutes.
Mr. CULVER. It is just a question whether we want the debate to be balanced.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield 2 minutes.
Mr. CULVER. I have 2 minutes in the greatest deliberative body in the world. On this point of whether we unilaterally give up the B-1 and do not pay attention to the Soviets in the SALT context, if this B-1 is crucial to our national interest, we should never bargain it away and we should build it. If it is not, the Soviet Union knows that and they do not worry a bit about our being so dumb as to spend $30 billion on it. The Soviet Union has far more concern, understandably and properly so, in terms of their own air defense capabilities, to be confronted with a mixed manned bomber force with cruise missiles than the B-1 ever presented to them.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. GARN. Now, if I may get back to the distinguished Senator from Maine, I thought I was very clear in my righteous indignation in saying, at least three times and summarizing, that I agreed with the Comptroller General that the President was in technical compliance with the impoundments law by dribbling out a little bit of money. I thought I made it very clear that my righteous indignation was in respect to an obvious delay in the dribbling of funds without a restart order in compliance with the Impoundment Control Act, in the hopes that Congress would reverse the decision.
So I agree with him: Technical compliance, yes; but certainly not with the spirit of the law. I think the facts show that. That is why I put the whole record of correspondence with Elmer Staats there.
I do not claim a technical violation of the law. I do claim deliberate delay. I think that package of letters over 4 months, back and forth, shows that the administration is barely staying within the law.
I agree with him, the chairman of the Budget Committee, about a certain percentage of the budget not being allotted to any department. All I made was one brief statement — in response to the constant harangue by some in this body that we are spending too much for defense, and talking about reordering priorities — that we were spending a lower percentage of the total of the gross national product for defense than in any year since 1950, period.
I did not say nor do I believe that we should allocate a certain fixed percentage to the defense budget or any other budget. That is why I was so anxious to jump up. My remarks will show in the RECORD that I simply did not say that. I do not believe it. I agree it would be ridiculous to budget on that basis. But I did want to illustrate the point that the defense budget had gone down.
I also said that, in real terms, it had gone up 2 percent this year, which I was grateful for. I think it should have gone up more.
Mr. MUSKIE. Will the Senator yield 30 seconds?
Mr. GARN. Yes.
Mr. MUSKIE. In response to the Senator's remarks, I was also reacting to what seemed to be a strengthening conviction on the part of those who speak for national defense that they sort of support the idea of a fixed percentage. I appreciate the Senator's clarification as to his own position, but there is that big argument.
The growth in the defense budget this year was 2 percent real growth. Last year, it was 3.6 percent. The year before that, I think it was about 1.9 percent. That is not a monstrous growth, but it is growth.
Mr. GARN. I did want to make that clarification.
Mr. MUSKIE. I appreciate that clarification
Mr. GARN. The response did not sound to me like what I said. Again, I repeat, it is ridiculous to budget on that basis. I think we ought to have a higher percentage, but a fixed percentage, no. That is no way to carry on a budget.
Mr. MUSKIE. I wanted to be sure thatI would prod the Senator away from that position, so I may have stated it more strongly than the Senator's real position justified.
Mr. GARN. The distinguished Senator did not have to prod me away from that particular stand.
I yield back the remainder of my time.