February 1, 1978
Page 1737
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes at this point to the Senator from Maine, again thanking him for his splendid statement he made this morning.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I thank my good friend from Mississippi.
I have listened to his very persuasive argument just concluded. I shall only take a couple of minutes to underscore it. I have listened all day to the arguments of those who are on the other side of the issue. One of the reasons for building aircraft 5 and 6 is to keep the B-1 option open by keeping the production line open. But, Mr. President, my understanding is that there is no production line. The first four aircraft that have been built are R. & D. aircraft. They were not built by a production line committed to the B-1 program. They are R. & D. aircraft and they represent an opportunity to further refine and develop the B-1 concept, and indeed only plane No. 4 contained the defensive avionics package, which is perhaps the most critical single element in the B-1 program.
So aircraft 5 and 6 would not keep a production line open. There is no production line. There is an R. & D. line open, and the R. & D. line is open and would be continued.
In fiscal year 1978, the budget provided over $400 million in R. & D. funds; in fiscal year 1979, the budget contains over $100 million to continue R. & D.; and there is a program in the budget for the fiscal years 1980 to 1982 for which $300 million would be provided to keep R. & D. going.
So the B-1 option is going to be kept alive and healthy by the R. & D. program which is already underway and which will be continued. There is no production line for the B-1.
With respect to aircraft 5 and 6, which are the subject of this debate, two aircraft will not open a production line. No company in America is going to open up a B-1 production line for two aircraft. Those two aircraft would simply be added to the R. & D. program, and would be essentially handmade aircraft, and you do not need to spend $1 billion more to keep the R. & D. program going. It is already very much alive.
No one from the President on down, through every Member of the Senate wants to cut the R. & D. program, so the production line argument, as far as I can see, is a complete phony.
From a point of view of the Budget Committee, we have to be concerned with wasting dollars, not just wasting of all dollars available for Federal programs, but defense dollars.
If there is any Senator in this Chamber who thinks there is an unlimited reservoir of dollars for defense, I invite him to attend meetings of the Budget Committee as we consider the limitations on the resources available. There are limitations. We cannot afford to waste budget dollars for any purpose, and we surely cannot afford to waste defense budget dollars.
So I have listened to this production argument. It has been made by some very well intentioned Senators, and very able Senators, on the other side of this issue. But I have explored it, within the limit of the lines of communication available to me, and there is absolutely nothing to it.
If you want a production line for this B-1 program, you have got to make a decision to build not 2 aircraft but enough aircraft — and there are 240 aircraft in all that the proponents of this program advocate — you have got to make a commitment to a sizable number of aircraft to tempt any company to open up a true production line. There is none at this time.
I urge my colleagues to bear that argument in mind as we proceed to the vote on this issue.
Mr. President, there are some other arguments — I do not know whether I can have the time from my good friend, the Senator from Mississippi — that need repeating at this stage in the debate.
Aside from the points I have just made, Mr. President—
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if I may interrupt, since the Senator used his time in complementing my argument, I want to yield him more time in his speech, and I yield 3 more minutes.
Mr. MUSKIE. Three minutes will be fine.
There are five basic reasons why we ought to support the President's decision on the B-1 argument:
First, the U.S. defense posture does not need any new manned penetrating bomber under present defense strategy. The supplemental appropriation which has been passed provides an initial $400 million for acceleration of the cruise missile program, B-52 modifications to adapt to that program, and a wide-bodied cruise-missile carrier as an alternative to the B-1 bomber. Surely we do not need both at this time. It is also less costly than the B-1 option.
We do not need the expensive B-1 to perform this particular strategic mission.
How long, may I ask, Mr. President, will the pressure be exerted on Congress to buy a weapons system we do not need?
Second, the $462 million involved in the rescission before us is only the beginning of further substantial funding requirements for the B-1. It is my understanding that up to $500 million more would be needed to complete fabrication of the fifth and sixth aircraft. The $462 million in the rescission will not do it, it will not cover fabrication of the aircraft, buy spares, and support equipment, and pay training and tests costs. Thus these two planes would cost close to $1 billion, not the $462 million in the rescission before us.
Third, the estimated cost for the fully armed 240-plane B-1 program is roughly$60 billion to $75 billion. It is entirely inevitable that if the President's decision on this rescission is not agreed to by Congress, the next step of the B-1 advocates will be on the full program, and a spending level of this significant amount built on the precedent of such a favorable vote. Everybody in this Chamber knows that what we are talking about is the first step toward a commitment to 240 planes at a cost of $60 to $75 billion.
If that is a decision that is ever made, it should not be made today, given the fact that the option is still alive without making such a commitment today.
Fourth, the second budget resolution assumed the B-1 rescission, and it means close to $200 million in outlay savings in the current fiscal year.
Fifth, failure to support the President adds $190 million to the deficit in fiscal year 1978, and $170 million more to the 1979 deficit or a total of $360 million.
Mr. President, we are going to be asked to consider additional defense expenditures, such as the Trident program, and building up our forces in Europe, and those two items together could add $100 billion to future defense expenditures above current policy.
There are not dollars to waste. If we spend those dollars unnecessarily here, we are going to reduce our capability to spend them for those programs and other high-priority programs coming down the pike.
Mr. President, recently the editor of Jane's All the World's Aircraft has stated that the West is doomed by the B-1 decision. His position is that cruise missile cannot replace the B-1. The apparent concern, as stated by the editor, is the supposed inability of the cruise missile to penetrate Soviet air defenses as successfully as a B-1 can, that cruise missile technology is not up-to-date and consequently a gap would exist in the U.S. triad until the technology was modernized, and that the weapons delivery accuracy of the cruise missile is not as great as the B-1.
Mr. President, the Department of Defense has an entirely different viewpoint concerning these arguments for continuing the B-1. To begin with, the DOD has stated that the cruise missile program is considered one of the more successful test programs undertaken by the DOD. The Air Force air launched cruise missile (ALCM) program evolves from the SCAD program dating back to 1972 and earlier cruise missile research. The technology applied to the ALCM and the Tomahawk, the Navy version of the ALCM, is well tested. The engine has over 2,800 hours of various test time. The navigation guidance system has compiled over 2,200 fixes from various platforms.
The DOD response to the penetration and weapons delivery argument is that the cruise missile is projected to be equal to the B-1 in this regard and the cruise missile speed is virtually the same as the B-1 when actually delivering its payload. Further, the DOD expresses more confidence in the ability of the cruise missile to penetrate Soviet air defenses because of the small radar cross section of the missile as opposed to the ECM ability to defend the B-1 while it penetrates Soviet air defenses.
Mr. President, I believe the concerns of the Jane's editor, while very sincere, cannot stand up to the facts surrounding the potential capabilities of cruise missile technology.
I thank my good friend from Mississippi at this time.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute here. I think the Senator from Maine is so correct in his predictions. We are going to have a merry time here discussing priorities in the military program during this session we are now in, and if these planes are ordered, the money turned loose and spent on them — in the face of General Jones' testimony here, you had better look out, fasten your seatbelts, there will be a request for $1 billion for more B-1's at this sitting session.
Mr. MUSKIE. We may not be able to afford the seatbelts.