March 8, 1977
Page 6677
Mr. MUSKIE addressed the Chair.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator desire?
Mr. MUSKIE. Ten minutes, to start.
Mr. CRANSTON. I yield the Senator 10 minutes.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I compliment my good friend, the Senator from Massachusetts, on his statement, and I am happy to join him in support of the nomination of Paul Warnke for the two important posts to which the President has nominated him.
I note at the outset that I have read the testimony of Mr. Warnke before the Foreign Relations Committee, I have read the testimony before the Armed Services Committee, I have reread the testimony he delivered to the Senate Budget Committee over the last 2 years and, in all that review, I find nothing but confirmation of what I am about to say.
The interesting point is that, before I reread any of that record, I asked Mr. Warnke, if I were limited by time in my reading, which he would like me to read. He said:
By all means, read my testimony before the Armed Services Committee, because it was there that the issues were most sharply defined and which challenged me most clearly with respect to my own record and my own positions.
Paul Warnke is not afraid to face his critics. He went to the Armed Services Committees deliberately for that purpose and, in my judgment, Mr. President, after reading the record, his record stands up well.
Mr. President, in 1971, when our Nation was in the midst of the first round of SALT talks, I was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control.
It became evident in the course of the hearings the subcommittee held that year that the areas for possible agreement on arms control, which seemed so broad when the talks opened in 1969, were being swiftly narrowed. By the time the 1972 treaty was signed, its principal achievement was the limitation of ABM systems. The imperatives of the time had made the negotiation of many components of the U.S. SALT package impossible, and many of us who had hoped for a substantial slowdown in the nuclear arms race were disappointed.
This year we have been offered a second chance. Government leaders in Washington and Moscow are talking openly about trying to negotiate a halt to the endless escalation. We must try to come to an agreement this year before this most awesome weapons technology dominates the superpower relationship.
President Jimmy Carter's commitment to nuclear arms control and reductions is explicit in his words and proposals and implicit in the men he has chosen for the chief policymaking posts in his administration.
Paul Warnke, who has been nominated to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as well as our SALT negotiating team, would round out the Carter administration's national security policymaking team.
Paul Warnke served the Johnson administration in several top Defense Department positions in the sixties. He has written extensively on weapons control issues, and has remained a leading voice in our Nation for negotiated arms limitation policies.
The issue confronting us today, as we approach those negotiations is similar to what it was at the beginning of this decade: the relationship between U.S. technological developments and the chances for arms agreements.
Since that time, Paul Warnke has warned consistently that deployment of advanced weaponry substantially impairs our chances for further negotiations to end the arms race. That warning has been dramatically borne out by events.
In March 1971, the United States deployed its first sea-launched MIRV'ed missiles. Soviet MIRV'ing capacity had not even been adequately tested at that time. But the demonstration of our superiority spurred the Soviets to redouble their efforts. In 1977, Soviet MIRV'ing capability is unquestioned. And who would claim that the net effect has been to increase either side's security?
Paul Warnke's point, of course, was that, whereas the possibility of U.S. deployment of advanced weaponry gives the Soviets strong incentives to negotiate, actual deployment can only force them to emulate.
Paul Warnke discerned that negotiating positions must also be predicated on the contemporary technological state of weapons development. He knows that when technology changes the nature of our weapons, our negotiating positions must accommodate those new realities. For this understanding, he has been called "inconsistent" by opponents of arms control.
Paul Warnke recognizes the truth that only from mutual verifiable agreements can the United States or the Soviet Union gain the sense of security vital to each nation. He has urged that we consider flexible forms of restraint to test the Soviets' willingness to respond. And he has suggested that our technological superiority itself is one of our strongest "bargaining chips" with the Soviets.
Warnke will not be representing himself at the SALT talks. I do not know of any SALT negotiator who has ever done so. He will be arguing for agreements his country wants pursued, from negotiating positions arrived at through the work of many individuals in the armed services, the security agencies, the Congress, and by the President.
In fact, Paul Warnke's views embody the Carter arms control policy, as do those of the other members of the policymaking team.
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance believes that slowing the escalation in weapons building and reducing the nuclear arsenal is vital. He has reiterated the need to make headway by October 3, when the term of the present arms agreement expires.
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Treasury Secretary Blumenthal agree that finding ways for both superpowers to halt the momentum in the arms race is crucial.
Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown's revisions of the 1978 Ford budget demonstrate that he understands the strategic value of defense program decisions to signal U.S. intentions and willingness to negotiate. The projected slowdown in purchases of the B-1 bomber, the slowing of MX mobile missile development, and the halt in production of the 60 Minuteman III ICBM's are all indications of U.S. restraint which — if matched by Soviet cutbacks — can be a starting point for new understandings in arms controls. These slight reductions are not so immutable that they irrevocably affect the U.S. strategic posture or substantially alter our ability to change course, if necessary. The flexibility of this approach gives the United States added negotiating power and, at the same time, responds adequately to our real security needs.
President Carter endorsed this approach to reopening active negotiations when he was questioned about future production of the B-1 bomber and replied that—
Part of the factor to be assessed is the attitude of the Soviet Union. If we can have a general lessening of tension, a demonstrated commitment on their part toward disarmament, it would certainly make it less likely that we would go ahead with the B-1.
President Carter has given the Soviets specific opportunities to respond to his initiatives and reopen serious and productive arms negotiations.
He called on the Soviet Union to cease deployment of the mobile SSX-20 missile. Although it is not a strategic missile, the President made the point that both sides have to take initiatives, and that this missile "is difficult to distinguish from the intercontinental SSX-16 missile."
He has suggested 24 or 8 hour pre-launch warnings of intercontinental ballistic missile tests.
He has called on the Soviets to join in "a comprehensive test ban to stop all nuclear testing for at least an extended period of time — 2 years, 3 years, 4 years."
And he proposed that we move quickly to conclude a SALT agreement that would omit all reference to the Soviet Backfire bomber and the U.S. cruise missile, leaving those weapons to a third round of SALT negotiations.
President Carter's initiatives stem from a recognition of the realities that face Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev at this time.
At Secretary Brezhnev's instruction last fall, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Andrei Gromyko, submitted to the U.N. General Assembly the most explicit Soviet paper on arms control ever. The Gromyko memorandum called for an end to the arms race, including the manufacture of weapons, an end to arms transfers to other nations, and an end to the development and deployment of new weapons. It also called for the reduction of nuclear stockpiles, with the ultimate goal of eliminating "all types of nuclear weapons — strategic and tactical, offensive and defensive."
In the past several months, our Nation's experts on Kremlin politics have seen a new unanimity among top Soviet leaders about the dangers of war. One sign of this has been the evidence of tighter political controls on the Soviet military leadership. The most obvious example is the promotion of Marshal Ogarkov to become the new Soviet Chief of Staff, over the hawks' favorite, Marshal Kulikov, who was named Commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces. The new Chief of Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, has been the U.S.S.R. military representative at the SALT talks.
Secretary Brezhnev, in his January 18 speech at Tula, further emphasized the importance of completing "in the nearest possible future" the Vladivostok agreement signed in 1974. He explicitly mentioned the possibility, following such action, of "more far reaching measures."
Both the Soviet Military Historical Journal and Pravda in recent months have carried significant articles signaling a new desire on the part of the Soviet leadership to negotiate an end to the arms race and a renewed recognition that further stockpiling and development of arms will "change nothing."
This is a conclusion that most Americans have also reached: beyond the ability to inflict devastation on each other, neither superpower can hope to achieve increased security from continued arms building.
What is propitious is that clear signals to control nuclear weapons are being beamed from Moscow to Washington and vice versa. These signals indicate a desire by Secretary Brezhnev to bring his political career to a close with an effective agreement on nuclear weapons, and by President Carter to begin his Presidency with a bold step to curtail the spiral of arms buildups.
This positive climate was enhanced by the President's first meeting with the chief envoy from the People's Republic of China, when he was told of China's interest in reducing reliance on nuclear weaponry to zero. The signs from China show a possibility that the new leadership is willing to support positive means to improve its security against its Soviet neighbor, and to reduce the economic strain that a large scale accelerated weapons program would inevitably cause in the Chinese economy.
As Budget Committee chairman, I feel I have a duty to tell the Senate of the very practical need for action on nuclear arms agreements now. Since the May 1972 SALT agreement, spending associated with defensive strategic arms has substantially declined. But, at the same time, the rate of increase for strategic offensive arms has risen. Fiscal years 1976 and 1977 marked real increases in defense spending. The same is true for the Ford-Carter request for fiscal year 1978.
The modernization of our forces will remain a substantial budget item. But without any effort at all to control arms technologies and developments, there will be no end to the enlargement of our forces on a vast scale. Arms agreements cannot immediately wipe out weapons costs, and no thinking person believes they will. But they can substantially brake the rate of increase and they can provide a way in which our Nation can rationally budget ahead to deal with the other demands on national revenues.
I am apprehensive that the personal attack on Paul Warnke might undercut a very real possibility for a breakthrough in the arms control deadlock.
For more than a month, the newspapers and the airwaves have been filled with distortions of Paul Warnke's views.
May I add that my mail these days and that of other Senators is filled with similar distortions.
Aside from any harm inflicted upon an honorable American and a distinguished public servant, such attacks obscure the real issues and raise fears about our Nation's military preparedness.
The "missile gaps", "throw-weight gaps", "spending gaps" and other gaps that have been hastily perceived and as hastily forgotten when they had served their purpose should have armed us with more skepticism about the annual budget-timed saber rattling that is launched against this city. And they should make us recognize the nature of the attacks directed against Paul Warnke's nomination at this time.
The Warnke hearings could have served as a valuable forum for extensive public debate on this issue. Instead, they have been used as a platform by those who oppose arms controls and seek to undermine President Carter's efforts to reopen the SALT negotiations. The need for a national debate is evident. We all have a stake in recognizing the realities involved in our Nation's nuclear power.
Paul Warnke, over the many years I have known him, has demonstrated a depth of understanding and expertise in the arms field which superbly equip him for the hard bargaining with the Soviets that lies ahead. He recognizes that current inventories of nuclear weapons must be mutually reduced, not increased, and he knows that the inevitability of technological advances mandates verifiable limits.
President Carter has said that Warnke's confirmation is crucial to the success of his administration's efforts to control the arms race. I share the President's perception of Paul Warnke as a man "thoroughly and totally qualified" to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the U.S. SALT negotiating team.
Mr. President, it should be clear to everyone from his appearances before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee that he has the necessary background for these responsibilities and that his views on arms control as an adjunct to our military strength in providing our national security fit him admirably for the job he has been asked by the President to undertake.
From my years in the Senate and my recent service as chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, it is clear to me that sensible measures of arms control, negotiated with our potential adversaries, can do much to help the Congress in meeting all of its obligations to the American people.
Certainly a strong defense capability which will deter aggression and, where necessary, defend our interests against attack, is our first obligation. But a sound economy, provisions for quality education, the maintenance of our transportation facilities and providing a decent existence for those not in a position to care for themselves are also attributes of true national security.
I know that Paul Warnke shares these ideas. As to the suggestions of some that his basic positions have changed and that his present statements are inconsistent with those of the past, I can assure the Senate that I know much better than that. I have been consulting with Paul Warnke on national security issues for about 7 years. The views he has expressed to me throughout this period are the same views he expressed in his Senate testimony. In our discussions, he has consistently argued that the United States must recognize the serious military and political threat presented by the armed forces of the Soviet Union. For this reason, he has recommended to me that I oppose any significant reductions in our European force levels except in the context of the negotiations on mutual balanced force reduction. Indeed, it was in part on the basis of his advice that I changed my earlier inclinations and opposed on the floor on November 23, 1971 a proposed cut of 60,000 American troops.
In our Asian deployments, Paul Warnke has frequently said that our commitment to Japan is integral to our own security and that our 7th Fleet and Air Force units should be maintained in the Western Pacific. With respect to our troops in Korea, he has supported the proposition that reductions should be made in close consultation with our Asian allies.
In our many meetings, he has always affirmed our commitment to Israel's security and its need for adequate military strength to deal realistically with problems of a Middle East settlement.
With respect to strategic nuclear arms, the subject of the SALT negotiations, Paul Warnke has never been willing to accept the concept of minimum deterrence or that we could tolerate the acquisition of any meaningful superiority by the Soviet strategic nuclear forces. What he has urged is that mutual and realistic arms control measures be sought to lessen the risks involved in the ongoing accumulation of more and more sophisticated nuclear weapons on both sides. He has insisted that a cessation of the nuclear arms race is not only consistent with our national security but would, in fact, preserve and enhance it. He and others worked with me in 1970 on a statement urging agreement with the Soviet Union on an "immediate and mutual interim strategic standstill." Senate Resolution 211 was approved that year by the Congress stating that the President should propose to the Soviet Union an immediate suspension by both countries of the further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems. As pointed out in a report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations dated July 21, 1972, the Nixon administration rejected this advice and deployments of nuclear weapon, have continued.
In stating today that he is alarmed at the ongoing developments in strategic nuclear weapons, Mr. Warnke's views have not been changed. Instead, his fears have begun to be realized. The developments in nuclear missile accuracy now threaten to make vulnerable the land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in the United States and in the Soviet Union. Development of mobile launchers is proceeding, at least in part, as a response to the specter of land-based missile vulnerability. Such developments can increase the danger of nuclear war in a time of international emergency and can render effective arms control substantially more difficult.
It is for these reasons that I support Paul Warnke's confirmation. We must have in these vital jobs someone who is aware of the benefits that sound and verifiable arms agreements can bring to us and who is also aware of the dangers involved in the continued and virtually unrestricted competition in nuclear arms.
[Unrelated intervening action omitted]
NOMINATION OF PAUL C. WARNKE TO BE AMBASSADOR — SALT NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Maine, I yield myself 3 minutes for a question.
I understand there are 6 hours set aside for this subject today, is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURDICK). That is correct.
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield myself 5 minutes.
I simply want to congratulate the Senator from Maine on his very thoughtful and excellent statement. I think, particularly from the vantage point of his important Senate responsibilities in the areas of foreign policy and also strategic arms, he brings a special insight into the matters which have been raised during the course of debate on this nomination.
I would just like to ask the Senator from Maine, and perhaps later the Senator from South Dakota and others, about their reaction to a newspaper story that was printed this morning in the New York Times, which alleges that one of the leading opponents to the President's nomination — and I shall read the quotation; I cannot ascertain whether it is true or not, but it is obviously by a dependable and reliable newspaper reporter:
— has told the colleagues that they could weaken Mr. Warnke's position to the point of uselessness by holding the vote in his favor to 60 or less.
And then it continues,
No one questioned that Mr. Warnke could be confirmed. The only issue was whether his critics would damage him in the process.
I am just wondering.
The Senator, during the course of his own comments, as I did in mine, referred to the nitpicking on grammatical questions that have been raised. I believe the Senator pointed out very clearly that there was never any reluctance by Mr. Warnke to confront those who challenged his views. He did so in a very thoughtful and forthright way.
He has been subject to unnecessary abuse from his opponents.
He has been subject to abuse, as the Senator from Maine has pointed out, about distortions, misrepresentations, and misstatements of his positions. I have received a similar kind of mail.
I am just wondering if the Senator does not feel that this kind of debate and discussion on a matter of grave importance to our national security, to the security of peoples around the world, and to our allies, does not reach, if the newspaper account is accurate, sort of a new low. If Members of this body are attempting to secure votes in opposition in order to weaken Mr. Warnke's position to uselessness in representing our national interests in future negotiations that are pending and which, we all are very much aware, will take place in these next very few months, then that tactic must be challenged.
Mr. MUSKIE. That could very well be the effect if distortions of Mr. Warnke's positions become fixed in the current thinking of a wide percentage of the American people.
As I read the answer in the hearings, I was struck by the fact that over and over again those who challenged Mr. Warnke's positions undertook to restate them in their own distorted interpretation, notwithstanding the fact that he had already given a sufficient explanation which effectively rebutted the interpretation. So over and over again one gets the repetition of the distortion. Mr. Warnke was doing his best to testify in new words, new approaches, to explain what his new position was.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield another 5 minutes.
Mr. MUSKIE. The postcards I am getting are not handwritten but are typical mass mailing postcards, with a "Dear Senator Muskie" in somebody's handwriting and then somebody's name at the bottom. They are a repetition of the same kind of distorted view of Mr. Warnke's position.
If that kind of thing becomes widely current, then it could have a damaging effect upon Mr. Warnke's ability to bring back to us an agreement which could commend public support.
I do not know what we can do about that kind of propaganda. It does go on and it has gone on. It is a technique which has been used by many of these same sources over and over again for many, many years.
Mr. KENNEDY. I would agree with my colleague that that kind of distortion and misrepresentation, which I believe has been in too many instances the situation in the opposition to this nominee, serves no interest whatsoever. The kind of pernicious attack by either Members of this body or by others, who feel that opposition votes to Mr. Warnke's approval will virtually make his bargaining position in terms of our national interest with the Soviet Union virtually useless, is absolutely irresponsible by any Member of this body, if it is going on, or by any of those who oppose Mr. Warnke's position.
I just want to further agree with what my understanding is of both the record, reflected in terms of his presentation on each of these questions that was addressed to him, the way and the manner in which he composed himself, and the continued record of service to our Nation's interest in a strategic arms policy and in other matters in the Defense Department, his record which will continue to stand long after these irresponsible and, I believe, reprehensible salvos fade in the breeze.
I thank the Senator for his comments. I join in hoping that we get a strong vote.
I might raise just one other question. During the earlier parts of the debate the opponents were making, or at least attempting to make, a case against Mr. Warnke because of his opposition to various specific weapons systems. Yet I find that even Mr. Nitze, who is strongly opposed to Mr. Warnke, indicated in his testimony in response to a question:
I think the Soviet Union negotiates with the opposing delegation on the assumption that whatever the delegation says represents the considered government position and I do not think past positions would necessarily affect the Soviet negotiators.
That was repeated later in a question from Senator HART:
You would not join his critics who say that his opposition to the system makes him less qualified to renegotiate?
Mr. Nitze said:
No, I would not join with them with respect to opposition to individual systems.
Yet time and time again in the course of this debate we hear both the distortion of the position and the attempt to assault Mr. Warnke's position solely on that basis. I think that is obviously unwarranted and unjustified as well.
I thank the Senator.
Again, I commend our colleague from South Dakota who, in his excellent statement at the opening of this debate, has laid out the various strategic arms issues about as cogently and as effectively as we have seen presented in the Senate in a long time. It is unfortunate that the debate was not on those particular kinds of issues or questions but instead on distortions and misrepresentations.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. McGOVERN. Will the Senator yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time has expired.
Mr. MUSKIE. I believe Senator CRANSTON had some time that he left to me. I would be happy to yield to the Senator from. South Dakota.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I have on my note that the Senator from Utah was to be recognized at 1:30. Has there been a change?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair knows nothing of an order for the Senator.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Is the Senator from. Arizona recognized?
Mr. McGOVERN. If the Senator will yield on that point, I came to the floor before 1 o'clock and requested permission to speak. I was told that the only Senator ahead of me was Senator MUSKIE, the Senator from Maine. I asked that my name be added to the list. I think the Chair will discover that my name was, in fact, listed as the next speaker.
Mr. GOLDWATER: Will the Senator yield to me just 2 minutes?
Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, I am happy to yield.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I could not help but hear what the Senator from Massachusetts said. I remind him that the tactics that he objects to now have been used time and again by members of his party. While I find them distasteful and he does, too, they go on and there is nothing we can do about it.
There are those of us who feel very strongly about Mr. Warnke. I did my best to satisfy my conscience to the extent that I could vote for him. But I could not. It was not due to any pressure by anybody else or anything that the New York Times or the Washington Post might have said. I just feel, in my body, that this man is not the man to handle this job. So, while the Senator from Massachusetts may find the New York Times obnoxious in this case, I might say I find it obnoxious most times, but there is nothing new in this approach. I do not like it, either.
I think most of us who oppose Mr. Warnke do it on the grounds that we do not think he is the man for the job. It is like when the President proposed Mr. Sorensen. I called the White House and told him that I thought he was making a mistake, that at best, he would come out of it with an indication that we did not have the confidence in Mr. Sorensen that we should have for a man in that job. Now, the same thing is going to happen about Mr. Warnke.
There is no question that he is going to be approved. I think the fact that we may have 35 or 40 people on this floor who oppose him may give the President time and cause to think about it. That is our job. We are not supposed just to say, Amen, to everything that comes down from the President's office.
I remember many times when my Democrat friends opposed with great abusiveness appointments that were tried to be made by Republic Presidents. Now we have a Democrat in the office. I feel very strongly about this.
Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator yield for just a moment?
Mr. GOLDWATER. I do not have the floor.
Mr. McGOVERN. I yield.
Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, do I have the floor?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota has the floor.
Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, I yield.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mike Hunter and Tom Parry of my staff be granted the privilege of the floor during the remainder of the proceedings concerning the Warnke nomination.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Schneider be granted the privilege of the floor during the proceedings concerning the Warnke nominations.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
How much time does the Senator from South Dakota yield to the Senator from Massachusetts?
Mr. McGOVERN. I yield to myself 30 minutes. I yield now to the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, my remarks were not directed to those who, as a matter of conscience or view, differ with Mr. Warnke. All of us understand that responsibility, each and every one of us. It is being exercised and should be and will be as long as this is a free and open body.
What I am objecting to, Mr. President, is the use of an argument that, in order to weaken a negotiator of the United States, the tactic that should be used is to vote against him in order to weaken his position, to make him virtually useless in carrying on negotiations in which he is clearly representing the United States position. It is that tactic which I think is irresponsible.
In the time that I have been here, for 14 years, I have yet to see that particular argument advanced. I cannot see how that carries forward any person's or individual's views or matters of conscience in opposition to a particular nominee. That is what I am objecting to, not the question of just opposition based upon a matter of judgment.
I thank the Senator from South Dakota for yielding.
Mr. JACKSON. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?
Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, I yield.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Richard Perle and Dorothy Fosdick, of my staff, be granted the privilege of the floor during the pendency of the nominations of Mr. Warnke.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, first of all, I thank the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) for his thoughtful words about my statement last Friday and commend him for the statement that he has made here on the floor of the Senate this afternoon. I also thank Senator MUSKIE, whom I heard speaking when I came into the Chamber.
It seems to me they have made the essential case for Mr. Warnke's nomination. The Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) took exception based on the thought that some of the objections that are being raised here this afternoon to the kind of attack being made on Mr. Warnke deny those who are opposed to this nomination their day in court. That is not the intention of those of us who are defending the Warnke nomination. There are legitimate grounds on which people can disagree about this nomination. What disturbs me about it is the ridiculous character of some of the criticisms that have been directed against Mr. Warnke.
One, in particular, that bothers me does so because he is being unfairly identified with some of the positions that I have taken in the past. I cite, for example, an editorial in the Wall Street Journal that has been widely circulated, in which this statement appears:
Mr. Warnke is best understood as George McGovern's Defense Secretary. During the 1972 presidential campaign, he was the chief apologist for Mr. McGovern's plan to lop $30 billion off the Pentagon budget.
Then we have a letter that has been given wide circulation, written by a member of the other body, Representative McDONALD of Georgia, who repeats this line :
Mr. Warnke is best known as George McGovern's national defense adviser during the 1972 campaign and the architect of McGovern's scheme to slash $32 billion out of our national defense budget. If that is not enough to make him totally unfit for the job, he has recently been calling for unilateral disarmament.
Mr. President, the first thing I want to say about this is that any proposal I made for reductions in military outlays in 1972 was based on a 3 year forward period; not a $30 billion cut in any given year, but a phased reduction that would be continued dependent on the response from the Soviet Union.
The second thing I want to say while Senator MUSKIE is on the floor is that, at the time that alternative defense budget was issued over my name in January of 1972, Mr. Warnke was not an adviser to my campaign. If my memory serves me right, he was very heavily involved in the campaign of the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE). I would like to be fortified in my memory on that point.
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator is correct. Earlier in my remarks today, I characterized the nature of Mr. Warnke's advice to me in that period, the preceding period, and subsequently.
Yes, much to my regret, in 1972, Mr. Warnke became his legacy from me when my campaign folded, I say to my good friend from South Dakota. That was sometime, as I recall it, in late April or May. Mr. Warnke, at that time, was clearly one of my foreign policy advisers. He was so good that I was delighted when he chose to shift his offer of assistance to the McGovern campaign. I am sure the Senator from South Dakota found him valuable in that role, as some of us have in the years since as we have consulted him and others on various foreign policy matters.
He just has such a lucid mind, such an articulate way of analyzing and preparing complex foreign policy and defense issues that it is a sheer pleasure to deal with him. He has a touch of commonsense and complete dedication and commitment to the national security interests. I cannot imagine a man who, by character, personality, background, experience, and knowhow would be a more comfortable man to have in this responsibility.
I am sure that must have been the reaction of my good friend, GEORGE McGOVERN, to him in that 1972 campaign.
Mr. McGOVERN. I appreciate the Senator's comment. That was precisely my reaction to him. I always found him a thoughtful, cautious, and prudent man.