January 10, 1977
Page 496
By Mr. MUSKIE (for himself, Mr. ROTH, Mr. GLENN, Mr. RIBICOFF, Mr. PERCY, Mr. ALLEN, Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. BELLMON, Mr. BENTSEN, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR., Mr. CANNON, Mr. CHAFEE, Mr. CHILES, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. CULVER, Mr. CURTIS, Mr. DECONCINI, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. EASTLAND, Mr. GARN, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. HASKELL, Mr. HATFIELD, Mr. HATHAWAY, Mr. HELMS, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. LAXALT, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. McCLURE, Mr. MCINTYRE, Mr. MATHIAS, Mr. NUNN, Mr. SCHMITT, Mr. SCHWEIKER, Mr. STAFFORD, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. DURKIN, Mr. McGOVERN and Mr. LUGAR :
S. 2. A bill to require authorizations of new budget authority for Government programs at least every 5 years, to provide for review of Government programs every 5 years, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Government Operations.
SUNSET ACT OF 1977
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, it is with a sense of great anticipation this morning that I am reintroducing the sunset bill, along with Senators ROTH, GLENN, RIBICOFF, PERCY, ALLEN, ANDERSON, BELLMON, BENTSEN, BURDICK, HARRY BYRD, CANNON, CHAFEE, CHILES, CHURCH, CULVER, CURTIS, DECONCINI, DOMENICI, EASTLAND, GARN, GOLDWATER, HASKELL, HATFIELD, HATHAWAY, HELMS, HUDDLESTON, HUMPHREY, KENNEDY, LAXALT, LEAHY, McCLURE, MCINTYRE, MATHIAS, NUNN, SCHMITT, SCHWEIKER, STAFFORD, STEVENS, WEICKER, DURKIN, and MCGOVERN.
I say anticipation because sunset is an extremely important legislative idea. Its enactment by the 95th Congress would be a splendid accomplishment indeed.
I say anticipation also because within a matter of days, we will inaugurate a new President who was elected on a promise to the American people of making Government more effective.
What better way to demonstrate our willingness to cooperate with this commitment than to move rapidly ahead to consider the sunset proposal.
Many of us in this Chamber have just come from an election in which perhaps the overriding concern of our constituents was that Government is not working as well as it should be.
And all of us in this Chamber have heard the American people voice time and again — in one public opinion survey after another — their concern that Government is no longer effective nor responsive to their needs.
The sunset bill I introduce today is an imaginative and indeed a revolutionary response to this concern.
In its simplest sense, sunset proposes nothing more than a process through which Congress can begin to exercise greater control over the results of its legislative work — the hundreds of individual programs we have created over the years and which affect the daily lives of all Americans in so many ways.
In its most far reaching sense, sunset proposes nothing less than to make Government more effective, by improving the quality of services which Government programs are intended to provide.
These are lofty goals indeed. They have concerned many of us for years.
But they have also eluded us at every turn. Not because we have not tried. But I suspect because the solutions we saw required decisions we did not want to make.
As a result, we in Congress have too often satisfied ourselves with the rhetoric of legislation, leaving the hard work of oversight — a fundamental congressional responsibility — to be carried out in a hit-or-miss fashion rather than with the steady diligence it requires.
Sunset proposes one solution to these years of inattention, and a drastic one at that. To implement it seriously will be difficult medicine for us all.
Like budget reform, for example, the mechanics of sunset are not exciting press release material. On the contrary, sunset is concerned with the nuts and bolts budget decisions we in Congress have to make every day.
Moreover, sunset will not allow us to sidestep difficult decisions we may have preferred to avoid in the past. Each and every one of us will have to bite the bullet where our favorite programs and constituencies are concerned.
But as far as I can see, we have no choice.
And, in sunset, we have the best vehicle in my experience for setting about this all important task.
The job will be easier because we have taken the first step in budget reform. That new process, which has worked so well in its first 2 years, is an essential element in regaining control over the Federal budget — the most important statement of national priorities that we have. Budget reform has given us a badly needed method for looking at the picture as a whole.
Sunset will make us take a closer look at all the component parts of that budget, the individual building blocks of national priorities, to insure that we are getting the most for the tax dollars we
spend. As such, sunset is a logical second step.
Why do we need such a second step?
Because in the fiscal year 1977 budget, so-called uncontrollable spending — funds spent with little regular review by Congress — will take up 77 percent of the entire budget.
Because from 1966 to 1976, the fastest growing component of the Federal budget has been in permanent programs, those programs enacted forever, and subject to no regular review by Congress.
Because we have 302 different health programs, 259 community development programs, or 62 separate programs involved in providing social insurance and aid to the needy.
Or because no one really knows how many Federal programs there are altogether.
I suggest that any one of these answers by itself is reason enough for change. Taken together, they constitute an overwhelming case for far reaching reform. For they tell us that every year we have fewer options open to us in determining the priorities for Federal spending. They suggest that Government in Washington has become so cumbersome and unwieldly that no one is really in charge.
And they underscore the need for a process like sunset to help us regain the balance we have lost.
In principle, the sunset bill is a relatively simple idea.
It assumes that there is no Federal program so important or so holy that it should escape regular and thorough review — to see if it is working, to see if it is still needed, to see if its funding level is justified by its contribution to society.
The principal provisions of the bill are as follows:
First, the bill sets out a 5 year schedule for the mandatory reauthorization of all Federal programs. Where no such reauthorization is provided, no money can be spent to carry out the program. The bill also requires the appropriate committees of the House and Senate to propose a similar schedule for the review and reenactment of tax expenditures.
Second, authorizations for Federal programs are grouped for reauthorization by budget function and subfunction, so that Congress will be forced to look at all programs in a given area at one time, rather than in bits and pieces as is now the case.
Third, no program scheduled for reauthorization can actually be reauthorized unless the authorizing committee with jurisdiction over it has completed a thorough review of the program and provided a substantial justification for the program's continuation. As part of the review, the authorizing committees are required to explore the potential consequences of cutting into the base of a program's funding rather than simply recommending an incremental funding increase.
By applying the sunset concept to all programs, Mr. President, we have tried to insure that the process is neutral to all sides. The only exceptions we have made are for interest on the national
debt and a handful of programs like social security, into which people have paid with the expectation of later benefits from the Government.
By requiring the reauthorization of programs according to budget function, we have tried to insure that the potential for program duplication and overlap will be minimized, with the result that tax dollars are used more effectively.
And by encouraging review of programs from the ground up, we have tried to insure something more than a speeded up version of our current reauthorization process, where often it is only the increments that are reviewed, not the core program itself.
With these principal provisions, Mr. President, the legislation I am introducing today is substantially the same as S. 2925 which was considered and approved by the Government Operations Committee last year.
There have been two important modifications, however, which have been made in response to criticisms of the bill made by a number of Senators last year.
The single most controversial section of last year's bill was in title II, which set out the requirements and guidelines for the authorizing committees to follow in conducting their reviews of programs scheduled for reauthorization. These requirements were repeatedly singled out as being too burdensome on the committees.
In response to this criticism we have substantially simplified the title II requirements on the authorizing committees, in effect shortening the review process from four separate steps to one.
In so doing, we have eased considerably the potential workload on the authorizing committees.
A second modification we have made, Mr. President, is in the inclusion of a 1 year grace period for programs which terminate unintentionally rather than by design — either through scheduling problems on the Senate floor or through a filibuster where a minority of the House or Senate prevents the majority from voting up or down on the reauthorization of a bill. With this change, we believe we have responded adequately to the concern that there may be contingencies we cannot now foresee when mandatory reauthorization according to the schedule would not be possible.
In making these changes, Mr. President, we have responded to the most oft-cited criticisms of last year's bill. Far and away the bulk of those comments were directed at the review process which many saw as so cumbersome as to be unworkable.
I might note here, Mr. President, that we are fully aware that the schedule set out in the bill can be refined to take into account any changes made in committee structures and jurisdiction as a result of the Stevenson committee recommendations.
We have retained without change the fundamental operative mechanism of this bill, which is the sunset principle itself. Of all provisions of the bill, it was the sunset idea which garnered the broadest political support — because it is totally neutral, and because, I believe, it makes such good sense.
The extent of support for the sunset idea is evidenced by the fact that last year, the legislation had 59 cosponsors in the Senate and well over 100 in the House. The bill was unanimously approved by the Senate Government Operations Committee last summer. And it was only the logjam of legislative activity at the end of the last session that kept the bill from consideration by the Senate as a whole.
In a colloquy on the Senate floor at that time, I and several other Senators expressed our hope that the sunset bill could be given the highest priority by the 95th Congress. In reintroducing the bill at this early date, we mean to underscore our intention to work toward that end.
More than anything else, Mr. President, sunset has opened up a much-needed dialog in the Congress on the important task of making Government more productive. We welcome all who would like to join us in this undertaking because we believe it is one in which liberals and conservatives alike have a vital stake.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of S. 2 be included in the RECORD at this point, as well as a summary of the bill and a sample of newspaper clippings on the sunset bill.
There being no objection, the bill and material were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
S. 2
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Sunset Act of 1977".
Sec. 2. (a) For purposes of this Act—
(1) The term "budget authority" has the meaning given to it by section 3 (a) (2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
(2) The term "permanent budget authority" means budget authority provided for an indefinite period of time or an unspecified number of fiscal years, but does not include budget authority provided for a specified fiscal year which is available for obligation or expenditure in one or more succeeding fiscal years.
(3) The term "Comptroller General" means the Comptroller General of the United States.
(4) The term "agency" means an Executive agency as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code, except that such term includes the United States Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission but does not include the General Accounting Office.
(b) For purposes of this Act, functional and subfunctional categories are those set forth in the Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1977. All off-budget programs shall be assigned to functional and subfunctional categories by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in consultation with the Committees on Appropriations and the Budget of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Each committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives which reports any bill or resolution which authorizes the enactment of new budget authority for a new program shall include, in the committee report accompanying such bill or resolution, a statement from the Committees on Appropriations and the Budget of its House of the functional and subfunctional category in which such program will be included.
(c) For purposes of titles I and II of this Act, the first review date applicable to a program is the date specified for such program under section 101(a) and each subsequent review date applicable to a program is the date five years following the preceding review date.
TITLE I — AUTHORIZATIONS OF NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY
SEC. 101. (a) The first review date applicable to a Government program is the date specified in the following table:
Programs included within functional or subfunctional category:
First review date
050 National Defense
303 Recreational Resources
351 Farm Income Stabilization
453 Disaster Relief and Insurance
552 Health Research and Education
704 Veterans Housing September 30, 1979
305 Energy
306 Other Natural Resources
450 (except 453) Community and Regional Development
506 Social Services
553 Prevention and Control of Health Problems
702 Veterans Education and Training
753 Federal Correctional and Rehabilitation
806 Other General Government
807 Federal Financing Bank
850 Revenue Sharing and General Purpose
Fiscal Assistance September 30, 1980
150 (except 151) International Affairs
404 Ground Transportation
501 Elementary Education
503 Research and General Education Aids
600 Income Security
705 Other Veterans Benefits
754 Law Enforcement Assistance
802 Executive Director and Management September 30, 1981
250 General Sciences, Space, and Technology
302 Conservation and Land Management
304 Pollution Control
403 Other Advancement and Regulation of Commerce
502 Higher Education
504 Manpower Training
505 Other Manpower Services
701 Income Security for Veterans
752 Federal Judicial Activities
804 General Property and Records Management
900 Interest September 30, 1982
151 Foreign Economic and Financial Assistance
301 Water Resources and Power
352 Agricultural Research Services
400 (except 403 & 404) Commerce and Transportation
551 Health Care Services
554 Health Planning and Construction
703 Hospital and Medical Care—Veterans
751 Federal Law Enforcement
801 Legislative Function
803 Central Fiscal Operations
805 Central Resource Management September 30, 1983
(b) (1) No new budget authority (including permanent budget authority) which is provided for a program for a fiscal year beginning after the first review date applicable to such program under subsection (a) may be obligated or expended unless (A) the enactment of such new budget authority is authorized by the provisions of a law enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act, or (B) the provisions of this paragraph are deferred for such fiscal year by an extension resolution enacted under the procedure provided for in section 504.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to programs which are included within functional category 900, or are funded through trust funds and which are included within subfunctional categories 551 (Health care services), 601 (General retirement and disability insurance), or 602 (Federal employee retirement and disability).
(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to new budget authority initially provided for a program for a fiscal year beginning before the first review date applicable to such program which is available for obligation or expenditure in a fiscal year beginning after such date.
(c) It shall not be in order in either the Senate or the House of Representatives to consider any bill or resolution (or amendment thereto)—
(1) which authorizes the enactment of new budget authority for a program for a fiscal year beginning after the next review date applicable to such program, unless the report required under section 201(b) on the sunset review of such program has been submitted to the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be; or
(2) which changes (or has the effect of changing) budget authority for or outlays under any program which is included within functional category 900, or within subfunctional category 551, 601, or 602 and which is funded through a trust fund, if such change is to take effect after the next review date applicable to such program, unless the report required under section 201(b) on the sunset review of such program has been submitted to the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be.
(d) Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require the enactment of authorizations of new budget authority for a program for a period of five fiscal years. In any case in which it is determined necessary or desirable to enact authorizations of new budget authority for a program on an annual basis, or for any period of less than five fiscal years, such new budget authority may, subject to the provisions of subsection (c) (1), be authorized for the period so determined.
SEC. 102. (a) On or before January 1, 1978, the Comptroller General, in cooperation with the Director of the Congressional Budget Office and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on the Budget of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report setting forth each program new budget authority for which is by law—
(1) authorized for a definite period of time;
(2) authorized without limit of time;
(3) not specifically authorized; and
(4) permanently provided.
(b) The report submitted under subsection (a) shall also set forth—
(1) the law or laws under which each such program is carried on;
(2) in the case of programs to which paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) apply, the annual appropriation bill which provides new budget authority for each such program;
(3) the amount of new budget authority provided for each such program for each of the last four completed fiscal years ending before January 1, 1978; and
(4) each program for which no outlays have been made during each of the last two completed fiscal years ending before January 1, 1978.
The information required by this Section shall be cross-indexed so as to provide information to the committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives with respect to programs under their jurisdiction.
(c) The report submitted by the Comptroller General under subsection (a) shall identify programs in a manner which—
(1) assures that all provisions of law which serve as authorization of new budget authority are included in the identification of programs;
(2) classifies each program in only one functional and only one subfunctional category;
(3) provides, to the maximum extent feasible, that each program is administered by only one department or agency of the Government;
(4) is consistent with the structure of national needs, agency missions, and basic programs developed pursuant to section 201(1) of the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921;
(5) to the maximum extent feasible, is consistent with the appropriation account structure of the United States Government; and
(6) to the extent appropriate, classifies related authorizations within a single program.
SEC. 103. (a) On or before March 1, 1978, the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on the Budget of the Senate and the House of Representatives, acting jointly, shall review the report submitted under section 102 and submit it to their respective Houses together with a report setting forth, with respect to each program
(1) the functional or subfunctional category in which such program is included; and
(2) the first review date of each such program.
(b) At the request of the Committee on Appropriations or the Committee on the Budget of the Senate or the House of Representatives, the Comptroller General, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall furnish to such committee such assistance as it may request in carrying out its functions under subsection (a).
SEC. 104. (a) New budget authority shall not be provided for any program for any fiscal year beginning after the first review date applicable to such program under section 101 (a), unless the provision of such new budget authority is specifically authorized by law.
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply in the Senate or the House of Representatives with respect to new budget authority if the committee report in that House accompanying the bill or resolution which provides such new budget authority states that the provision of such new budget authority is necessary because of an emergency and sets forth the conditions which caused such emergency,and budget authority was not available for the program in the preceding fiscal year.
(c) Subsection (a) shall not apply in the Senate or the House of Representatives with respect to new budget authority for a program for one fiscal year beyond the year in which the program would terminate under section 101 if—
(1) the provision of such new budget authority is authorized by a bill or resolution which has been passed by that House or has been reported in that House; and
(2) new budget authority was available for such program for the preceding fiscal year.
SEC. 105. (a) All proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to changes in the review dates applicable to programs under this title and title II shall be referred in the Senate to the Committee on the Budget of the Senate, and shall be referred in the House of Representatives to the Committee on the Budget of the House, and each such committee shall have jurisdiction to report to its House, by bill or otherwise, proposed changes in such dates.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), any committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives may report bills and resolutions changing the review date applicable to any program under its legislative jurisdiction. Any such bill or resolution so reported shall then be referred to the Committee on the Budget of its House, which shall report such bill or resolution to its House within fifteen days after such bill or resolution is referred to it not counting any day on which its House is not in session), beginning with the day following the day on which such bill or resolution is so referred, accompanied by its recommendations. If the Committee on the Budget does not report such bill or resolution to its House within such fifteen day period, it shall automatically be discharged from further consideration of such bill or resolution and it shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be.
TITLE II — REVIEW OF PROGRAMS
Sec. 201. (a) Each committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall conduct a sunset review of each program within its legislative jurisdiction prior to each review date applicable to such program.
(b) For purposes of this title, the term "sunset review" means, with respect to any Government program, a systematic evaluation by the committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives which have legislative jurisdiction over the program, with the assistance of the appropriate agencies and congressional support agencies, to determine if the merits of the program justify its continuation rather than termination, or its continuation at a level less than, equal to, or greater than the existing level. Such review shall be undertaken in the scope and the detail the committee having jurisdiction deems appropriate and shall include, but not be limited to, an assessment of the degree to which the original objectives of the program have been achieved (including a statement of the number and types of beneficiaries or persons served) expressed in terms of the performance, impact, or accomplishments of the program and of the problem it was intended to address, and an analysis of the costs of the program.
(c) Each such committee shall submit a report on each sunset review of a program conducted under subsection (a), together with its recommendations, to the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, on or before May 15 of the year in which occurs the review date for such program. A committee may submit the results of the sunset reviews of two or more related programs in a single report.
(d) Whenever a committee recommends the authorization of new budget authority for the program under review or the authorization of new budget authority for a new program with objectives similar to the reviewed program, the report accompanying the first bill or resolution reported by such committees which authorizes the enactment of such new budget authority or any portion thereof shall include the report required by subsection (c), and shall include but not be limited to the following—
(1) an identification of the problem or the needs that the program is intended to address;
(2) a statement, to the extent practicable, in quantitative and qualitative terms of the objectives of such program and its anticipated accomplishments;
(3) an identification of any other programs having similar, conflicting, or duplicate objectives, and an explanation of the manner in which the program avoids duplication or conflict with such other programs;
(4) an assessment of the consequences of eliminating the program of consolidating it with another program, or of funding it at a lower level, taking into consideration similar or duplicate programs in the public or private sectors of the economy; and
(5) a projection of the anticipated needs for the program, including an estimate of when, and the conditions under which, the program will have fulfilled the objectives for which it was established
SEC. 202. (a) To assist in the sunset reviews of a program under section 201, the agency which administers such program, and any other agency when requested, shall provide to each committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives which has legislative jurisdiction over such program such information and assistance as the committee may request.
(b) On or before October 1 of the year preceding the year in which occurs the review date for a program, the Comptroller General shall furnish to each committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives which has legislative jurisdiction over such program the results of prior audits and reviews of such program.
(c) Consistent with the discharge of the duties and functions imposed by law on them or their respective Offices or Service, the Comptroller General, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, the Director of the Congressional Research Service shall furnish to each committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives such information, analyses, and reports as the committee may request to assist it in conducting sunset reviews of programs under section 201.
Sec. 203. (a) Section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (31 U.S.C. 1176)is amended to read as follows:
"AGENCY REPORTS
"SEC. 236. Whenever the General Accounting Office has made a report which, in the judgment of the Comptroller General, discloses any substantial deficiency in the achievement of the objectives of any agency program, or which contains recommendations to the head of any Federal agency, such agency shall—
"(1) not later than six months and not later than twelve months after the date of such report, submit a written statement to the Committees on Government Operations of the House of Representatives and the Senate, the committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate which have legislative jurisdiction over such agency program, and the Comptroller General of the action taken with respect to such deficiency or recommendations and of the specific progress made toward eliminating such deficiency;
"(2) at such times thereafter as any of such committees may specify, submit a written statement to such Committee of further action taken with respect to such deficiency or recommendations and of further specific progress made toward eliminating such deficiency; and
"(3) provide, in connection with all applicable requests for appropriations for that agency submitted to the Congress, a copy of all written statements submitted during the past fiscal year in accordance with paragraphs(1) and (2) to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.".
(b) The Comptroller General shall furnish to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and to the committees of the Senate and the House which have legislative jurisdiction over any Government program, the report of each audit or review conducted by the General Accounting Office involving such program.
TITLE III—CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF GOVERNMENT
SEC. 301. There is established, as an independent instrumentality of the United States, the Citizens' Commission on the Organization and Operation of Government (hereafter in this title referred to as the "Commission").
SEC. 302. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to promote economy, efficiency, and improved service in the transaction of the public business in the departments, agencies, independent instrumentalities, and other authorities of the executive branch of the Government.
SEC. 303. (a) The Commission shall conduct a nonpartisan study and investigation of the organization and methods of operation of all departments, agencies, independent instrumentalities, and other authorities of the executive branch of the Government, and shall make such recommendations as it determines necessary to—
(1) increase the effectiveness of Government services, programs, functions, and activities by changing the structure and execution of administrative responsibilities;
(2) improve delivery of services through elimination of needless duplication or overlap, consolidation of similar services, programs, activities, and functions, and termination of such services, programs, activities, and functions which have outlived their intended purpose;
(3) maintain expenditures at levels consistent with the efficient performance of essential services, programs, activities, and functions;
(4) simplify and eliminate overlaps in agency regulatory functions by review of the laws, regulations, and administrative reports and procedures; and
(5) determine the appropriate responsibilities of each level of government, the manner and alternative means for each level of government to finance such responsibilities, the forms and extent of intergovernmental aid and assistance, and the organization required for proper balance and division of respective Federal, State, and local government roles, responsibilities, and authorities.
(b) The Commission shall submit to the President and to the Congress such interim reports as it deems advisable, and, not later than September 30, 1980, shall submit a final report together with its findings and recommendations.
(c) At least once every year for two years after the submission of the final report, the Comptroller General shall report to the Congress on the status of actions taken on the Commission's final report.
SEC. 304. (a) The Commission shall be composed of eighteen members appointed from among individuals with extensive experience in or knowledge of American Government as follows:
(1) Eight members shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) Five members shall be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, three upon recommendation of the majority leader and two upon recommendation of the minority leader of the Senate.
(3) Five members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, three upon recommendation of the majority leader and two upon recommendation of the minority leader of the House.
(b) (1) Two members appointed under subsection (a) (1) shall be appointed to serve as chairman and vice chairman (as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection) and shall not engage in any other business, vocation, or employment. Such two members shall not be of the same political affiliation.
(2) The member described in paragraph (1) who is not of the same political affiliation as the President shall serve as Chairman of the Commission and the other member shall serve as Vice Chairman of the Commission.
(c) Of the members appointed under subsection (a) (1) (other than the members to whom subsection (b) applies), not more than three shall be of the same political affiliation.
(d) Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.
(e) Ten members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum, but the Commission may establish a lesser number to constitute aquorum for the purpose of holding hearings.
SEC. 305. (a) The Commission or, on the authorization of the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this title, hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, administer such oaths, and require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents as the Commission or such subcommittee or member may deem advisable.
(b) (1) Subpoenas shall be issued under the signature of the Chairman or any member of the Commission designated by him and shall be served by any person designated by the Chairman or such member. Any member of the Commission may administer oaths or affirmation to witnesses appearing before the Commission.
(2) The provisions of section 1821 of title 28, United States Code, shall apply to witnesses summoned to appear at any such hearing. The per diem and mileage allowances to witnesses summoned under authority conferred by this section shall be paid from funds appropriated to the Commission.
(3) Any person who willfully neglects or refuses to appear, or refuses to qualify as a witness, or to testify, or to produce any evidence in obedience to any subpoena duly issued under the authority of this section shall be fined not more than $500, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both. Upon the certification by the Chairman of the Commission of the facts concerning any such willful disobedience by any person to the United States Attorney for any judicial district in which such person resides or is found, such attorney may proceed by information for the prosecution of such person for such offense.
(c) The Commission is authorized to secure directly from the head of any department, agency, independent instrumentality, or other authority of the executive branch of the Government, available information which the Commission deems useful in the discharge of its duties. All departments, agencies, independent instrumentalities, and other authorities of the executive branch of the Government shall cooperate with the Commission and furnish all information requested by the Commission to the extent not prohibited by law.
SEC. 306. (a) Subject to such rules and regulations as may be adopted by the Commission, the Commission shall have the power—
(1) to appoint and fix the compensation of an Executive Director, and such additional staff personnel as it deems necessary, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, but—
(A) in the case of the Executive Director, at a rate equal to that for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code; and
(B) in the case of all other personnel, at rates not in excess of the maximum rate for GS-18 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of such title; and
(2) to procure temporary and intermittent services to the same extent as is authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code.
(b) The Commission is authorized to enter into agreements with the General Services Administration for procurement of necessary financial and administrative services, for which payment shall be made by reimbursement from funds of the Commission in such amounts as may be agreed upon by the Chairman and the Administrator of the General Services Administration.
SEC. 307. (a) The Chairman of the Commission shall receive compensation at a rate equal to the rate prescribed for level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, and the Vice Chairman shall receive compensation at a rate equal to the rate prescribed for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.
(b) All other members of the Commission who are not officers or employees of the Federal Government shall receive compensation at the rate of $200 for each day such member is engaged in the performance of the duties vested in the Commission.
(c) Members of the Commission shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred in connection with their activities as members of the Commission.
SEC. 308. The Commission shall cease to exist ninety days after the submission of its final report.
SEC. 309. There is authorized to be appropriated, without fiscal year limitations, the sum of $12,000,000 to carry out the provisions of this title.
TITLE IV — TAX EXPENDITURES
PART 1—TERMINATION AND CONTINUATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE PROVISIONS
SEC. 401. (a) For purposes of this title—
(1) The term "tax expenditure provision" means any provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or any other law, or of any regulation or ruling, which allows a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction in determining liability for any tax or which provides a special credit against any tax, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.
(2) The term "Committee on Ways and Means" means the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.
(3) The term "Committee on Finance" means the Committee on Finance of the Senate.
(4) The term "sunset review" means, with respect to any tax expenditure provision, a systematic evaluation by the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Finance, with the assistance of the Department of the Treasury and other appropriate agencies and congressional support agencies, to determine if the merits of the tax expenditure provision justify its continuation rather than termination, or its continuation at a level less than, equal to, or greater than the existing level. Such review shall be undertaken in the scope and the detail the committees deem appropriate and shall include, but not be limited to, an assessment of the degree to which the original objectives of the tax expenditure provision have been achieved (including a statement of the number and types of beneficiaries or persons served) expressed in terms of the performance impact, or accomplishments of the provision and of the problem it was intended to address, and an analysis of the costs of the provision.
(b) For purposes of this title, the first review date for a tax expenditure provision is the termination date of such provision prescribed by law enacted pursuant to section 402, and each subsequent review date for a tax expenditure provision is the date five years following the preceding review date.
SEC. 402. (a) The Joint Committee on Taxation shall conduct a study for the purpose of identifying and recommending termination dates for all tax expenditure provisions. The termination date for each tax expenditure provision shall be on December 31 of one of the five years beginning with 1979. The Joint Committee, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Committees on the Budget of the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall submit its recommendations to the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Finance as soon as practicable, but not later than January 1, 1978.
(b) During the Ninety-fifth Congress, the Congress shall complete action on a bill prescribing termination dates for all tax expenditure provisions in effect on the date of the enactment of the bill. The termination date for each tax expenditure provision shall be on December 31 of one of the five years beginning with 1979, and shall be effective with respect to taxable years beginning after the termination date of such provision.
(c) Any tax expenditure provision which is enacted after the enactment of the bill described in subsection (b), first applies to a taxable year beginning before January 1, 1980, and is to remain in effect (but for this subsection) for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1979, shall have a termination date which shall be effective with respect to taxable years beginning after December 31 ofone of the five years beginning with 1979.
(d) Any tax expenditure provision which is enacted after the enactment of the bill described in subsection (b) and first applies to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1979, shall have a termination date which shall be effective with respect to taxable years beginning after December 31 of one of the five years beginning with the first taxable year to which such provision applies.
(e) Insofar as possible, termination dates shall be prescribed under subsections (b), (c), and (d)
(1) for all tax expenditure provisions so as to provide an even distribution of the workof reviewing tax expenditure provisions during each year, and to take into consideration the economic impact of this process; and
(2) for each tax expenditure provision so as to provide for a review of such provision during the same period as the review under title II of programs having similar objectives.
(f) The Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives and the Senate shall report to the Joint Committee on Taxation and to the House of Representatives and the Senate on the relationship between the purposes of tax expenditure provisions and those of related programs as both are identified by functional and subfunctional categories, as soon as practicable, but not later than September 1, 1977.
(g) The Joint Committee on Taxation shall assist the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Finance in identifying tax expenditure provisions which become effective or are proposed after the date on which it submits its recommendation under subsection (a). The Committees on the Budget of the House of Representatives and the Senate shall report to such committees on the relationship between the purposes of such new or proposed tax expenditure provisions and those of related programs as both are identified by functional and subfunctional categories.
SEC. 403. It shall not be in order in either the House of Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or resolution (or amendment thereto)—
(1) which contains a tax expenditure provision which does not comply with section 402 (c) or (d); or
(2) which continues any tax expenditure provision (whether or not in a modified form) for any taxable year beginning after the next review date for such provision, unless the report required under section 411(b) on the sunset review of such provisions preceding such review date has been submitted to the House of Representatives or the Senate, as the case may be.
PART 2 — REVIEWS OF TAX EXPENDITURES
SEC. 411. (a) The Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Finance shall conduct a sunset review of each tax expenditure provision prior to each review date applicable to such provision.
(b) Each such committee shall submit a report on each sunset review of a tax expenditure provision conducted under subsection (a), together with its recommendations, to the House of Representatives or the Senate, as the case may be, on or before May 15 of the year in which occurs the review date for such provision. A committee may submit the results of the sunset reviews of two or more related tax expenditure provisions in a single report.
(c) Whenever the Committee on Ways and Means or the Committee on Finance recommends the continuation of the tax expenditure provision under review (whether or not in a modified form) or the enactment of a new tax expenditure provision with similar objectives, the report accompanying the first bill or resolution reported by such committee which continues such provision or contains such new tax expenditure provision shall include the report required by subsection (b) and shall include, but not be limited to the following:
(1) an identification of the problem or the needs that the tax expenditure provision is intended to address;
(2) a statement, to the extent practicable, in quantitative and qualitative terms of the objectives of the provision and its anticipated accomplishments;
(3) an identification of any other tax expenditure provisions or any other programs having similar, conflicting, or duplicate objectives and an explanation of the manner in which the program avoids duplication or conflict with such other provisions or programs;
(4) an assessment of the consequences of eliminating the provision, of consolidating it with another tax expenditure provision, or of reducing the revenue loss from the provision, taking into consideration similar and duplicate tax expenditure provisions and similar or duplicate programs in the public or private sectors of the economy; and
(5) a projection of the anticipated needs for the provision, including an estimate of when, and the conditions under which, the provision will have fulfilled the objectives for which it was established.
Sec. 412. (a) To assist in the sunset reviews of a tax expenditure provision under section 411, the Department of the Treasury, any agency which administers a program having objectives similar to the objectives of such provision, and any other agency when requested, shall provide to the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Finance such information and assistance as the committee may request.
(b) On or before October 1 of the year preceding the year in which occurs the review date for a tax expenditure provision, the Comptroller General shall furnish to the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee en Finance the results of prior reviews of such tax expenditure provisions and the results of prior audits and reviews of programs having similar objectives.
(c) Consistent with the discharge of the duties and functions imposed by law on them or their respective Offices or Service, the Comptroller General, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, the Director of the Office of Technology Assessment, and the Director of the Congressional Research Service shall furnish to the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Finance such information, analyses, and reports as the committee may request to assist it in conducting sunset reviews of tax expenditure provisions under section 411.
TITLE V. MISCELLANEOUS
SEC. 501. (a) The head of each agency shall transmit to the Senate and the House of
Representatives a statement of each request for new budget authority for a fiscal year, and a statement of estimated outlays during a fiscal year, which that agency has submitted to the President or the Office of Management and Budget.
(b) The statements required to be transmitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives under subsection (a) shall be transmitted on the day after the day on which the President transmits the budget to the Congress under section 201 of the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, for the fiscal year.
(c) At the request of any committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives, the head of any agency shall furnish to such committee such information as the committee may request with respect to (1) requests submitted to the President or the Office of Management and Budget for supplemental new budget authority for a fiscal year and statements of supplemental proposed outlays during a fiscal year and (2) requests for new budget authority and statements of proposed outlays made to the head of such agency, or any officer or employee acting for him, by any component of such agency.
SEC. 502. (a) Nothing in this Act shall require the public disclosure of records which are specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order, or which are otherwise specifically protected by law.
(b) Nothing in this Act shall require the committees of the Senate or House of Representatives to publicly disclose records described in subsection (a) except as otherwise provided by the rules of the respective House.
SEC. 503. The provisions of this section andsections 101(c), 103(a), 104, 201, 402, 403, 411, and 504 of this Act are enacted by the Congress—
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such they shall be considered as part of the rules of each House, respectively, or of that House to which they specifically apply, and such rules shall supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change such rules (so far as relating to such House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of such House.
Sec. 504. (a) For purposes of this section and section 101(b) (1), the term "extension resolution" means a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the provisions of section 101(b) (1) of the Sunset Act of 1977 are deferred with respect to ______for the fiscal year —." (with the first blank space being filled with a description of the program to which the extension is to apply and the second blank space being filled with the appropriate fiscal year).
(b) It shall not be in order in either the Senate or the House of Representatives to consider an extension resolution relating to a program until 15 calendar days (not counting any day on which that House is not in session) after May 15 of the year in which occurs the review date for such program under Titles I and II of this Act.
(c) An extension resolution relating to a program introduced in the Senate or the House of Representatives shall be referred to the appropriate committee of that House.
(d) (1) If the committee to which an extension resolution relating to a program has been referred has not reported it at the end of 15 calendar days (not counting any day onwhich its House is not in session) after May 15 of the year in which occurs the review date for such program under Titles I and II of this Act, it is in order to move either to discharge the committee from further consideration of the resolution or to discharge the committee from further consideration ofany other extension resolution relating to the same program which has been referred to the committee.
(2) A motion to discharge may be made only by an individual favoring the resolution, may be made only if supported by one-fifth of the Members of the House involved (a quorum being present), and is highly privileged in the House and privileged in the Senate (except that it may not be made after the committee has reported a resolution with respect to the same program); and debate thereon shall be limited not more than 1 hour, the time to be divided in the House equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution, and to be divided in the Senate equally between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees. An amendment to the motion is not in order, and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.
(e) (1) When the committee of the House of Representatives has reported, or has been discharged from further consideration of, an extension resolution, it shall at any time thereafter be in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. The motion be highly privileged and not debatable. An amendment to the motion shall not be in order, nor shall it be in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.
(2) Debate in the House on an extension resolution shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. A motion further to limit debate shall not be debatable. No amendment to, or motion to reconsider the resolution shall be in order. It shall not be in order to move to reconsider the vote by which an extension resolution is agreed to or disagreed to.
(3) Motions to postpone, made in the House with respect to the consideration of an extension resolution, and motions to proceed to the consideration of other business shall be decided without debate.
(4) All appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the Rulesof the House of Representatives to the procedure relating to any extension resolution shall be decided without debate.
(5) Except to the extent specifically provided in the preceding provisions of this subsection, consideration in the House of any extension resolution shall be governed by the Rules of the House of Representatives applicable to other resolutions in similar circumstances.
(f) (1) Debate in the Senate on any extension resolution, and all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours. The time shall be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.
(2) Debate in the Senate on any debatable motion or appeal in connection with an extension resolution shall be limited to 1 hour, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the mover and the manager of the resolution, except that in the event the manager of the resolution is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in opposition thereto shall be controlled by the minority leader or his designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from the time under their control on the passage of a waiver resolution, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any debatable motion or appeal.
(3) A motion in the Senate to further limit debate on an extension resolution, or any debatable motion or appeal in connection therewith, is not debatable. No amendment to, or motion to recommit, an extension resolution is in order in the Senate.
BRIEF SUMMARY OF S. 2 — THE SUNSET ACT OF 1977
TITLE I
Sets out a five year schedule for review and reauthorization of all Federal programs, according to budget function and subfunction.
Requires that no program which has not been specifically reauthorized by the Congress shall continue to function after the review date set out in the schedule.
TITLE II
Requires the authorizing committees of the Senate and House to conduct a "sunset" review of all programs prior to the review date applicable to such program and to issue a report on the findings of the review.
Sets out guidelines for the content of the sunset reviews, including an identification of programs with similar objectives and an assessment of the impact of eliminating the program or funding it at a lower level.
Provides authorizing committees with assistance from executive branch and congressional support agencies — GAO, CBO, OTA and CRS — in carrying out their sunset reviews.
TITLE III
Establishes a Citizens' Commission on the Organization and Operation of Government, modeled after the two previous Hoover Commissions, to study and make recommendations on ways to improve the effectiveness of the Federal government.
TITLE IV
Requires the Joint Committee on Taxation, after consultation with Secretary of the Treasury and the Budget Committees of the House and Senate, to prepare a reauthorization schedule for all tax expenditures, similar to the schedule set out in Title I for Federal programs, and to report its recommendations to the Committees on Ways and Means and Finance.
Requires the Congress to take final action before the end of the 95th Congress on the schedule for tax expenditures.
Following the adoption of the schedule, the Committees on Ways and Means and Finance are required to conduct "sunset" reviews of tax expenditures according to the schedule. Guidelines for such reviews are similar to those set out in Title II for programs.
TITLE V
Requires Executive Department agency heads to submit to Congress (after the President has submitted his budget) a statement of that agency's request for new budget authority as transmitted to the Office of Management and Budget.
Requires agency heads to furnish the authorizing committees of Congress information regarding supplemental budget requests and supplemental estimates of outlays.
Sets out the procedures for a one year grace period for programs which have not been specifically reauthorized by the scheduled time.
[From the Arizona Republic, Feb. 25, 1976]
WHY NOT LOOK FIRST?
In the past year, as chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, Edmund S. Muskie, the Lincolnesque Democrat from Maine, has been attempting to keep federal spending within bounds.
Muskie is not a conservative by any means, but, as a Down Easter, he does have a native aversion to waste. Unfortunately, not many of his fellow Democrats share his attitude, so his admonitions against waste generally have fallen on deaf ears.
Muskie has now come up with an idea so eminently sensible that it also is likely to fall on deaf ears. He has introduced a bill requiring Congress to review every four years all federal programs except those which are not subject to review, like the interest on the national debt and Social Security payments.
Muskie points out that Congress is forever starting programs and creating agencies, advisory boards, commissions and committees to run them, and that, once it does so, Congress never bothers to find out whether they are serving the purpose they're supposed to.
It simply renews them automatically.
There are now, he points out, 228 health programs, 156 income security and social service programs and 83 housing programs. Supervising them are not only 11 cabinet departments and 44 independent agencies but 1,240 boards of various sorts, as well.
Congress establishes dozens of these boards every year. It rarely abolishes one.
Many of the programs overlap, many are redundant, many that once served a purpose no longer do. The bureaucracies running them are snarled in red tape.
Muskie cites a city where one General Accounting Office found eight clinics operating in one neighborhood under different programs, with none of them having any knowledge of what the others were doing.
He cites complaints from citizens who had to wait 18 months for a ruling on claims for disability compensation. He cites complaints from towns which had to wait months for federal approval of sewer systems mandated by federal law.
The GAO, he says, has found agencies unable to say how much they were spending on administrative costs as compared with actual services.
In effect, what Muskie's bill proposes is that every agency, commission, committee, what-have-you be forced to justify its existence and the existence of the programs it administers every four years.
Then Congress would have to determine whether they should be continued or killed, whether the programs should be curtailed, expanded or eliminated.
Forced to reexamine the agencies and programs, Congress might discover that it had been voting money for no purpose except to keep people on the federal payroll.
Muskie's bill deserves support. The trouble is that, when it comes to money, Congress so rarely does the obvious.
[From the Washington Post, July 21, 1976]
PROGRAMS THAT SELF-DESTRUCT
(By Neal R. Peirce)
The "sunset" law idea — to force government agencies and programs to justify their own existence or face extinction — is advancing rapidly in Congress and spreading like a prairie grassfire among the states.
Sunset measures were introduced this spring in California, Florida, Illinois and Louisiana — even before Colorado, in April, could complete action on its pioneering bill to put 40 state regulatory agencies on a seven year life cycle. Maryland has set up a 15 member commission to study the feasibility of a sunset law.
The Colorado chapter of Common Cause, which originated the sunset idea, reports inquiries from 30 states. "I wouldn't be surprised if two dozen legislatures were debating sunset bills by next winter," says Rosalie Schiff, executive director of Colorado Common Cause.
On Capitol Hill, 47 senators, of every ideological hue, are sponsoring sunset legislation requiring federal government programs, grouped by functional area, to come up for renewal every five years. Programs that couldn't pass muster would be cut back or eliminated altogether. Those that proved themselves would be given a new lease on life by Congress.
The bill cleared the Senate Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee by a 7-0 vote May 13, and sponsors Edmund S. Muskie(D-Maine) and William V. Roth (R-Del.) hope it will reach the Senate floor this summer.
On the House side, a companion bill has more than 100 sponsors including 41 members of the freshman class lined up by chief backers James J. Blanchard (D-Mich.) and Norman Y. Mineta, (D-Calif.). House committee hearings are scheduled to begin this month.
Broad support — from Common Cause to the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. — for the sunset legislation was forthcoming during Senate hearings. Only one interest group — the veterans — had the temerity to oppose the idea in public, out of fear that Congress might cut back their benefits.
Blanchard says he's "absolutely convinced"sunset legislation will eventually pass Congress. If he's right, the results could be revolutionary: the most effective brake on federal spending and programs in modern times — perhaps ever.
Muskie and Roth see sunset as a logical extension of the new congressional budget process, now in its second year. Whereas the budget process lets Congress establish spending priorities and overall ceilings, the sunset mechanism would force Congress to make periodic decisions on whether federal programs are really working so that duplicative or unnecessary ones can be weeded out.
Up to now, bureaucratic and political pitfalls have made it almost impossible to eliminate programs or agencies once they're on the statute books.
The sunset bill tries to avoid those pitfalls in three ways. First, a triggering mechanism requires that Congress must act every five years to keep a program alive. The burden of proof is shifted to a program's backers, to show that it deserves continued life. According to Alvin From, staff director of the Senate Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee, "it will be very hard for a committee to justify reauthorizing the Tea Tasters Board or 228 individual health programs."
Second, the sunset measure requires that all related programs — in manpower or health or national security, for example — come up for review and a decision on extension in a single year. Under strict budget guidelines, Congress will have to decide which programs are the most worthwhile which might be dropped or consolidated.
Finally, the sunset bill as it's now written requires a zero-based review of each federal program. to be prepared for Congress by executive agencies and the General Accounting Office. Zero-based review shows the consequences of cutting any program's budget 25 percent or more, eliminating it altogether, or providing the services another way.
The zero-based review process alarms professional budget makers. Roy Ash, former director of the Office of Management and Budget, says that zero-based review of an average of 250 programs a year "is like attempting to jump aboard a 747 in full flight." Others say the bill is overly ambitious, would set a "paper mill" in motion and create "a modest pilot or test runs."
Muskie and Roth show little patience with such arguments. If Congress proceeds at the pace predicted by many critics, Roth says. "I will be dead by the time the work is completed." Much of the resistance, sunset law backers believe, stems from normal bureaucratic terror of any radical change in their way of doing business.
Even federal tax incentives are the target of a sunset provision suggested by Ohio's Sen. John H. Glenn (D). However noble their original purpose, Glenn says, tax incentives often degenerate into loopholes that cause an annual loss of $101 billion in tax revenue — as much as the entire national defense budget.
Common Cause urges a kind of sunset for Congress itself — reorganizing committees into more clear cut functional areas and forcing members to rotate committee assignments every few years to break up "unholy" alliances between committee members and special interest lobbyists.
Even an imperfect sunset system, however, could help breathe life into the oft-neglected oversight role of the legislature, prompt the executive to be more accountable, and begin the arduous process of rescuing government from its own cumbersome inefficiencies and the nadir of public esteem where it finds itself today.
[From the New York Times, Aug. 5, 1976]
SPENDING REVIEW BACKED IN SENATE — COMMITTEE APPROVES BILL TO RESTUDY PROGRAMS AT FIVE YEAR INTERVALS
(By Edwin L. Dale, Jr.)
WASHINGTON, August 4.— The Senate Government Operations Committee approved today legislation, applying to Congress, that would end nearly all Government spending programs unless each one was specifically approved again over a five year review cycle.
Known as the "sunset" bill, it is the legislative counterpart of the "zero-based budgeting" concept embraced for the executive branch of government by Jimmy Carter, the Democratic Presidential nominee.
If enacted, the bill would amount to a revolution in Congressional procedures almost comparable to the Budget Reform Act, which is in full operation this year for the first time. That reform requires Congress to set an overall spending ceiling each year and live with it.
Enactment of the "sunset" bill by both houses of Congress this year is regarded by Congressional staff experts as doubtful but not impossible. Hearings on companion legislation in the House have been conducted by both the Rules Committee and the new Budget Committee.
The bill approved today would exempt from the automatic termination, or "sunset," process only a few programs of the insurance type, such as Social Security, where individuals contribute to a retirement or other benefit.
Thus, even longstanding "entitlement" programs such as veterans' combat related disability benefits would be subject to review every five years, though there is little expectation that cash payments now received by individuals will be taken away.
More likely to be modified or possibly terminated would be some of the more than 1,000 grant programs, often through state and local government, that deliver services of various kinds.
The committee report on the bill will begin as follows:
"The purpose of S. 2925, as amended, is to close the gap between Congress and the results of its legislative work — the actual performance and accomplishments of Federal programs paid for out of the Federal budget."
The bill sets up a schedule of "functional" programs — health, education, income security, veterans, agriculture, natural resources — for review and possible termination every five years.
Under an amendment adopted today, the reform itself would have to be reenacted by Congress after five years of experience. If it was not reenacted, the old procedures would resume.
The bill must now be considered by the Senate Rules Committee. It must also be considered by the Finance Committee because one of its provisions requires a five year review cycle of "tax expenditures" that is, special tax deductions, exemptions or exclusions that are aimed at achieving results in such areas as mining and health or home ownership outlays by taxpayers.
The chief sponsor of the legislation was Senator Edmund S. Muskie, Democrat of Maine, who is chairman of the subcommittee of Government Operations that drafted the bill. Senator Muskie's perception of the need for "sunset" grew as a result of his other role as chairman of the new Senate Budget Committee.
The committee report on the bill says, "The committee would like to state at the outset that S. 2925 does not require the reenactment of the entire United States code every five years. Rather it only affects those provisions of law authorizing the expenditure of funds. Accordingly, substantive provisions of law — antitrust, civil rights, occupational safety laws, etc.— are not affected by the termination provisions . . . the focal point of the termination and review process in S. 2925 is intended to be those provisions of law which authorize or provide budget authority for the delivery of services or goods by the Federal Government."
The term "sunset" apparently arose as a verbal counterpart to "sunshine" legislation, which relates to the conduct of Government business in the open. Both terms originated in the states, not Washington. Colorado has just enacted the first state sunset law.
The committees that handle the basic legislation would conduct the reviews, with help from the Office of Management and Budget, the General Accounting Office and the new Congressional Budget Office.
The Ford Administration has been lukewarm to the legislation, though not overly opposed. Paul H. O'Neill, deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget, told the House Budget Committee last week that he feared it could produce "mountains of paperwork" with few substantive results in cutting back ineffective programs.
However, there was also much skepticism about the radical Congressional budget reform. While it remains to be fully tested, there is now much more optimism than there was a year or two ago, both in and out of Congress, that it will work in restraining the Congressional "propensity to spend" under its old procedures of passing bills one at a time with no control over the total.
The committee report on the "sunset" bill says that the "number and complexity of Federal programs," the great increase in "uncontrollable" outlays and the "rapid growth in the number of Federal programs with permanent appropriations" have made the new system of review necessary.
[From the National Observer, June 5, 1976]
"SUNSET"BUDGETING: HIGH NOON FOR FEDERAL WASTE?
(By Mark R. Arnold)
WASHINGTON, D.C.— The hottest political idea of the year is something called the sunset bill. It has nothing to do with daylight saving time. It has everything to do — or so its sponsors say — with making the Federal Government more accountable and more efficient.
A response to a widely held view that the Federal bureaucracy is wasteful and inept, sunset is being eagerly embraced by liberals such as Hubert Humphrey and Charles Percy and conservatives such as Barry Goldwater and James Eastland.
The measure would set a termination date — a date for the sun to set — on every Federal program. Each would be renewed only if, after rigorous analysis by Congress its performance could justify its existence and spending level.
Every five years each Federal program would face extinction unless a "zero-based budgeting" review demonstrated its value to the nation. Such a review would weigh the effect of various levels of spending — beginning with zero, or termination — upon the program's goals.
Sunset is modeled in part on the zero-based budgeting techniques instituted by former Gov. Jimmy Carter in Georgia in 1972. The measure would reverse the assumption under which most bureaucracies operate — that programs, once established, should be continued (and usually grow). Sunset, says chief Senate sponsor Edmund Muskie of Maine, "offers one of the few chances we have to clear out some bureaucratic deadwood to make way for the nation's changing agenda."
Muskie and Delaware Republican William Roth introduced the sunset bill in the Senate on Feb. 3. "We hoped to get some hearings going and build a record that would lead to passage in the next Congress," says Alvin From, staff director of Muskie's Intergovernmental Relations subcommittee, which reported the bill May 13. But the proposal has attracted so much attention — and the support of both Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Minority Leader Hugh Scott — that the Senate could vote on it before the July recess. House action may not be far behind.
As of last week, 48 of the 100 senators and 110 of 435 House members were cosponsoring sunset or zero-based budget legislation in Congress, representing all viewpoints on the ideological spectrum. "Conservatives see this as a way of reducing the responsibilities of Government, liberals as a way of getting our house in order to take on new responsibilities,"says Muskie. Adds House sponsor James Blanchard of Michigan: "This is a good government issue, not a liberal or conservative issue."
Interest in the idea is not confined to Washington. Colorado recently became the first state to adopt sunset legislation when Gov. Richard D. Lamm signed into law a bill that swept through the legislature with strong bipartisan support. The measure requires that all of the state's 43 regulatory agencies undergo a complete performance audit every seven years. Other sunset bills have been introduced this year in the legislatures of Minnesota, Florida, Louisiana, California, Illinois, and Alaska.
Behind the interest in sunset legislation lies a popular reaction against the growth of government. The largest increase in public sector spending over the past 20 years has come at the state and local levels, but the growth rate of government at all levels has exceeded the growth rate of the economy during the period, according to studies by the Senate subcommittee. One consequence: The average family's tax burden has doubled in 20 years.
The period has also seen a dramatic rise in the most visible kind of Federal aid — that earmarked for domestic social programs. The Federal Government today has roughly the same number of employees it had a decade ago (2.8 million), but they administer more than 1,000 programs of assistance to all 50 states and 80,000 units of local government. In the health field alone, 10 agencies run 228 different programs.
"Government has become out of touch and out of control,"says Muskie. Proponents see the sunset bill as a way of regaining control over the services that the Federal dollar buys. This is "a logical second step," adds Muskie, to the Budget Reform Act of 1974, which gave Congress a framework to help set national priorities. "No one in the executive branch or Congress really knows if we're getting the most for the money we spend."
The sunset bill is officially known as the Government Economy and Spending Reform Act of 1976. It would require that all Federal programs — including income tax deductions — be reauthorized every fifth year or go out of existence. The only exemptions to the termination edict are payments for interest on the national debt and programs under which individuals make payments to the Government in the expectation of future benefits, such as Social Security.
THE ZERO-BASED PROCEDURE
Programs would be grouped for review by functional purpose (all defense programs would be reviewed in one year, all health programs in another, and so on) . The President would submit with his budget request a zero-based review of all programs earmarked for termination in the coming fiscal year and an independent evaluation of their effectiveness.
The appropriate committees of Congress would consider the President's zero-based reviews and evaluations, perform any additional studies deemed warranted, and recommend to the House or Senate how much — if anything — to spend on each program. Its backers believe the process would identify numerous areas of waste and duplication. "There's the potential for billions of dollars of savings," says Muskie.
The House bill introduced by freshman Democrat Jim Blanchard of Michigan is modeled after Muskie's. It has been endorsed by 106 House Members, including 45 of the 75 freshman Democrats. Blanchard says the bill is particularly appealing to liberals:
"We all want new programs, but we know it's politically unacceptable these days to raise taxes to finance them. The only way to pay for them is to weed out programs that have outlived their usefulness. Zero-based budgeting is how you find them."
BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS
The oldest and most comprehensive use of zero-based budgeting is Jimmy Carter's Georgia system, which has been continued and refined by his successor, Gov. George Busbee. National Observer interviews in Atlanta with state budget officials, agency administrators, and legislators suggests that the process can yield some benefits but that political factors limit its potential. In addition, because that system calls for annual zero-based review, some administrators complain that it causes needless paper work.
Georgia officials cannot recall a single program that has been "zero budgeted" out of existence. But administrators say the system keeps them on their toes and makes programs more efficient. In addition, argues Clark Stevens, who oversees the system for Governor Busbee, "we can look at all expenditures and measure them off against each other better. Old programs compete for resources with new proposals, and ideas don't get squeezed out on the grounds that the money has already been committed."
POLITICS OVER PERFORMANCE?
As a governor's management tool, the Georgia system has important advantages over traditional budgeting techniques, but its utility is severely hampered because the state legislature ignores it. "We prepare a continuation budget, and so does the governor," says Georgia legislative budget analyst Pete Hackney. "Then they decide which items in addition to that ought to be funded. If old things get cut out, it's usually because they've proved pretty unpopular."
No one has yet opposed the legislation in Congress, but numerous skeptics wonder if political considerations, rather than performance, might not sway Congress' deliberations. "Any ongoing program has a constituency around the country that is going to be mighty unhappy with anyone trying to tamper with their line into the Treasury," says a White House official.
PROGRAMS SEEN JEOPARDIZED
Sunset's backers insist that it would give reformers ammunition they now lack in facing down defenders of ineffective programs.
"We'd be viewing programs as they relate to other programs and spending options, not in a vacuum as we do now," says Blanchard. "That's got to be a plus."
Another criticism holds that program evaluation is too primitive an instrument — "more art form than science," says James Lynn, director of the Office of Management and Budget — to produce the standardized measures of effectiveness that the legislation would seem to require. Lynn, testifying on the Muskie bill in April, called the Senate formula "too mechanical and inflexible." His lieutenants are working with Senate aides to try to iron out the difficulties.
Requiring periodic reauthorization for all Federal spending "might put suicidal demands on Congress," worries a legislative appropriations expert. Without additional resources to undertake thorough reviews, he adds, "We might end up with a BS type of re-certification procedure, a paper exercise."
PILOT PROJECTS SUGGESTED
Moreover, a functional approach to consideration of Federal spending would require a thorough realignment of the present haphazard committee structure. No longer, for example, would 17 committees of Congress have jurisdiction over energy legislation. Muskie thinks sunset would spur this needed realignment, but he concedes, "If we don't solve the jurisdiction problem, implementation will be weakened."
These problems prompt some sunset backers to conclude that the legislation should be implemented in phases, beginning with some pilot projects. "We don't want to bite off more than Congress can chew and discredit the whole idea," says a strategist for Common Cause, which is pushing sunset in Washington and in state legislatures.
Whatever approach prevails, the idea behind sunset — to force a systematic and periodic reevaluation of Government programs — is gaining strength. Says Muskie:
"People are fed up. They read about abuses in the Medicare program and cost overruns in defense spending. They don't know if it's the tip of an iceberg or the whole iceberg. I don't know either. The fact is, nobody knows. But we, as their representatives, have an obligation to find out."
[From the Washington Star, Apr. 26, 1976]
AUTOMATIC "SUNSET" MAY FACE U.S. SPENDING PROGRAMS
(By Martha Angle)
Archy the cockroach and Mehitabel the cat are alive and well on Capitol Hill.
It figures, if you stop to think about it.
These days, the spirit of Archy seems to have slipped into Sen. Edmund S. Muskie, D-Maine. The freewheeling Mehitabel, never one for modesty, has reappeared in the Congress as a whole.
Archie, as readers of a certain age may recall, was a vers libre poet returned to life as a cockroach. Mehitabel, Cleopatra in an earlier existence (or so she always claimed), was a fun loving cat of easy virtue, perpetually producing kittens which she promptly forgot about.
Archy, with some social conscience, regularly inquired about the well being of Mehitabel's offspring — only to be met by a blank stare and innocent query, "What kittens, Archy?"
Like Mehitabel, the Congress for a decade or so has been happily producing programs — health programs, education programs, veterans programs, energy programs, environmental programs, transportation programs, every size, shape and price program you can name.
And like Mehitabel Congress never checks up on its progeny. Each new program is sent out into the world to fend for itself and grow willy-nilly. Until Ed Muskie started asking a few months ago, no one ever bothered to inquire how all those programs were faring.
In the last dozen years, the number of federal domestic programs multiplied from 50 to nearly 1,000. The federal budget climbed from $158.2 billion in 1967 to an estimated $413 billion for fiscal 1977.
But the good old days are over. Vietnam, inflation and recession have bent the federal budget all out of shape. There's no longer enough money in the treasury to feed all those programs Congress created, let alone provide sustenance for a new generation.
The American taxpayers are tired of government profligacy. Nothing seems to work right. Benefits don't trickle down to the average citizen. Promises go unfulfilled. Taxes go up, and up, and up — with no corresponding increase in results. People have had it with big government, and the message is sinking in with a few legislators like Muskie.
"Government has become out of touch and out of control," said Muskie, chairman of the new Senate Budget Committee, in a Feb. 3 speech to his Senate colleagues.
"We in Congress have not paid enough attention to how well the programs we adopted were working — and now these years of inattention to performance are taking their toll as we reap a bumper crop of public disenchantment with the government."
Under the guidance of the Maine Democrat, a Senate Government Operations subcommittee is preparing landmark legislation that would automatically abolish almost all federal programs every four years unless Congress specifically reauthorizes them.
The only exemptions from the quadrennial review would be interest payments on the public debt and programs like Social Security where individuals contribute to the system with the promise of receiving future benefits.
All programs in a specific budget function would be scheduled for expiration at the same time, to force the executive branch and Congress to examine the total federal effort in a particular field, such as health.
And when a program comes up for evaluation, Congress and the President would have to apply "zero-base budgeting" techniques to the review — a fancy way of saying the program managers would be required to explain what would happen if they got zero funds, half their current funds, three-quarters of their present budget, and so forth.
The Muskie bill, cosponsored by a remarkable array of senators of every ideological stripe, is known as "sunset"legislation. It embodies, at the federal level, a concept which is catching fire all over the country.
Colorado has just enacted the first major state "sunset"law, which will require automatic termination of dozens of state regulatory boards and commissions every seven years unless reauthorized.
The measure, first proposed by the Colorado chapter of Common Cause, the self-styled citizens lobby, was guided through the legislature by a coalition of liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans and was signed into law last week by Gov. Richard Lamm.
In Florida, where the state legislature is now in session, a similar "sunset" bill has been introduced with the support of 33 of the 40 state senators.
In Maryland, Del. David L. Scull, D-Mont., succeeded in winning approval during the final days of the legislative session of two resolutions dealing with sunset review and zero-base budgeting.
The first resolution calls for creation of a 15 member commission to assess the feasibility of enacting a sunset law like Colorado's. The second asks Gov. Marvin Mandel to select one state agency for zero-base budget review as a pilot program.
And Georgia, although lacking a sunset law, was the first state in the nation to adopt zero-base budgeting — the other half of the Muskie bill. It did so at the insistence of former Gov. Jimmy Carter, now the front running contender for the Democratic presidential nomination.
A Carter spokesman said last week the former Georgia governor is unfamiliar with the specifies of the pending federal legislation, but said. "it appears to entail the sort of philosophy and approach that he would take as president."
Carter has already pledged to implement zero-base budgeting in the federal government, if elected, and to reorganize the bureaucracy — a step which would necessarily include termination of some agencies, the spokesman noted.
As it happens, Peter H. Pyhrr, a business executive who helped Carter establish zero-base budgeting in Georgia five years ago, is working with the Muskie subcommittee in drafting the federal legislation.
Pyhrr said Carter deserves full credit for initiating the system in Georgia. "He is not an executive who is run by his staff. He has his own ideas, and he is a very quick study. He personally decided to do it, even before his staff knew what the hell zero-base budgeting was."
Pyhrr, now vice president of Alpha Wire, Inc., a New Jersey firm which manufactures electronic wire cable and tubing, said Carter contacted him just before taking office after reading an article on zero-base budgeting Pyhrr had written in the Harvard Business Review.
"There aren't too many politicians who read the Harvard Business Review, but Carter did. He called me and asked if I could spend a couple of days with him explaining zero-base budgeting," Pyhrr recalled..
The days stretched into weeks, and by his second year in office, Carter had implemented zero-base budgeting for every executive branch agency in Georgia.
Pyhrr conceded many agency heads in the Georgia government were initially "very hostile" to the concept, having become accustomed to justifying only the annual increases in their budgets — not every penny spent.
"But we gave them no choice. They either produced zero-base budgets, or they didn't get any money. It was a super incentive to cooperate," Pyhrr said..
Muskie and his staff are acutely conscious of the technical and political hurdles which must be cleared to win enactment of effective sunset and zero-base budgeting requirements for the entire federal government.
They know federal agencies have never before been required to justify their existence and aren't anxious to start now. They realize special interest groups with a stake in existing federal programs will descend upon Congress to plead for their favorite causes.
They anticipate an epidemic outbreak of the "Washington Monument" syndrome, a standard bureaucratic response to proposed budget reductions which features threats to eliminate the affected agency's most popular program unless funds are restored.
(The syndrome first appeared one year when the Interior Department, ordered to cut spending by a certain percentage, quickly announced it would be forced to limit visiting hours at the Washington Monument. The cuts were then rescinded.)
During hearings on the Muskie bill in recent weeks, nearly every executive branch official who testified praised the aims of the legislation but insisted they can't be accomplished — at least not all in one swoop.
James T. Lynn, director of President Ford's Office of Management and Budget, called the bill "far too mechanical and inflexible,"predicting it would produce mostly "unneeded paperwork and wasted effort."
Secretary of Commerce Elliot L. Richardson suggested a four year zero-base review of every federal program is "overly ambitious," warning, "If we attempt too much, the effort may simply become one of satisfying the form without addressing the substance."
And William A. Morrill, assistant secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, noted his agency alone has over 370 programs, "Undertaking zero-base reviews of all these would be a major burden requiring extreme amounts of staff time,"he said.
Muskie and other sponsors of the sunset legislation are neither surprised nor discouraged by the dire predictions. Much of the resistance, they suspect, stems from normal bureaucratic terror of anything which challenges business as usual.
The subcommittee plans to move to markup of the sunset bill in about two weeks, hoping to steer it through the full Government Operations Committee and onto the Senate floor before the Democratic National Convention in July.
Enhancing prospects for action on the bill is the striking breadth of support it enjoys. Cosponsors range from Democratic liberals like Mike Mansfield to conservative Republicans like Barry Goldwater. Common Cause and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, groups which seldom agree on the time of day, both vigorously support sunset legislation.
"There's terrific political momentum for this concept right now," said one Muskie aide. "With all the public concern about big government, excessive spending and overlapping programs, it's a natural for an election year."
[From the Washington Star, Feb. 5, 1976)
MORE BANG FOR THE BUCK
Senator Edmund Muskie has come up with a legislative proposal that has the look of a winner.
Instead of following the usual practice of plowing more money into federal programs year after year whether they work or not, Mr. Muskie says, why not take a fresh look at them periodically?
Indeed, why not? Congressional failure to reexamine what it creates is a major reason why the budget keeps getting bigger, the bureaucracy keeps growing, and the taxpayers keep wondering why they don't get more bang for their bucks.
The way Mr. Muskie and the bill's cosponsors — Republican William Roth of Delaware and Democrat John Glenn of Ohio — see it, the government will never have enough money for new initiatives if it continues to throw good money after bad programs.
Under the Muskie bill, beginning in 1979 almost all federal programs would be put on a four year authorization cycle. This means that each program, with the exception of such things as servicing the federal debt and Social Security pensions, would be examined every four years to see if it is doing what it was established to do. Any program that was not reauthorized would automatically be abolished.
There's more. Programs deemed worthy of keeping would not necessarily be retained at existing or greater size. Congress would start at "zero base" in its reexamination and every dollar of authorization would have to be justified as to the job it is supposed to do and the impact on overall government spending.
To help the process, the executive branch would he required to make a "zero-base review and evaluation" of programs scheduled for extension or termination.
Enacting the Muskie proposal will not be easy. Congress is a world of 535 fiefdoms and each potentate has pet programs that he's determined to hang onto. Then there are the special interests — the lobbyists, if you will — that cajole, badger and even now and then bribe congressmen to keep programs going that benefit the special interests. The government bureaucracy itself is an important influence in keeping programs going long after they have served their purpose or proved to be inadequate; abolished programs mean abolished jobs, and paper shufflers can always find arguments to keep them in business.
Inertia is a factor in keeping programs going. Unless there is an external force to change its direction, a program continues on its course. Congress is not a body that works very hard at overcoming inertia.
As Senator Muskie said, there is no valid basis for the assumption that old programs and old agencies deserve to be continued simply because they existed the year before. "Government," he said, "has become out of touch and out of control." The time may be ripe for doing something about it, given the growing public sentiment for cutting back the government — and the Muskie plan seems a good place to start.
[From the Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 10, 1976]
CARTER ENDORSES "SUNSET LEGISLATION"
(By Jim Merriner)
COLUMBUS, OHIO.— Democratic presidential nominee Jimmy Carter Wednesday endorsed "sunset legislation" which would abolish federal agencies after a certain time period unless Congress renewed them.
Carter said it was his first endorsement of the idea, although he made favorable statements about it last June after meeting with Sen. Edmund Muskie, D-Maine, sponsor of the legislation.
At the time, Carter likened the "sunset" bill to the zero-based budgeting concept he had introduced as governor of Georgia.
"The instinct for bureaucratic survival, the political inertia which keeps old agencies afloat, is too strong to be overcome except by drastic measures," Carter said Thursday.
"If elected, I will actively support a strong sunset law.... I want a law which will shut down outdated agencies and programs once and for all," he said.
Carter was flanked by Sen. John Glenn, D-Ohio, a sponsor of the legislation along with Muskie. Both senators had been considered for the job of Carter's running mate, which was won by Sen. Walter F. (Fritz) Mondale, D-Minn.
"Up to the present time, I have not taken a position on this issue. Today, I have decided to do so," Carter said.
He said, "The Republican administration, despite campaign rhetoric about controlling government waste, has testified against enactment of sunset legislation before both houses of Congress."
Meanwhile, Carter accused President Ford Thursday of trying to "cloud the issue" about FBI Director Clarence Kelley's acceptance of gifts and FBI work in his apartment by bringing up the fact that Kelley's wife was dying of cancer.
Ford had accused Carter of a "lack of compassion"in saying Kelley should have been fired. Ford said Kelley's wife was dying of cancer at the time he accepted federally financed improvements for his apartment and gifts from subordinates.
Reacting to the death of Chairman Mao Tsetung in China, Carter said, "I want to know if this death signifies a shift toward or away from friendship with the American people" during the transition of leadership.
(From the Washington Post, Apr. 27, 1976)
SUNSET FOR BUREAUCRACIES
Out in Colorado, an intriguing experiment in regulating bureaucratic growth is getting under way. Gov.
Richard. D. Lamm has just signed a novel "sunset law"which would terminate every one of the state's
regulatory agencies — let the sun set on them — within seven years unless the legislature votes to
continue them. This unique self-destruct measure, initiated by Colorado Common
Cause, was passed with broad bipartisan support, extending from consumer oriented legislators to
Republican conservatives.
However much these factions may disagree about the proper role of regulation in the state, they shared a desire to make the regulatory agencies leaner and more accountable.
The great advantage of the "sunset" approach is that it establishes a framework for systematic, periodic scrutiny of the bureaucracies involved, and makes the advocates of each agency openly justify continuing public investment in it. This can focus legislative and public attention on some corners of government that have grown very cluttered and musty over the years. The Colorado law, for instance, is aimed at the more than 40 boards and commissions in the states that regulate or license various occupations, from barbers to morticians. Such agencies, which are usually fairly small and obscure, can easily become captives of the professions they are supposed to regulate — or can do nothing at all except provide sinecures for a few employees.
Since cutting back government regulation has become a popular cause, the Colorado "sunset law" may become a model for other states that are also burdened with inefficient or antiquated agencies. At the federal level, a number of similar bills have been introduced in Congress during the past several months. One of the most ambitious, sponsored by Senate Budget Committee Chairman Edmund S. Muskie (D-Maine) and others, would require a "zero-based" review, or total reassessment, of every single federal program every four years. Other bills would impose periodic termination dates on all or some regulatory agencies. Along this line, the House wrote a 7 year expiration clause into its version of the consumer advocacy agency legislation last fall.
One reason for all the congressional interest in the "sunset" concept is that most other methods of congressional oversight of the executive branch do not work very well. The appropriations process is an inadequate tool for comprehensive evaluation of agencies' performance. Unless deadlines are imposed or great public pressure is brought to bear, authorizing committees seldom bestir themselves to consider structural changes in programs and agencies. Oversight panels tend to function in a scattershot way, directing their attention primarily at programs that become generally controversial or particularly irksome to powerful congressmen. There is widespread interest right now in reining in agencies through legislative review of administrative rules and regulations, but this raises substantial issues of separation of powers.
All in all, some kind of federal "sunset"plan could have considerable benefits both for the taxpayers and for the government. In exploring such possibilities, however, it is vital to recognize that serious attempts to discipline the federal bureaucracy require considerable effort and self-discipline by Congress too. In fact, the broader proposals now pending would involve a staggering amount of legislative coordination and concentration. A few years ago, we might have said that Congress could never manage it. Since the new budget process has begun to take hold, the prospects for more orderly and effective congressional operations have improved substantially. Even so, the Senate and House committee structures are so sprawling, and committees' performance so uneven, that Congress might profitably start by devising a "sunset" program for itself.
[From the Los Angeles Times, Feb. 18, 1976]
MUSCLEBOUND AND FATBOUND
Sen. Edmund S. Muskie (D-Me.) has come up with the refreshing idea that the best way to restore public faith in government is to weed out federal programs that, however well-intentioned, aren't working well enough to earn their keep. More refreshing still, he has gone beyond easy rhetoric to offer a practical means of achieving this result.
Legislation introduced by Muskie early this month would require virtually every federal program to be reviewed by Congress every four years to determine if it should be continued — and, if so, at what level of spending. Those failing to win reauthorization would expire.
The only spending programs exempt from the automatic quadrennial review would be interest payments on the national debt and programs, such as Social Security, under which individuals make payments to the national government in the expectation of later compensation.
Because Muskie's proposal calls for fundamental changes in the psychological atmosphere in Washington, as well as in actual procedures, it is likely to encounter stiff resistance.
But it strikes us as one of the most sensible ideas to come along in years.
The way the political system now operates, members of Congress concentrate on generating new programs to solve real and not-so-real national problems. But once the legislation is enacted, they move on to new frontiers and show scant interest in following up to determine whether the hoped-for results are in fact achieved. In the meantime, the programs gain powerful constituencies of their own in the bureaucracy and in the public. Social and defense programs alike generate pressures for their continuance, and against their reexamination. The question. "Should we be doing it at all?" is too seldom asked.
The cumulative result is a government in which performance increasingly falls short of promise.
Muskie notes that the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance lists, among other things, 228 health programs, 156 income security and social service programs and 83 housing programs. The federal government annual lists not only 11 Cabinet departments and 44 independent agencies, but also 1,240 advisory boards, committees, commissions and councils. And while dozens of new such bodies are created each year, the old ones rarely go out of business.
As an all too typical case of overlapping social programs, the Maine senator told of one city where the General Accounting Office found eight clinics operating in one neighborhood under several different programs — each proceeding without regard to what the others were doing. The GAO has found agencies that were unable to say how much they spend on administrative costs as opposed to actual services.
The American people are understandably turned off, Muskie added, by a government that is too musclebound to do the things it is trying to do. He cited complaints from citizens who had to wait 18 months for a ruling on claims for disability compensation, and from towns that had to wait many months for federal approval of sewer systems mandated by federal law.
Muskie, who has done a highly creditable job as chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, says the point is not that there should be a freeze on new programs to help people, but that the country cannot afford new programs unless Congress is willing to eliminate old ones that are ineffective, unnecessary or redundant.
The same sort of waste and duplication is to be found in military programs; they would be subject to the proposed reauthorization procedure, too.
As part of the quadrennial review process that would be required by Muskie's bill, congressional committees would have to make "zero-base"evaluations. That is, they would consider the comparative effects of eliminating a program, of funding it at existing or greater levels, or of funding it at various levels in between. Their findings would be reported to the full House and Senate.
Congress took a big step toward rational setting of national priorities when it established the House and Senate budget committees last year. The Muskie proposal is a natural followup; it deserves the support of everybody in and out of Congress who believes in responsible, effective government.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that the text of Senator ROTH's remarks on the sunset bill be included in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
SUNSET REFORM: FIRST PRIORITY OF THE 95TH CONGRESS
(Statement of WILLIAM V. ROTH, Sr., U.S. Senator)
There is no more pressing need facing this Congress than to strengthen the control we exercise over federal spending for federal programs. The American public deserves and will be satisfied with nothing less than full scrutiny of every federal program expenditure. We must adopt procedures to assure that the operations of government are periodically reviewed and measured against tough standards of performance. The average taxpaying citizen of this country is demanding stronger controls over our vast national budget and expanding national debt.
Last year I authored a proposal with Senator Muskie to confront the need for stricter control over our national budget authorizations. Our bill — S 2925 — became known as the sunset bill because, under the procedures in the bill, the "sun" would set on outmoded or inefficient government programs.
The authorizations for nearly every program would automatically terminate after five years unless a convincing case is made that the program is satisfying its objectives at reasonable cost. Today the need for such sunset legislation is greater than ever, and accordingly, I am again submitting comprehensive spending reform legislation to the Senate for its careful consideration and approval. The Government Economy and Spending Reform Act of 1977 reflects many of the changes made in our original proposal after consideration by the Government Operations Committee. I am pleased to reintroduce this legislation with Senator Muskie and Senator Glenn and Senator Ribicoff.
Congress must recognize the urgent need to restore fiscal responsibility to government spending. In a scant ten years our federal budget has increased from $158 billion to over $414 billion. Yet the system of budgetary checks and balances to administer and control expenditure of these funds is woefully antiquated. The nation's inability to manage its budget resourcefully and to achieve program goals is a serious national failing. The Congress must fulfill its responsibility to the citizens by confronting this problem and narrowing the gap between government performance and public expectation. The public has a right to expect its government to be wise and frugal with its tax dollars. The unmet promises of government programs reduces the credibility of Congress and the confidence of our citizens in government. I urge my colleagues to adopt remedial procedures such as those contained in the sunset bill to restore people's trust in their government and their faith in our nation's future.
The sunset bill which I am introducing today is familiar to most of my colleagues. During the last Congress, 58 senators endorsed the Government Economy and Spending Reform Act of 1976 in principle and agreed to cosponsor the sunset legislation. I urge my colleagues to consider this proposal and renew their pledge of support for improved fiscal management and program oversight in this Congress.
Let me review for a moment the case for comprehensive spending reform. Today we are speaking up for an important new principle for making Government more responsive to the public. The Government Economy and Spending Reform Act of 1977 offers Congress a procedure to review all spending by Government and to restore the confidence of our citizens that big Government is under control. The procedures in this bill for termination, review, and reordering of our Nation's programs and priorities will assure that no Government program is immune from review.
OPEN GOVERNMENT
Much attention was focused on "sunshine" reforms and "sunset"reforms during the last Congress. I have the distinction of being a principal sponsor of both of these reforms and can speak about the legislative intent for both. Despite the similarity of the popular names, each of these reforms was developed independently of one another.
However, together these reforms represent a major breakthrough in the conduct of Government business. The basis for these reforms is that all areas of Government conduct ought to be fully open to public scrutiny as a matter of right. The sunshine reform was a first effort to win acceptance of the principle that meetings in the departments, agencies, and the Senate itself should be open to the public as a general rule. Citizens have a basic right to know how their elected representatives and their agents in the departments conduct the public's business. We established the sunshine principle for the Federal government during the last Congress.
The sunset proposal would establish the principle that every program must be open for review at least once every 5 years and prove its worth before being continued. No dollar of spending should be sealed from public scrutiny. There should be no sacred cows when it comes to proving the effectiveness of public programs. The sunset bill is consistent in principle and philosophy with the effort to open up all Government business to the public. I think it is an idea which is long overdue and which deserves a trial.
FISCAL REFORMS
The sunset bill is also consistent with the reforms in fiscal management and the budget process which we developed with the Budget Reform and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The budget process establishes a procedure to set national spending totals and to keep outlays for spending functions within that ceiling. However, the budget process provides no fiscal control over the parts of the budget.
Congress cannot maintain discipline over the budget as a whole unless it can exert control over spending among the separate parts of the budget. The heart of the sunset approach is to review spending or programs grouped together by function to assure that effective programs will continue and that ineffective programs are terminated.
S. 2 would change several of the assumptions about budget authority and the way Congress spends the tax dollars of our citizens. It would end the unspoken rule that money spent on a program in 1 year must be continued or increased in the following year. There would be no permanent authority for spending which places Government programs effectively beyond periodic review. The new assumption of program spending will be that budget authority will be renewed only when a program is shown to be worthwhile and cost effective.
NEED FOR SUNSET
In principle these new assumptions have broad appeal and have gained acceptance as a basic element of sound fiscal management. However, in practice, existing Congressional procedures provide no assurance of comprehensive review and evaluation. There is no process which gives Congress control over its spending practices and requires programs within the same spending function to be considered with other programs serving the same basic objectives. The sunset bill would establish such a procedure in Congress and assure comprehensive oversight of spending by budget function.
There is a risk with any process that the procedure will be too rigid or become a mere formalism. The termination and review cycle in S. 2925, however, provides a firm schedule for review yet retains flexibility for congressional committees in the performance of their oversight role. The sunset process establishes an action-forcing mechanism that demands periodic review, but permits committees to exercise considerable discretion in the execution of their oversight responsibilities.
Our Federal budget has grown so large that effective management is exceedingly difficult. We are making decisions daily in the Congress which have enormous impact on the national economy and the disposition of our Nation's resources. Unless we have a process which permits Congress to develop a national budget which is arrived at rationally and by choice, wasteful Federal spending will continue to burden the economy. Without a process to assure that all programs in one functional area are reviewed at the same time, the overlapping and duplicative programs will never be consolidated or weeded out.
Congress has no more important responsibility to the citizens of this country than to make Government responsive and effective. Programs which have missed their intended mark, outlived their usefulness, or failed to measure up to standards of effectiveness do not deserve to remain on the books. Congress has the responsibility to provide this oversight function to make sure Government is working.
It is evident that public confidence in the Federal Government is low. A recent Harris survey showed that a 58 to 8 percent majority of citizens believe the Federal Government is "more wasteful" than State governments. When the public demands better Government, Congress has a responsibility to examine its own role and to find a practical solution that will improve Government effectiveness. I believe the sunset bill is such a practical approach which will permit Congress to scrutinize Federal spending and answer to the American public for the performance of the Federal Government.
Public attitude surveys have shown a steadily declining confidence in Government among citizens. There is a widespread concern that Government over promises, yet fails to deliver. And there is a general perception that Washington mismanages and spends irresponsibly. I would like to see Congress come to grips with the consequences of its free spending attitude. I believe the public is demanding a major reexamination of Government programs, Government regulation, and bureaucratic growth. I believe the public favors a reorganization of existing bureaus, and departments if necessary to make Government more effective in conducting public affairs.
The Federal Government is larger than any major corporation, yet the process in Congress for determining how our resources are spent is dominated by an antiquated network of legislative committees with overlapping jurisdictions and uncoordinated agendas. It is exceedingly difficult for 100 Senators working full time in 18 separate committees to coordinate and manage the Nation's overall budget. It is small wonder that our Federal budget is the source of outrage and concern to many citizens today.
There can be no greater priority during this Congress than to make the Federal Government more accountable and more effective in serving the American people.
CITIZENS COMMISSION TO AID REORGANIZATION PROCESS
I am pleased that S. 2 provides for a Citizen's Commission to reexamine government structure and administration, and sort out the basic responsibilities for different levels of government. This approach is modeled after the Hoover Commissions which conducted an independent and thorough review of the operation and effectiveness of Government in the 1950's. Citizen panels were organized to review all areas of Government and recommend changes. I know the effectiveness of this kind of approach firsthand because I was involved in a citizen review panel in Delaware.
The Citizen's Commission would have a broad charter to examine and review government operations. Panels of citizens would again be invited to participate in the evaluation and reorganization process. A government which is open and responsive to its citizens should seek to involve private citizens and invite their counsel and recommendations for government reorganization.
KEY CONCERNS
The sunset bill this year includes several technical revisions to make it a flexible instrument for Congressional oversight of federal programs.
The procedures for sunset review have been considerably simplified in Title II of S. 2 to allow committees broad discretion in setting appropriate standards for review of programs within their jurisdiction. A waiver provision has also been added to permit a one year grace period for review of programs which cannot be reconciled with the initial reauthorization cycle. The sunset bill has been tightened and revised this year to keep it as simple and direct as practicable.
Several concerns about what sunset will mean to the legislative process if the process is fully implemented were raised last year during the bill's consideration in the Government Operations Committee and during its joint referral to the Finance Committee and the Rules Committee.
WORKLOAD
First, much attention was focused on the added workload for Congress which a periodic and comprehensive review entails.
Under the sunset review procedures programs would have to be reviewed at least once every 5 years. This would also apply for programs which are now "permanent" and do not require periodic review or renewal for budget authority. It seems to me that Congress is shrinking from its basic oversight responsibilities unless we subject programs to review at least once every 5 years.
The concern about excessive workload is a tacit admission that Congress has passed more programs than it can reasonably check up on. If this is true, Congress has not acted responsibly to control how the citizen's tax dollars are spent. The evaluation process of this bill reserves considerable discretion to the committees in determining which programs will have highest priority for review. But, unless programs are scheduled for review, there is no assurance that wasteful spending will be discovered and terminated.
SUNSET REVIEW
There has also been special interest in the sunset review procedure in this bill. Many are confused by this. It does not impose zero-based budgeting for the annual budget cycle. The requirements which are enumerated in the bill will give a committee considerable discretion in determining the method of review and relative concentration for each program. At the same time, no program would be immune from review within a 5 year period and in no event will the review fail to provide some basis for evaluation of a program's effectiveness. This seems to be a reasonable compromise between an inflexible universal standard of review and no requirement for review at all.
The sunset bill is a reform proposal which will serve to focus our attention on the task of delivering effective services to the citizens we serve. Congress must find a reliable means to come to terms with this basic responsibility. I urge my colleagues to examine S. 2 and pledge their support in this historic effort.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to join Senator MUSKIE in introducing "The Sunset Act of 1977." This legislation requires a zero-base review and termination, unless reauthorized, of all Federal Government budget authorizations and tax expenditure provisions on a 5 year cycle. This legislation is essentially the same as S. 2925, the Government Economy and Spending Reform Act of 1976 which I coauthored with Senator MUSKIE during the 94th Congress.
I consider this Sunset bill to be extremely significant and necessary. It is designed to impose discipline and restraint on the proliferation of Federal programs, and to restore confidence in the ability of Congress to control Federal Government. I believe that this bill meets some of the demands of the American people concerning the way in which our Government operates. Our citizens are demanding an efficient, responsive, and competent government — one that delivers what it promises, one that makes its decisions humanely, clearly, and understandably, not one that merely grows unrestrained without any real direction. The Sunset Act of 1977 is an important step in meeting these demands.
I believe that the Sunset Act of 1977 has the potential for substantially upgrading the performance of government. The once ever-expanding pie of Federal expenditure has begun to reach its limits. Within that limitation, competition for program priority and preference will be severe. That competition must be rational, sane, and substantive. The Sunset Act of 1977 provides a framework for serious evaluation of our programs and our spending. Basically and fundamentally, the bill requires that congressional committees take a hard look at programs under their jurisdiction and report among other things:
First, whether they are, indeed, working as Congress intended;
Second, whether the program is duplicative of others; and
Third, the impact the program has on the national economy.
In other words, we are asking that congressional committees assume their oversight function with increased vigor and vitality and with more quantitative stringency. With the exception of programs to which individuals make payments to the Federal Government in expectation of later compensation — social security, railroad retirement, civil service retirement, medicare, et cetera — all Government programs would have to be reauthorized after stringent review every 5 years.
An amendment which I offered to S. 2925, the Sunset bill which Senator MUSKIE and I introduced in the 94th Congress, which was approved unanimously by the Senate Government Operations Committee and incorporated into that bill as title V, and which has been retained as title IV of the present bill, would apply this same zero-base review and "sunset" mechanism to what are commonly known as "tax expenditures" — tax incentives. To my mind this is essential if we are to effectively achieve the objectives of the bill, for example to get a firm hold on Federal spending.
It would seem to follow that if the termination and reauthorization process of the bill is confined to spending programs alone, we will leave a substantial portion of our job undone. The Congress recognized this basic problem in 1974 by including in the Congressional Budget Act the tax, as well as the spending side of the equation.
My proposal would require that each Federal tax expenditure be investigated systematically to determine whether it has been effective or whether it is being used for purposes not originally intended by Congress. It must be emphasized that the review procedure is totally neutral. All that is called for is a zero-base review; title IV does not suggest that the tax incentives under consideration should be terminated. In fact, they could be increased if found to be working well for the purpose intended.
Today there are scores of tax incentives built into the Federal income tax system. All were created with a specific goal in mind. Some were intended to stimulate or move the economy in certain directions; others were motivated by social concerns and were intended to encourage individuals and businesses to move toward various national goals. Yet, whatever their original purposes, the fact remains that some of these tax incentives have grown to the point where they are tax loopholes, going far beyond their original purposes and eagerly sought as a means of avoiding taxes. The result has been that the revenue loss due to these tax expenditures has mounted each year to the point where, in fiscal year 1977, it is estimated that they may approximate the amount our Nation spends for defense.
This upward trend in revenue loss gives no indication of abating. It is certainly disturbing that there are no clear limitations on how much each tax expenditure provision could ultimately cost the Treasury. Presently there is insufficient analysis of each tax expenditure to determine whether some have grown out of control and should be eliminated because the original purposes have been obscured. Efforts toward tax reform reflect how difficult it is to revoke or even modify tax expenditure provisions once they take effect and become entrenched. It is my hope that this proposal will greatly facilitate such revisions of the tax code whenever circumstances warrant them.
Due to the hard work and diligent efforts of Senator MUSKIE, the sunset bill which we introduced last year attracted considerable attention and support both outside and within the Congress. The bill was reported out unanimously from Senate Government Operations Committee but, unfortunately was not considered by the full Senate because of the press of business at the end of the session. I am hopeful that these efforts have laid the groundwork for full enactment in the 95th Congress.
It is also my fervent hope that President-elect Carter will lend his full support in favor of this legislation. In my discussions with the President-elect I have been impressed with his earnest desire to reorganize the Federal Government. He recognized that the sunset concept can be an effective means of gaining control of the Government for that purpose, and, during the Presidential election campaign, specifically endorsed a strong sunset law covering both Federal programs and tax expenditures. I am eagerly looking forward to working closely with the President-elect on this extremely important issue.
Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, during the 1976 political campaign, both parties seemed to recognize that the people have become disenchanted with the operation of their Federal Government. It is now up to those of us who have been given high public responsibility to build a better, not a bigger, Federal Government. It is time for the Federal Government to more effectively and efficiently carry out its mandate to serve the American people.
In the past, the Federal Government's efforts to solve pressing social problems have frequently resulted in the creation of new programs rather than effective solutions. These new programs have generated their own bureaucracy. The result has been the proliferation of duplicating and overlapping programs. The executive branch of the Federal Government now includes 11 cabinet departments, 59 independent agencies, 1,240 advisory boards, committees, councils, and commissions, 1,026 aid programs, almost 400 programs dealing with higher education, 228 health programs, 158 income security programs, and 83 housing programs. This bureaucratic growth has generated a concomitant increase in the Federal Government's gargantuan appetite for more and more information. By some accounts, paper generated in 1 year by the Washington bureaucracy would fill the astrodome 51 times, and the Government's records would fill 11 Washington Monuments.
Federal paperwork now costs the American people over $40 billion a year. The Federal Government now spends $1 billion annually just explaining to the public how to complete its forms.
Swift and sure execution of outmoded and ineffective programs is the way to end this extravagance. That is why I am cosponsoring the Sunset Act which my distinguished colleague, Senator MUSKIE, introduces today. This bill would end the unspoken rule that money spent for a program this year must be continued next year. In fact, the basic premise of the Sunset bill is that no new budget authority is necessary until a program is proven worthwhile. The bill sets up a schedule under which Government agencies would have to come before Congress for review and possible termination every 5 years. This is the application of zero-base budgeting — a reasonable budgeting tool that is effective in business.
Enactment of this legislation will finally do something about bureaucratic boondoggles and red tape. In the words of Mark Twain :
Thunder is good, thunder is impressive, but it is lightning that works.
It is time for the Federal bureaucracy to be given a long overdue jolt.
I do have one reservation about S. 2. The bill requires the periodic review of Federal "tax expenditures." While systematic review of all tax incentives in the Federal tax code is necessary to make sure they are achieving their intended purpose, I strongly object to the term "tax expenditures." This term implies that all income earned by American taxpayers somehow belongs to the Federal Government. Therefore, it is a "tax expenditure" if the Federal tax code allows these taxpayers to keep part of their own income. I object to this term and more importantly, I reject the philosophy which it implies.
SUNSETTING OUTDATED GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, it is my pleasure today to join once again in sponsoring legislation which will offer the American public a way to send outdated Government bureaucracies riding into the sunset.
The idea of this legislation is simple. The whole purpose is to end an agency or program which is no longer needed. If a particular program, or even an entire agency or department, is wasting the taxpayer's money, or has done more harm to the public good than help, that program or that agency will come to an end without expecting a perpetual renewal.
The basic notion is as old as the original Hoover Commission. And, as surprising as it may seem to some people, two former Supreme Court Justices noted for their liberal attitudes, Justices Black and Douglas, recommended some years ago that new regulatory agencies and new government programs should be dismantled after a fixed period of time unless their need was clearly demonstrated. With such support coming from spokesmen of all political and philosophical shadings, this proposal must have merit.
Unfortunately, the idea itself faded away until 1969 when a young Congressman, and now our colleague, Senator ROTH of Delaware, published the first overall catalog of Government assistance programs. It took him 2 years to find out that there were over 1,300 Federal programs, many of which were unknown, even by the people they were supposed to help. That study was the stepping stone for the introduction of legislation in 1973 by Senator HOWARD BAKER and 13 other Senators, including myself. The objective of our proposal was to terminate all Federal spending programs every 3 years, unless a powerful reason existed for keeping any of them.
Early last year, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, Senator MUSKIE, introduced a similar reform proposal cosponsored by Senator ROTH, myself, and 56 other Senators. and now a revised version of that bill is being introduced in the 95th Congress.
Mr. President, although some technical changes have been made in the bill, its basic features remain intact. Most importantly, the sunset features have not been narrowed at all. In fact, my decision to join again as a sponsor of this legislation is based upon the personal assurance of the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) that the commitment to sunset means what it says.
Upon reading the Government Operations Committee report on the sunset bill in the last session of Congress, I was concerned at first that certain statements contained in the report might infer that sunsetted agencies would go on and on with merely their enforcement power being temporarily suspended. However, I have been assured in an exchange of letters with Senator MUSKIE that this was not the intent of the amended bill. In fact, in his reply to my inquiry about this, Senator MUSKIE stated:
The commitment to a periodic termination and review of federal programs and agencies remains as firm today as when we first discussed the bill some months ago.
It is technically true, as the committee report describes, that an agency "would remain in existence" if Congress decides not to extend its basic authority. Senator MUSKIE's letter explains:
Substantive laws which relate to the operation of government agencies would technically remain on the books.
This is because sunset is linked to authorizations. According to Senator MUSKIE’s reply, and I agree, the authorization process "offers an effective means for terminating a program or agency without specifically repealing every law that relates to its operation."
Senator MUSKIE's letter continues:
But this does not mean . . that all officials and employees of a sunsetted agency would remain on its payroll. Quite the opposite; lacking authorization and appropriations, such an agency could not continue in operation.
Mr. President, I certainly agree that using the authorization process and through it the appropriation of funds, we can compel a review of all Government bodies and programs without repealing every provision of law relating to those agencies or programs. I am satisfied that should Congress not act to renew the authorization of funds for an agency it will, for all practical purposes, come to an end. Nor will the officials and employees stay on the payroll, since there will be no authority for funds to pay them.
A second matter that had given me trouble in the committee amended bill has also been cleared up. I had been disturbed at the description given in the committee report of last August that during any period when an agency had been sunsetted, all its previously issued rules would remain in effect. It occurred to me that if a person violated a rule while the agency itself was put in some sort of legislative "limbo" the person may be subject to prosecution whenever Congress restored the agency's authority. Since no one knows when or if, Congress would decide to restore the authority of an agency whose powers had been sunsetted, the particular regulatory field affected would be placed in total confusion. As the bill stood, it seemed possible that an agency would not be able to make changes in its rules which may be demanded by equity due to new circumstances, but a private citizen or business who violated one of the agency's prior rules could be prosecuted for that conduct if funding for the agency were reenacted.
This interpretation, if it occurred, would have created the worst of all possible worlds for citizens affected by governmental regulation. Moreover, by possibly allowing the prosecution of someone later for committing a violation at a time when an agency's powers were under suspension, it may have run afoul of the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Now, I am delighted to know that this interpretation is most certainly not what the committee intended. Senator MUSKIE's letter of October 22 makes it clear that the real problem which the committee was addressing was the situation where there is only a temporary failure of Congress to act on renewing an agency's charter. Senator MUSKIE states that the committee was concerned that "an agency's rules and regulations should not have to be readopted upon a reauthorization measure becoming law" if there is only a temporary lapse of an authorization.
The bill has now been changed to remove this problem. In Senator MUSKIE's words, as set forth in his letter to me:
It is not at all our intention to impose ex post facto conditions on citizens affected by government regulations or to confuse them about what they may or may not do under law.
The bill corrects this problem by entirely removing the provision concerned.
Mr. President, the third and final problem that I raised with Senator MUSKIE is the question of whether or not the procedures required by the sunset bill might create more paperwork and need for staff to comply with its reporting requirements than it saves by its other provisions. My question arose out of uncertainty as to how many programs would be identified for review and reporting by Government agencies and congressional committees.
Once again, I am satisfied with the answer which Senator MUSKIE has provided. In the first place, the preliminary estimates of the number of different programs for which a congressional committee would be responsible were too high. The General Accounting Office has been preparing a list of Federal programs by functional budget category which is running far smaller than the "worst case" estimates had first assumed. Moreover, amendments have been developed which would give the authorizing committee a greater role in the sunset process.
Mr. President, with the assurance I have been given by the primary sponsors of the bill and in view of their willingness to make remedial changes, wherever reasonable suggestions are made, I am pleased to continue as a cosponsor of the sunset proposal and to urge its prompt adoption.
The need for this kind of law is obvious. Government spending has grown too burdensome as well as becoming fiscally irresponsible. As an example of the burden upon the U.S. taxpayer, I might mention that the number of Federal domestic programs has multiplied 20 times in the last dozen years. And right now, there are at least 44 independent agencies, 11 cabinet departments and 1,240 other units of the Federal Government in existence.
With this unchecked growth, it is urgent that we attempt a new approach in order to get a handle on bureaucracy. We in Congress have simply not been as responsible as we should have. We have not paid sufficient attention to how well the programs that are already on the books have been working and we have been too concerned with initiating new programs as fast as every special interest group can think one up.
As might be expected, the entrenched bureaucrats are resisting any change. These people have little or nothing to gain by reform or innovation. But the problem of an enormous, uncaring and insulated bureaucracy is one of the major concerns of the American public. I only hope that this concern by the ordinary citizen is strong enough so that it will finally force enough officeholders to take drastic action to clear the Government of deadweight and abuses, to rid ourselves of the notion that the bigger government is, the better it is. We must force these agencies to came in and prove they have been worth their salt and if they cannot do it, then let us get rid of them. Now, what is wrong with that?