October 7, 1977
Page 32957
REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT’S STATE OF PREPAREDNESS FOR ENERGY EMERGENCIES THIS WINTER
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I have asked for time to speak on an aspect of our energy policy which we have managed to overlook thus far in our debate.
The Congress is currently in the midst of a period of unparalleled attention to the development of a long term energy policy. It is not clear to me yet exactly what the outcome of all this activity will be.
Hopefully, it will be more than a reaffirmation of the status quo. Hopefully, the end result of all this talk will be a coherent, meaningful, and effective energy policy capable of serving this Nation during the difficult years ahead.
As important as this long range view is, however, there is something else we need to consider — a problem of immediate concern.
Another cold winter is on its way. And according to a report just issued by my Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, we are not ready for what it may bring.
Last year, the country endured the coldest winter in 60 years. We muddled through not because of any foresight or effective planning on our part, but largely through the good graces of Mother Nature, who gave us an early spring.
In the process, the economic dislocation in certain parts of the Nation was substantial. An estimated 1.2 million Americans were thrown temporarily out of work as factories shut down, because of insufficient fuel supplies. Schools were closed, and businesses operated on reduced hours. Home heating bills soared, and it was only thanks to emergency moratoria on utility cutoffs that millions of Americans were able to keep their homes warm.
Although the principal villain of this drama was the weather, it had an equally unfriendly sidekick in the form of a substantial shortfall in natural gas supplies — a shortfall that was only exacerbated by the unprecedented demand.
I raise this unpleasant memory, Mr. President, because there is a very real possibility that we are in for a replay of this story in the months immediately ahead.
And I am concerned that in focusing so much attention on long range energy needs, we not overlook the immediate possibility of another energy emergency this winter.
Two weeks ago, my Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations held 3 days of hearings on the state of governmental preparedness for the upcoming winter.
What we learned at those hearings, and from a followup staff investigation, was discouraging indeed.
First, we are told by both Government forecasters and a well known forecaster from the private sector that the Nation can expect a winter significantly colder than normal, although not as cold as last winter.
Second, we were told that we can expect substantial natural gas curtailments beginning as early as next month. In one State — Tennessee — where curtailments are expected to be most severe, we were told that factory closings are expected to begin as soon as November, with an estimated 300 closings anticipated over the course of the winter.
Finally, and most discouraging, testimony at the subcommittee hearings raised substantial questions about the state of governmental preparedness to deal with the kind of dislocation which we saw last winter and which may very well recur this year.
The Carter administration has given considerable time and attention to the development of contingency plans for the upcoming winter. A winter energy emergency plan (WEEP), prepared by FEA, contains numerous policy options for both increasing supplies and curtailing demand in the event of serious natural gas shortfalls.
The administration is to be credited for this effort. It far surpasses any previous effort to plan ahead for winter emergencies.
However, after careful study of these contingency plans, the subcommittee has concluded that the sum total of their impact is likely to be both too little and too late.
In short, the subcommittee believes that if the forecasters are right and we do face another hard winter, the Federal Government is simply not adequately prepared.
The WEEP plan, using Federal Power Commission data, projects natural gas curtailments this winter of about 340 billion cubic feet per month. This compares to estimated curtailments last. winter of approximately 305 billion cubic feet.
The plan estimates that the various policy options which it outlines for increasing supplies and reducing demand could make up 60 percent of the projected curtailment, or about 200 billion cubic feet per month.
If these figures were correct, we could clearly go a long way toward easing the impact of any shortfalls this year. Unfortunately, however, the WEEP numbers do not stand up under careful scrutiny.
The subcommittee found that many of the assumptions on which the WEEP projections were made rest on very shaky foundations. In several instances, specific authorities cited in the WEEP plan for either increasing supply or reducing demand simply do not exist. In other instances, Federal regulations governing a specific authority have not yet been promulgated and are not expected to be completed until well into the late fall or early winter.
The WEEP plan places considerable reliance upon the States as the front line of defense against another winter energy emergency. And yet many States lack the specific authority necessary to take emergency action in an energy crisis.
I do not intend to list every single finding of the subcommittee study here this morning. They are all discussed in some detail in the final report which has just been released.
Several examples of the findings do bear repeating here, however, simply to underscore the severity of the predicament we are in.
The WEEP plan projects a savings of 20 billion cubic feet per month under the temporary sales authority of section 6 of the Emergency Natural Gas Act. Yet that authority expired on August 1 of this year. And neither the House nor Senate-passed energy bill currently includes a renewal of that authority.
The WEEP plan projects additional curtailment reductions of 12 billion cubic feet per month through purchases of extra natural gas from Canada and Mexico. Yet negotiations with Canada have not even begun, while the Mexican Government has indicated a willingness to sell us only about 1.5 billion cubic feet per month, far less than the WEEP projection.
As a final example, the conclusion of the WEEP report states that we can expect to reduce demand by almost 170 billion cubic feet per month — or almost half of the total projected curtailment — by switching gas fired boilers with alternate capability to other fuels. Yet the ability of the Government to implement this switch over in a timely fashion is so tenuous that the WEEP report itself calls this estimate into serious question. The body of that report suggests that a more realistic estimate of demand reduction through this policy option is 50 billion cubic feet per month.
These and other uncertainties in the WEEP estimates prompted the subcommittee to make its own estimate of the potential impact of the WEEP options in easing the jolt of natural gas shortfalls this winter. The subcommittee's conclusion:
These options can be expected to reduce curtailments by 22 percent.
Mr. President, that is a far cry from the 60 percent reduction claimed by the WEEP report. If correct, its implications for the upcoming winter are grim indeed. As the subcommittee report concludes:
The U.S. faces the prospect of another winter plagued with energy shortages and resulting large scale unemployment, if temperatures fall significantly below normal in the months ahead. And the Federal government will not be in a position to help very much.
I find this an alarming prospect — one which we cannot afford to ignore.
It is late to be talking about planning for an energy emergency which — if it comes at all — will begin within the next couple of months. Plans should have been laid long ago.
Unfortunately, that does not seem to be the case.
And that means we have yet another issue to consider as part of the unfinished energy agenda ahead.
The subcommittee report includes a number of specific recommendations for congressional and executive branch action. Among them, that—
First. The State Department begin negotiations immediately with Canada for the purchase of additional natural gas this winter;
Second. That the Congress enact legislation granting the President authority — similar to that provided under section 6 of the Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977 — to allocate natural gas supplies;
Third. That Congress consider providing the President with authority — similar to that in the Petroleum Allocation Act — to reallocate small amounts of natural gas from pipelines not experiencing shortfalls to those which are experiencing shortfalls, for the purpose of protecting jobs which might otherwise be lost;
Fourth. That the special crisis intervention program (SCIP), under which more than 2 million low income persons have been certified to receive assistance for payment of last winter's bills, be continued into this winter; and
Fifth. That the Department of Energy take immediate steps to ease the special problems adversely affecting the maintenance of an adequate fuel supply and distribution network in the New England States.
Within the very near future, I intend to introduce legislation to implement these recommendations where congressional action is necessary.
Mr. President, I recognize that Congress has a heavy legislative load in the weeks immediately ahead. On currently pending energy matters alone, we could probably debate until Christmas.
But by then it would be too late.
It is now the first week of October, and we are rapidly moving into the cold weather season. In my own State of Maine, we have already had the first frost of the year.
We in the Senate like to think that we have considerable influence over the course of national events. And in many ways we do.
But there is one thing we cannot do. We cannot ask winter to wait until spring.