March15, 1977
Page 7582
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I rise to speak in favor of H.R. 3839, a rescission bill which includes five rescissions of the Department of State, Department of Defense, and for military assistance programs. I also want to express my views on how the bill relates of the third budget resolution for fiscal year 1977.
H.R. 3839 would rescind $664 million in budget authority. Outlays associated with the rescissions total $49 million; these amounts are in line with the third budget resolution assumptions.
Four of the rescissions are technical in nature, and the funds previously appropriated by Congress for these items are excess to program needs. These rescissions, totaling $211 million, involve reductions in retired military pay, Air Force procurement, foreign military credit sales, and the U.S. assessment for peacekeeping forces in the Middle East.
The fifth rescission in the bill, and the only non-technical item, concerns the Navy shipbuilding construction rescission of long lead time components for the CVN 71 Nimitz class nuclear attack carrier and conversion of the U.S.S. Long Beach cruiser to accommodate the Aegis missile defense system. The amount proposed for the shipbuilding rescission by President Ford in his rescission message of January 17, 1977, was $721 million.
President Carter affirmed his support for the proposed shipbuilding rescission in February; however, in testimony, it was pointed out that $268 million of the funds had been obligated for spare parts for the nuclear propulsion unit of the carrier. Inasmuch as these spares can be utilized by the three nuclear carriers previously approved by Congress, the rescission bill rescinds only the remaining unobligated $453 million in budget authority for Navy shipbuilding.
There are several substantive reasons for supporting the shipbuilding rescission.
The basic decision not to build the large carrier results from a National Security Council study.
The study disclosed that a Nimitz class carrier will incur 38 percent more in investment costs and 13 percent more in 30 year operating costs than a conventional carrier of the same size.
Further, the study concluded that the United States must begin dispersing its at-sea aviation assets. This obviously requires a larger number of aircraft carriers. The National Security Council suggested a larger number of smaller vertical/short takeoff and landing — V/STOL carriers as an alternative to Nimitz class carriers. This alternative should significantly reduce the vulnerability of our at-sea assets by basing more inexpensive carriers throughout the world. The current estimate for two V/STOL carriers is $2.4 billion as opposed to $2.3 billion for one Nimitz class carrier.
The lack of desire to retrofit the U.S.S. Long Beach as a platform for the Aegis missile defense system is based on Department of Defense analysis that the DDG 47 destroyer represents the cheapest and fastest way for introducing the Aegis system into the fleet. Further, if a need ever exists for retrofitting ships with Aegis, it would be cheaper to retrofit on the newest nuclear powered cruisers. The Long Beach is the oldest nuclear powered surface combatant ship in the fleet, and its assumed life utility after Aegis conversion would not warrant the expected expenditures.
Based upon the above facts, both the Republican and Democratic administrations supported this rescission. Moreover, the Chief of Naval Operations testified before the House Appropriations Committee on February 17, 1977, and voiced his support for the proposed actions.
Although I fully support this rescission, the report accompanying the bill includes language which directs the Department of Defense to submit supplemental requests for fiscal year 1978 for a V/STOL carrier and V/STOL aircraft. It is the administration's view that these systems are required. However, due to further design and development requirements, the Secretary of Defense has stated that fiscal year 1979 is the earliest time extensive development could occur for the systems. He is also on record that he does not intend to seek appropriations for any system not ready for development. I accept the Department's position in this matter and disagree with the committee's language stipulating a fiscal year 1978 supplemental request prior to the time the systems are ready for full scale development.
Mr. President, in closing, I remind colleagues once more that the third budget resolution, approved by the Congress on March 3, assumes enactment of this rescission bill.
With regard to the rescission of the Nimitz carrier, there are two additional points:
First, from a budgetary aspect, a nuclear attack carrier cannot stand by itself. The carrier must have a large number of escort and supply/support ships, aircraft, and weaponry. These supporting items are not included in the fiscal year 1978 budget nor in the 5 year projections of the Department of Defense.
The investment and operating costs of these additional items would be multi-billions of dollars over the presently assumed defense program for the next 15 years. The carrier alone would add $2 billion to the fiscal year 1978 budget. I do not believe there is room in the defense budget for these additive shipbuilding and associated equipment and operating costs at the expense of other defense requirements, particularly at a time when the Department of Defense is focusing on upgrading our conventional arms capability for the primary U.S. defense mission, our NATO forces.
Second, a Nimitz class carrier is an illustration of interest in maintaining the task force concept for projecting power against our adversaries. The United States currently has 12 carriers for this mission; it is expected that these 12 will be in the fleet until the year 2000 with most of the carriers active well beyond that time. An additional large carrier makes no sense when we confront these facts. Equally as important is the question of what is the primary future mission of the Navy, sea control or power projection? The large carrier and the projection role precludes the United States from placing many ships in several places to meet contingencies, and at a much higher cost than a sea control Navy. The proposed rescission is a first step toward building up the size of our naval fleet with more cost efficient, smaller, more flexible, and less vulnerable ships. It also leaves the door open for the administration to determine the future roles and missions of the Navy.
I strongly support this move toward the sea control mission of the Navy. In my opinion, the consumption value of the Navy dollar is enhanced by the development of smaller, efficient ships. These are the facts I suggest colleagues should consider as reasons to support the rescission bill.