June 8,1977
Page 18059
Mr. STAFFORD. The Senator from Tennessee had to leave the Chamber briefly. He will return quickly for the purpose the Senator from Maine had in mind.
Mr. MUSKIE. I think it might be well for me to state the purpose now so no one is disabused. Under the agreement, time on amendments is divided between the proponent of the amendment and myself. In the case of this amendment, I would support this amendment. For that reason, I ought not to have control of the time in opposition. I do not wish it.
I had discussed that with the distinguished minority leader (Mr. BAKER), and suggested that I yield the time in opposition to him. He indicated that he would designate the distinguished senior Senator from Michigan as his representative in dividing up that time. I would like to have that resolved.
I suppose I could yield some time. How much time remains, Mr. President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ninety-four minutes remaining.
Mr. MUSKIE. That is the time in opposition.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. MUSKIE. Out of that 94 minutes—
Mr. RIEGLE. If I might inquire, if I am not mistaken about 11/2 hours of the time on the Hart amendment has been used. Unless I am mistaken, I do not believe anyone has been recognized to speak in opposition. I presume there is approximately 30 minutes left in behalf of the amendment and presumably a full 2 hours available for those who want to speak in opposition to the amendment. Is that correct?
Mr. MUSKIE. I do not think that is correct for the reason I have stated.
Under the unanimous consent agreement the time in opposition to an amendment is mine to control. I used some of that time to get an explanation of the amendment so I might fully understand it, and to expose some of the justification for it. That is why there are 94 minutes instead of 120 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is correct.
Mr. MUSKIE. Under the unanimous consent agreement, there are 94 minutes left. I would think that would be sufficient for time in opposition. If it is not, we can consider additional time at that point.
Mr. RIEGLE. Let me say I appreciate the courtesy of the Senator from Maine in inquiring about it. I would appreciate the chance to speak. I would ask, if I might, from the Senator from Maine or from whoever the time is being passed along to, to be given the opportunity to speak for 20 minutes. As I say, we have heard something in excess of 11/2 hours argumentation in behalf of the amendment. Whether it is now or later, I believe it is only fair that those of us who may hold the other view have a chance to address some of the issues which have been raised.
Mr. MUSKIE. That was the purpose of my rising. At this point, the minority leader has entered the Chamber. I believe under the terms of the unanimous consent agreement if I do not control the time the leadership does.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the agreement the minority leader or his designee will be in control of the time.
Mr. MUSKIE. Then I release my control of the time to the distinguished minority leader.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I might say I would be delighted to yield to the distinguished Senator from Michigan. It will be my intention shortly to designate the distinguished senior Senator from Michigan in control of the time in opposition. He is unavoidably absent from the Chamber at this moment. For the time being, I yield to the distinguished junior Senator from Michigan.
Mr. RIEGLE. I appreciate the Senator from Tennessee yielding. There are a number of points and issues which have been raised in the last hour or two to bring into perspective.
Let me start, if I may, by addressing my former colleague in the House from Connecticut. I will say at the outset that I know the Senator from Connecticut prizes his independence very greatly, and properly so. I might say to him that I do as well, as I believe he is aware. I would resent any inference by him or anybody else that the positions I take here are dictated to me by one or another economic interest in or out of my State.
I was in the other body for 10 years and I have taken a number of positions in opposition to the automobile industry, as they well know, and I am sure I will in the future. The positions that I take here now are not based on being here as a servant of that particular economic interest. Any suggestion to that effect would be incorrect.
I resent it. I do not know if that was the intent of the Senator from Connecticut when he made a reference to what seemed to suggest that. I would hope when he has the opportunity later he will make it clear that was not his suggestion because that is clearly not the fact, as I think he well knows.
It is all well and good to condemn the automobile industry. They have made their share of mistakes, as most people and economic groups have at one time or another. But some significant progress has been made in cleaning up auto emissions. People who feel contrary can talk all day long, but that does not obscure the fact that in terms of hydrocarbons there has been an 83 percent reduction since we started in 1970, very specific and very precise. It was done by those same automobile companies.
Carbon monoxide has been reduced by 83 percent. It does not mean it is all gone, but a lot of work has been done, and I believe a lot of work has been done in good faith.
In the area of NOx the progress is not as great. Thirty-eight percent is a conservative estimate. I have seen other estimates that go much higher. More progress needs to be made there.
Clearly, much has been done in the time that we have had since we started down this road. A good deal more needs to be done.
I voted for the clean air legislation over the last 10 years, and I would do so again.
The schedule of emissions which Senator GRIFFIN and I intend to offer at a later point continues that progress. It brings us out very near to the same point as the committee bill in terms of the levels of the various emissions, the three emissions that we are after here, but it does it in a different way. It carries with it other implications which I believe, very profoundly, in fact, help the national interest.
I also heard the Senator from Colorado speak with great passion and feeling about the children of this Nation. I share every feeling and concern he has in that direction. Three of those children are mine. My concern about the impact on the public health, whether it comes from auto emissions, smokestacks, cigarettes, or anything else, is something I care about, as much as he does.
But it does not put the forces of right on anybody's side because they raise those issues. This is a complicated matter. To try to strike some kind of a reasonable balance when there are a number of conflicting objectives is not easy. I can see how people of conscience can disagree, and I respect those disagreements.
I will not, in the course of my remarks, try to cast a shadow over anybody's motivation. I assume that all the people here intend to do what they believe to be in the national interest. Clearly, I intend to do that. If I cannot make this case on facts, then we ought not to be successful.But I think we can. I have heard a lot more rhetoric today than I have heard hard facts.
I have heard people say, why does not the automobile industry do it? But I have not heard anybody here say how. I have not heard the Senator from Connecticut come in here with an engineering design, or seen the Senator from Colorado come in here with an engineering design that gives us 0.4 on NOx. I have not heard them refer to anybody who has been able to demonstrate that that can be done on a production basis across the board in this country, if the technology exists to do it. Because it does not exist to do it. I wish it did. If it did, and if it made good sense, I would argue for it. But to call for it when it does not exist is really not, in my judgment, a responsible position.
It does not solve any basic issues here, nor does it make things clearer.
I want to refer, point by point, to some of the assertions that were made by the Senator from Colorado in his presentation in behalf of his amendment, because I oppose his amendment, because I do not think it is a sensible one. I do not think it is a workable one, I do not think it serves the national interest.
First, I want to refer, if I may, to two charts that I am going to display here in just a moment. In the case of one, it shows that, due to the lack of any hard health data, including EPA's admission of uncertainty, the NOx, reduction — not the 0.4, but the 1.0 — is sufficient for public health protection.
The DOT Analysis of EPA, DOT, FEA Panel on Air Quality, Noise and Health report to the Task Force for Motor Vehicle Goals beyond 1980 — the date being 4-11-77 — stated that "it is evident that a reduction in auto emissions from 2.0 to 0.4 gpm cannot produce the claimed reduction in lower respiratory attacks."
The DOT analysis further stated:
It is difficult to put a price tag on health and even more difficult to place a cost on life. However, it has been suggested that headaches attributable to oxidant concentration might be more cost-effectively treated with aspirin than with auto emission controls and that such could be priced.
That is not me talking. That is the EPA itself.
It stated that going to a 4 grams-per-mile NOx standard would not reduce the number of air quality control regions above ambient air quality standards.
There has also been some medical research done that ought to be referred to. First, we do not know what we need to know about nitrogen oxides. That science is still in its basic infancy. We need to know more.
The WHO states:
Several studies have been reported in which an attempt has been made to relate pulmonary function to nitrogen dioxide exposure.
However, between the groups exposed to different levels of oxides or have been confounded by the fact that relatively high concentrations of other pollutants were present.
Also, the atmosphere is complicated. The National Academy of Sciences, in its 1977 report on photochemical oxidants, reports:
The urban atmosphere contains not just one but hundreds of different hydrocarbons, each with its own reactive and oxidation problems. Only a few realistic models of polluted atmospheres have been developed. Serious gaps were made in the present models and further fundamental research is necessary.
Automobiles; I might add to those Members who spoke about them earlier and are here now, are not the major source of nitrogen oxide emission. The National Academy of Sciences reports that automobile NOx is already less than 20 percent of the total NOx standard and that, even at 2 grams-per-mile standard — and we intend to cut that in half — the burden would decline to 10 percent by 1985. So that is the part of the problem that is being referred to here.
Let us talk about the penalties, because there are some significant penalties. The first is that nobody knows how to do it. The technology does not exist to produce cars on fleet level that can meet anything close to 0.4 in NOx.
As a matter of fact, as we run engines at higher temperatures and burn gasoline at higher temperatures in order to get better fuel efficiency, we actually create more NOx. This is one of the areas where we run into this direct contradiction with the need to try to conserve energy.
We have heard the President say — and maybe that should be discounted totally; I do not think it ought to be. I have heard the President say that he thinks we need an effort that is the moral equivalent of war to deal with the energy crisis. The Hart amendment, if it were to be. adopted, according to the Government analysis data, which I put in the RECORD previously, would, between the years 1979 and 1985, cost this Nation 27 billion gallons of gasoline, nearly 4 billion gallons of gasoline each year. That figures out to 254,000 barrels of oil a day. That is part of the cost and maybe we ought to pay it, if we had the technology, which we do not.
Furthermore, if we are going to make the breakthroughs in terms of fuel economy, we have to do some experimentation. We have to build cars differently.
I am willing, along with everybody else here, to help move the automobile industry as fast as it can go in terms of redesign, re-engineering, and new manufacturing techniques. But to try the new alternatives, to try the diesel engine, to try burning these other things — we are not going to be able to do that if we are having to live with a 0.4 NOx schedule, because those other technological possibilities cannot be tried at those levels for they do not come close to meeting those kind of levels. In effect, we have ruled those out. Then we do freeze the technology. We stay with exactly the kind of engines we have today and that would be foolhardy. I do not think anybody who really understands the technology would call for that, because that would be a mistake. We have to develop the technology. That means we have to leave ourselves enough flexibility to be able to do it.
We are proposing in our own amendment, which we are offering later, to go down to a 1.0 NOx. level. I do not know of any study of any consequence that exists that says that we need to go below that level. I am talking about anything that comes out of the Government, any agency of the Government. If anybody can show me that, I shall be happy to see it.
There is a lot to consider here. In raising these points, I hope that we can keep this debate on the level of the facts that do exist, because these are complex subjects. There are differences of opinion. I would like to assume that everybody comes in here with proper and clean motivations. I feel I do.
If I may, I want to make one other point. The question was asked earlier of another Senator whether any reports exist that bear out the fact that a 0.4 NOx level is not needed or ought to be relaxed. I just want quickly to cite five particular studies that do that in very pointed fashion.
First is the EPA study of June 5, 1973; November 5 and 6, 1973; November 8, 1973; December 3 to 5, 1973; March 22, 1974; June 3, 1974; December 11, 1974; March 5, 1975; National Academy of Sciences, Dr. Philip Handler, president, September 17, 1973.
Also a critique on the 1975-76 Federal automobile standards for hydrocarbons and oxides of nitrogen, May 27, 1973, from California Air Resources Board, chairman, Charles Conrad, March 15, 1974, to the Senate Committee on Environmental Conservation.
Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator yield for just a moment?
Mr. RIEGLE. I am happy to yield.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I designate the distinguished senior Senator from Michigan to control the time in opposition.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. RIEGLE. To continue: The panel on emission standards of the Committee on Motor Vehicle Emissions, National Academy of Sciences, September 1973. Also a review of the study of air quality emission control by the NAS, contract number DOTOS30171, Sevodka Co., Inc., November 8, 1975. That is just a partial list.
I might respond to another point that was made, which is just clear misinformation, and I think designed not to shed objective light on this debate. The point was made that the Ford Motor Co. allegedly spent, last year — and I am not here to make a brief for that company. To continue, the point was made that they spent only $118,000 on research, on fuel economy, and I think on auto emissions.
Obviously and patently false. Anybody would know that.
Mr. HART. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. RIEGLE. In a moment, I would like to yield and I would like the Senator to yield to me from time to time, when I seek to have him yield to me on matters of fact, not because I want to sop up his time, but to pack these down as we go.
We have contacted the Ford Motor Co. and their answer to us is that they are currently spending $300 million a year on R. & D. certification facilities and launching with respect to auto emissions. Since 1967 the Ford Motor Co. indicates to us they spent $1.5 billion to $2 billion on emission control research, and this also includes R. & D. and launching.
The $118,000 figure the Senator refers to was for research. That was clearly directed at the 0.4 NOx level in 1976 alone.
Mr. HART. The Senator is correct.
Mr. RIEGLE. But that is not the way it was presented and not the way it was stated to anyone in the debate from time to time and the Senator knows that.
Mr. HART. The Senator from Colorado corrects himself and apologizes for the mistake. But the fact still exists that in 1976, $118,000 was spent. That was the issue.
Mr. RIEGLE.Let me address another point that was made. Again, I have to take issue with the Senator from Colorado where he makes an argument to the effect that pollution from automobiles would cost 4,000 deaths and 4 million illness restricted days.
The National Academy of Sciences does not make this claim at all. What it actually says is, and I quote:
It is suggested— And I underline "suggested"— that automobile emissions may amount for as much as 1 percent of the total urban health hazard. For the whole United States urban population effect of this magnitude — I again stress — might represent as may as 4,000 deaths and 4 million illness restricted days per year.
Now, realize that the other side leaves out these absolutely critical qualifiers, such as suggested, might, and represent, because the National Academy of Sciences makes no such cause and effect relationship at all.
The National Academy of Sciences admits there is no quantitative data on illness and death due to air pollution.
In the same report that the other side cites, the question is asked: What fraction of illness. and death can be attributed to air pollution specifically, and what amount is caused by automobiles, the Academy responds, and I quote:
We can make no pretense of providing accurate quantitative estimates rooted firmly in scientific knowledge of the contribution of air pollution to this total.
Now; to suggest otherwise is really not to be honest with what facts we have. This is a difficult area because the facts are not complete. They are not as complete as I wish they were. But that is why, in trying as reasonable people to strike some balance when we have the very substantial energy penalty involved, we have got what I can find to be no quantifiable public health assurance of those standards. The fact is that the technology does not exist.
In light of those circumstances, it seems to me we obviously have to turn down the 0.4—
Mr. MUSKIE. Will the Senator yield?
Mr: RIEGLE. I shall yield in just a moment.
But I think that is really the reason the committee did not adopt that standard. The committee was free to pick it if they thought it was the right one. The committee in its wisdom on this particular matter elected not to, as the chairman himself indicated a while ago.
The Senator has asked me to yield and I yield to him.
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator just made the statement to the effect that since we cannot prove the technology exists that, therefore, we should relax our objective.
Let me make clear to the Senator that the 1970 act was deliberately enacted by the Congress as a technology forcing act.If we had not enacted the 1979 act we would not have today's catalyst. We would not have the catalyst which today is achieving the kind of results where the automobile industry is saying, "That's enough."
We chose the 1970 mechanism in order to force the technology. If we were to set standards only in accordance with what the industry was willing to develop to deal with air pollution, we would not have any technology.
If we were to leave air quality policy to the corporate board rooms of the automobile industry, we would never move, even as far as we have.
It is our responsibility to decide what the health requirements of the country are and say to the industry, "That is what the health requirements are and you must meet them."
That was the philosophy of the Clean Air Act of 1970.
It may be that the majority of the Congress is now willing to abandon that kind of policy, and if a majority of the Congress does so, I guess I will have to live with it.
But I still think it is the only way. It is the only way to force technology, and this has to do not only with the automobile industry, but with every other major industry, all of whom resist the technological kind of initiatives that are necessary to deal with this public health problem.
Mr. RIEGLE. Will the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. MUSKIE. Of course.
Mr. RIEGLE. If I may just respond, I understand the Senator's point and I have enormous regard for the Senator from Maine, for his leadership in this area over a long period of time. I do not relish in any way being on a different side, even one issue, because we find ourselves on the same side of most issues.
I voted for those standards the Senator speaks about for 1970. I voted for all of them.
I think the situation today is quite different than the situation we faced then.
The standard that I am proposing is the Riegle-Griffin substitute which we hope to bring up at a later point continues that same approach.
It does it at a slightly different rate than the bill the committee is proposing, hut we continue to tighten down those standards. We do so because we think it is necessary to set tougher goals and then strive to meet those goals.
Mr. MUSKIE. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. RIEGLE. After just one more point.
The automobile industry wanted a different set of standards, ones that would be easier to meet than those Senator GRIFFIN and I are proposing.
What we are proposing represents, I think, an accomplishment on our part in persuading the auto companies, as well as the United Auto Workers and the AFL, to sign on to a tough set of improvements as we go forward through 1985.
But the difference is that they have committed themselves to meet that standard and if our alternative is accepted, then we solve this problem forever more because we will have standards that they have said will meet and they will have no way out. I mean, they are absolute and final standards. Quite frankly, I say to the Senator that if we look at some—
Mr. MUSKIE. Before the Senator refers to a chart, may I say that I hope the Senator will forgive my cynicism, but I regard the Griffin-Riegle standards as an abandonment of any effort to require the automobile industry to do anything better than it is now doing.
Mr. RIEGLE. If the Senator will yield at that point, we reached the same standards, as he knows, in two out of the three measures.
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator abandoned one altogether, the most lethal one.
Mr. RIEGLE. Well, there are three.
Mr. MUSKIE. The most lethal one was abandoned altogether.
Mr. RIEGLE.That is a question of judgment. But let us take the three and take them in the order they are talked about and presented.
Hydrocarbons, we reached the same level there. The CO standard situation went up with a different level in that area. But as far as the NOx is concerned, we both end up at the 1.0 level.
That is the final, standard we both meet. So we are together on two of the three.
Mr. MUSKIE. Let me recite my view of what the Senator is proposing.
With respect to hydrocarbons, there have been delays in the achievement of that standard, which was first mandated for 1975, which is now required by the 1978 law, but 2 years longer than the committee version — notwithstanding the fact that all the evidence indicates that the technology now exists to achieve it.
With respect to carbon monoxide, which is the most lethal of all, for the first time the industry has persuaded the Senator that we can abandon the standard — totally abandon it, permanently abandon the standard that was set for 1975, which is now the law for 1978, and which the committee would require achieving in 1980.
It is interesting to me that that abandonment was not even proposed until after the committee agreed to the relaxation of the NOx standard. The NOx standard was the industry's prime target until they won the 1.0 concession, which still does not satisfy the industry. Then they picked a new target, the carbon monoxide standard. Nobody outside the industry challenged the carbon monoxide standard until the last 12 months. Now, suddenly, we are going to change that one. If the industry wins that one, I suspect that they may well target in on the hydrocarbon standard.
With respect to the 1.0 in the committee bill on NOx, I say to the Senator what I said earlier: I went to 1.0 NOx not because I doubted that 0.4 might not ultimately have to be required but because I wanted to eliminate the argument that going beyond 1.0 NOx would eliminate technological options that should be explored.
That was a concession on my part to try to do what the Senator says his amendment would do — finally get the industry on board. Well, the industry did not come on board. Having won that much, they seek to win more, and that has been their effort for more than 7 years. The entire 14 years I have been chairman of the Environmental Pollution Committee, the industry has had to be dragged, kicking and screaming, into every new advance in dealing with this problem.
Mr. RIEGLE. Will the Senator concede that, in terms of the progress that has been accomplished, if we take 1970 as our starting point, we have made substantial progress in cleaning up the emissions we have been after, particularly in the area of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide?
Mr. MUSKIE. We have made some progress, but we still have not achieved the ultimate result which the industry claims to have reached.
Every time I concede that there has been some progress, the industry then seizes upon that as an endorsement of their position that they have done all they need to do. I hear that over and over and over again.
There never has been a positive attitude on the part of the industry to say to the public, "We recognize our responsibility, and we are prepared to do what is necessary to meet it." Never once has that kind of attitude been expressed by the industry. For the first time, there was a semblance of that kind of attitude in this year's hearing. The Ford Motor Co. testified that they could meet the committee standards in 1980.
Mr. RIEGLE. I say to the Senator that I think the automobile companies are, in fact, saying that, by supporting the schedule that Senator GRIFFIN and I are proposing.
Mr. MUSKIE. They proposed the schedule before the Senators proposed it.
Mr. RIEGLE. I beg the Senator's pardon. They did not.
Mr. MUSKIE. They asked for a 5 year extension.
Mr. RIEGLE. I say to the Senator that the discussions and the working meetings that were held with the United Auto Workers and a host of interested parties ended up with the numbers we were proposing being very much different and tougher than those for which the industry had hoped. They joined this coalition, and they have said to us that they are willing to commit themselves absolutely to meeting these objectives. We are tightening up each of the three standards, and we are hitting two of those exactly as the Senator proposes.
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator from Michigan is tightening up the carbon monoxide standard only to the extent that he is asking them to do something more than they are now doing, but he is abandoning the carbon monoxide standard which is now written into law, and it is the most lethal of the automobile pollution initiatives.
Mr. RIEGLE. Let me show the Senator one thing.
I do not know whether the Senator has had a chance to see this chart before or not. It shows the one about which the Senator speaks, the one he calls the most lethal — namely, carbon monoxide levels.This takes in three areas — Los Angeles, Denver, and Chicago — and they are important because of the amount of air pollution.
This shows, according to CEQ what we can anticipate, starting from 1970, the experience we already have, and going to 1980 and 1990, using 15 grams, 9, or 3.4. That is the range about which we really are talking.
The Senator sees what the effect of the difference is in terms of when we cross that air standard line which is noted right here.
I say to the Senator that each of those standards, whichever one he wishes to take, gives us essentially a comparable result. One can argue which it should be, but the difference between the 9 and the 3.4, as it is charted here, in two of the areas about which we have the greatest concern, is a relatively minor difference.
Mr. MUSKIE. I say to the Senator that I have not seen the chart, and I cannot see it from here; but I will look at it and compare it to our own carbon monoxide chart for the purpose of making comparisons.
Mr. RIEGLE. One of the world's best chart bearers is bringing it over.
Mr. MUSKIE. I doubt very much that a chart I cannot see would offset the evidence I have been listening to for 14 years.
Mr. RIEGLE. I say to the Senator that these are very complicated issues, as he probably knows better than anybody else,because he has lived with this matter and struggled with it, as we all have.
Mr. MUSKIE. That is something on which we can agree completely.
Mr. RIEGLE. There are legitimate differences of opinion.
One of the major changes in circumstance, in terms of 1977 versus 1970, or any point in between, is the fact that we have an energy crisis on our hands. The people of Maine know that; the people of Michigan know that; the whole country knows that. There are some very major fuel economy differentials here that relate to those emission standards. Perhaps they should not be treated. Perhaps we should put those to the side and say that the only issue is air quality.
Mr. MUSKIE. In one way, I say to the Senator. Not at all. The Senator is so wrong on the conclusions he has drawn about the energy implications of the standards that the committee bill would provide that I would be delighted to discuss that issue. In due course, I will have some charts here that will put a perspective on this that will seem strange to the Senator. The idea that there is a fuel penalty associated with our standards just does not stand up under examination of the facts.
We have heard the automobile companies' arguments on this. I heard them when they finally went to the catalyst in 1975. They predicted horrendous fuel penalties, and that was when the fuel economy began to improve.
We will show the Senator a chart going back to 1956, as to what has happened to fuel economy in automobiles. The Senator can look at that curve as opposed to the curve of auto emission regulations,and he will not find his argument supported. Here it is, right here.
Mr. RIEGLE. The Senator, I am sure, will acknowledge that the cars that are being driven in California today which meet type emission standards carry with them a substantial fuel penalty, will he not — something in excess of 10 percent?
Mr. MUSKIE. That is exactly true, because in order to meet those standards, for just California, the automobile industry did not go to the next level of technology.
The next level of technology would eliminate that fuel penalty, and I sometimes think they did it deliberately to try to persuade us on the basis of the California experience that moving to tighter standards would carry a fuel penalty.
They said the same thing about the catalyst. It was not proven right. They said the same thing when they moved to the 1977 Federal standards; they were proved wrong.
They have argued fuel penalty and fuel penalty every time we have gone to the next level of control, and then argued that it is an inevitable consequence.
There is no rational connection between clean air and fuel inefficiency. The fact is that the less fuel you consume the less pollution you produce. That is a fundamental fact. But it is the technology, and the industry's choice of technology, which has produced the penalties, the fuel penalties, that the industry has then used as an argument against a healthier performance by automobile engines. That has been demonstrated to me and to the public so many times in the last 10 years that I have absolutely no patience, as I am sure I demonstrate, with that argument.
Mr. RIEGLE. I might just say to the Senator that in my own judgment I think the industry today is committed to the breakthroughs and redesign, radical redesign, going into a threeway catalyst and other kinds of technological changes to get both of these jobs done, to get the fuel economy job done and, as you know as well as I do, we have laws on the books today that require fuel economy improvement, and we also have clean air standards. Both things have to be met simultaneously.
But I think what is important to recognize is that on two of these three emissions you and I get to exactly the same point.
Mr. MUSKIE. We do not.
Mr. RIEGLE. Yes, we do.
Mr. MUSKIE. We do not.
Mr. RIEGLE. Well, I beg to differ with the Senator.
Mr. MUSKIE. The time frame is different. You abandon 0.4 NOx. altogether.
Mr. RIEGLE. I am not prepared to abandon 0.4 as a research objective; I am not prepared to abandon that at all.
Mr. MUSKIE. I am glad to hear that. But, first, we have the time frame different which slows down the technological push. That makes a big difference, a big difference. I mean the industry itself agreed to the 1975 standards, and let us talk about them as 1975 standards because that is what they were. 1978 represents the third delay. So the 1975 standards are something that the industry itself agreed to at a White House meeting with President Nixon — as a matter of fact, it was a 1969 conference in the White House with President Nixon — to be achieved in 1980. That is the committee bill, 1980.
(At this point Mr. MOYNIHAN assumed the chair.)
Mr. MUSKIE. Now, they want to abandon, totally abandon, the carbon monoxide standard; they want to delay the hydrocarbon standard beyond that.
Mr. RIEGLE. If I may, just before you do that—
Mr. MUSKIE: All right.
Mr. RIEGLE. The Senator from Maine did support those extensions, if I remember correctly.
Mr. MUSKIE. What is that?
Mr. RIEGLE. The Senator from Maine did support those extensions to which he just referred.
Mr. MUSKIE. Let me give the Senator the reason: As a concession to industry, as a leaning backward recognition that there may have been problems technologically.
Mr. RIEGLE. Is that not another way of saying—
Mr. MUSKIE. That I was willing to lean over backward 1 year, then another year, then another year, then another year, and then the industry, having taken those 3, now say, "We will now go back for 5." I cannot step back 5 years. I can give 1 year at a time, and not because they could not have done it in 1975, not because I did not think they could not have done it in 1976 or 1977 or 1978, but because I know I have to persuade a majority of this body that I am reasonable. So now I have been reasonable three times. The committee bill represents being reasonable four times, and now the Senator wants me to be reasonable five times.
Mr. RIEGLE. Let me just say to the Senator that I am here to help him. [Laughter.]
Mr. MUSKIE. That is not very clear.
Mr. RIEGLE. Well, I want to make it clear because we are going to get this settled for once and for all this time, and when we set the standards
Mr. MUSKIE. I would not bet on that.
Mr. RIEGLE. Let me say this to the Senator: If the Riegle-Griffin package is adopted, I intend to see that it is met, and that is how I feel about it, and I do not intend to back off from it once it is done.
Part of the understanding of the coalition of the people who support it is that this is it, and this is locking in on standards that will be, in fact, final standards that will be met.
Mr. MUSKIE,. Let me say to the Senator that if the Griffin-Riegle standards are made part of the law, I will be strongly tempted to recommend to the Senate that we adopt an amendment that will place the setting of the standards and their enforcement in the corporate board rooms of Detroit.
I just think that that kind of surrender — and I am not attacking the motives or the integrity of either of the sponsors of that amendment — represents a complete surrender to an industry timetable that the industry itself changes every time they think they have got a reason to persuade a majority of the Congress or the public that the standards are unreasonable. We might just as well abolish the farce that this is public policy. You might just as well let them make it private policy and surrender to that. That is my feeling about the amendment.
Mr. RIEGLE. I know it is.
The Senator says that, in the face of the fact that the Senator and I get two of the same standards at exactly the same levels, and that we establish two of them in terms of end standards at exactly the same point, two out of three—
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator wants me to agree to that in order to obscure some very fundamental differences between his position and mine.
Most fundamental to my position is that we need the technology to clean up the single worst source of pollution in this country, and only the industry can produce it, only the industry or satellite industries which the industry up to this point has been tempted to ignore.
Mr. RIEGLE. Let us take—
Mr. MUSKIE. If I might finish — that is a fundamental difference because if you relieve the pressure on the industry, the history of the last 7 years demonstrates that they will slow down their effort. This happened on NOx, let me repeat, this happened on NOx. That is why technological improvement was so limited that we had to go to 1.0 because the industry gave us no technology, no technological choices that were adequate.
So I consider that when you stretch out the timetable you slow down the research effort, the R. & D. effort, in industry, so that when you have to pick it up again then you are faced again with the argument,. "We need another extension of time because we haven't got the technology yet." I have heard the same story for 12 to 14 solid years.
Mr. RIEGLE. Let me say this to the Senator: The industry, if it were left to itself, would prefer not to get the figure to one figure in. NOx, which you require and which I require. That is not anything that they prefer to do. So to suggest that that is something they argued for or that that represents a position they fought to establish is really not correct, as the Senator knows.
Mr. MUSKIE Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. RIEGLE. Because the Senator is laying down a tough standard, as you know it, with the one figure, as we are.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. RIEGLE. Yes, I yield.
Mr. MUSKIE. I suspect if I had stayed with .4 longer we could have made 1.0 look so desirable to the industry they would have made it part of their compromise.
I just regret yielding on it when I did, because the only way you get those fellows to come along is to stand tough, and I gave them 1.0 as a concession too early, too soon, and they moved on to other — they moved on to CO and to a 5 year extension. You give those fellows an inch and they take 25,000 miles.
There is a story we tell in Maine of an out-of-stater who was lost somewherein the back roads, and he stopped and asked a native, "How far is it to Portland?" The native said, "The way you are headed 25,000 miles, and there are some wet spots along the way." [Laughter.]
Well, the way the industry has been headed, you know, has been exactly in the opposite direction for 14 years. TheSenator cannot persuade me. I am sorry — maybe it is time for me to give up this committee or this chairmanship — you cannot persuade me that anything, the committee compromise or your compromise, will engage the real sense of urgency of the industry to do this job because I think they could have done it if they had made up their mind to do it long before the deadline the Senator sets, long before the deadline the committee bill sets, long before 1978, if they had made up their mind to do it. Nothing will persuade me to the contrary, and I am sorry I have become so unreasonable, but I am at that point.
Mr. JACKSON.. Mr. President, will the Senator yield so that the Chair may appoint conferees on H.R. 2?
Mr. RIEGLE. I yield to the Senator.
Mr. JACKSON. I thank both Senators.
SURFACE MINING CONTROL
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on HR. 2.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MOYNIHAN) laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 2) to provide for the cooperation between the Secretary of the Interior and the States with respect to the regulation of surface coal mining operations, and the acquisition and reclamation of abandoned mines, and for other purposes, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.
Mr. JACKSON. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendment and agree to the request of the House for a conference, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.
The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. JACKSON, Mr. METCALF, Mr. METZENBASIM, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. FORD, Mr. MATSUNAGA, Mr. HANSEN, Mr. HATFIELD, Mr. MCCLURE, and Mr. BARTLETT conferees on the part of the Senate.
CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1977
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (S. 252) .
Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. President, I might just say one final thought, if I may, and that is that the Senator from Maine is, I think, as he properly describes, inflexible on this matter, but he is delightful at the same time, and I have enormous regard for him despite the fact that we have a difference of opinion on this issue.
Mr. MUSKIE. I did not say "inflexible." I said "unreasonable."
I find that I had to match the attitude of my opposition in order to deal effectively with this subject.
Mr. RIEGLE. I just hope that I can convince the Senator I am here to help him get this job done and I think if an alternative is adopted it will settle it and settle it in the way that gives us the best balance in terms of the conflicting objectives that we are after.
I conclude only in addition by saying that I do not think there is any evidence in terms of quantifiable health benefits, in what in fact are quantifiable fuel penalties, and the fact that the technology is not available insofar as anyone with qualification can demonstrate to indicate that the 0.4 level makes good national sense. It is a research objective. Sure, I am willing to continue to look for every way we can find to try to make these breakthroughs. But wanting it and looking for it is a profoundly different matter than finding it or suggesting that it is ready to go which it is not.
So I hope that the Senate in its wisdom will turn down the Hart amendment because it just does not make good sense.
I yield the floor.