May 25, 1977
Page 16541
AUTO EMISSIONS FACT SHEET
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 will be considered by the Senate during the week of June 6. As many Members will recall, 1976 Clean Air Amendments were approved by this body on August 5, 1976, only to be killed by filibuster after a conference agreement had been reached.
This year the committee has reported a bill which is similar to last year's Senate-passed bill, in the interest of consistency and in the interest of presenting the Senate with familiar legislation.
The issue of auto emission standards and deadlines has been debated on numerous occasions in this Chamber since 1965, when the first Federal mobile source pollution control program was authorized. Once again, auto emission standards are the focus of extensive debate and intensive lobbying. I believe that the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee has resolved the auto emissions questions in a way which will guarantee clean cars and provide adequate lead time for the auto industry to accomplish that goal.
Many questions have been raised about the effects of various auto emission standards and deadlines on public health, fuel economy, cost, and employment. I am placing in the RECORD today a fact sheet on auto emission issues in order to provide Members with the information which led the committee to its decisions. The fact sheet contrasts the Senate committee bill with the provisions of S. 919, a package of amendments to the Clean Air Act introduced by Senators GRIFFIN and RIEGLE.
I emphasize that the Griffin-Riegle bill deals with a number of issues other than auto emissions and deadlines, which would undo the basic framework of the existing Clean Air Act. Most of these provisions have not been explained or defended. My fact sheet includes an analysis of these provisions.
I ask unanimous consent that the fact sheet and summary be printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the fact sheet was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
TECHNOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY
The auto industry can meet the requirements of the Senate bill.
The more stringent 1979 standards in the Senate Committee bill for hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide have already been met by a number of 1977 California models of cars in EPA's Federal Test Procedure. The test results showed that a number of models actually had emissions below the 1980 standards in S. 252, without even being adjusted to meet those levels.
These cars include American Motors' Pacer and Matador, Chrysler's Aspen, Ford's Maverick and General Motors' Caprice, Impala, Monza, Sunbird, and Skyhawk. It is important to note that this list includes a variety of weights, sizes, engines and manufacturers, and that these standards were achieved without trying.
All of the U.S. auto companies have stated that they can meet the final 1980 standards in S. 252. One company stated in February, 1977, that it could meet the 1980 standards on 100% of their cars in 1980. In fact, two of the U.S. companies plan to use the 3-way catalyst, the most promising new technology on some of their 1978 California models as a major production trial.
This is the traditional way in which the auto industry has phased-in new technologies. The 1979 requirements are a logical progression to the ultimate statutory standards in 1980.
HEALTH IMPACT
The Griffin-Riegle bill would relax the carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxide standards, resulting in a severe adverse effect on public health.
NITROGEN OXIDE STANDARD
Nitrogen oxides react with hydrocarbons to form oxidant, and thus is associated with the health hazards of oxidant. Nitrogen dioxide alone, however, is known to produce adverse health effects such as acute respiratory illness, increased bronchitis morbidity in children, decreased lung functions in children, and increased susceptibility to respiratory infection.
At the 2.0 grams per mile NOx standard of S. 919, even in the year 2000, one million excess attacks of respiratory disease are projected to occur in children. This health impact is almost halved by the adoption of the 1.0 NOx standard of the Committee bill.
The Griffin-Riegle bill would also cause almost 2 million excess days of restricted activity from lower respiratory disease in children. This health impact is also approximately halved by adoption of the Committee bill.
OXIDANT STANDARD
Health effects associated with oxidant are aggravation of asthma and lung disease, respiratory irritation in healthy persons, increased eye irritation and changes in heart and lung function in healthy persons. Of the 313 air quality control regions in this country, 170 regions still have not achieved the air quality standard for oxidant set at a level to protect public health from adverse effects.
CARBON MONOXIDE STANDARD
Carbon monoxide is the most harmful of the pollutants emitted by the automobile. In sufficiently high concentrations, it can cause death. Carbon monoxide exposure also affects the central nervous system, the heart, human reflexes, hearing, and exacerbates the incidence of heart disease. Eighty air quality control regions still have not attained the carbon monoxide standard at which adverse health effects occur. Monitoring data from New York shows carbon monoxide levels 200% — 400% above the health standard.
The Griffin-Riegle 9.0 carbon monoxide standard will cause between 65% and 130% more violations of the health standard between 1980 and 2000 than the Senate Committee bill. By the year 2000, the Senate standard leaves only five urban areas in violation of the health standard, while the Griffin-Riegle standard leaves twelve areas in violation of the health standard.
EMPLOYMENT
Future emission controls will not lead to unemployment or poor sales either. EPA projections indicate that 185,000 new jobs in the U.S. auto industry would be created through increased sales between now and 1985 if the Senate Committee standards are adopted.
FUEL ECONOMY
The Griffin-Riegle bill proposes final standards of .41, 9.0, 2.0 for the avowed purpose of allowing the auto companies to continue to use the existing, inefficient technology now in use to meet the 1977 California standards of .41, 9.0, 1.5. The average fuel penalty of these cars was 11% worse than 1977 Federal cars. This illustrates the result of standards which can be met by adding on equipment to existing technology. The auto industry will do only the technological minimum when a jump to more advanced emission control technology is not required, but is a voluntary option. One must associate that fuel penalty with the Griffin-Riegle proposal, since it cannot be assumed in the absence of statutory impetus, that the manufacturers will go to a higher level of technology voluntarily.
In contrast to the 11% fuel economy penalty of existing technology, the Ford Motor Company estimates that the Senate standards could result in a fuel penalty of 5% in 1980, the first year, but better fuel economy or at least no fuel penalty in 1981.
COST
The Senate bill will save the consumer money over the lifetime of a car.
The 1977 Volvo 3-way catalyst system sold this year which has exceeded both California and Federal emission standards has cost the customer $25 — $50. This car has been sold in California throughout 1977. Lifetime savings due to 10% better fuel economy exceed this initial first cost by $275-$300. This is similar to the advanced technology which the domestic auto manufacturers have stated they will use to meet the Senate standards in 1980.
The Senate Committee bill will result in substantial savings to the consumer. The current technology which the auto companies have stated they would use to meet the Riegle-Griffin standards carries an 11% fuel economy penalty. Advanced technology which must be used to meet the Senate Committee standards could improve the average 1977 fuel economy by 10%. The 21% improvement results in a $650 lifetime savings to the car owner. After deducting the EPA's estimated $250 first cost of the equipment, the Senate standards result in a net savings of $400 to the consumer. This is a conservative savings figure, since the EPA equipment cost estimate includes items which may not be needed, such as a $70 start catalyst.
AUTO EMISSION STANDARDS
The following table compares the auto emission standards in the bill reported by the Committee on Environment and Public Works, S. 252; the Griffin-Riegle bill, S. 919;and existing law:
[Table omitted]
The more stringent 1979 standards in S. 252 for the HC and CO have already been met by a number of 1977 California models of cars, in EPA's Federal Test Procedure. The test results showed that a number of models actually had emissions below the 1980 standards in S. 252, without even being adjusted to meet those levels.
These cars include American Motors' Pacer and Matador, Chrysler's Aspen, Ford's Maverick and General Motors'Caprice, Impala, Manza, Sunbird, and Skyhawk. It is important to note that this list includes a variety of weights, sizes, engines and manufacturers, and that these standards were achieved without trying.
All of the U.S. auto companies have stated that they can meet the final 1980 standards in S. 252. One company stated in February, 1977, that it could meet the 1980 standards on 100% of their cars in 1980. In fact, two of the U.S. companies plan to use the 3-way catalyst, the most promising new technology on some of their 1978 California models as a major production trial.
This is the traditional way in which the auto industry has phased in new technologies. The 1979 requirements are a logical progression to the ultimate statutory standards in 1980.
STATEMENT
Emission standards of S. 919 will provide the most desirable air quality and health improvement standards when measured against statutory fuel economy requirements and costs to the consumer.
FACT
The automobile is a significant contributor to the unhealthy air pollution levels across the country; however, the net changes in total automotive emissions since the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1970 have been rather modest of 14% for hydrocarbon, 16% for carbon monoxide and an increase of 16% in nitrogen oxides.
Hydrocarbon standard: Hydrocarbons emitted into the air from automobiles react with nitrogen oxides (also emitted into the air by the auto and regulated by law) in the atmosphere to form photochemical oxidant (smog) .
Health effects associated with oxidant are aggravation of asthma and lung disease, respiratory irritation in healthy persons, increased eye irritation and changes in heart and lung function in healthy persons. Of the313 air quality control regions in this country, 170 regions still have not achieved the air quality standard for oxidant set at a level to protect public health from adverse effects.
There is general agreement that the .41 hydrocarbon standard should be imposed as rapidly as possible to mitigate the pervasive smog problem. Even with that stringent standard, a strong vehicle inspection and maintenance program, and control of hydrocarbons from stationary sources such as refineries, the health standard for oxidant (smog) will still be violated in 26 or more air quality control regions in the year 2000.
The Griffin-Riegle timetable which delays imposition of the .41 hydrocarbon standard will cause 4% more violations of the oxidant health standard between 1980 and 1990 than the Senate Committee bill.
There is no reason to delay the final statutory auto emission standard of .41 grams/mile beyond 1970, as S. 919 would, given the availability of technology now to meet the .41 grams/mile standard, and the critical need to control hydrocarbons now, in order to achieve healthy air.
Carbon Monoxide Standard: Carbon monoxide is the most harmful of the pollutants emitted by the automobile. In sufficiently high concentrations, it can cause death. Carbon monoxide exposure also affects the central nervous system, the heart, human reflexes, hearing, and exacerbates the incidenceof heart disease. Eighty air quality control regions still have not attained the carbon monoxide standard at which adverse health effects occur. Monitoring data from New York City shows carbon monoxide levels 200% – 400% above the health standard.
The Griffin-Riegle bill proposes to almost triple the ultimate statutory carbon monoxide standard from 3.4 grams per mile to 9.0 grams per mile, based on theoretical calculations that every city will meet the ambient CO standards by 1990, even at 9.0 grams per mile. This is an unrealistic projection, since test data from autos on the road show that carbon monoxide emission levels are double the amount permitted by the current standards on the average. In some cases, carbon monoxide emissions have been almost as high as those from uncontrolled cars because of carburetor maladjustments. The air quality projections used by the proponents of relaxation do not take this severe deterioration into account.
The Griffin-Riegle 9.0 carbon monoxide standard will cause between 65% and 130% more violations of the health standard between 1980 and 2000 than the Senate Committee bill. By the year 2000, the Senate standard leaves only five urban areas in violation of the health standard, while the Griffin-Riegle standard leaves twelve areas inviolation of the health standard.
This argument for relaxation of the carbon monoxide standard surfaced only in January,1977 despite the ongoing debate on this subject for seven years. The National Academy of Sciences and the Environmental Protection Agency agree that the 3.4 grams per mile standard contained in the Committee bill is necessary to protect public health.
Nitrogen Oxide Standard: Nitrogen oxides react with hydrocarbons to form oxidant, and thus is associated with the health hazards of oxidant. Nitrogen oxide alone, however, is known to produce adverse health effects such as acute respiratory illness, increased bronchitis, morbidity in children, decreased lung functions in children, and increased susceptibility to respiratory infection.
The original statutory NOx standard was set at .4 grams/mile in order to protect public health. During the past seven years, the exact level of nitrogen oxide control required has been a matter of much debate. The Committee determined on the basis of scientific data that a revised standard of 1.0 grams/ mile would meet public health needs, and also stimulate new, improved control technology.
The Griffin-Riegle bill would relax the NOx standard an additional 100%, to 2.0 grams/ mile, on top of the relaxation of 21/2 times in the Committee bill. Although the Griffin-Riegle bill allows for the possibility of a 1.0 NOx standard eventually, in 1982, any auto company may apply for waivers to the current 1977 standard of 2.0 indefinitely. If past history is any guide, one must assume a 2.0 NOx standard indefinitely, as the auto companies have received every waiver they have applied for from EPA.
At the 2.0 grams per mile NOx standard of S. 919, even in the year 2000, one million excess attacks of respiratory disease are projected to occur in children. This health impact is almost halved by the adoption of the 1.0 NOx standard of the Committee bill.
The Griffin-Riegle bill would also cause almost 2 million excess days of restricted activity from lower respiratory disease in children. This health impact is also approximately halved by adoption of the Committee bill.
The sponsors of S. 919 base their NOx waiver on the uncertainty as to the level of NOx control needed to protect public health. The uncertainty surrounds the necessity for a .4 NOx standard; to the knowledge of the Committee, no scientific or medical body contends that a level as high as the 2.0 NOx standard would satisfy public health requirements. S. 252 accommodates this uncertainty by maintaining the .4 NOx level as a research objective. Auto manufacturers must submit prototype cars at this NOx level to EPA annually. Should the EPA Administrator determine the necessity for a standard more stringent than 1.0 grams per mile NOx of S. 252, the existing law provides authority to tighten the standard.
Air quality projections show that even with stringent stationary source controls total NOx emissions will rise over the next 20 years at any automotive emissions standard above .4 grams per mile. At the 2.0 NOx standard of Griffin-Riegle, the number of urban areas not meeting the public health standard can more than double by the year 2000. If a short-term ambient air quality standard is adopted in the range being considered by the World Health Organization, there will be widespread violations in almost all areas of the country even at the most stringent automotive standards. The number of violations would be cut substantially only at the .4 level.
STATEMENT
The implementation of the auto emission standards of the bill reported by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works will result in massive job losses in the motor vehicle and related industries, andnegative effects on the entire national economy.
FACT
These assumptions of a catastrophic decline in auto sales and resultant layoffs have no basis in past history. In 1973, the industry set a record for retail sales of 11.5 million cars. 1974 sales dipped 23% in the midst of a national recession, an oil embargo, dire projections that the gas
shortage was permanent, and that gasoline would either be rationed or become prohibitively expensive.
The case was never made that the decline in sales and job losses were due to emission control requirements. Subsequent sales data indicate, to the contrary, that auto sales are most sensitive to the general health of the economy, and to the disposable income ofconsumers.
For example, by 1976, auto sales had once more climbed to over 10 million units. For 1977 models, the nitrogen oxide standard was tightened by 33%, yet sales for this year are substantially higher than those for model year 1976. The most recent figures show a 12.5% increase for the month of April, compared to April, 1976. Henry Ford, Chairman of the Ford Motor Company, has predicted 1977 auto sales of 11.2 million units, the second highest sales in the history of the industry.
Future emission controls will not lead to unemployment or poor sales either. EPA projections indicate that 183,000 jobs in the U.S. auto industry would be created through increased sales between now and 1985 if the Senate Committee standards are adopted.
FUEL ECONOMY
STATEMENT
The requirement of auto emission standards at the levels in the Senate Committee bill will result in fuel economy penalties and will prevent the development of alternative, fuel efficient technologies.
FACT
There is no inherent relationship between fuel economy and emission control. Actual fuel economy depends on the choice of technology chosen as evidenced by the examples below:
The most significant tightening of auto emission standards to date occurred in model year 1975. Although Chrysler Corporation testified that these standards would cause a fuel penalty, their cars realized a 12% fuel economy gain.
General Motors estimated a substantial gain, and their actual experience was twice the fuel economy improvement predicted.
In model year 1977, the NOx. standard was tightened by 33%. The auto industry has always claimed that this standard would cause the greatest fuel economy penalty. Chrysler estimated a 7% fuel economy loss; the actual loss was zero. General Motors estimated a 5% loss. The actual change was a 9% improvement between 1976 and 1977 model years.
The history of automobile fuel economy over the past 20 years evidences this lack of a detrimental relationship between emission control and fuel economy. The chart below illustrates the decline in fuel economy long before the advent of emission controls. It also indicates that the biggest improvement occurred in 1975 (13.5% over 1974) when the standards were significantly tightened and the industry used a new, more advanced emission control technology. In 1976, at the same standards, there was an additional 10% improvement, and in 1977, another 3.3% improvement for a total of 26.8% increase over the fuel economy of 1974 models.
[Table omitted]
The Griffin-Riegle bill proposes final standards of .41, 9.0, 2.0 for the avowed purpose of allowing the auto companies to continue to use the existing, inefficient technology now in use to meet the 1977 California standards of .41, 9.0, 1.5. The average fuel penalty of these cars was 11% worse than 1977 Federal cars. This illustrates the result of standards which can be met by adding on equipment to existing technology. The auto industry will do only the technological minimum when a jump to more advanced emission control technology is not required, but is a voluntary option. One must associate that fuel penalty with the Griffin-Riegle proposal, since it cannot be assumed in the absence of statutory impetus, that the manufacturers will go to a higher level of technology voluntarily.
The Senate Committee bill, on the other hand, sets standards which require the auto manufacturers to go to the next level of technology, which is more efficient, and more effective to control emissions. The only way the fuel penalty of the 1977 California cars can be avoided with the Griffin-Riegle standards in effect is if the manufacturers choose to use the next level of technology, as would be required to achieve the standards in the Senate bill in 1980.
In contrast to the 11% fuel economy penalty of existing technology, the Ford Motor Company estimates that the Senate standards could result in a fuel penalty of 5% in 1980, the first year, but better fuel economy or at least no fuel penalty in 1981.
EPA has stated that the impact of the Senate standards on fuel economy would range from plus 2 miles per gallon to minus two miles per gallon, depending on the technology chosen.
The advanced technology which already exists to meet the Senate Committee standards improves the average 1977 fuel economyby 10%. This is a savings of 105,000 barrels of oil a day.
The 1.0 NOx standard in the Committee bill will also allow production of alternative, fuel- efficient engines. The National Academy of Sciences has identified five technologies that can meet the Senate Committee standards (0.41/3.4/1.0): dual catalyst or three-way catalyst on conventional engines, CVCC stratified charge (Honda), CCS stratified charge (Ford), and diesel. These are in additional to longer-term alternative engines which can also meet the Senate Committee standard, including Sterling cycle, Rankine cycle, gas turbine and electric or hybrid engines.
As for the diesel, the National Academy of Sciences' assessment that they can meet 1.0 NOx is confirmed by a 1977 VW Rabbit diesel which has already achieved 0.8/1.0/0.8 in certification tests. Teledyne Continental Motors has studied the diesel for ERDA and finds that they can achieve 30 miles per gallon on the city cycle with a 3000 pound car, while meeting emissions levels of (0.24/1.2/ 0.2). And General Motors has been working with Opel on diesel development. Using electronic exhaust gas recirculation, they obtained emissions of (0.27/1.30/0.71) with fuel economy of 26 miles per gallon and no fuel penalty. Thus, at this early stage of commercial development of diesels for passenger cars, there is already strong evidence that they can meet the Senate Committee standards without undue difficulty.
COST OF NEW AUTOMOBILES
STATEMENT
The cost of emission control has greatly increased the price of cars in the past, and the emission requirements of the Senate Committee bill will raise the price of cars to an even more unreasonable level.
FACT
The sticker price increase of cars clue to emission controls have not been unreasonable, even as auto standards have become stringent. Bureau of Labor Statistics data since the inception of the Federal emission control program bear this out.
[Table omitted]
A recent example bears out this trend. The California Air Resources Board has stated that the 1977 Volvo 3 way catalyst system sold this year which has exceeded both California and Federal emission standards has cost the customer $25-50. This car has been sold in California throughout 1977. Lifetime savings due to 10% better fuel economy exceed this initial first cost by $275-300. This is similar to the advanced technology which the domestic auto manufacturers have stated they will use to meet the Senate standards in 1980.
The Senate Committee bill will result in substantial savings to the consumer. The current technology which the auto companies have stated they would use to meet the Griffin-Riegle standards carries an 11% fuel economy penalty. Advanced technology which must be used to meet the Senate Committee standards could improve the average 1977 fuel economy by 10%. The 21% improvement results in a $650 lifetime savings to the car owner. After deducting the EPA's estimated $250 first cost of the equipment, the Senate standards result in a net savings of $400 to the consumer. This is a conservative savings figure, since the EPA equipment cost estimate includes items which may not be needed, such as a $70 start catalyst.
WARRANTY OF EMISSION CONTROL SYSTEMS
STATEMENT
Reduction of the existing 5 year or 50,000 mile performance warranty for emission control systems is necessary to improve the competitive position of the independent parts and service dealers.
FACT
The performance warranty was included in the 1970 Clean Air Act to protect the consumer and to assure continued air quality improvement by requiring that a vehicle will continue to meet the applicable emission standards over 5 years or 50,000 miles, one-half of the average life of a car on the road.
Reduction of the performance warranty to 18 months or 18,000 miles (less than one-fifth of the average life of a car) will not achieve the stated objectives and will do serious harm to other objectives.
It is anti-consumer because it would shift the burden and expense of repairing a faulty emission control system from the manufacturer to the consumer whose car fails a State inspection after 18,000 miles.
It eliminates any financial incentive for manufacturers to produce an emission control system which functions for the car's life since their financial exposure would only be for 18,000 miles.
The Federal Trade Commission has recommended two actions to prevent any possible anti- competitive effect of the existing warranty. S. 252 adopts these recommendations and three other measures to avoid any anti-competitive effects of the warranty. These provisions include :
(1) requiring all owners' manuals to contain instructions that maintenance does not have to be performed by the dealer or with the manufacturer's own parts;
(2) making illegal any warranty provision that attempts to tie coverage to the use of the dealer's service and parts;
(3) establishment of a program which will enable aftermarket parts manufacturers to certify that their parts perform as well as the auto manufacturer's (the auto manufacturers have no role in approving such certification);
(4) specifying that a car owner may go anywhere to have required maintenance performed;
(5) a Federal Trade Commission study of any possible anti-competitive effect.
The 50,000 mile performance warranty has been law for seven years now. Independent dealers now hold 80% – 85% of the service and parts business, and that proportion has actually increased since 1970 when the warranty provision became law.
The United Auto Workers are in favor of maintaining the 5 year 50,000 mile performance warranty. President Leonard Woodcock stated in February, 1977: "We are basically in support of the 50,000 miles (performance warranty)."
The Consumer Federation of America is "strenuously opposed to this anti-consumer amendment" to reduce the performance warranty to 18 months or 18,000 miles.
Consumer's Union, publisher of Consumer's Reports, states in opposition to the reduction of the performance warranty to 18 months or 18,000 miles:
"In response to the five-year warranty requirement promulgated by EPA, auto manufacturers have designed the control devices, and the various parts related to the performance of these devices, for substantially longer endurance than would be the case under a one year warranty;
a reduction in designed durability would mean an increased incidence of repair for such devices and parts. This would add substantially to the consumer's cost of maintaining emission control devices to EPA performance standards."
Defects Warranty
This production, or defects warranty requires that each element of the vehicle related to emissions must be designed and built so as to conform to auto emission standards at the time of sales, and must be free from defects which would cause the vehicle to fail to meet emission standards over the life of the vehicle. The consumer is thus protected if a specific part fails within 5 years or 50,000 miles, and it is shown to be defective at the time it fails.
The Griffin-Riegle bill would make the production-defects warranty of existing law meaningless. S. 919 would require a consumer to prove that a defect in an emission control system, which occurred at any time prior to 50,000 miles, existed at the time of sale of the vehicle. This means that the consumer who discovered at 45,000 miles that a piece of equipment had ceased to operate, would have to prove that that defect also existed when the car was purchased. This is an impossible burden of proof to sustain, it is counter to the thrust of the Moss-Magnuson Act, and it goes against the established principles of products liability law.
The Griffin-Riegle warranty amendments benefit only one party — the auto industry. The consumer would pay for an emission control system to deal with an air pollution problem which lasts the life of the car but for which the auto industry would have no financial responsibility whatsoever. The aftermarket industry would lose much repair and maintenance work because none could be required of the car owner after 18,000 miles or 18 months under the terms of the warranty; and the public would have cars which can legally violate emission standards after 18,000 miles, and the resultant adverse health effects from dirty cars.
HIGH ALTITUDE
STATEMENT
The Griffin-Riegle provision dealing with emissions from automobiles in high altitude areas remedies the inequities of the current EPA regulations.
FACT
The Riegle-Griffin bill does not come to grips with the high altitude problem. The Committee bill adopts a solution to the problem of the inferior operation of automobiles which is far preferable to deal with consumer and air quality needs.
The major problems now are: (1) the availability of only 50% of all car models in urban high altitude areas; (2) the inferior performance of those high altitude cars; and (3) the loss of business by dealers in urban high altitude areas to nearby dealers who have all models available.
The Griffin-Riegle bill proposes to solve these problems by simply exempting the adjustment of emission control systems of high altitude vehicles from anti-tampering requirements of the law.
It maintains a separate requirement for cars in high altitude (about 3% of total sales) which ensures that minimal effort will be directed toward improvement of that technology by the auto manufacturers.
The separate high altitude requirements do not alleviate the problem of a high altitude dealers' loss of business to dealers who have all models available.
The Committee bill prohibits all differential treatment for high altitude areas so that all low altitude models can be sold everywhere in the country.
From 1978 to 1980, all high altitude requirements are suspended, so that the auto manufacturers do not have to do anything additional for high altitude model cars; all model cars can be sold everywhere.
After 1980, all cars must comply with applicable auto emission standards at all altitudes. This provides two years for the perfection of existing technology which automatically compensates for any altitude change.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
STATEMENT
The Griffin-Riegle bill sets up new administrative procedures and a new standard of judicial review for major regulatory actions related to the auto emissions standards established under the Clean Air Act, including promulgation or revision of emission standards, the consideration of a waiver application, the consideration of California's application for imposition of more stringent standards, and the establishment of test procedures for new cars. These changes are necessary to correct shortcomings in the current law.
FACT
These changes benefit solely the auto companies at the expense of protecting the public health and welfare, and may have a disastrous effect on the industry the sponsors of the amendment propose to assist.
The Griffin-Riegle bill establishes a separate set of procedures and a new standard of review for one category of regulations, auto emissions, creating a confusing dual set of procedures under the Act, the need for which has not been established.
The regulatory actions to which these new procedures apply are precisely those for which unnecessary delay can be catastrophic for the auto industry. Any change in the auto emission standards, the certification tests, or the selective assembly line testing car determine the technology to be used. Long delays may result in inability to manufacture cars which meet the standards. The new procedures apply also to the California waiver. It is equally important that the industry know these standards as soon as possible, in order to certify new cars for that State. A delay in the granting of the California waiver couldbe equally catastrophic, resulting in a possible inability to supply 10% of the new car market because of belated knowledge of the standards.
There is no evidence that the existing procedures have proved inadequate in the promulgation of auto emission regulations. Under current law, the Administrator has the option of holding a public hearing on any proposal. When the last waiver of standards was granted by EPA in 1975, 3 weeks of public hearings were held. Under S. 919, if one interested party desired to make an oral presentation, EPA would be required to hold a public hearing.
In addition, the required opportunity for cross-examination would transform the EPA hearing process into a more formal trial-type proceeding. The danger of the use of this provision as a dilatory tactic far outweighs its usefulness, taking into account the Administrator's existing discretion to hold a hearing, which has been used frequently in the past.
EPA presently establishes rulemaking dockets for its proposed regulations which contains most of the documents specified in S. 919. The only documents not regularly included in the docket are the draft proposals to OMB, and interagency comments on them.
EPA also currently includes in all proposals the statement of the purpose of a rule, the factual data supporting it and responses to significant criticism of it.
A change in the standard of review now, seven years into the implementation of the Clean Air Act, and for only one category of regulations, could result in only confusion. The courts have thus far applied the arbitrary and capricious standard to their reviews of EPA actions under the Clean Air Act. This has resulted in extraordinarily close scrutiny of the regulations, and it is unclear why a change is thought to be necessary.
The authorization to the Administrator to extend unilaterally the deadlines specified in the law defeats the purpose of establishing legally enforceable deadlines by delegating legislative authority to an executive agency. This provision also will result in uncertainty for those parties regulated under the Act.