June 7, 1977
Page 17774
REBUTTAL TO "AUTO EMISSION FACTSHEET"
Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. President, Senator GRIFFIN and I have prepared a rebuttal to several statements we find either misleading or inaccurate in Senator MUSKIE's May 25 "Auto Emission Factsheet."
I urge my colleagues to review this information carefully in preparation for the Senate floor debate on the Clean Air Act later this week.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this analysis be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the analysis was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
RIEGLE-GRIFFIN REBUTTAL TO SENATOR MUSKIE'S "AUTO EMISSION FACTSHEET"
AUTO EMISSION CONTROL STANDARDS
Health impact
The Muskie analysis says that the Riegle/ Griffin bill, S. 919, to be the basis of our amendment of S. 252, would "relax the carbon monoxide and oxides of nitrogen standards, resulting in a severe adverse effect on public health." This is untrue.
The Council on Environmental Quality, in their annual report for 1976, states, "Differences in prospective tailpipe emissions levels do not greatly influence the projected year when the CO standards will be met. For example, if the current 49-state emission standards of 15 grams per mile were retained, achievement of the air quality standard might be delayed a year or two, and, until then, CO concentrations in the air would be only 13 parts per million more than if the 3.4 grams per mile standard were in effect." The CO air quality standard is 9 parts per million. CEQ is saying that it might go to 10-12 parts per million if a 15 gpm standard were retained. Since exposure to 100 parts per million for several hours is necessary to induce even headaches or reduce mental acuity, such exposures are far from having a "severe adverse effect on public health."
As regards NOx, the World Health Organization has stated, "It has not yet been shown that the concentrations in ambient air of oxides of nitrogen other than nitrogen dioxide have any significant biological activity." The same document from WHO also says, "It has not been possible to associate observed increases in the frequency of chronic respiratory illnesses with measured level of nitrogen dioxide."
Nitrogen oxide standard
The Muskie analysis discussion of the nitrogen oxide standard needs to be considered in the light of the WHO statements noted above. Additionally, the same WHO document notes that a study to evaluate the effect of nitrogen dioxide on the incidence of acute respiratory diseases in children was made but, "the probable contribution of other pollutants such as sulfur acid aerosols, nitric acid fumes, and suspended nitrates made it difficult to contribute this excess to nitrogen dioxide." This study dealing with children, on which the Muskie analysis bases its allegation, is the five-year-old CHESS study, which Representative George Brown, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Environment and the Atmosphere, last year, after conducting hearings into the CHESS studies, declared unfit as a basis for any estimates.
As a matter of fact, the latest health studies, those done at Yale University last Fall, state that, "An
emission standard for NOx of 1.0 grams per mile would eliminate excess incidence of acute respiratory
illness by 1981 . . . or have roughly the same effect as the 0.4 grams per mile standard." Further, a
professor of medicine and epidemiology at the Yale University Lung Research
Center testified before the Muskie Subcommittee on February 11, 1977, that, "Any excess morbidity of
chronic lung disease, if it occurs at all, due to air pollution in a typical U.S. industrial town, is
exceedingly difficult to document with objective data."
Oxidant standard and carbon monoxide standard
There is concurrence that there are adverse health effects associated with oxidants, but there is substantial disagreement among those associated with air chemistry as to whether or not the simultaneous reduction of HC and NOx will increase or decrease oxidants. Some say that the Muskie strategy will aggravate health effects due to oxidants.
As regards carbon monoxide, the Muskie analysis allegations are totally unfounded. He is right in saying that "in sufficiently high concentrations, CO can cause deaths." But, the concentration to which he refers begins at 600 parts per million. The air quality standard is 9 parts per million and is exceeded infrequently and not by much. Several studies emanating from EPA in the last year have indicated that there may be 1 to 13 excess cardiac deaths due to CO between 1980 and 2000. Since 1.2 million people die of cardiac arrest annually, a figure of 1 to 13 in 24 million is a statistical absurdity to begin with.
The Muskie analysis cites monitoring data from New York which indicates CO levels of 200-400% above the health standard (18-36 ppm). Even if these numbers were accurate, we are still in the "no symptom" area of exposure and it is now recognized that the New York monitoring data is too high by a factor of about 25%, since the data was taken for some years without making a necessary correction for water vapor.
Employment
As regards employment, the Muskie Statement is incomplete and incorrect. Any EPA projections as to new jobs in the auto industry are not based on the effect of standards but on the population growth. What the EPA indicates in their May 19th 3-Agency study is that some 15,000 jobs in a manufacturing area will be lost. A recent EPA memo to Secretary Blumenthal of Treasury states the job loss would be 20,000.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, for each manufacturing job lost, 3.3 jobs are lost in associated industries. At the Muskie level, then some 50,000 jobs are prejudiced and at the Hart level, .4 NOx., some 100,000 jobs may be lost.
Fuel economy
The Muskie analysis grossly misstates the final Riegle/Griffin standards as .41/9.0/2.0, when in fact they go to .41/9.0/1.0 only two years later than the Muskie proposal and only one year later than the earliest that EPA says that they can be met. He also states that the purpose of the Riegle/Griffin standards is to allow the auto companies to continue to use existing technology.
Both Ford and General Motors have made public commitments to phasing in three-way catalysts beginning in 1978 and going across the board, if field experience is satisfactory, prior to 1982.
This is dependent upon progress made by the catalytic converter manufacturers who have testified in Congress this year that their device will be ready for the nationwide fleets by model year 1982 if they can bring the loading of the precious metal rhodium in the converter down to the South African mine ratio of 19 to 1.
The fuel penalty of the Muskie standards in S. 252 have been previously pointed out. Muskie, relative to Riegle/Griffin standards, would waste 14.33 billion gallons of gasoline1979 through 1985, or 134,000 barrels of oil per day, according to calculations based on various government analyses. This would be unnecessary waste with no quantifiable health improvements due to the overly stringent auto pollution control levels. This calculation is based on the projected 10 percent fuel penalty, a middle ground position. EPA and auto manufacturers estimate tighter emission standards than the current standards for 1977 to 1.5 HC, 15.0 CO, and 2.0 NOx would result in a fuel penalty range of from 5 to 20 percent. The calculation assumes that no waiver or suspension would be granted under Riegle/ Griffin for NOx. in the 1982 and subsequent model years. This calculation is conservative.
Costs
With regard to costs, the Muskie Statement is again incorrect. He notes that the 1977 Volvo has added a three-way catalyst system at an additional cost of $25-$50, but it does not say that this is added to a car which already has electronic fuel injection, which is an item which itself adds $200-$300 to the cost of cars not presently so equipped. Nor does he indicate that meeting his standards will require an additional oxidation catalyst at a cost of about $170. He alludes to a 10% better fuel economy because of this expensive added equipment, but the 10% fuel economy gained was for Volvo's 1977 car over their 1976 car. The 1977 Volvo uses about 11% more fuel in miles per gallon than its United States competitor of comparable weight. EPA has said that it may take more time past 1981 to "meet these standards with good fuel economy." At best, the three-way catalyst system — when perfected — will approach a 0-5% fuel economy penalty. Further, Volvos are expensive cars that sell for between $6,900 and $10,200.
EPA on March 28, 1977 sent a memo to the Secretary of the Treasury indicating a sticker price increase of about $240 per car over 1977 cars to cover the cost of equipment required by the Muskie bill and a cost of $105 per car more than the Riegle/Griffin proposal. (EPA's staff has increased that estimate to $170.)
Auto emission standards
The Muskie analysis says their proposal will allow production of 1978 and 1979 automobiles. The EPA technical analysis of April 1977 indicates that the Muskie proposal can be met only with "a delay in introduction of new models" in 1979. Such delays involve major layoffs and unemployment.
The Muskie analysis indicates that the automobile is a significant contributor to air pollution levels. To put this in perspective, let us turn to the NAS study so often quoted. NAS says "Automobile emissions may account for as much as one-fourth of one percent of the total urban health hazard." Also, "Some fraction in the range of one-tenth to one-fourth of the health hazard imposed by present (1973) air pollution is attributable to automotive emissions."
The Muskie analysis also lists some percentages for net changes in automotive emissions since 1970. Since 1970, controls on emissions by 83% in the case of HC, 83% in CO and 38% in NOx.
Technological feasibility
The Muskie analysis, "The auto industry can meet the requirements of the Senate bill."
Reference to individual prototype cars which have some tests showing numbers below the 1980 standards is irrelevant. To begin with, in order to assume the risk of production at a given standard, a manufacturer must have certification cars whose test numbers meet each of the three standards with a factor for production variance of roughly 30%. For instance, the certification data car limit for a .41 (HC) standard has been .32; for a 3.4 (CO) standard, the certification data car limit has been 3.09; for a .4 (NOx) standard with technology not involving catalytic control of NOx and, hence, small deterioration factor, the certification data car limit is .396, but with the catalytic control it will be similar to the numbers associated with CO and HC. Also, the cars, in order to meet the federal standard, must never have a test data point above the standard during the 50,000 mile durability run. The cars to which Muskie refers had not reached 50,000 miles. The Buick, for example, failed before 20,000 miles.
The statement, "All of the U.S. auto companies have stated that they can meet the final 1980 standards in S. 252," is accurate, but totally misleading. None of them have stated that they could meet them in 1980. The farthest that any auto manufacturer has gone is a Ford statement that they will try to make all cars meet the standards in 1980, but their testimony clearly shows that they don't expect to do that for all models. The EPA technical analysis of April 1977, which is based on comprehensive information about product plans, development work, and test data from all of the manufacturers, foreign and domestic, indicates that the 1980 Muskie standards cannot be met until 1981 and that they "could be more reasonably met in 1982-83." They preface that remark with the statement that as regards 1981, "more time may be required for the development of systems that meet these standards with good fuel economy." (Page 29, Automobile Emission Control: EPA Emission Control Technical Division, April 1977.)
The Muskie analysis would do well to share with us other information as to the 1980 standards it proposes which appear in the EPA analysis. Because of the inclusion of a 3.4 CO standard, Muskie's 1980 standards, according to the EPA analysis, will have the following undesirable aspects:
(1) "... will tend to be more complicated and costly than the basic three-way catalyst system to meet 9.0 CO."
(2) Achievement of good drivability at the 3.4 CO level may be more difficult than at 9 CO and, as a result, "in-use vehicles could be maladjusted in an attempt to improve drivabllity with possible losses of emission control capability," as happened with the 1973-74 models.
(3) Also, since control of CO at the 3.4 level will require a downstream oxidation catalyst (additional cost about $170) in addition to the three-way catalyst, "sulfuric acid emission can be expected to increase,"
WARRANTY OF EMISSION CONTROL SYSTEMS
The Muskie Statement in regard to this issue is correct and misleading. The AntiTrust division of the Department of Justice in its March 1977 comments on TPA's proposed regulations regarding the automobile performance warranty expressed concern that the warranty could lead to increased consumer costs and other anticompetitive results beyond those necessary to attain the desired environmental goals. The House Small Business Committee, after extended hearings and analysis of the Clean Air Act emission control warranty, reached the same conclusions and found that the present warranty provisions could seriously jeopardize the continued existence of many small businesses which engage in automotive maintenance and repair work.
In the Department of Justice comments it was pointed out that an expanded comprehensive warranty of this type would significantly impede the ability of independent service stations and garages to compete with the service departments of dealers franchised by the national automobile manufacturers. Monopolistic concentration in the automobile aftermarket could increase substantially, and the advantage of free competition could be lost.
In short, the Riegle/Griffin amendment addresses the problem of how to reduce the widely recognized anticompetitive effects of the federally mandated automobile emission control performance warranty. The question should have been addressed even earlier. It is noteworthy that during debate of the Clean Air Act performance warranty provision in the Senate last year, unquestionably the most knowledgeable member of the United States Senate regarding antitrust matters, my predecessor, Senator Philip Hart, was in firm support of reduction of the performance warranty to 18 months/18,000 miles as the only solution to the problem.
The Muskie analysis is clearly incorrect in its assertion that the warranty provisions of the Riegle/Griffin amendment "eliminates any financial incentive for manufacturers to produce an emission control system which functions for the car's life since their financial exposure would only be for 18,000 miles." The amendment does not in any respect reduce or otherwise affect the production warranty which is also mandated under the Clean Air Act.
Although the Riegle/Griffin amendment only addresses the performance warranty, it is important to note here briefly that the provisions of the production warranty which are already in effect adequately protect the consumer with mandated durability enforced through EPA recall. Under the production warranty, 207(a) of the Act, the vehicle manufacturer must warrant that the emission control system is designed, built and equipped in a manner that will enable it to comply with emission regulations which exist at the time the vehicle was first sold and that it is free from defects in materials and workmanship that would cause the system to fail to conform the applicable regulations for its useful life, which is defined in the Act as five years or 50,000 miles, whichever occurs first.
Vehicle manufacturers will still be required to produce a durable system in order to pass the 50,000 mile EPA certification test under the production warranty. The amendment proposes no change in the length of the production warranty. Under the production warranty the EPA not only certifies that the car's emission control system will last for 50,000 miles, but if a substantial number of systems fail during their on-the-road operation, the EPA can recall the entire lot for repair at the manufacturer's expense. Reduction of the performance warranty will not let the manufacturers "off the hook" regarding the requirement to produce a durable emission system. On the contrary, the potentially huge liability that would be incurred by the manufacturer in the case of a large recall provides a substantial economic incentive to manufacturers to produce reliable and durable emission control systems.
The Muskie analysis also states incorrectly that the United Auto Workers are in favor of maintaining the 5 year/50,000 mile performance warranty. The UAW strongly supports the Riegle/Griffin bill which reduces the performance warranty to 18,000 piles in 18 months and which leaves the production warranty at 5 years and 50,000 miles.