September 15, 1976
Page 30453
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I support the military construction authorization bill, H.R. 14846, as reported from the Armed Services Committee and congratulate Chairman STENNIS and his committee for their patience and diligence in successfully reporting this bill and the attached base realignment provision. I appreciate particularly the efforts of Senator SYMINGTON, the distinguished chairman of the Military Construction Subcommittee.
The construction projects in the bill which the committee reported represent a continued commitment to priority defense needs throughout the country including projects at Brunswick and Kittery, Maine, and it is crucial that we move forward with these projects. As importantly, however, for many people in Maine and ultimately for the integrity of our defense operation, Senator SYMINGTON has sought in this bill to lend some order and structure to the process through which base realignment decisions are reached. It has been a privilege to work with him toward that goal and I congratulate him on the provision in this bill as reported. It represents a major step toward protecting local communities from the dramatic impact of sudden base realignment actions.
As the committee report indicates the provision which the committee accepted is similar to an amendment which I had introduced with Senators McGOVERN, KENNEDY, HATHAWAY, CASE, DURKIN, SPARKMAN, McINTYRE, ALLEN, EAGLETON, WILLIAMS, BAYH, STEVENSON, HUMPHREY, MATHIAS, MONDALE, and PHILIP A. HART, and I recommend its adoption to my colleagues. I will work with the committee for more thorough treatment of this issue in the next Congress.
The need to structure and reorganize the process through which the Department of Defense reaches and implements base closure announcements is clear to everyone who has been associated with a major action. Clearer and more regular communication is necessary for Congress to appropriately fulfill its oversight responsibilities and insure that these major decisions reflect our real strategic needs in the most cost effective manner. And clearer and broader communication and cooperation is clearly necessary to assure local government officials and local businessmen the opportunity to fully review the proposed action and its potential impact and potential judgment alternatives.
The situation confronting the people of Aroostook County, Maine, following the Air Force announcement of a proposed 85-percent reduction of Loring Air Force Base is an example of the need for a more open and ordered process. The people of Aroostook learned of the Air Force proposal on March 10 of this year, but still do not have a clear explanation of the rationale for this approach and have received mixed, but generally counterproductive advice regarding potential adjustment activity.
When the Air Force announced the proposal in March they recognized the potential adverse impact on Aroostook County, but pointed with pride to the successful conversion efforts at Presque Isle Air Force Base and Dow Field in Bangor. When the draft EIS became available early this month the Air Force confessed explicitly that:
Since the base will continue in operation as a military installation development projects cannot be designed around the use of land and facilities currently at the base.
No suggestions have been made by the Air Force for other specific adjustment actions despite the further admission that:
Local government units in the town of Limestone will be thrown into disorder and future activities severely constrained due to losses in local population and losses in manpower and financial resources for governmental functions.
The base closure provision in this bill is a modest attempt to improve the uncertainties and hardships imposed on local communities in the process. It will not and does not purport to halt base closures, but it does shift some of the burden for dealing with the process from local officials to Federal agencies and helps assure that information for effective oversight and appropriate action will be available to the public and Congress.
I am disappointed that administration officials have as yet been unwilling to support this proposal. It is clear that the President's prerogatives are preserved. The provision applies only to major actions and even then provides a structure for decision making and review which is similar to that already required under existing administrative and legal requirements and imposes little in the way of new requirements on military departments. I hope that the President will override the minor administrative concerns of Pentagon bureaucrats and recognize the opportunity to remove tremendous burdens of suspicion and uncertainty from individuals in affected communities and demonstrate the willingness of the Federal Government to accommodate its administrative procedures, when appropriate to local community problems.
I urge my colleagues to support this provision and look forward to support on the House side and reconsideration by President Ford. This legislation and the attached base closure provision is too important to sacrifice to the wishes of Pentagon planners for unfettered discretion in these matters which affect our national security and the lives of so many people.
Mr. President, I had the opportunity this afternoon to examine Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Reed regarding a proposed major reduction at Loring Air Force Base in Maine. I ask unanimous consent that the text of my comments and questions to Secretary Reed be printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE AT HEARING OF THE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing. I am well aware of your deep concerns over the way the military is approaching its base closure and cutback decisions. I know you are particularly concerned about the Air Force's most recent announcements of base closure and reduction candidates.
Your support in bringing these concerns to the Armed Services Committee and to the full Senate was crucial in the successful adoption of the base closure amendments to the Military Construction bill. I want to thank you again for your leadership in that effort. I look forward to enactment of that legislation.
Mr. Secretary, the people of Maine and the Maine Congressional delegation share many of the same concerns regarding the proposed reduction at Loring Air Force Base that Senator Symington expressed to me and I am sure to you regarding the closure of Richards-Gebaur Air Force Base in Missouri.
Loring Air Force Base was constructed at about the time I first became involved in public life in Maine. Since that time I have always understood and have been reassured by Air Force officials that the facility is crucial to our strategic bomber mission and will remain vital to our national defense as long as strategic bombers are an element in our nuclear triad. Personal reassurances in this regard were given me by the Base Commander just before the surprising announcement in March that Loring was a candidate for reduction: I have yet to hear the strategic importance of Loring challenged. In fact, during hearings on the matter in Limestone this May, the Base Commander, Colonel Morton, again confirmed the strategic importance of Loring. The very proposal to reduce Loring recognizes, and I quote, that "The strategic bomber and tanker forces located at Loring are in a geographic region which provides operational flexibility for employment in an Emergency Warfare Operations and conventional role." And further in a statement of operational utility, again I quote, "Loring Air Force Base provides major advantages to the employment of Single Integrated Option Plans committed forces and is strategically located for tanker operations." Colonel Reed, Director of Aerospace Programs, testified before the House Appropriations Subcommittee in 1975 that "One of the most valuable bases from the deployment standpoint against Russia is Loring, Maine." In February of this year, one month before the announced reduction, Air Force officials testifying before a House Appropriations Subcommittee listed Loring as a projected base for B-52's and KC-135's through at least 1981.
The Air Force proposel to reduce Loring purports to accommodate the recognized strategic value of Loring by retaining the facility at 15% of current levels as a Forward Operating Base. But the logic of this approach from the standpoint of either cost savings or strategic planning escapes me completely. And I am even more baffled after having reviewed the document presented to us as a "Draft Environmental Impact Statement."
I know that you were new on the scene as Secretary of the Air Force at the time this proposal was initiated and I do not know your involvement in this decision. But I must tell you quite frankly, Mr. Secretary, that I am embarassed to tell the people of Maine that this is the way the Air Force makes vital decisions regarding the management of our strategic forces.
Allow me to quickly outline the substance of the Air Force rationale as it is presented in this document.
The stated goal of the Air Force is to achieve cost savings, particularly in support and headquarters manpower, without diminishing strategic capabilities. That is an admirable goal. But the approach bears little apparent relationship to the stated goal. The approach reflects, a preference for support considerations over strategic capabilities with less cost savings than might otherwise have been achieved, and the conversion of one of the most strategic bases in the country into a cost ineffective forward operating base.
The Air Force begins by asserting that Loring is a prime candidate for realignment because it is a "single mission" SAC base. I would challenge this starting point on several grounds. My own understanding is that in the final analysis our entire defense establishment has a single mission — the defense of the vital interests of the United States. Loring is ideally suited for this ultimate mission. I would point out that the criterion is Air Force defined and selfserving. The only logical starting point for base realignment decisions is from the definition of our defense goals and the strategic requirements for meeting those goals. From that perspective Loring Air Force Base would be one of the last bases considered for reduction.
Even accepting the single mission criterion as a starting point, it should be clear that Loring is not a single mission SAC base. And if there was any question about that before the realignment proposal was announced there should be none now. Actions already taken or proposed would expand the variety of missions performed from Loring. A Fighter Interceptor Squadron was assigned to Loring in April of this year — one month after the proposed action was announced. And the very realignment proposal relies on the future use of Loring by reserve forces manning C-135 tankers.
Loring is, in fact, now a triple mission base with a strategic nuclear attack force, air defense fighter interceptors and aerial refueling, not only for bombers of the SIOP (Strategic) mission, but also for combat and transport aircraft performing other missions such as long range logistics support.
Proceeding from that erroneous beginning the Air Force first concedes that among single mission SAC bases Loring is strategically the most important and not the best candidate for cost savings since greater savings could be achieved elsewhere. But, and here the process turns 180 degrees from the stated goal, other bases provide important support services, and still others support the support bases. The apparent conclusion is, "Why not reduce Loring to mothballs in case the Air Force ever has to perform its strategic mission and thereby preserve our support bases."
It is particularly ironic that the Air Force argues that snow and other cold weather conditions make Loring flight line operations unduly expensive when in fact the Air Force proposal relies on maintaining the flight line operations at Loring as a Forward Operating Base.
I might point out as well that your own draft EIS recognizes, Mr. Secretary, that this proposal not only throws the local community into disorder, but also holds no hope of mitigation through use of land and facilities since the base will continue in operation at a reduced level.
I could challenge the approach and the content of the "Draft Environmental Statement" further, Mr. Secretary, by pointing out factual errors and internal inconsistencies. But that is not my purpose here today. My purpose is much more basic and goes more to the heart of this matter.
On September 3, the Air Force presented these documents to the Maine delegation in Congress and to the Maine people. The documents purport to represent the decision making process of the Air Force. This so-called process leads to the suggestion that Loring be reduced by 85%. Maine people have been asked to frame their comments to the proposed action in response to these documents.
I find this situation unacceptable. These assembled papers are not worthy of the people affected. The presentation is inadequate as even a draft EIS. It does not, I suspect reflect the actual decision making process in the Air Force and it would be a misservice to the people of Maine to ask that they respond to it.
If this shabby analysis does, in fact, reflect the Air Force approach to this issue then it reflects a disservice not only to Maine, but to the country.
Our strategic interests deserve more careful analysis and our taxpayers deserve more careful planning.
The most appropriate course for the Air Force would be to start the entire process over and reconsider cost saving alternatives based on our actual defense priorities. The minimum acceptable course, I believe, is to rewrite the draft EIS and present the people of Maine with a legitimate document to which they can meaningfully respond.
I urge you, Mr. Secretary, to personally review the EIS. Reconsider the approach and content of this document, and if you remain convinced that Loring is the most appropriate candidate for this type of action then present the people of Maine with a document which at least reflects your decision making process and which gives a fair and complete analysis of the alternatives.
Specific questions to which I would draw your attention are:
1. Why were reductions at other Air Force installations not considered as alternatives to Loring. Several bases less strategic than Loring have been preserved as multimission bases. Why were reductions at those bases not considered as alternatives to Loring? It appears from the draft EIS that only full closures were considered as alternatives.
2. The Draft EIS cites Loring as an expensive flight line operation, but it is the flight line operation at Loring which is being preserved. Is such an approach a legitimate cost saving analysis?
3. It is clear that the Air Force recognizes Loring as a strategically valuable base. But this reduction will surely make Loring one of the most cost ineffective operations in the U.S. by reducing the total function, but retaining the most expensive flight line operation. Are you not concerned that under these circumstances this vital facility will be extremely vulnerable to future cost cutting efforts? Would it not be more appropriate to reduce less strategic facilities and strengthen Loring?
4. The capital investment at Loring Air Force Base is far larger than at alternative candidates. Would it not be most cost effective to utilize existing investments to capacity and avoid unnecessary expenditures elsewhere? Military planning must be a flexible process and to increase capital investment in a strategic facility would limit funding available elsewhere.