May 19, 1976
Page 14651
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 3 minutes?
Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Maine.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I have a more complete statement covering my support of the compromise resolution, but in light of the colloquy which has taken place between the distinguished Senator from Georgia (Mr. NUNN) and the distinguished floor manager of the bill, part of which related to the budget process, I shall make some brief observations on it from that point of view.
Mr. President, I rise and support the establishment of a new Senate committee with legislative jurisdiction over the national intelligence community.
Senate Resolution 400, as favorably reported by the Committee on Government Operations, would have created such a permanent committee. The substitute reported by the Committee on Rules and Administration would not have established the kind of committee that the times demand. The compromise amendment (No. 1643), proposed by the two committees, would set up a new select committee with sufficient authority to exercise those responsible uses of power that are required.
As the American people now know so well, Congress 40-year informal method of overseeing the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other agencies involved in domestic and foreign intelligence has been careless and ineffective. Their host of intelligence agency abuses, violations of the law, covert operations, and infringements on civil liberties — without the knowledge of Congress — has been revealed by the Rockefeller Commission and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.
The Senate must take the lead to start anew in fulfilling the constitutional role of controlling the Nation's purse strings and formulating national policy. Vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States is very much in order to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the land.
From the Budget Committee's viewpoint, a new select committee with jurisdiction over the national intelligence budget on an annual basis fits right into the congressional process of analyzing and controlling the budget.
The aggregate outlay of the various intelligence agencies is significant. At this time, Senate committees deal with parts rather than the whole. Intelligence spending is not looked at in terms of national priorities or priorities within our foreign defense policies. "Neither the Armed Services Committee nor any other committee has the time, because of its other duties, or the necessary overall jurisdiction to attend to the Nation's intelligence system," Senator CHURCH testified before the Committee on Rules and Administration. He added that—
The executive budgets for, and organizes and directs the national intelligence effort in a way that draws together the various components, and unless the Congress establishes a committee that can do the same, it will continue to fail in its oversight responsibilities.
Section 3 of Senate Resolution 400, as amended, would provide for periodic authorization of appropriations for the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Each March 15 that committee would submit a report on intelligence spending for the forthcoming fiscal year to the Senate Budget Committee. This is what every authorizing committee does now, in accordance with section 301(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Section 4(c) of the compromise resolution reads:
On or before March 15 of each year, the select committee shall submit to the Committee on the Budget the Senate views and estimates described in section 301(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 regarding matters within the jurisdiction of the select committee.
Reports to the Committee on the Budget would be received and handled in a manner consistent with the protection of national security.
It seems to me that the colloquy between Senator RIBICOFF and Senator NUNN covers this point very well, from my point of view.
Another aspect of the legislative process involved here is helping to restore Congress role as a coequal branch of Government. I agree with the "Minority Views" statement set forth by Senators PELL, WILLIAMS, CLARK, and HATFIELD in the Rules Committee report: In failing to adequately control the activities of the intelligence agencies abroad, Congress, in effect, has appropriated funds without knowing how they would be spent by the executive to carry out foreign policy objectives. Without the knowledge or approval of the full Congress, the CIA has received funds to carry out paramilitary operations in Chile and Laos and assassination attempts against a number of foreign leaders. At the same time, Congress has refrained from demanding access to vital intelligence information concerning matters of foreign policy upon which it is called to act.
By establishing an effective oversight mechanism, Congress can assert its right to essential information and begin to define the proper limits of secrecy in a democratic society.
A Select Intelligence Committee in the Senate with authorizing powers is essential. This committee must have primary authority to consider and act on the annual budgets for the intelligence agencies within its jurisdiction. By controlling the purse strings, the select committee and Congress will have restored its rightful role in directing America's future intelligence activities — and America's future.
I thank my good friend from Connecticut for yielding me this time to support him in his efforts and to compliment him on the effective way in which he has handled this issue and the problems connected with it.