July 26, 1976
Page 23849
CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1976
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I think that out of convenience to the Members, I will put my full statement in the RECORD today so that Members may have the opportunity to read it, if they plow through it, and then in the morning in response to the distinguished Senator's request, I would only offer a brief summary so we can get to the amendments rather quickly. I hope Senators with amendments will bring them up and put them before the Senate as early as possible tomorrow.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, that will be most appropriate, and it is very considerate, and I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from Maine be allowed to do as he suggested as if read on the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. And he can be recognized at the conclusion of morning business tomorrow.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Chair inquires of the distinguished majority leader if the request that the Senator from Maine be recognized after the bill is laid down?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, during the 13 years that I have been chairman of the Senate Pollution Subcommittee, I have watched the evolution of environmental laws.
We began simply. We authorized the development of the Federal expertise necessary to understand the scope of environmental problems. We established programs to assess the development of State and local regulatory programs. We established a rudimentary Federal enforcement capability to deal with those environmental problems which did not respect jurisdictional boundaries. And, we began the process of regulating auto emissions — a task which required a Federal presence.
Our knowledge expanded. The public became more aware of environmental problems. The Congress attempted to respond to the public demand for a significantly greater level of performance in the pollution control effort.
In 1970 we enacted the landmark clean air amendments, which had three basic objectives: first, to achieve air quality which would protect public health; second, to establish specific regulatory requirements and precise timetables for achievement of those requirements; and third, to establish long term public policy goals for air quality programs.
The Clean Air Act was the result of our belief that public confidence had to be restored in both the progress and the results of these programs. For too long, promises had been made and results had not been delivered. Autos which purportedly met stiff standards on the production line failed to comply after minimum mileage. Enforcement actions were tedious — the results ranged from limited to nonexistent. Examples of failure are too numerous to mention.
We had a choice: We could continue and try to improve past initiatives or we could change course and experiment with innovative methods which might achieve results at a more rapid pace.
The Clean Air Act of 1970 was a new departure.
We knew our goals. They had been established in 1967 when Congress asserted a national interest in achieving health related air quality standards in our Nation's urban industrial areas and in maintaining clean air in regions in which air was still pristine.
The question we addressed in 1970 was how to achieve these goals — how to move from rhetoric to regulation — how to maintain public confidence.
We proposed and saw enacted two basic tools — controls on emissions and establishment of deadlines. Emission controls replaced air quality standards as the enforcement mechanism; and deadlines provided the public with a basis against which to judge progress. For autos, this translated into statutory emission standards and fixed deadlines.
The 1970 amendments have brought considerable progress in controlling air pollution. Of the Nation's 20,000 largest stationary sources accounting for 85 percent of all stationary source pollution, 15,600 were in compliance with emission regulations or were meeting compliance schedules by mid-1975.
Between 1940 and 1970, controllable particulate emissions increased 15 percent, sulfur dioxide increased 50 percent, carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons emissions more than doubled, and nitrogen oxide emissions quadrupled.
Since 1970, these increases have been curtailed.. Total emissions of some pollutants have been reduced. We should take pride in these accomplishments. But in most cases, these improvements will be temporary.
By mid-1975, the national ambient air quality standards for all pollutants have been fully achieved in only 91 of the Nation's 247 air quality control regions. Emissions from new growth will reverse this progress unless further efforts are made to control pollution.
The real test of pollution control comes now — years later. Whether or not the legitimate gains made can be held is uncertain. Those victories and those precedents are now under attack.
Many believe that the Clean Air Act is basically a sound law. Its premises — the protection of public health and welfare from the adverse effects of dirty air and the maintenance of clean air in areas where air quality has not been degraded — have been broadly accepted.
In order to assure Congress that the requirements of the 1970 act were justified, the Senate Public Works Committee contracted with the National Academy of Sciences for a $500,000 study of air quality standards. That study was presented September 1, 1974. Its analysis remains valid.
The Academy reached these conclusions:
First, evidence accumulated since the enactment of the 1970 amendments supports the ambient air quality standards which were promulgated as a result of that act;
Second, safety margins associated with those standards are only marginally adequate;
Third, susceptible groups in the population which may be adversely affected by unhealthy air constitute about 40 million people;
Fourth, best estimates indicate that air pollution causes 15,000 excess deaths per year, 15 million days of restricted activity per year, and 7 million days spent in bed; and
Fifth, health effects of automobile pollution alone cause 4,000 deaths per year and 4 million illness restricted days per year.
The Nation still experiences the problems which led Congress to adopt the firm approach of the 1970 amendments.
In the summer of 1975, the State of Iowa experienced its first air pollution alert.
In the summer of 1975, the Washington, D.C., area suffered its highest recorded single day level of photochemical smog in history. The 8-day alert was the area's second longest ever.
A study released in August of 1975 b the Environmental Protection Agency reported that in small towns in Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, air quality standards are exceeded about 50 percent of the time. On the basis of these studies, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency concluded that it may be necessary to expand to an areawide (multi-State) basis some of the pollution control measures now in effect only in urban areas.
The New York Times reported on November 20, 1975, that as many as 30 industrial plants in the Pittsburgh area cut back operations to alleviate emergency levels of air pollution which were the highest concentrations ever recorded in Allegheny County since the establishment of its monitoring system in 1971. An alert is called when the air quality index reaches 100; the readings from November 17 through 20 reached 249.
The Environmental Protection Agency has determined that at least 14 excess deaths occurred during the 4-day episode, as a result of the emergency particulate levels. In addition, hospitals received increased complaints of headaches, choking, and stinging eyes. Those with respiratory ailments, pregnant women, and infants were warned to stay indoors.
This situation closely parallels the 1948 Donora, Pa., episode during which 20 persons died and nearly half of the area's 13,839 residents became ill. Both incidents provide a striking example of the continuing problems that remain in achieving healthful air in this country.
The continuing smog in the Los Angeles, Calif., basin provides evidence that once air pollution levels are allowed to rise, extreme efforts are required to reverse such conditions.
At the same time, the pollution control requirements required by the Clean Air Act and other environmental statutes provide new jobs. At a time when the economy has 7.5 percent of the work force unemployed, additional expenditures required by Federal regulations create jobs. The effect will be to hire workers who would otherwise remain on unemployment compensation.
Statistics of the employment produced by pollution control programs have been collected by the Council on Environmental Quality. CEQ concluded from these studies that "over 1 million jobs were associated with air and water pollution programs last year." This analysis indicates that $1 billion generates 70,000 jobs directly and indirectly. Some estimates place the employment impact as high as 82,000 jobs per $1 billion.
Other studies estimating the overall impact of air and water pollution control requirements have indicated that impact on inflation will be minimal, and the impact on economic growth and unemployment will be positive. A study done by Chase Econometric Associates in January 1975 indicates that when averaged over the decade ending in 1982, the Consumer Price Index will have risen only two-tenths of 1 percent because of pollution control expenditures.
The gross national product was 1.6 percent higher in 1978 due to pollution control expenditures. The effect is projected to diminish by 1982, when the gross national product will be virtually unaffected. The net effect of pollution control expenditures is characterized in the Chase Econometric report as being "rather modest." While some specific companies and facilities may have substantial costs, it is useful to place such individual costs against the more comprehensive background supplied by the Chase Econometric study. As further background on the employment aspects of these expenditures, the appendixes contain a February 1976 report entitled "Pollution Control and Employment" prepared by the Council on Environmental Quality.
The basis of the Clean Air Act remains valid. Poor air quality still affects the health of millions of Americans. Cleanup efforts are reversing these conditions, the air quality goals have been reconfirmed by panels of experts, and the positive economic impact has been demonstrated.
The challenges to the premises of the act have been limited, but there has been a campaign to eliminate the regulatory and enforcement tools necessary to achieve those public policy objectives.
The bill before the Senate reflects these conflicting pressures. For example, we voted to give cities more time — more time to utilize new transportation modes — to improve existing public transit systems — to provide transportation alternatives. We had to do this because the problem of auto pollutants is far worse than we envisaged in 1970 and control is elusive.
At the same time, we voted to give the auto industry 2 more years to achieve statutory standards — 4 years to overcome technical problems — to begin to deal with the fuel economy problem — and to recover from the economic troubles of 1974-75.
I had hoped that we would not have to give the auto industry that much time — that they could have produced some clean cars in 1978 — that we would have had an opportunity to test out new technology for a couple of years before it was required across the board. But that approach did not prevail.
We also revised the enforcement sections of the act — revisions which are encouraging. We voted to provide more time for stationary sources to achieve applicable emission limits. But, in return for a new outside deadline of January 1, 1979, which for some polluters is only an 18-month extension, we have proposed two new penalty features.
The most difficult issue which the committee was asked to resolve was the question of nondegradation. As I have indicated, this controversy involves the extent to which national policy requires protection of air quality in clean air areas. This policy was an essential element of the Air Quality Act of 1967.
This year the committee voted to make specific the requirement that clear air areas be protected. We determined that each new major plant should be required to use the best pollution control technology available and that the impact of each new plant's emissions should be evaluated against a national nondegradation standard.
The committee confirmed that new air pollution sources have a special responsibility to preserve air quality values, both to avoid a repetition of the past air pollution mistakes that now plague our urban areas and protect the capacity of our clean air resource to provide margins for future growth.
This decision was a victory for environmental quality. It comes at a time when Congress is being asked to sacrifice environmental initiative for economic recovery even though there is little demonstrable relationship between the two.
The members of the committee heard allegations that the Clean Air Act and other environmental legislation pose unacceptable limits on this country's capacity to grow. The committee examined these allegations and found them false.
Mr. President, I would like the record to show that an economic growth policy which abandons environmental objectives would be a foolish course. The Nation must have clean growth. The studies conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency indicate that adequately controlled facilities of all industrial categories can meet the nondegradation requirements in these amendments.
If the price of clean growth, however, is to restrain the size of particular activities pending the development of new pollution control technologies or new production procedures, then new technologies and processes can and will be developed in order to take advantage of the economies of scale. A great nation's growth cannot be measured only in termsof new production capacity; it will ultimately be measured by how well growth preserves the quality of areas people cherish.
Conversely, if environmental objectives are abandoned simply to accommodate the economies of scale, new pollution control technologies will not be developed, and the result will be environmental chaos. The effect of failure to take account of the environmental implications of future growth is well demonstrated in the table entitled "Added Emissions Over 1975."
I ask unanimous consent to have this table printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. MUSKIE. This table shows that, if electric generating capacity increases at a rate of 6 percent per annum and new fossil fuel fired power plants only meet EPA's new source emission performance standards, there will be an additional 7 million tons of sulfur oxides actually discharged to the atmosphere each year.
Even with a more moderate growth rate of 4.8 percent per annum, there will be an increase in emissions of 5 million tons of sulfur oxides per year between now and 1990, again assuming that only new source performance standards are required. If the States act aggressively to require more strict control, then added emissions of sulfur oxides can be less than 3 million tons per year.
I underscore this point. Even if the most moderate growth rate is projected and even if the States are most aggressive in the application of technological requirements as allowed by the committee bill, there will still be an increase of 2.8 million tons per year of sulfur oxides to the atmosphere nationally.
The second part of this table which relates to nitrogen oxides indicates similar trends, though in that table we have had to factor in the implications of various auto emission control strategies.
I only note that there is but a small increase in the emissions of NOx when new statutory NOx standards for automobiles in this bill are compared with the old standards. But, if the President's proposed freeze at 1976 NOx standards was adopted, there would be 23 million additional tons per year.
However, a combination of 1 gram per mile auto NOx standard proposed in this bill and an effective stationary source control program would limit the additionof oxides of nitrogen emissions to 9 million tons per year by 1990. Without controls required by this bill and if the administration's 5-year moratorium had been followed, the gross increase would have exceeded 25 million tons per year. Emissions in 1990 would be more than double their present level.
These projections show that, under almost any level of expected growth, the Nation will face increasing emissions of sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and other pollutants. Thus, it is essential to select a strategy that reduces the increase as much as possible. If we have learned anything from our environmental effort to date, I would hope at least that we have learned that we have to achieve a net reduction in gross national emissions to the atmosphere as soon as possible.
Application of the best available control technology is a strategy that can do this. As incorporated in this bill, prevention of significant deterioration and application of best available control technology combine to provide a strategy which will leave room for future growth and thus to facilitate growth, not a strategy to limit growth.
The environmental effects of air pollution will be discussed in more detail later; however, the facts on the record clearly suggest that subtle and irrevocable changes are being made in man's basic life support system as the result of uncontrolled dispersion of pollutants into the environment. Almost without exception, research into the effects of dispersal of these pollutants has given us more, rather than less, evidence of adverse effects. To ignore these problems because they are not fully understood is to court catastrophe.
The National Academy of Sciences report of March 1975 concluded that controls to avoid such broad adverse effects are justified. It only takes one disaster of the scope of the current "Kepone" crisis to demonstrate that environmental damage once done may be irreversible.
Clearly, the burden of environmental protection should rest with those who use environmental resources. The cost of control ought to be borne by those who produce the problem. The polluter should bear the responsibility to show that use of the environment for dispersal of wastes is free from risk.
The structure of these amendments supports these objectives. Let me discuss some specific issues regarding the committee bill.
II. NONDEGRADATION
A nondegradation policy was articulated first in Federal water pollution law. That was in 1965. The concept was incorporated in the 1967 Air Quality Act, which stated that a basic purpose of the act was to "protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources." Guidelines to prevent degradation of clean air were issued in 1969. The statutory basis for those guidelines was not altered by the 1970 Clean Air Amendments.
In 1971, EPA proposed new guidelines to prevent significant deterioration for air quality implementation plans, but this requirement was deleted before final guidelines were promulgated. A court challenge followed.
On June 2, 1972, the U.S. District Courtf or the District of Columbia upheld the interpretation given by the 1969 guidelines that the Clean Air Act required protection of clean air in addition to enhancement of air quality in dirty air regions. That action was upheld by the circuit court of appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court on June 11, 1973.
EPA promulgated regulations to prevent significant deterioration in December 1974. These were promptly challenged in court by industry and environmental groups.
During hearings in 1973, 1974, and 1975, the committee was urged to clarify and resolve this issue through legislation rather than leaving the matter to the courts.
In July 1973, National Coal Association President Carl Bagge testified:
This is far too significant an issue to be determined, as it has been thus far, on narrow legal grounds by the judiciary. Its economic and social implications are so broad that it cannot and should not be determined by an independent regulatory agency in a rulemaking proceeding as has been proposed. This is an issue which can only be resolved if we seek to achieve a common commitment which is responsive to our national goals, by the Congress of the United States. For this is truly a political issue of such importance that it must be resolved in the political crucible. Only then can it be examined and deliberated on by the entire range of national interests as represented in our legislative process. The fundamental issues raised by today's inquiry demand no less.
On behalf of the American Petroleum Institute, Howard Hardesty testified:
It is the Institute's conviction that unless this issue is quickly and intelligently resolved, efforts to strengthen our economy and develop a stronger domestic energy base will be stymied.
This bill attempts to respond to the appeals of these and other witnesses. The committee unanimously agreed as to the importance of preventing significant deterioration of air quality in clean air areas. The committee also unanimously agreed that the prevention of deterioration of clean air areas should be resolved by the Congress and not by the courts. Having reached these conclusions, the committee worked for many months to develop a consensus regarding the most useful method for prevention of deterioration.
The provisions in the bill:
First, place primary responsibility and authority with the States, backed by the Federal Government;
Second, apply only to new major emitting facilities, not affecting existing facilities;
Third, require that large new sources use the best available technology to minimize emissions, determined by each State on a case-by-case basis;
Fourth, provide a margin of safety to protect national ambient air quality standards, assuring prudent consideration of any major emitting facility that may threaten that air quality;
Fifth, require the Federal Government, as a property owner, to protect the values related to air quality on certain Federal lands under the stewardship of various Federal agencies;
Sixth, eliminate the so-called buffer zones that were hypothesized around various land classifications;
Seventh, affect only those areas where air quality is cleaner than the present primary or secondary standards;
Eighth, establish a permit process, managed by the State, which is included in an analysis of the air quality impact of new major emitting facilities;
Ninth, require that the permit application should include data on background air quality and potential associated growth in order to better understand the overall air quality implications of the new facility; and
Tenth, establish that there should be a nationally applicable maximum level of change in the air quality of clean air regions — the so-called class II increments — which would be a measure in the change in air quality permitted in any given area as a result of the operation of one or more new major emitting facilities.
The committee bill requires each State to identify the air quality of existing air quality control regions or portions thereof for each pollutant. The States must submit this information to the Administrator within 4 months.
The regional designation of ambient levels of each regulated pollutant is preliminary to all State regulatory programs. It is therefore essential that the identification process proceed in the timely fashion required by the Senate bill.
If the air quality levels of a region or portion of it exceed the primary standard for a mobile source related pollutant, that is, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide or photochemical oxidant, it is subject to the requirements for nonattainment areas, which may include transportation control planning under existing section 110, as amended by section 5 of the committee bill.
Similarly, a State in which a region or portion of it has attained the primary or secondary standard for either sulfur oxides or particulates will be subject to applicable nonattainment strategies.
An area in which air quality levels for sulfur oxides or particulates are better than the ambient standards would be subject to the nondegradation process of the bill — section 6. The State would be required to adopt and enforce as part of its implementation plan provisions to prevent significant deterioration of air quality.
For the most part, there is sufficient information available to determine which air quality control requirements apply to which portions of each State. In the absence of information to the contrary, a region would be assumed clean and thus subject to the significant deterioration provisions.
The bill's procedures to prevent significant deterioration apply only to new major emitting facilities and do not affect existing facilities or new facilities which are not specified as major by this bill or subsequent EPA regulations.
Major emitting facilities are only those 29 industrial sources identified by category in the statute — or later identified by EPA — and which have the potential to emit more than 100 tons of a pollutant per year. These do not include houses, dairies, farms, highways, hospitals, schools, grocery stores, and other such sources.
Just as sources in class II areas must be reviewed to assure that emissions do not cause or contribute to significant deterioration in class I areas, sources in other areas must be reviewed to assure that they do not cause or contribute to significant deterioration in nondegradation areas.
The Federal role is sharply restricted in implementing this policy. The Environmental Protection Agency has responsibility to: First, approve the new source review process established by the State; second, seek injunctive relief or other judicial relief as necessary to prevent the issuance of a permit for a new source if it does not comply with the specific statutory requirements related to significant deterioration; third, resolve interstate disputes; and fourth, notify appropriate Federal land managers when an adverse impact may occur in a class I area. Once the State adopts a permit process in compliance with this provision, the Environmental Protection Agency role is to seek injunctive or other judicial relief to assure compliance with the law.
Much confusion has been generated about so-called "buffer zones" that encircle class I regions.
This bill eliminates the inflexibility of current EPA regulations by establishing the class I increments solely as a means of determining where the burden of proof should lie as to adverse impact on air quality values. Like the class II numbers, the class I increments are an index of the change in air quality. They do not, in any way, establish a final basis for approval or disapproval of a permit application. Thus, any maps which describe buffer zones as a result of the Senate bill distort the impact of these amendments.
Decisions regarding each new facility will be made by a State depending on the information presented in each permit application. Whether or not there is a Federal interest related to class I areas will be established on a case-by-case basis. The decisions which the Federal land manager and the States make as a result of the analysis of impact on class I areas and the extent to which any parties appeal the results of the class I increment test and the decisions reached during such an appeal are flexible. I repeat: There are no arbitrary buffer zones.
If the Federal land manager certifies that the air quality values of the class I areas in question will not be adversely affected by sulfur dioxide or particulate emissions from a new major emitting facility, the source can be given approval to build even if the Class I increments would be exceeded. Conversely, if the Federal land manager convinces the State that the air quality related values would be adversely affected, the States must deny approval even if the class I increments would not be exceeded.
This approach is flexible. It provides a basis for determining the air quality values of Federal lands which are to be protected. And it requires a balancing judgment to be made on a case-by-case basis.
The committee did not extend the use of nondegradation increments to pollutants other than sulfur oxides or particulates. The lack of adequate information on the implications of covering other criteria pollutants precluded such a requirement. The committee did, however, agree that the best available control technology requirements should be applicable to all pollutants emitted from any new major emitting facility so that the maximum degree of emission reduction would be achieved in order to minimize potential deterioration. And the committee did authorize a study by EPA of increments applicable to other pollutants in order to establish a basis for future congressional action.
Again, I refer my colleagues to the tables, with particular reference to the table entitled "Added Emissions Over 1975." These statistics show various air pollution trends under differing growth and control technology assumptions. (See exhibit 1.)
One purpose of the committee provision to prevent significant deterioration is to try to reverse the current trend in air pollution. The lower segment of this chart which shows oxides of nitrogen trends is particularly interesting.
Under the nondegradation provision, each new facility in a nondegradation area is required to comply with the best available control technology for all pollutants emitted. This is critical if the growth trend for oxides of nitrogen is to be slowed. Current new source performance standards for power plant NOx emissions are inadequate. For many other industries, standards do not even exist. As the chart shows, virtually any set of assumptions which relies on current new source standards for NOx results in a significant increase in total national emissions.
Conversely, in combination with aggressive auto controls, the application of best available control technology for oxides of nitrogen can begin to restrain the upward trend in emissions.
These charts indicate the importance of an effective nondegradation provision. Although total emission of sulfur oxides have declined about 15 percent between 1970 and 1974 as reported by the Council on Environmental Quality, analysis of future trends shows that this decline will soon be reversed.
This chart shows that emissions will climb again as the number of new stationary sources grows. Although it will be difficult to make progress, we can and must at least minimize the increase. If the States insist on the best available control technology instead of being satisfied with the inadequate new source performance standards for sulfur oxides, there can be 3.2 million fewer tons of sulfur oxides in 1990, even in the high growth scenario.
There were numerous other issues associated with nondegradation which are important to an understanding of this legislation.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS
The nondegradation provision provides needed environmental protection which the existing ambient air quality standards do not provide. If the national secondary ambient air quality standards were revised to protect against these damages, achievement of the secondary standards in dirty air areas would be extremely difficult.
Secondary standards were envisioned as a goal for cleanup of dirty air areas. They were intended to identify the degree to which pollution needed to be reduced to stop damage to crops, household plants, buildings, and general esthetic deterioration.
Secondary standards as promulgated did not address ecological and esthetic values. EPA apparently assumed that if secondary standards had been established to protect these values, their achievement in dirty air areas would have been virtually impossible in any reasonable time frame.
The nondegradation provision is intended to provide protection against harmful environmental effects not anticipated by secondary standards and to assure that a single, new major emitting facility will not consume the entire regional air resource thus barring any future growth.
For example, if the secondary standards were the only restraint on new sources in clean air regions, visibility which is now 100 miles or more in some areas could deteriorate to 12 miles. If humidity is high, visibility would be reduced even further. While visibility may not be important in dirty air areas, it has high public value in many clean air regions and should have been protected by secondary standards.
Another example of the inadequacy of secondary standards is the increasing number of studies indicating that pollutants are transported for much greater distances than previously thought. This means that emissions from sources in rural areas contribute to urban pollution problems and vice versa. In its report to the Senate Public Works Committee of March 1975, the National Academy of Sciences expressed concern that emissions as far away as 300 miles could contribute to unhealthy air in major cities.
Sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides increasingly are returning to the ground in the form of acid rain which damages valuable water and soil resources. A conference was held in the summer of 1975 in Columbus, Ohio, where many scientists expressed concern over this impact. Norway has experienced a substantial decline in its fishery resources which has been attributed to acid rain. A 20-year study in Scandinavia indicates that acid rain has killed fish and caused an ecological change. Forest growth and yield have declined. Fish populations have been adversely affected by acid rain in 75 percent of the high elevation lakes of the Adirondack Mountains.
Pollution at less than the concentrations accepted by the national secondary standards has been proved to damage vegetation. Acute injury to spruce trees has been reported when average concentrations of sulfur dioxide were only two-thirds the level allowed by the ambient secondary standards. Studies indicate that other crops are also damaged at concentrations less than the secondary standards, including wheat, potatoes, spinach, apples, and white pine.
Exposure to low level concentrations of pollutants has health effects. Studies done in Japan since the establishment of the primary standards in the United States indicate that air pollution concentrations lower than the national standards cause increases in reported illnesses. The National Cancer Institute estimates that 60 to 90 percent of cancer is environmentally caused.
The ambient standards as presently established do not include consideration of these facts.
The nondegradation amendment is intended to help reduce overall emissions and thus provide protection against these kinds of adverse impacts.
TECHNOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
One of the cornerstones of a policy to keep clean air areas clean is to require that new sources use the best technology available to clean up pollution. It is important to assure that new, improved technology is applied as it is developed. And it is important to provide incentives to improve pollution control systems.
To encourage this result, the bill requires the use of pollution control systems which achieve the maximum degree of continuous emission reduction, determined by the States on a case-by-case basis. The States are authorized to take into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs in reaching their determination. Such an approach should provide greater emission reductions and allow more rapid application of improved technology than would otherwise occur through uniform application of the new source performance standards periodically promulgated — and seldom changed — by the Environmental Protection Agency.
The record to date under the new source performance standards approach has been disappointing. The most glaring example occurs in the control of coal fired power plants — the largest and fastest growing stationary source of sulfur oxides and particulates. The inadequacy of these standards is exemplified by the fact that pollution control for particulates achieved at the Four Corners power plant in New Mexico is already 14 times cleaner than required by the new source performance standards promulgated by EPA. In addition, the new San Juan plant in New Mexico, scheduled to begin operation in 1977, is expected to achieve cleanup of particulates which is 30 times better than required under EPA's new source performance standards. These facts were presented in our hearings last April. For sulfur oxides, the San Juan plant is expected to be almost 10 times cleaner than required by EPA's new source performance standards.
Because of the gap that exists between actual "best available technology" and what has been required under new source performance standards, individual States have established emission limits which exceed the new source performance standards of sulfur dioxide which are more restrictive by an order of magnitude.
At present there are only 18 source categories for which new source performance standards have been promulgated — less than half of the biggest sources that should be covered. Though some of these were promulgated as long ago as 1971, none have been revised to take into account improved technology which has been developed, and only one is under active consideration for such a revision.
Much of the advancement of pollution control technology has occurred at new plants located in clean air regions. This has been due to the efforts of States interested in preserving clean air. The Federal standards, on the other hand, were based upon burning poor quality coal with stack gas cleaning. While this may be necessary in areas where dirty coal will be used, it is certainly not an adequate basis for national policy. In addition, although cleaner coal is burned in many areas, the impacts of resulting emissions are still substantial.
A typical new 1,000 megawatt coal fired power plant using clean coal and no control technology for sulfur oxides emits 144 tons per day when operating at full load. When controlled with technology currently being used today, these emissions can be reduced to 14 tons per day.
In some cases the new source standards mean that requiring the "best technology" will result in no improvement in emission control at all — a disappointing result from a requirement which was designed to maximize the protection of air resources and minimize the need to retrofit facilities in the future.
One objection which has been raised to requiring the use of the best available pollution control technology is that a technology demonstrated to be applicable in one area of the country is not applicable at a new facility in another area because of differences in feedstock material, plant configuration, or other reasons. For this and other reasons, the committee voted to permit emission limits based on best available technology on a case-by-case judgment at the State level.
This flexibility should allow such differences to be accommodated and still maximize the use of improved technology.
Reliability of new pollution control technologies has also been challenged, particularly against sulfur oxides emission control systems.
At an EPA symposium on scrubber development in March of 1976, it was reported that 109 flue gas desulfurization systems with a rating of 42,000 megawatts are either operational, under construction, or planned in the United States. The efficiency of these systems in removing sulfur dioxide was reportedly to be in the range of 80 to 90 percent. Although the older systems did have problems, developments have reached the stage where these systems are clearly a viable means of pollution control. And evidence available to the Environmental Protection Agency and the committee indicates that sulfur oxide control systems are, in fact, more reliable than electric generating equipment.
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
The economic objections raised against the nondegradation provisions are not new. They are restatements of old arguments used by industry against other attempts to improve the lives of Americans.
When we fought for improved wages for workers, industry said that they could not afford it.
Now when we are fighting for an improved environment, industry says that it cannot afford it.
The table on projected capital investment for selected major industries through 1985 shows that the added capital investment required for pollution control is modest:
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have that table printed in the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. MUSKIE. And if expenditure of an additional 2.3 to 2.6 percent — the maximum estimated by an FEA-EPA study of the various significant deterioration policies being considered by the Congress — is required, it is not an unreasonable price to assure that air quality in clean air areas remains clean. Not only would such an investment protect the public against the long term ecological impacts of increasing levels of overall pollution, but also such a policy would reduce public exposure to low levels of pollutants which may lead to chronic health effects.
The FEA study found that total operating costs for powerplants, including air pollution controls through 1990, would be $1.335 trillion. The Senate nondegradation provision could add a maximum $16.5 billion or 1.1 percent to operating costs if the States insisted on the use of the best and most expensive pollution control systems. The minimum increase would be zero, using new source performance standards, if States could justify such modest efforts. The actual cost would obviously be somewhere in between.
The impact on the consumer, in both direct costs and indirect costs attributable to the increased prices of goods manufactured through the use of electricity, would be modest. Again, if the States require the most stringent levels of control and expensive techniques, the maximum consumer cost would be $2.33 or 2.3 percent additional costs per month, during the year showing the greatest cost.
The direct impact on consumers in electric bills would, under the most rigorous scenario, be $1.17 per month additional cost in the year 1990. This is approximately a 1.1 percent increase.
Some opposition to meeting stringent; environmental goals is based on a desire to balance these goals against the cost of installing pollution control equipment. This is a distorted view of economics. It places the cost of pollution on those who receive the damage: the asthmatic who has more attacks, the child who has bronchitis or a more serious respiratory disease, and the farmer whose crops yield less. These people are now bearing the costs of air pollution.
According to the National Academy of Sciences, a single large source such as a power plant may cause $20 million to $50 million in pollution related costs per year.
Another important economic question relating to nondegradation policy is the impact on national coal development and the goal of energy independence.
There is a great deal of justifiable concern about potential decline in the use of eastern and midwestern high sulfur coal. The EPA/FEA analysis indicates that the nondegradation requirements would have a beneficial effect for the marketing of eastern and midwestern coal.
The report concludes that many plants, especially those in the Midwest which formerly were planning to import oil or rely on western low sulfur coal in order to meet the requirements of the. Clean Air Act, will find it more economical to blend local medium sulfur coal with high sulfur coal and install a scrubber. As a result of the Senate control technology requirements, the demand for western coal — or Mideast oil — would be reduced by 35 million tons or by 5 percent — a demand which would be filled by eastern high sulfur coal and stack gas cleaning equipment or new clean fuels techniques.
Some additional costs may result from the disposal of captured pollutants. These captured byproducts — sludge which would otherwise be dispersed in the air, can be treated to reduce volume substantially. And there are regenerable sulfur oxide control processes which yield no sludge, other than would normally result from reduced dispersal of pollutants to the atmosphere.
In any case, the amount of sludge — captured pollutants — need be little more than the amount of ash which has been disposed of by power plants for many years.
Some low sulfur coals presently being burned actually result in three times the amount of ash produced compared to eastern high sulfur–high Btu coal. Treated sludge, on the other hand, can reduce the volume of ash and sludge combined by approximately 50 percent and can be used as landfill and building materials.
ENERGY IMPLICATIONS
In many cases, the use of the best available new processes will yield significant pollution reduction and also conserve energy. The adoption of hydro-metallurgical processes to replace
smelting techniques in the copper industry is yielding pollution reduction approaching 100 percent. New paper mill processes for burning pulping liquors will provide half the steam to run the mill. A new paper mill evaporator recently developed eliminates odors and saves 200,000 barrels of oil per year.
Coating processes using volatile solvents that contribute to smog are being replaced by water based, ultraviolet, or dry processes which are solvent free.
The use of best available control technology as add-on devices may increase energy consumption. But these increases are expected to be modest. Flue gas desulfurization systems for power plants use approximately 3 percent of the capacity of the plant. For example, according to available data, the energy demand of a scrubber system for an 800 megawatt power plant is roughly equivalent to the energy demand to mine the coal for that plant. And the energy used is not foreign energy — it is domestic coal.
An EPA study of costs of nondegradation policies indicates that the maximum energy penalty associated with the operation of pollution control equipment at new power plants would be modest: only 0.8 percent in 1990.
If all new powerplants between now and 1990 were equipped with stack gas cleaning devices, the energy needed to operate these cleaning devices could be generated without the addition of any new capacity if existing plants were to increase their actual generation by 1 percent capacity over their present performance.
The present performance of coal fired power plants is approximately 65 percent of capacity; for nuclear plants the performance is 59 percent capacity. Clearly, priority should be given to increasing the reliability of existing powerplants so that energy is available for public consumption and for the operation of pollution control equipment.
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP
The States are assigned the lead role in implementing nondegradation policy. As I pointed out earlier, EPA is given a carefully defined role.
As important to the national controversy on significant deterioration is the role of the Federal Land Manager. These Federal officials are given a positive responsibility to assure protection of air quality values associated with the national parks and wildernesses and other Federal lands which may become designated as class I areas. The Federal Land Manager will play an important role relative to emissions which have potential impact on these valuable areas.
Many national parks and wilderness areas have been set aside because of their extensive vistas, expansive scenic views, unique natural formations or primitive value. If pollution would impair such values, or if the existence of the plume or the discoloration which would be caused by a major emitting facility would detract from the values of a park or wilderness area, then the Federal Land Manager must act to try to prevent this damage.
The Federal Land Manager has a mandate to protect the air quality values of these areas. This bill requires the Federal Land Manager to be diligent in carrying out this new responsibility.
In most cases, the added pollution allowed by this act will still leave a cushion in clean air areas before the national health and welfare standards are exceeded. The States are expected to avoid using up this safety margin with pollution from non-major emitters.
This is an important admonition. If efforts are not made to control these sources before they begin to threaten health and welfare standards, there is great likelihood that those standards will, in fact, be exceeded. The patterns that create such pollution — such as sprawl requiring excessive transportation — will already be established. Reversal will be difficult if not impossible. Even if reversal is possible, unnecessary and undesirable deterioration of air quality would have occurred.
It would be of little value to have carefully reserved the option of States to make balancing judgments in relation to the degree of emission reduction beyond that required by the increments if, in the absence of careful consideration of non-major emitters, the growth capacity were frittered away.
III. ENFORCEMENT AND PENALTIES
ENFORCEMENT
The 1970 Clean Air Act established a deadline for achieving public health related air quality standards. States were authorized to establish a "reasonable time" for achievement of secondary standards. The statutory deadline for primary standards was mid-1975 with 2 additional years available in areas with particularly difficult air pollution control problems. As the committee considered the current legislation, it became evident that for a variety of reasons, some sources would not meet the compliance schedules established pursuant to that act.
A substantial number of major emitting facilities remain out of compliance with emission limitations. Some States have not even adopted full State implementation plans. While substantial progress has been made in bringing many sources into final compliance, an improved mechanism must be established to handle sources presently not in compliance.
The committee recognizes that some of the facilities are in compliance and that other facilities are on compliance schedules. These sources deserve praise. They have made or committed investments. They have cleaned up their emissions or are in the process of cleaning up their emissions.
Such sources are faced with a competitive disadvantage associated with increased costs for pollution controls — costs not incurred by sources either not on a schedule or not in compliance with a schedule. Those sources which have chosen to delay, avoid or litigate have, in fact, achieved economic advantage. Thus, the competitive health, as well as the public health, has been placed in danger. The committee bill attempts to correct this imbalance.
The nature of the problem is underscored by a review of the status of compliance with eight major categories of stationary sources. As the table entitled "Stationary Source Compliance," indicates, between one-third and two-thirds of stationary sources are in compliance or on compliance schedules and meeting those schedules.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have that table printed in the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 3.)
Mr. MUSKIE. However, this table shows that a large fraction of power plants and industrial boilers — approximately 40 percent — are either not on schedule or not in compliance with the applicable schedule. Only 41 percent of Federal facilities are in compliance or are on schedule. Only 32 percent of the smelters and 35 percent of the steel mills are in compliance. These sources not in compliance in many cases represent the largest industries and the largest emitters within those industries.
DELAYED COMPLIANCE PENALTIES
The committee bill provides for delayed compliance orders and delayed compliance penalties as a new strategy to enforce applicable emission limitations and to address the problem of those existing sources which are out of compliance. This provision allows a State or EPA to issue enforcement orders to sources not in compliance with applicable emission limitations. Such orders will require compliance as expeditiously as practicable but in no event later than January 1, 1979.
Sources which are presently on schedules extending beyond that date are operating under unauthorized extensions and are to have their schedules revised to meet that date. In order to enforce this provision, an automatic delayed compliance penalty is provided for sources which are not in compliance by January 1, 1979. The level of this penalty is intended to assure that no economic benefit will accrue to a facility that does not comply.
The penalty will require monthly payments equal to the cost of compliance computed over a 10-year amortization period.
On the chart there is a category described as unknown. Included in this unknown category are plants where the emission standards are in litigation or where the compliance status otherwise cannot be precisely determined. It can be assumed in general that most of the plants in the unknown category require controls in order to meet the requirements of the Clean Air Act.
CIVIL PENALTIES
The committee bill also authorizes the Administrator to seek civil penalties for violation of emission limitations or schedules and timetables of compliance. This authority is independent of the deadline extension and the delayed compliance penalty. If a State has not issued a delayed compliance order with a new time schedule, the Administrator is required to seek an injunction against the noncomplying source and is authorized to seek civil penalties for noncompliance. In addition, the Administrator is authorized to seek additional penalties against sources which are subject to the delayed compliance penalty.
The principal purpose of the Clean Air Act is to protect the public health. The mere payment of an economic penalty required by the delayed compliance penalty provision should not be insulation against achieving requirements related to protection of public health. The purpose of the delayed compliance penalty is to create an adequate economic disincentive to achieve compliance at the earliest possible date. It is not intended to provide an opportunity for continued noncompliance. As an enforcement mechanism, the delayed compliance penalty should remove some of the burden on the Administrator to commit enforcement resources; but it should not reduce the responsibility for the Administrator to seek injunctive relief and penalties against noncomplying sources.
Finally, the delayed compliance penalty will give the courts an option which has not heretofore been available. When the courts determine the public health and welfare costs of plant closure are greater than the public health benefits to be achieved from strict adherence to compliance with emission limitations by the deadlines in the statute, the court may rely on a combination of delayed compliance penalty and civil penalties to equalize economic differences while maintaining momentum for compliance with the law.
IV. EXPANSION IN NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARD AREAS
Under present law, facilities that want to expand at their present location face a very stringent review test if they are located in areas where ambient standards are presently exceeded. In many cases, this means that under the law, expansion at that site is precluded until the ambient standard is attained.
The reported bill provides some new flexibility in this area, but it is carefully contained and strictly limited. The new amendment would allow expansion at an existing site if a new facility uses the best available control technology, if existing sources meet all applicable emission limitations, and if total cumulative emissions will be sufficiently less to represent reasonable progress toward attainment of the standards. Sources resisting compliance will now have an incentive to end that resistance, since the desire to expand at existing facilities is based upon the economics of industrial expansion.
It is, therefore, important to assure that all applicable emission limitations are met. The statutory language is quite clear. The amendment requires that all of the State requirements be met. These include limitations on visible emissions and opacity levels as well as all other types of emission limitations contained in the State requirements.
The bill language makes no distinction between emission limitations which relate to the primary standard and other emission limitations. Such a distinction is not authorized.
State implementation plans usually contain a unified set of requirements and frequently do not make distinctions between the controls needed to achieve one kind of ambient standard or another. To try to separate such emission limitations and make judgments as to which are necessary to achieving national ambient air quality standards assumes a greater technical capability in relating emissions to ambient air quality than actually exists.
A Federal effort to inject a judgment of this kind would be an unreasonable intrusion into protected State authority. EPA's role is to determine whether or not a State's limitations are adequate and that State implementation plans are consistent with the statute. Even if a State adopts limits which may be stricter than EPA would require, EPA cannot second guess the State judgment and must enforce the approved State emission limit.
In fact, in many areas where this provision will be used, such as steel facilities, it is highly possible that even when all applicable emission limitations contained in the State implementation plan have been met, the ambient standard may still be exceeded. This is particularly true where both opacity limitations and limitations on visible emissions are used as a means of enforcing emissions reductions to attain ambient standards. Any attempt to make a distinction between emission limitations on this basis would, in all likelihood, have the effect of undermining pollution control efforts at such facilities. That is one reason the statutory language makes no such distinction.
A key aspect of the amendment allowing such expansion is the requirement that reasonable further progress toward attainment of the standard must result from the new scheme. The committee report says that:
Where ... there is nothing further which can be done to move toward the ambient air quality standards, the State may take into account progress already made in determining reasonable further progress.
The test of "nothing further" is to be interpreted strictly. This means that further control of existing facilities, development of further production process controls, and new innovative control techniques must be applied on all sources, including all "fugitive" emissions, before the condition of "nothing further" is met. It is also the intent that "reasonable further progress" means pollution control will reduce emissions at a rate that will lead to attainment of the ambient standards in the near future.
V. TRANSPORTATION AND LAND USE CONTROLS
Transportation and land use controls were authorized as air pollution control mechanisms by the 1970 act. The Congress recognized that air pollution problems of many urban centers were the cumulative result of development patterns encouraged and sustained by the private use of automobiles.
We knew in 1970 that air pollution problems were extensive in many areas and would require the use of these controls in ways that could require substantial changes. The Senate report in 1970 said this:
Land use policies must be developed to prevent location of facilities which are not compatible with implementation of national standards.
Transportation policies must be developed or improved to assure that the impact of pollution from existing moving sources is reduced to the minimum compatible with the needs of each region. Construction of urban highways and freeways may be required to take second place to rapid and mass transit and other public transportation systems. Central city use of motor vehicles may have to be restricted.
When carried out properly, such controls are a positive tool. The requirementsof the 1970 act could have been the stimulus for beneficial uses of land and transportation in environmentally compatible ways.
This opportunity was not seized. The Administrator initially allowed States to put aside development of transportation control plans. That action was overruled by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on January 31, 1973. States adversely affected by mobile source related pollutants were required to develop and submit transportation control plans which provided for the achievement of primary ambient air quality standards no later than 1977, the final date in the statute. This belated effort to require transportation controls and land use regulations to prevent further deterioration in air quality resulted in many EPA promulgations in the absence of adequate State action. This caused a furor.
In addition, the limited time available for submission of plans, the controversial nature of many of the measures contained in the plans, and the magnitude of the pollution problem in many metropolitan areas made this task extremely difficult.
In order to adjust the transportation control requirements to the difficulties of implementing such policies, the committee has adopted an amendment which provides more flexibility, more local involvement, more time, and more State discretion in fashioning these strategies.The bill requires the adoption as rapidly as practicable of all reasonable transportation control measures in areas where such measures are necessary.
Under the 1976 amendments, the States will establish and the Administrator will approve designation of areas which fall under four different classifications. The first classification will be areas where transportation control plans will be required. The second and third categories are covered by section 110(e) of existing law and the last category will be nondegradation areas.
If an area is implementing transportation control measures and all requirements for stationary sources that emit mobile source related pollutants, but still cannot meet the deadline, it may receive a 5-year extension to achieve primary standards for the applicable mobile source related pollutant. A second 5-year extension is available for the few most difficult problem areas. This means that deadlines could extend to May 31, 1987.
States are required to involve local communities in the selection of strategies contained in transportation control plans.
The key tests are that all reasonable requirements are contained in the plan and are implemented as expeditiously as practicable. If the State plan does not meet these tests, the Administrator shall promulgate an implementation plan for the area after consultation with State and local elected officials.
A new provision would allow the States to apply to the courts for a stay of any provision of such an EPA promulgated plan, pending review of that plan in the courts. Grants of 100-percent funding are available to local planning organization to help implement this provision.
In order to assure that this new flexibility and additional time are used effectively, the Administrator of EPA is required to withhold EPA funds for projects after June 1, 1977, in States where an extension of the transportation control plan is required but has not been requested.
In the event that a State, or region, does not implement the requirements of an approved plan, the Administrator is required to decrease by 15 percent annually the EPA funds for any project in the region in question. Other Federal agencies must assure that the funds provided for federally approved projects are expended so as to conform with approved transportation control plan requirements.
Adjusting the Clean Air Act to provide a more acceptable plan of implementing transportation controls was frustrating. The committee recognized that relaxation of deadlines would cause millions of people to be exposed to unhealthy levels of air pollution. Yet, to continue with the present deadlines could create equally unacceptable adverse public health and welfare implications.
The committee action is a compromise assuring that reasonableness will guide transportation control strategies. Further relaxation would not provide adequate public health protection at any early enough date. Any further compromise of transportation control requirements would allow unhealthy levels of pollution in cities for far too long.
The selection of measures to be used is to be made initially by State and local governments. The bill does not specify the "reasonable measures" to be adopted. However, the Administrator cannot reject any measure selected at the State or local level because he considers it to be unreasonable. If it is adopted by the State or regional agency, then it is reasonable.
Conversely, the Administrator may determine that all reasonable measures have not been adopted. In this case the Administrator is required to promulgate additional reasonable measures.
The court will ultimately rule on any disagreement between the affected State or local agency and the Administrator as to the reasonableness of an EPA proposal.
The definition of what is a reasonable measure will relate to the adverse social and economic impact that would occur through its use.
While it is not possible to completely define this concept, it is possible to provide some boundaries. The adverse impact must be widespread and general. It must also be of sufficient duration to cause substantial difficulties. Some dislocation and disruption frequently occurs during the beginning stages of any control program or any change in transportation patterns. This interim impact is not justification for ruling that a measure is unreasonable. The adverse impact must be of a continuing nature. The difficulties that initially occur during the transition period during implementation of strategies are not sufficient to meet this test.
The committee bill injects additional flexibility into the initial planning process by requiring local involvement in the development of transportation control plans at the outset, with a more limited EPA role throughout. We have shifted much of the burden to the States and localities in an effort to overcome past failures.
Many of the transportation control plans now in existence for communities have been tested in the courts. It is not the intent of these new amendments to interfere with or void any requirements which have been upheld by the courts.
The Administrator will be receiving applications for extensions which will call for his action prior to the publication of the information documents required by these new amendments. In such cases, the Administrator is not required to wait for the publication of the information documents. Information has been gathered over the last 4 years on transportation control measures. That information will serve as the basis for the Administrator's decision until it is replaced by the new information documents.
The plans submitted by States must be reviewed by the Administrator under section 110(a) of existing law. This means that the Administrator must review and approve or disapprove transportation control plans within 4 months after submittal. In addition, the June 1978 date for submission of new plans is an outside date. The Administrator may seek earlier submission where it is appropriate. This authority is to be exercised only where processes are already underway which would make an earlier submission more appropriate.
For example, the January 1976, letter received by the committee from the Environmental Protection Agency during consideration of these amendments indicated that transportation control plans were under development in nine cities where such plans were not previously required. All of these cities received notice of the need for action in 1973. The data which has been developed to justify the provisions contained in such plans would be obsolete and would have to be gathered again if submission of control plans is not required prior to 1978.
LAND USE
The reported bill revises the basis on which land use controls are to be used to assure that land use decisions be made at the local level. The 1976 amendments place EPA's authority to promulgate land use regulations in a new perspective. Land use questions are to be resolved at the State and local level. Federal action is to occur only when the State fails to act or there is a demonstrated inadequacy in the State program to achieve or maintain a health related level of clean air.
Even this restricted authority does not extend to land use planning in any conventional sense. While EPA may require land use controls for maintenance of primary air quality standards or for prevention of further deterioration from such standards, this authority only applies in the absence of appropriate State action. It does not require Federal planning. At most, the Federal role will be limited to an examination of the air quality impact of a particular site location decision.
The Administrator is required to consider the potential energy, environmental, and economic impact of such controls prior to their imposition. This is new guidance provided in the 1976 amendments. It does not affect the review of new stationary sources under the existing requirements of Section 110 of the present law.
These amendments provide the assurance that improper land use controls will not be authorized under the Clean Air Act. It also assures that proper land use controls can and must be used where necessary to protect public health. Specific decisions regarding construction of a facility must be reviewed to examine the associated effects of that facility. This is not a requirement for land use planning, but a requirement for examining the air quality impact of land use decisions. That is an important distinction.
LONG RUN BENEFITS
The proper design of communities and transportation systems can yield numerous benefits. In addition to significant air quality improvements, it can mean less money spent traveling because destination points are less scattered and more accessible. It can mean less commuting from home to office and thus less consumption of scarce energy. It can mean increased freedom for residents who have access to adequate public transportation. It can mean reduced costs for supplying sewer connections and other basic services.
A study conducted of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area stresses that if new growth is directed to the areas where the new mass transit system is being constructed, the air pollution impact of new growth could be drastically reduced. Such action could yield a 50-percent reduction in the increased vehicle miles traveled projected for the Washington, D.C. area. The sober side of that calculation is that, unless such policies are encouraged, pollution in the area will be much worse than at present even with clean cars.
VI. OTHER ISSUES
EMISSION LIMITATIONS
The 1970 clean air amendments included a requirement that State implementation plans impose "emission limitations." This term has been the subject of controversy, litigation, and dispute.
These 1976 amendments provide a statutory definition of the phrase "emission limitation" to make clear the intent of the 1970 law — as upheld in numerous judicial decisions — that the basic strategy for implementation of air quality programs must be premised on continuous emissions control. Intermittent controls or dispersion techniques are unacceptable as a substitute for continuous control of pollutants under this act.
This clarification of existing law is grounded on these factors: First, intermittent control strategies are, as a practical matter, unenforceable by air pollution control agencies. Such strategies require elaborate monitoring and forecasting capability. Implementation relies on the polluter's ability to predict weather conditions and willingness to curtail production in response to those predictions. At the same time, few air pollution control agencies have the resources to police these strategies to assure that a polluter does in fact, curtail production on a timely basis. In addition, they can cause unacceptable disruptions in production and employment.
Russell Train recently summarized his Agency's position in this way:
In the area of ICS, we have determined that such methods are inherently unreliable and difficult to enforce. EPA's view has been supported by the Department of Commerce Technical Advisory Board which has found in its 1975 Report on Sulfur Oxide Control Technology that intermittent control systems create administrative and financial difficulties which could prevent effective enforcement. The report also states that under certain circumstances the costs of such a system would approach that of continuous emission control measures. The National Academy of Sciences has also supported the EPA position.
Without emission limitations there would be no fixed end point when compliance would be achieved. And, even if air quality standards were enforceable, it would have to be on a constant, continuous day-to-day basis. There would be no basis for judging the performance of one source against another in regard to air quality effect in a multi-source area because each source would have no specific, legally enforceable requirement to meet.
There would be no credible measure of air pollution control against which the public would judge the performance of the polluter. And, most important, there would be no legal basis against which to take an action if the polluter failed to perform. This is particularly true for citizen enforcement.
Mr. Benjamin Wake, administrator of the Division of Environmental Sciences of the Montana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, stated to the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution in April of 1975:
If it was the intent of the Congress, and I do not believe it was, to make the country uniformly dirty then the attaining of the national ambient air quality standards by use of the intermittent control system will achieve those ends in short order.
Second. Continuous emission reduction measures are available, they are reliable, and they are economically justified. Available measures for continuous emission reduction include use of fuels which are low in sulfur or ash, and techniques such as desulfurization of fuels, coal cleaning and washing, flue gas cleaning, and more effective combustion engineering.
The choices among such measures or the combination of measures to achieve the level of emission control set by the air pollution control agency rests with the owner of the source. The use of intermittent controls is appropriately reserved for air pollution emergencies.
Third. There is increasing evidence of the long range transport of pollutants that become sulfates, acid rain, and other phenomenon affecting human health, vegetation and soils, but leaving no definable plume that is traceable back to the source.
In a report for the committee, the National Academies of Science and Engineering found that dispersion measures may exacerbate the formation in the atmosphere of acid sulfates and nitrates from the sulfur and nitrogen oxides emitted from fuel burning sources. These derivative pollutants are thought to be more toxic forms than the oxides of sulfur and nitrogen that are actually emitted at the smokestack and are measured in the vicinity of the source.
It is recognized that the source controls may not be available to achieve the full reduction required of a particular source under particular circumstances. In such cases, supplementary programs can and should be used on a temporary basis until continuous controls are developed. But this flexibility occurs only after imposition of the continuous emission limitation.
EPA will be expected to review existing State implementation plans and require revision in any that depend upon dispersion techniques rather than continuous controls. Where necessary, State implementation plans will have to be modified. This injunction also affects the provisions of State plans which permit tall stacks.
Administrator Train stated on April 9, 1976:
... EPA's position on tall stacks and ICS are founded upon a pre-existing and longstanding opposition to an increase of the total atmospheric burden of sulfur oxides. Prior to EPA's creation, the Federal officials had argued that dispersion methods of air pollution control would not guarantee that air quality goals would be met at the ground level. The former National Air Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA) consistently opposed the use of tall stacks as the primary means of sulfur dioxide control because of their effects on the formation and dispersion of fine particulate acid sulfates, visibility conditions, the health of exposed populations, and the acidity of rainfall. Information collected since 1970 has reaffirmed these NAPCA assessments. Thus ... ample evidence exists to support concerns over total atmospheric sulfur loading and the use of tall stacks.
The recently promulgated guidelines setting forth the Agency's tall stacks policy, however, does not fulfill this policy pledge.
On February 18, 1976, the Assistant Administrator for the Air Pollution Programs published guidelines of the Environmental Protection Agency's position on the use of "tall stacks" and "supplementary control strategies" as control strategies under the Clean Air Act. The guideline was ostensibly published as a response to three U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals opinions. The courts have permitted "tall stacks" and "supplementary control strategies" only on an interim basis and only after the maximum imposition of constant emission reduction measures.
The guidelines are considerably less protective of the environment than the courts' decisions require.
Far from prohibiting the construction of tall stacks or the use of intermittent controls, the guidelines provide that once minimal emission control requirements are met, polluters are encouraged to substitute unlimited stack height for any further control of emissions.
As the courts have held, the act prescribes how air quality standards must be met — neither EPA nor the States may permit a proposed plan to meet the requirements by using tall stacks or other dispersion devices or systems.
A policy of encouraging "tall stacks"will increase the burden of pollution. Long range transport of pollutants will be exacerbated. There is no support in the Clean Air Act for such a policy. Certainly such a policy would be wholly inconsistent with the policy to prevent significant deterioration.
OZONE
The committee bill contains a new provision to protect stratospheric ozone. This amendment requires further studies by a number of agencies to provide for a better understanding of the effects of human activities, especially those resulting from halocarbon emissions, on the ozone layer and the effect of that layer on human health and welfare. There are also provisions for restriction or prohibition of activities which cause halocarbon emissions if EPA finds that they may be reasonably anticipated to cause or contribute to the endangerment of public health or welfare.
This provision was based upon a draft bill provided to the Committee on Public Works by Senator DOMENICI. That bill, with the exception of the question of burden of proof, represented a consensus among a number of Members interested in the ozone problem. At the time the committee considered this provision there were many proposals the effect of which would have required an immediate ban on fluorocarbons. The committee determined that the issue should be studied first. Now, on the basis of a little new scientific information, it has been suggested that we need not be concerned with fluorocarbons at all. This course is as unacceptable as a ban without a study. We need to establish the regulatory mechanisms to be available in case the studies confirm our fears. The potential consequences of depletion of the ozone layer are too serious to ignore without providing a framework for action when adequate scientific information is expected to be available. The committee bill does this. As the sponsor of the version that prevailed, Senator DOMENICl will explain its provisions in more detail in his floor statement.
VII. AUTO EMISSIONS
In 1970, the Clean Air Act established statutory standards for automobiles because it was recognized that the automobile presented the single most difficult national pollution problem. Auto emissions continue to be a threat to public health.
Congress recognized in 1965 that, as a national industry, automobiles required national emission regulation. Except for California, which is unique both from a product distribution and an air pollution point of view, the argument in 1967 for preemptive national standards was defensible.
The underlying principle of national emission standards was, and should continue to be, that those national standards would be adequate to achieve health related air quality standards in the areas with the most difficult problems. Statutory standards established in 1970 reflected that policy. This legislation continues that policy.
STANDARDS IN THE COMMITTEE BILL
The committee has made two modifications of the statutory standards adopted in 1970. First, a new standard for oxides of nitrogen emissions is proposed which increases by 2½ times the level of emissions of that pollutant which will be permitted. Second, except for a minimum number of vehicles, the achievement of that new statutory standard for oxides of nitrogen has been delayed until 1980.
In other respects, this bill represents a modest extension of time for the auto industry to bring emission control technology into conformity with fuel economy and other objectives. The bill continues the basic purpose that health related air quality standards associated with auto emissions should be achieved uniformly throughout the country.
The committee bill requires compliance with the statutory standards of .41 HC, 3.4 CO, 1.0 NOx in 1980.
Also, the committee bill requires manufacturers to produce 10 percent of their 1979 fleet at the statutory levels required for all cars in 1980. This phase-in is intended to provide a period during which new emission control systems meeting the statutory requirements can be introduced and modified if necessary before 1980. However, the remaining 90 percent of production would continue to meet the 1977 requirements. This will enable manufacturers to maximize their efforts on the statutory standards, and to minimize disruption which would occur were another incremental jump mandated as in the Administrator's proposal.
Equally important, the 10 percent phase-in can be used to evaluate the implications of the technology which, in all probability, will be used in 1980.
The requests for a 5-year freeze in auto emission standards were rejected by the committee after careful analysis.
Such a delay would merely give the automobile industry further time to continue to lobby Congress for further extensions.
Such a delay would remove the kind of pressure that has been absolutely essential in forcing the adoption of improved auto emission pollution control technology.
Such a delay would demoralize many local communities which have made efforts to develop control strategies to reduce auto emission pollution in their area.
Such a delay is not needed for energy or economic reasons.
The committee also rejected the recommendation of EPA Administrator Train in two respects. First, the Administrator proposed an additional incremental step at the current California standards of .9 HC, 9.0 CO, and 2.0 Nox for model years 1980 and 1981, before reaching the statutory requirements in 1982.
Mr. Train's proposal was predicated on the potential health hazard of sulfate emissions from catalyst equipped cars. The cornerstone of his proposal was the promulgation of a sulfate emission standard, effective in model year 1979. The ensuing 2 years were to provide time for the perfection of emission control systems to achieve the statutory standards in conjunction with the new sulfate standard.
We are now told that EPA will not promulgate such a sulfate standard for model year 1979. Thus, the rationale for the Administrator's recommendation disappears. Without a limitation on sulfate emissions, there is a strong likelihood that manufacturers would meet the 1980-81 Train numbers of .9, 9, 2.0 as they have in the past — with a catalyst and an air pump. By the Agency's own best estimates, such vehicles emit approximately 4 to 30 times more sulfate than the more advanced catalyst technology — improved oxidation or three-way — which would be under consideration at the more stringent levels of control. According to an EPA chart entitled "Sulfate Emissions From Autos," the following information has been developed:
Approximate
emission rate
Technology:
Catalyst vehicles with air injection 30 mg/mi
Catalyst vehicles without air injection 8 mg/mi
ThreeWay catalyst vehicles 1 mg/mi
Non-catalyst vehicles 1 mg/mi
The Congress expects the Administrator to incorporate a sulfate test procedure into the certification process as soon as possible and to require a report on sulfate emissions by the manufacturers. The Administrator clearly has such general authority under section 301, as well as specific authority under section 202 to protect public health and welfare, under section 208 to require the submission of manufacturers' records and reports, and under section 211 to require testing for sulfate emissions.
TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY
There is no question that the industry has the technological capacity to meet the standards included in the committee bill in the time required.
Russell Train testified during the suspension hearings held over a year ago that "we found that oxidation catalyst technology to meet the hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide statutory standards — in 1977 — was available."
The National Academy of Sciences in their June 1975 report stated that—
Attaining these levels — .41 grams per mile HC and 3.4 grams per mile CO — by 1978 is both feasible and worthwhile.
and
With respect to nitrogen oxide emission control: It is probably feasible with catalyst technology to achieve the statutory emission standard for NOx (0.4 grams per mile) in 1978.
Evidence presented over 1 year ago from the National Academy of Sciences and the Environmental Protection Agency indicated that automobiles could meet final emission standards by 1978 on many cars, and on all cars by 1979. If we had required that some 1978 cars meet final standards, we would have assured that the industry would direct their efforts to meeting those standards. The manufacturers and the Congress both know this would have made appeals for delay lack credibility.
In order to be able to have independent information available to Congress which did not rely exclusively on the automobile industry judgment, the 1970 act created a technical capability in the Environmental Protection Agency to give judgments about auto emission standards. The 1970 act also created a National Academy of Sciences Committee on Motor Vehicle Emissions to issue reports on auto standards. Both of these bodies reached judgments in 1974 and 1975 which indicated that the final statutory standards could be achieved in 1978.
More than 15 months have passed since the NAS and EPA reports were issued. A new report, issued April 1976, by the Environmental Protection Agency, indicates that due to the lapse of time since the earlier report and because the automobile industry has not exerted a substantial effort in the past year, it will not be possible to meet the final standards established in these 1976 amendments by model year 1978 on all cars. The new report does indicate, however, that the final standards for hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide could be met on cars in model year 1978, a year earlier than would be required by the committee bill.
EPA's certification data for 1976 cars in California shows that the industry already comes very close to meeting the proposed 1980 standards even though they are targeted on the less stringent standard of .9 HC, 9 CO, and 2.0 NOx required in that State. These include an AMC Gremlin, a Dodge Charger, a Ford Ranchero, and a General Motors Chevette.
All of these cars achieved hydrocarbon levels of 0.4 grams per mile or less. Carbon monoxide levels ranged from 3.6 to 4.3 grams per mile and nitrogen oxide levels from 0.8 to 0.1 grams per mile.
It is notable that this list includes vehicles in a wide variety of sizes, manufacturers and engines. Additional cars that already come close to meeting the statutory standards in this bill are listed in the report on page 129.
The argument is made by the industry that these represent only a few cars, which is quite different from meeting standards across a wide range of model lines. However, to show how close their entire production has come without even trying, it can be noted that the median emissions for each manufacturer range from .4 to .6 grams per mile of hydrocarbons, 4.7 to 6.2 grams per mile for carbon monoxide, and 1.2 to 1.7 grams per mile of NOx. There is little doubt that between now and 1979-80, these figures can be improved the rest of the way. The industry can do it. The only question is will they be required to?
I would remind my colleagues of the risk of any further delay. When too much time is granted the auto industry, they use that time to petition for further delays and weakening of standards. We must avoid this in the future.
It is useful to remember that, with the exception of NOx, present cars being produced meet standards no better than the industry volunteered to achieve at White House meetings 1 year prior to the enactment of the 1970 Clean Air Act. Other than reducing NOx and lead emissions, the act has primarily served to hold the industry to its self-defined goals. This was no easy accomplishment, but beyond that, the basic objectives imposed by Congress in 1970 have been delayed subsequently by the Administrator or by Congress.
The committee's decision to provide the industry with more time did not rest principally on technical feasibility, but rather on the question of economic recovery, fuel economy and sulfates.
ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
On this first point, it is fair to say that the auto industry is well on the road to recovery.
Dark projections of permanent industry depression were vastly overstated. Suggestions that the domestic auto industry would suffer permanent retrenchment have been replaced by new statistics indicating that an upturn has occurred. These suggest that the industry will once again have a good sales year this year — better than 10 million car sales — and that new sales records will be set by 1980. The upward trend is evident already.
Industry sales as of December 1975 were up 30 percent over those of a year earlier. According to the Journal of Commerce, retail sales are expected to exceed the 1973 record of over 11 million units by 1977 or 1978, and should rise to over 13 million units before the end of this decade. In fact, Elliott M. Estes, president of General Motors, predicts that in 1980, "the auto industry can reasonably look forward to the sale of 16 million new cars and trucks"
The dire statistics presented by industry spokesmen as a basis for relaxing emission requirements have also undergone a metamorphosis. Long term layoffs of auto workers were down to about 65,000 industry wide in January 1976, compared to 275,000 in February 1975, as reported in the January 26 New York Times. According to the April 19 edition of the New York Times, "industry analysts believe that — barring a strike by the United Automobile Workers next fall — 1976 will surely become the third biggest sales year in automobile history." That same story went on to quote GM's chief economist as stating "We could even begin to approach the second best year."
I submit that these facts and projections are evidence that the cleanup of dirty cars to protect our citizens' health need not be foregone in the interest of jobs and the economy.
FUEL ECONOMY
Since the energy crisis there has been a great deal of discussion of the need for fuel economy in automobiles and the relation between fuel economy and emission standards.
Last year, the Congress passed a bill mandating a 43 percent improvement in fuel economy by 1980, with further gains to be achieved thereafter. Meanwhile, in response to the call from President Ford for a 40-percent improvement in fuel economy, the automobile manufacturers have called for a 5-year freeze of 1975 emission standards, in order to make it easier to reach the fuel economy goal.
The automobile manufacturers have projected figures for various emission requirements which suggest a loss of fuel economy of 15 percent or more if they must meet the 1980 standards adopted by the committee.
However, EPA has stated on several occasions that "there is no inherent relationship between exhaust emission standards and fuel economy." In numerous markup sessions dating from nearly a year ago, the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution and the Committee on Public Works have attempted to resolve these conflicting views.
The Senate Commerce Committee, in preparing the fuel economy bill last year, also was concerned whether their new fuel economy standards would take away the possibility of meeting emission standards. Although the Commerce Committee included a provision in the bill for fuel economy standards to be relaxed if necessary in order to maintain the momentum toward clean air, their basic assessment was that both goals can be reached, as stated in their report:
The essential point is, given an adequate commitment on the part of the automobile industry, the 21 mile per gallon industry wide average set as a goal for model year 1980 (50 percent improvement over 1974) can be achieved with any of the hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emission standards currently under discussion, and at most, with only slight relaxation of the statutory (0.4 g/mi) nitrogen oxide standards.
The Commerce Committee went on to comment that it was far from clear whether any relaxation is necessary, and cited a study prepared by the Federal Energy Administration which showed that, even with the present sales mix of vehicle size, up to 21 miles per gallon could be achieved as a new car fuel economy average in 1980 under the assumption that full statutory standards would be implemented in 1978, including the 0.4 gram nitrogen oxide standard — which this bill proposed to relax to 1.0 grams per mile.
The fact is that the actual fuel economy depends on the choice of technology. It is hard to say this any better than EPA did in their 1975 technology report:
With a fixed emission control system fuel economy is a function of the degree of emission control required. ... With a fixed level of fuel economy, the degree of emission control achievable depends on the type of control technology used.
We have recently had an example of this. The tightening of the emission standards in 1975 had a favorable impact on fuel economy, which improved 14 percent over 1974.
Now the 1976 model cars obtain 26 percent better gas mileage than the 1974 models, while continuing to meet more stringent emission standards.
In assessing claims and counterclaims about fuel economy, the committee felt the need for information from an objective source outside the automobile industry. The National Academy of Sciences Committee on Motor Vehicles Emissions is such a source, and has studied this issue carefully. The Academy has estimated that present statutory standards, even including the 0.4 grams per mile nitrogen oxide standard — which has been made a research objective by this bill — could be met with catalyst technology with a fuel penalty of 2 percent or less. Even that small penalty would be lessened with the relaxed 1.0 gram NOx standards in this bill.
The Academy reaffirmed this assessment in their June 5, 1975 report, which stated that
emission standards for HC and CO (.41 and 3.4 grams per mile) for the 1978 and subsequent year light duty vehicles should be maintained at the current statutory levels. Attaining these levels by 1978 is both feasible and worthwhile. These levels can be achieved while steps are taken to insure against excessive emissions of sulfuric acid and acid sulfates.
The Academy said that—
These goals could, and should, be achieved while improving fuel economy.
The Academy participants in the June 1975 report were not of one mind as to whether the marginal benefits of achieving the statutory emission standard of 0.4 NOx in 1978 exceeds the marginal cost.
They did, however, state that—
It is probably feasible with catalyst technology to achieve ... 0.4 grams per mile NOx in 1978.
That same report comments that as the technology is developed further, the use of exhaust gas recirculation may not be required and even the estimated 2 percent loss in fuel economy could probably be removed.
A study performed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at California Institute of Technology for the Ford Motor Co. and released last August concluded that goals for emission reduction and energy conservation for the automobile over the next 5 to 10 years could be met with improvement in the conventional engine and to the vehicle.
Thus, the committee was left with the task of devising a set of standards that would meet the clean air goals and that would result in forcing, insofar as possible, the industry to adopt fuel efficient technology.
The committee discussed establishing a 1.5 NOx standard as the statutory standard. This was rejected as not adequate to protect public health and not likely to lead to the introduction of new, improved technology. The report discusses the basis for this decision on page 60. The new 1 gram per mile NOx standard is expected to require an improved level of technological development with fuel economy benefits.
To a certain extent, fuel economy is a red herring in this debate. One cannot help but wonder what excuse the industry would have used in order to request further delays if it had not been provided with a conveniently available energy crisis.
It is quite clear that vehicle weight and engine displacement, not emission standards, are the most important factors in determining fuel economy. Well over half the gasoline used by automobiles is used by large and specialty cars, cars which almost always have more weight than is necessary to carry out their task. The report by the Department of Transportation and the Environmental Protection Agency entitled "Potential for Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Improvement — Report to Congress" and dated October 24, 1974, identified methods for improving fuel economy by over 40 percent with no change in engine design concepts or emission controls whatsoever.
Another opportunity for fuel economy improvement that is often discussed is the diesel engine. The 1 gram NOx standard proposed in this bill can be met by the diesel if the industry wishes to do so. A Peugot diesel has already achieved an average of 1.07 grams per mile of nitrogen oxide in five tests with 25 miles per gallon. The National Academy's June1975 report concluded that the diesel is one example of an engine that offers substantial fuel economy benefits at standards down to 1 gram per mile. An EPA study of the diesel as a light duty power plant concluded that the diesel could meet a 1 gram per mile standard for nitrogen oxides.
The most recent automobile emission control status report released by EPA in April, 1976, confirms the committee's judgment that statutory emission standards can be met with good fuel economy. According to this report, the single most important problem in meeting low emissions with good fuel economy is hydrocarbon emissions — not NOx as has been alleged by the industry for 5 years. The report specifically identified two of the many systems using combinations of available technology such as improved catalyst, start catalyst, port liners, and sonic exhaust gas recirculation which "could be considered to make the good fuel economy engine calibrations achieve hydrocarbon levels low enough to have a high confidence of certifying at a 0.41 hydrocarbon standard."
In considering the two goals of fuel economy and improved air quality, we must remember that fuel economy is salable. The individual customer will demand it, and the industry will deliver it, especially since passage of the fuel economy bill last year.
Emission control, which has a significant value to the general public, has less value to the individual user. It is not a sales item which the customer will demand, so public policy must require it or it will not be provided. The evidence the committee has gathered indicates that it needs to be done, that it can be done, and that it can be done without sacrificing fuel economy goals. The bill as reported is designed to do just that.
AUTOMOTIVE SULFATES
As I said earlier, the committee considered and rejected, as a basis for a moratorium on auto emission standards, the potential harm of sulfate emissions from catalyst equipped automobiles. After 3 years of concentrated study of various aspects of the issue by the Government, industrial, and academic communities, there remains a great deal of uncertainty and disagreement as to the potential scope of the automotive sulfate problem.
Concerned by the possibility that excess oxygen from air pumps increases the conversion of fuel sulfur into sulfate within the oxidation catalyst system, the committee extended the 1977 interim standards of 1.5 HC, 15 CO, and 2.0 NOx through 1978, rather than mandating the current (1975-76) California standards of 0.9 HC, 9.0 CO, 2.0 NOx, which are currently being met with wide use of air pumps and oxidation catalysts. The likelihood that no new technology would be employed at those levels nationally was one reason for going directly to the 0.41 HC, 3.4 CO standards in 1979 to encourage the use of technology which would not exacerbate the sulfate problem.
The bill also authorizes a 1-year study on the measurement of sulfur emissions from mobile sources, the health impacts of such emissions, and the control options available. It is important to note that under section 211 of existing law, the Administrator can require the desulfurization of fuel should data on these unknowns indicate an immediate need for control of sulfate emissions prior to the implementation of a sulfate emission standard.
This was precisely the strategy proposed by Administrator Train in November, 1973, when he determined that the sulfate controversy did not warrant deferral of the auto cleanup schedule or prohibition of the use of catalyst.
Also, it is important to note that the Administrator has determined tentatively that the sulfate emissions from non-catalyst cars and non-air pump catalyst cars are similarly low.
This modifies his March 1975 position that even without an air pump, catalyst cars appeared to emit substantially more sulfate than non-catalyst cars. The high estimates of sulfate emissions from air pump catalyst cars remained unchanged.
In fact, according to the most recent data from EPA, non-catalyst vehicles, catalyst vehicles without air pumps, and three-way catalyst equipped vehicles have similar sulfate emissions.
This information referenced previously in the chart on sulfate emissions, was only received on March 10, 1976. It confirms the committee's decision to go directly to statutory standards to avoid prolonged interim standards which would rely on modification of current technologies and thus potentially exacerbate the sulfate problem.
TOTAL ANNUAL AUTO EMISSIONS
The need to meet tight standards is emphasized by the table which shows total annual auto emissions 1970-1985.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this table be printed in the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 4.)
Mr. MUSKIE. The table shows that if a freeze is adopted at the present CO level of 15 grams per mile, the result will be emissions of 17 million tons of carbon monoxide in 1985, as contrasted with only 4½ million tons if the 3.4 gram public health based standard is implemented. Thus, for the sake of a freeze, we would be accepting four times as much emissions of this lethal pollutant. Emissions of smog producing hydrocarbons would follow the same pattern.
As for nitrogen oxides, the table shows that emissions rose after 1970, and have just dropped back to the 1970 level. If we were to freeze the NOx standard at the present level of 3.1 grams per mile as the administration and the auto manufacturers have suggested, by 1985 we still would be just about where we were in 1970 before NOx was controlled at all. This bill sets a standard which will allow a little more NOx — one-half million tons — than the present statutory standard. But it will reduce emissions by 2.2 million tons compared to the freeze. This is a significant 63 percent reduction from present emission levels.
The table on in-use auto emissions versus standards shows the standards which have been implemented and proposed to meet air quality needs.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this table be printed in the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 5.)
Mr. MUSKIE. Compared to pre-controlled cars, the 1976 standards represent a reduction of 83 percent hydrocarbon, 83 percent carbon monoxide, and 11 percent nitrogen oxide.
Compared to 1970 models as a base, the progress is 63 percent in hydrocarbon and 56 percent in carbon monoxide, while the standard set by Congress is a 90 percent reduction. We have made some progress, but more is clearly needed. We still must reduce hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide to about one-fourth and nitrogen oxide to about one-third of their currently allowed levels to meet our clean air goals.
COMPLIANCE TESTING
Because of the pressure of time and the controversy associated with major provisions of this bill, the committee did not try, in these amendments, to reemphasize existing authority in certain areas where the Administrator has failed to implement the intent of Congress. One such area relates to the extent to which cars which were certified to meet standards continue to meet these standards in use for the required 5 years or 50,000 miles.
IN-USE AUTO EMISSIONS
The committee has substantial data indicating that the emission performance of cars in use, with few exceptions, is considerably poorer than the requirement of the law. The table on in-use auto emissions versus standards shows that not since 1969 has the average car met the hydrocarbon standards in use, and never has it met the carbon monoxide standards. In fact, even with our newest cars, the hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide corning from cars on the road is approximately double that allowed by the standards, while NOx emissions just barely meet the weak emission standards presently required.
The table also shows the importance of getting the industry to use new technology by careful choice of standards. In 1968 when emission standards were first introduced, there was no NOx standard. The manufacturers took advantage of that loophole and chose a technology that caused NOx emissions to increase by over 40 percent.
Also, actual emissions of hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide changed very little indeed in the 6 years from 1969 through 1974 despite the fact that the standards were tightened twice and required about a 50-percent reduction in emission levels. Then, in 1975, there was a significant decrease in these emissions, although not as great a decrease as required. Why?
The answer is that it was not until 1975 that a new level of technology was introduced.
Only recently, when nitrogen oxide control has been required, have these emissions dropped even as low as their pre-1969 levels.
The committee believes that this bill sets standards that will require a new level of technology. Hopefully, this will result in a significant reduction in emissions from cars on the road — not just in certification.
The latest evidence has heightened awareness of these problems. New evidence has been received since the committee concluded its deliberations regarding the automobile provisions. In a memorandum dated February 25, 1976, the Environmental Protection Agency reported on recent tests conducted in two cities in which "about half of the 1975 model year cars are significantly exceeding CO standards." The memorandum goes on to state that a major reason for this failure may be changes made in idle mixture after the car has been purchased in order to overcome customer complaints about driveability.
According to EPA, this problem results because new cars have been built with a lean fuel mixture in order to receive high fuel economy ratings and low emissions and without regard to driveability. This is apparently satisfactory for pre-production prototypes which are hand built and only operated in certification tests by professional drivers. And the industry knows that if the consumer develops problems starting a car in cold weather, the carburetor can be adjusted with no responsibility accruing to the manufacturer even though both fuel economy and emission reduction benefits are compromised.
The conclusion from this evidence is that the industry has managed to make a car that performs well at the temperature used for the emissions testing procedures — roughly 72 degrees — but also has produced a car which the consumer can be expected to alter.
It is evident that EPA must modify pre-production certification requirements to require prototype testing for driveability and to change procedures to require a broader range of tests including conditions which are found in the real world. At a minimum, driveability tests should be conducted under a wide range of temperature conditions.
EPA also has the opportunity in its certification and its maintenance instruction review programs to take two steps which will help solve the in-use emission problem. The first is to minimize, to the extent feasible, the need for periodic maintenance of cars. The second is to minimize opportunities for mal-maintenance by eliminating adjustments that are commonly set improperly by mechanics and that significantly affect emissions. It is very important that EPA exercise its authority to stimulate these steps by the industry.
We must close the gap between demonstration vehicles and the actual cars on the road. We need an in-use test. We need to cause the manufacturer to be responsible, financially, for that vehicle which is in the hands of the consumer.
The 1970 act required a production line test and an in-use test. These tests are essential if consumers are to get that for which they pay. The law requires every vehicle produced to meet the standards set forth in the law or regulation for 5 years and 50,000 miles.
So long as the operator performs appropriately required maintenance, the manufacturer is legally responsible to pay for any costs associated with failure of that car to meet the standards.
PRODUCTION LINE TEST
Without a production line test, we will never know if cars actually meet the standards in the first instance — which they must, since without an in-use test, there will be no capability to monitor performance of vehicles on the road. And it is the combination of these tests which will create the necessary financial incentive for the manufacturer to begin to produce a clean car which can be expected to stay clean for its useful life.
The committee bill amends section 206 to require that a production line test be implemented, within 6 months of enactment. Such a test is intended to provide assurance that all cars actually meet the emission standards when they are produced. This is not to be confused with the currently proposed production line test which uses statistical sampling techniques which will not assure that all cars meet the standards, even when new. The Administrator is expected to expand this audit procedure with an actual per vehicle test by the 1979 model year at the latest.
The existence of a per vehicle production line test will not guarantee that each new car will continue to meet standards for the required useful life of 50,000 miles. Present law provides a defects warranty and performance for that purpose. The manufacturer warrants that each new vehicle will meet the emission standard for its useful life of 5 years or 50,000 miles.
The committee had considerable discussion of the automobile emission warranty provisions of the Clean Air Act. The committee report contains an extensive discussion of this issue. One of the purposes of the warranty is to assure that manufacturers make cars that control emissions when actually in the hands of consumers.
PERFORMANCE WARRANTY
The performance warranty provides the ultimate test of whether the manufacturer is carrying out its responsibility to build cars that will meet the emission standards for their useful life. The manufacturer is exposed to financial responsibility if a vehicle fails to do so. Without a performance warranty, the natural tendency will be to cut corners.
Some say that the useful life under the performance warranty could be reduced to 18 months or 18,000 miles. This ignores the fact that emission control systems deteriorate in use. Choice of a useful life shorter than 50,000 miles would be inconsistent with meeting air quality goals.
DEFECTS WARRANTY
The difference between a defects warranty and a performance warranty is important. The former requires that each element of the vehicle which relates to emissions be designed, built, and equipped so as to conform at the time of sales with applicable standards and free from defects in materials and workmanship which cause such vehicle or engine to fail to conform with applicable standards for the useful life of the vehicle. But this only protects the consumer if a specific part fails and it is shown to be defective. And, in the absence of an assembly line test, there is little possibility of catching these defects at a point where the manufacturer's responsibility can be established.
PERFORMANCE WARRANTY
The performance warranty is intended to assure that a vehicle will continue to actually meet standards in the hands of the consumer. It is reasonable to assume that all parts of a vehicle could meet the specifications to which they were designed without the vehicle itself meeting the standards. In this instance, a consumer, exposed to an inspection requirement, could suffer a penalty for noncompliance when the issue was the combination of performance of the system as a whole, with no particular part of that system defective.
The manufacturers have claimed that 400 parts are covered by this provision, but most of these parts are totally unrelated to emission performance. Some of those parts must be replaced at regular intervals. Some of those parts are designed to last the entire life of the vehicle. Congress need not be concerned with either of these conditions. The question is whether or not the car which the consumer purchases meets the standards before it is purchased — at the end of the production line — and whether or not the car will continue to meet the standards under conditions of proper maintenance.
Having established through a proper production line test that each and every car made meets the standards — with appropriate deterioration factors — when it leaves the assembly line, as the current Clean Air Act requires, then the companies have an obligation to build a car which, when properly maintained, will continue to meet those standards in the hands of the consumer. Except in those instances where the manufacturer is able to demonstrate that the proper maintenance was not followed, the manufacturer must be financially responsible to bring the vehicle into compliance.
I want to underscore this point. The performance warranty is triggered by the existence of an in-use test combined with the existence of an inspection program and a penalty for failure to pass inspection. Although this provision of existing law has not yet been triggered, the bill requires establishment of the test procedure. It is then anticipated that over the next few years a number of localities will implement in-use testing programs.
Even though the manufacturer is required to produce each car so that it will meet the standards for 5 years and 50,000 miles, he is only liable for the repair costs when an in-use test exists and the vehicle fails to pass inspection and the owner is subject to a penalty.
CONSUMER IMPACT
As for the impact of the performance warranty on the consumer, the Automotive Service Industry Association has claimed :
Automotive industry officials estimate that the new monopoly will cost consumers billions of dollars a year in the maintenance of their cars and trucks by 1980.
In the first place, the Federal Trade Commission study called for in this bill would certainly identify such an effect if there really was one in time for corrective action if needed.
In the second place, I would rather let the consumers speak for themselves rather than letting the industry do so. The Consumers Federation of America is "strenuously opposed to this anti-consumer amendment" — reduction of the performance warranty to 18 months/18,000 miles. They also point out that consumers whose cars fail the emission test beyond 18,000 miles will have to pay to have their cars remedied even when the cars were properly maintained.
Consumer's Union, publisher of Consumer's Reports, states:
In response to the five-year warranty requirement promulgated by EPA, auto manufacturers have designed the control devices, and the various parts related to the performance of these devices, for substantially longer endurance than would be the case under a one year warranty.
... a reduction in designed durability would mean an increased incidence of repair for such devices and parts. This would add substantially to the consumer's cost of maintaining emission control devices to EPA performance standards.
Evidently, consumers prefer the 50,000 mile performance warranty on emissions systems. They do not buy the auto industry claim that it will cost the consumer huge sums of money. Neither should the Congress. In fact, the reverse is true: the performance warranty saves the consumer money.
Reducing the duration of the performance warranty as proposed will only reduce the incentive for the manufacturer to produce clean cars that will stay clean. It will not protect the consumer. It will not protect the aftermarket industry. It will protect the auto industry. It is an auto industry proposal and it should be so branded.
If Congress wants to protect the auto manufacturer from the responsibility to produce a clean car that will remain clean, then I suggest that we consider elimination of the Federal emission standards altogether. We are perpetrating a hoax on the American people if we tell them to invest $100 or $200 to equip vehicles with emission controls and then tell them that the auto industry has no financial responsibility to insure that those vehicles will meet the standards after they are in the hands of the consumer. I will not be a party to that hoax.
If there is an anti-competitive aspect associated with this requirement in present law, then the committee amendments should be more than adequate to correct it. The manual for each vehicle must describe the elements for proper maintenance. Independent service operators can perform that proper maintenance and record performance of that maintenance in the owner's manual. On its face, that record would provide a rebuttable presumption which the manufacturer would have to overcome to avoid the burden of any costs resulting from the failure of a vehicle to pass inspection.
THE COMMITTEE BILL
The committee clearly wanted to take every reasonable step to protect the aftermarket industry and the consumer against monopolistic practices by the automobile manufacturers. As a result, this bill includes three new provisions to enhance competition in aftermarket parts and services. These actions include:
First, requiring all owners' manuals to contain instructions that maintenance does not have to be performed by the dealer or with the manufacturer's own parts;
Second, making illegal any warranty provision that attempts to tie coverage to the use of the dealer's service and parts;
Third, establishment of a program which will enable aftermarket parts manufacturers to certify that their parts perform as well as the auto manufacturer's — the auto manufacturers have no role in approving such certification;
Fourth, a Federal Trade Commission study of any possible anti-competitive effect.
The only other proposed change in the warranty provision was the reduction in useful life to 18 months/18,000 miles. As noted above, this would be inconsistent with clean air goals and consumer protection. The Consumer Federation of America and Consumer's Union oppose such a change in the law. The Federal Trade Commission examined this question about 1 year ago and recommended the steps the committee has taken in order to avoid any anti-competitive effect of this warranty. They did not recommend any change in the 5 year/50,000 mile provision.
The performance warranty is one of the most important tools for achieving air quality goals for automobiles. Any attempt to reduce its coverage must be rejected.
OTHER MOTOR VEHICLES
Control of mobile sources other than automobiles has lagged despite the fact that they can be regulated under the general provisions of the present Clean Air Act.
It is inequitable for automobiles alone to bear the burden of pollution control, when they only contribute, for example, 50 percent of the hydrocarbon pollution from mobile sources.
The committee intends that this situation be corrected and that all other classes of motor vehicles be required to achieve by 1980 a reduction of emission equivalent to that required for automobiles. Non-availability of technology would be the only reason for any delay.
To achieve this, this bill makes more specific EPA's authority to regulate heavy duty vehicles and motorcycles. It is expected that EPA will use existing authority to regulate light duty trucks and other non-automobile categories of motor vehicles to meet this requirement.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Congress asserted in 1967 a Federal interest in protecting the public's health from the adverse impact of air pollution and a national policy to protect air quality in clean air areas. Congress recognized that a national regulatory framework with basic minimum standards and an aggressive Federal agency would be necessary.
We must not disband that effort.
I support much of this bill. There are improvements. There are causes of concern. There are provisions which, if enlarged in later actions, will lead to delay, reductions of efforts, and the inevitable conclusion that environmental goals and public health protection will not be accomplished. That possibility we must not forget.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a study entitled "Pollution Control and Employment" prepared by the Executive Office of the President, the Council on Environmental Quality be printed in the RECORD at this point.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[Exhibits 1-5 omitted]
EXHIBIT 6
POLLUTION CONTROL AND EMPLOYMENT
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Pollution control and employment; an assessment of relevant research
Introduction
The possible impact of pollution control programs on employment has been an issue of particular concern during the past year as the country suffered from high unemployment rates. It is alleged that pollution control programs have added to this problem. Such programs can affect employment, both in a positive and a negative fashion. Possible negative effects can occur for several different reasons. Pollution control regulations can force plants to close down. They can interfere with the normal expansion of production capacity (directly by inhibiting new construction, or indirectly by diverting capital way from capacity expansion or generally interfering with smooth economic growth). And they might stimulate firms to shift new production capacity out of the United States to countries which have less stringent pollution control regulations.
On the other hand, cleaning up the environment also creates jobs. People are employed constructing pollution abatement systems, manufacturing the equipment used in these systems, and operating and maintaining the systems after they are built. The following paper summarizes the available information on both the job losses and the job gains that can be attributed to pollution control programs.
Job Losses
EPA maintains an "early warning system" which collects information on threatened and actual plant closings which, it is alleged, are caused in part by pollution control requirements. This system has found evidence of 75 such closings affecting 15,700 employees. The Bureau of Economic Analysis has also attempted to obtain information on closings. Their 1975 survey found that one-half percent of the firms surveyed reported closing a process or plant in 1975 at least in part because of environmental regulations.
This was a sample survey, and there is no indication how many closures there were in firms that were not surveyed. However, the BEA results suggest that the problem may be more serious than EPA's information would indicate, because a comparison between the two lists of closures showed little apparent correspondence between the firms included in the BEA sample, and the plants identified by EPA. The Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union (OCAW) also analyzed plant closures which affected its workers. They, and subsequently EPA, found little evidence that environmental regulations have been a significant factor in these closings.
It is not clear what these plant closings mean, either in terms of economic impact or in terms of lost jobs. Many of the closures take place in older facilities which economic considerations would have probably forced to close anyway, particularly during a severe recession such as the country has experienced. Nor is it true that the number of employees affected is an indication of the number of jobs lost. Even in the affected plant the number of lost jobs may well be less than the number of employees affected. U.S. Steel's closures of its Gary, Indiana, open hearth furnaces affected at least 2,500 workers, but only 250 to 500 employees actually lost their jobs. In addition, the production lost from closing one facility is likely to be made up by increasing production — and therefore employment — at another facility. These factors make it particularly difficult to assess the impact of closings on employment, although they can clearly create serious local problems, particularly when they occur in areas already suffering high unemployment rates.
In terms of plants shifting abroad, almost all the analyses done on this issue indicate that it is a relatively minor problem with little employment impact.
Employment Gains
But environmental programs have also created employment. There is a rapidly expanding industry manufacturing pollution control equipment. And hundreds of thousands of jobs are involved in constructing municipal sewage treatment systems and industrial pollution control systems, and in operating these systems once they are built.
One of the earliest studies of the employment generated by environmental programs was the work carried out by Bruce M. Hannon and Roger H. Bezdek at the University of Illinois. Their work, using an input-output model, focused on Federal programs, and analyzed the employment (and energy) impacts of constructing waste water treatment facilities compared to possible alternative expenditures. Their analyses showed that one billion (1975) dollars allocated to such construction would employ a total of 82,000 people. This is more employment than would result from the same amount of money being spent on highway construction or water resource projects, but less than would result from several other programs. Expenditures on construction programs in general stimulate less employment than equivalent expenditures in areas such as health or law enforcement.
One important point about the Hannon and Bezdek estimates is that they include both direct and indirect employment. They include not only the direct employment at the construction site and in making the equipment, but also such indirect employment as that involved in providing goods and services for the personal consumption of the people who are employed directly. Most of the 82,000 people would never associate their employment with the construction of waste water treatment systems. For instance,. EPA estimates that a $1 billion expenditure creates 20,000 jobs at the construction site; this is only one-fourth the total number of jobs that Hannon and Bezdek estimate are generated by this expenditure.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics undertook a similar employment study, which concentrated on different aspects of Federal environmental expenditures. They estimated that only 53,600 jobs were generated by each billion dollars spent on the construction of waste water treatment systems, but 76,000 to over 78,000 jobs resulted from a billion dollars spent on research and on administering the pollution control programs. These estimates were apparently based on 1972 dollars, and therefore would have to be adjusted downward to take account of the inflation that has occurred since then.
All these estimates have been given on the basis of jobs per billion dollars expended.
Converting these into total job estimates at current rates of expenditure indicates that 200,000 to 300,000 jobs are related to the municipal grants program (including the state and local share), and about 125,000 jobs are related to other Federal pollution abatement expenditures.
There are fewer studies available on the impact of private pollution abatement expenditures on employment. EPA has sponsored studies of manpower requirement to build and operate pollution control devices. The most recent study to be completed on this subject concluded that there are 3.76 million employees involved in operating industrial water pollution control equipment with an equivalent full time employment of 575,000 man years. Although the study was carefully done and was based on sample surveys, these estimates seem very high. It does not seem reasonable that one-half percent of our labor force is involved only in operating industrial pollution control equipment.
One employment estimate that has received a substantial amount of publicity recently is that made by Kenneth Leung and Jeffrey Klein in a report on the environmental equipment industry prepared for the Council on Environmental Quality. Based on an estimate that a total of $15.7 billion was being spent for pollution abatement in 1975, and assuming that, on the average, a billion dollars generates 70,000 jobs (directly and indirectly), they estimated that over one million jobs were associated with air and water pollution control programs last year. This is a very crude estimate, but can be supported by comparing pollution control expenditures as a percent of the total labor force. The Nation is spending somewhat more than 1 percent of its GNP on abating air and water pollution, and as a result would expect these expenditures to employ about 1 percent of the labor force. This amounts to about 1 million people.
These are not all new jobs, nor are they all attributable to Federal environmental legislation. And finally, many of these one million people would most likely have been employed somehow even in the absence of this legislation. To analyze the net increase in jobs resulting from environmental expenditures, one has to look not at the types of studies listed here, but at macroeconomic studies such as those sponsored by CEQ and EPA.
These studies indicate that during a period such as the present when environmental programs are forcing increased expenditures while the economy is suffering unemployment, these programs have a net beneficial impact on employment. The most recent analysis estimates that the unemployment rate has been 0.3 to 0.4 percent lower with environmental programs than it would have been without them. This means that approximately 300,000 people are now employed who would otherwise not be. This positive employment effect can, of course, only occur during periods when the country would otherwise be experiencing unemployment. It is expected to disappear as the economy recovers from the recession and as the price increases associated with environmental expenditures begin to have a slight dampening effect on GNP growth. In the long run, however, no significant net impact on unemployment is projected to result from the programs.
In brief, then, pollution control expenditures are seen as having a net positive impact on employment at the present time. And a new industry has been established which has been a source of growing employment during the past few years. This industry has the opportunity and challenge to devise innovative abatement systems which will conserve natural resources, save energy, and reduce costs. If it is successful in meeting this challenge, this industry will not only provide a source of continuing employment itself, but will help contribute to the continued viability and stability of our whole economy.