August 5, 1976
Page 25837
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD certain material relating to the amendment of the Senator from Colorado (Mr. GARY HART).
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
MATERIAL RELATING TO AMENDMENT 1608
The Committee's decision to provide the industry with more time did not rest principally on technical feasibility, but rather on the question of economic recovery, fuel economy and sulfates.
ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
On this first point, it is fair to say that the auto industry is well on the road to recovery. Dark projections of permanent industry depression were vastly overstated. Suggestions that the domestic auto industry would suffer permanent retrenchment have been replaced by new statistics indicating that an upturn has occurred. These suggest that the industry will once again have a good sales year this year (better than 10 million car sales), and that new sales records will be set by 1980. The upward trend is evident already.
Industry sales as of December 1975 were up 30 percent over those of a year earlier. According to the Journal of Commerce, retail sales are expected to exceed the 1973 record of over 11 million units by 1977 or 1978, and should rise to over 13 million units before the end of this decade. In fact, Elliott M. Estes, President of General Motors, predicts that in 1980, "the auto industry can reasonably look forward to the sale of 16 million new cars and trucks."
The dire statistics presented by industry spokesmen as a basis for relaxing emission requirements have also undergone a metamorphosis. Long term layoffs of auto workers were down to about 65,000 industry wide in January, 1976, compared to 275,000 in February, 1975, as reported in the January 26 New York Times. According to the April 19 edition of the New York Times,
"Industry analysts believe that — barring a strike by the United Automobile Workers next fall — 1976 will surely become the third biggest sales year in automobile history." That same story went on to quote GM's chief economist as stating "We could even begin to approach the second best year."
I submit that these facts and projections are evidence that the cleanup of dirty cars to protect our citizens' health need not be foregone in the interest of jobs and the economy.
FUEL ECONOMY
Since the energy crisis there has been a great deal of discussion of the need for fuel economy in automobiles and the relation between fuel economy and emission standards. Last year, the Congress passed a bill mandating a 43 percent improvement in fuel economy by 1980, with further gains to be achieved thereafter. Meanwhile, in response to the call from President Ford for a 40 percent improvement in fuel economy, the automobile manufacturers have called for a five-year freeze of 1975 emission standards, in order to make it easier to reach the fuel economy goal.
The automobile manufacturers have projected figures for various emission requirements which suggest a loss of fuel economy of 15 percent or more if they must meet the 1980 standards adopted by the Committee.
However, EPA has stated on several occasions that "there is no inherent relationship between exhaust emission standards and fuel economy." In numerous markup sessions dating from nearly a year ago, the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution and the Committee on Public Works have attempted to resolve these conflicting views.
The Senate Commerce Committee, in preparing the fuel economy bill last year, also was concerned whether their new fuel economy standards would take away the possibility of meeting emission standards. Although the Commerce Committee included a provision in the bill for fuel economy standards to be relaxed if necessary in order to maintain the momentum toward clean air, their basic assessment was that both goals can be reached, as stated in their report:
"The essential point is, given an adequate commitment on the part of the automobile industry, the 21 mile per gallon industry wide average set as a goal for model year 1980 (50 percent improvement over 1974) can be achieved with any of the hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emission standards currently under discussion, and at most, with only slight relaxation of the statutory (0.4 g/mi) nitrogen oxide standards."
The Commerce Committee went on to comment that it was far from clear whether any relaxation is necessary, and cited a study prepared by the Federal Energy Administration which showed that, even with the present sales mix of vehicle size, up to 21 miles per gallon could be achieved as a new car fuel economy average in 1980 under the assumption that full statutory standards would be implemented in 1978, including the 0.4 gram nitrogen oxide standard (which this bill proposed to relax to 1.0 grams/mile).
The fact is that the actual fuel economy depends on the choice of technology. It is hard to say this any better than EPA did in their 1975 Technology Report:
"With a fixed emission control system fuel economy is a function of the degree of emission control required ... With a fixed level of fuel economy, the degree of emission control achievable depends on the type of control technology used."
We have recently had an example of this. The tightening of the emission standards in 1975 had a favorable impact on fuel economy, which improved 14 percent over 1974. Now the 1976 model cars obtain 26 percent better gas mileage than the 1974 models, while continuing to meet more stringent emission standards.
In assessing claims and counterclaims about fuel economy, the Committee felt the need for information from an objective source outside the automobile industry. The National Academy of Sciences Committee on Motor Vehicle Emissions is such a source, and has studied this issue carefully. The Academy has estimated that present statutory standards, even including the 0.4 grams per mile nitrogen oxide standard — which has been made a research objective by this bill — could be met with catalyst technology with a fuel penalty of 2 percent less. Even that small penalty would be lessened with the relaxed 1.0 gram of NOx standard in this bill.
The Academy reaffirmed this assessment in their June 5, 1975 report, which stated that "emission standards for HC and CO (.41 and 3.4 grams per mile) for the 1978 and subsequent year light duty vehicles should be maintained at the current statutory levels. Attaining these levels by 1978 is both feasible and worthwhile. These levels can be achieved while steps are taken to insure against excessive emissions of sulfuric acid and acid sulfates." The Academy said that "these goals could, and should, be achieved while improving fuel economy."
The Academy participants in the June 1975 report were not of one mind as to whether the marginal benefits of achieving the statutory emission standard of .4 NOx in 1978 exceeded the marginal cost. They did, however, state that "it is probably feasible with catalyst technology to achieve ... 4 grams per mile NOx in 1978."
That same report comments that as the technology is developed further, the use of exhaust gas recirculation may not be required and even the estimated 2 percent loss in fuel economy could probably be removed.
A study performed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at California Institute of Technology for the Ford Motor Company and released last August concluded that goals for emission reduction and energy conservation for the automobile over the next five to ten years could be met with improvement in the conventional engine and to the vehicle.
Thus, the Committee was left with the task of devising a set of standards that would meet the clean air goals and that would result in forcing, insofar as possible, the industry to adopt fuel efficient technology.
The Committee discussed establishing a 1.5 NOx standard as the statutory standard. This was rejected as not adequate to protect public health and not likely to lead to the introduction of new, improved technology. The report discusses the basis for this decision on page 60. The new 1.0 gram per mile NOx standard is expected to require an improved level of technological development with fuel economy benefits.
To a certain extent, fuel economy is red herring in this debate. One cannot help but wonder what excuse the industry would have used in order to request further delays if it had not been provided with a conveniently available energy crisis.
It is quite clear that vehicle weight and engine displacement, not emission standards, are the most important factors in determining fuel economy. Well over half the gasoline used by automobiles is used by large and specialty cars, cars which almost always have more weight than is necessary to carry out their task. The report by the Department of Transportation and the Environmental
Protection Agency entitled "Potential for Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Improvement — Report to Congress" and dated October 24, 1974, identified methods for improving fuel economy by over 40% with no change in engine design concepts or emission controls whatsoever.
Another opportunity for fuel economy improvement that is often discussed is the diesel engine. The 1.0 gram NOx standard proposed in this bill can be met by the diesel if the industry wishes to do so. A Peugot diesel has already achieved an average of 1.07 grams permile of nitrogen oxide in five tests with 25 miles per gallon. The National Academy's June 1975 report concluded that the diesel is one example of an engine that offers substantial fuel economy benefits at standards down to 1.0 grams per mile. An EPA study of the diesel as a light duty power plant concluded that the diesel could meet a 1 gram per mile standard for nitrogen oxides.
The most recent automobile emission control status report released by EPA in April, 1976 confirms the Committee's judgment that statutory emission standards can be met with good fuel economy. According to this report, the single most important problem in meeting low emissions with good fuel economy is hydrocarbon emissions — not NOx as has been alleged by the industry for five years. The report specifically identified two of the many systems using combinations of available technology such as improved catalyst, start catalyst, port liners, and sonic exhaust gas recirculation which "could be considered to make the good fuel economy engine calibrations achieve hydrocarbon levels low enough to have a high confidence of certifying at a 0.41 hydrocarbon standard."
In considering the two goals of fuel economy and improved air quality, we must remember that fuel economy is salable. The individual customer will demand it, and the industry will deliver it, especially since passage of the fuel economy bill last year. Emission control, which has a significant value to the general public, has less value to the individual user. It is not a sales item which the customer will demand, so public policy must require it or it will not be provided. The evidence the Committee has gathered indicates that it needs to be done, that it can be done, and that it can be done without sacrificing fuel economy goals. The bill as reported is designed to do just that.
AUTOMOTIVE SULFATES
As I said earlier, the Committee considered and rejected, as a basis for a moratorium on auto emission standards, the potential harm of sulfate emissions from catalyst equipped automobiles. After three years of concentrated study of various aspects of the issue by the government, industrial, and academic communities, there remains a great deal of uncertainty and disagreement as to the potential scope of the automotive sulfate problem.
Concerned by the possibility that excess oxygen from air pumps increases the conversion of fuel sulfur into sulfate within the oxidation catalyst system, the Committee extended the 1977 interim standards of 1.5 HC, 15 CO, and 2.0 NOx through 1978, rather than mandating the current (1975-76) California standards of .9 HC, 9.0 CO. 2.0 NOx which are currently being met with wide use of air pumps and oxidation catalysts. The likelihood that no new technology would be employed at those levels nationally was one reason for going directly to the .41 HC, 3.4 CO standards in 1979 to encourage the use of technology which would not exacerbate the sulfate problem.
The bill also authorizes a one year study on the measurement of sulfur emissions from mobile sources, the health impacts of such emissions, and the control options available. It is important to note that under section 211 of existing law, the Administrator can require the desulfurization of fuel should data on these unknowns indicate an immediate need for control of sulfate emissions prior to the implementation of a sulfate emission standard. This was precisely the strategy proposed by Administrator Train in November, 1973, when he determined that the sulfate controversy did not warrant deferral of the auto cleanup schedule or prohibition of the use of catalyst.
Also, it is important to note that the Administrator has determined tentatively that the sulfate emissions from non-catalyst cars and non-air pump catalyst cars are similarly low. This modifies his March, 1975 position that even without an air pump, catalyst cars appeared to emit substantially more sulfate than non-catalyst cars. The high estimates of sulfate emissions from air pump catalyst cars remain unchanged.
In fact, according to the most recent data from EPA, non-catalyst vehicles, catalyst vehicles without air pumps, and 3-way catalyst equipped vehicles have similar sulfate emissions.
1. While the position taken in this amendment was credible almost a year ago, the auto industry has done very little in the meantime. According to the most recent EPA technical report on automobile emission control, dated April, 1977, "Development of emission control technology has slowed down from last year’s pace." Regardless of who gets the blame for the slowdown, this means that precious lead time has been lost. 1977 cars are now being certified, and tooling is already being ordered for the 1978 models. By the time this bill becomes law, it would be practically impossible to change 1978 production plans without a major disruption of the industry.
2. That study concludes that the 1979 standards of S. 3219 (.41 HO, 3.4 CO, 2.0 NOx could be met on 47 percent to 80 percent of the population without catalyst change and 64 percent to 100 percent within the 1978-79 time frame. Thus, we are pushing the technology to get 100 percent compliance in 1979, and 1978 would be unrealistic.
3. The EPA technical report does not support implementing stringent standards on all production before 1980, or on major portion of production before 1979. The statutory 1980 standards of S. 3219 (.41 HC, 8.4 CO, 1.0 NOx) could "only be met in model year 1979 on a limited number of vehicles" according to EPA. But even this would entail a high risk effort for the manufacturers since there is now only time to run one development fleet. Under S. 3219, we are asking them to take that risk in 1979 on 10 percent of production. The Hart amendment would require taking the risk on 100 percent, which is excessive.
4. The EPA study also indicates that even meeting tight standards on part of production in 1979 and all of production in 1980 will require manufacturers development efforts to be increased over what is being done now. This does not leave much hope for speeding up the time schedule. Hart amendment would do.