July 24, 1975
Page 24597
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. MUSKIE (for himself, Mr. ROTH, Mr. JAVITS, and Mr. ABOUREZK):
S. 2170.
A bill to establish a procedure assuring Congress the full and prompt production of information requested from Federal officers and employees. Referred to the Committee on Government Operations.
THE CONGRESSIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, today I am introducing, with Senators ROTH, ABOUREZK, and JAVITS, legislation which I believe will give the Congress the means to halt the steady erosion of its power by officials who arbitrarily withhold information needed to legislate and to oversee the workings of programs Congress has authorized.
Only 11 months ago, this Nation was embroiled in a conflict between two branches of the Government of such dimensions that it threatened the foundation of our system.
It is testimony to the durability, the resiliency and the lasting strength of our 200-year-old system of checks and balances, that the highest court in the land ordered the Chief Executive to produce materials withheld under a claim of privilege; that the same order precipitated the first resignation of a U.S. President, and that we smoothly made the transition to a new administration with little or no disruption in the chain of governing authority.
Earlier in the sequence of events which also had brought the House of Representatives close to a vote on the question of impeachment, the district court for the District of Columbia said that the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities lacked standing to seek production of many of the same materials which were the subject of the later famous case of United States against Nixon, President of the United States.
The Congressional Right to Information Act would, for the first time in the history of our country, provide a practical and a just way to solve the controversies between the legislative and executive branches as to what information the Congress is entitled in order to carry out its constitutional functions.
If the Congress is to legislate, if the Congress is to conduct investigations, if the Congress is to appropriate funds for the operation of the Government, then the Congress must have all of the information in the possession of the executive branch of Government which it finds necessary to fulfill those responsibilities.
In his book on the subject of "Executive Privilege," Harvard law professor, Raoul Berger, observed:
He who controls the flow of information rules our destinies ... It was not the design of the Founders that the people and the Congress should obtain only so much information as the President concluded was fitting for them to have. As a partner — as the senior partner — in the conduct of our government, the Congress is entitled to share all the information that pertains to its affairs.
Certainly the experiences of Teapot Dome, of Vietnam, and of Watergate, have shown that the abuse of delegation authority cannot be discovered, disclosed, identified, or restrained if the disclosure of information itself is controllable only by the executive branch.
Mr. President, this legislation represents a truly moderate and restrained congressional response to the recent history of immoderate and unrestrained exercise of Executive authority in the form
of withholding information from the Congress.
The bill would direct the head of every Federal agency to keep the committees of the Congress fully informed on all matters within their jurisdictions.
It further would mandate every Federal official or employee to comply with congressional requests for information unless the President specifically instructs them in writing not to do so.
If a request for information is denied, a committee chairman would be authorized to issue subpoenas to compel the production of the information sought. The committee would determine that the information is necessary to its legislative function, and the chairman could be authorized to issue a subpoena, notwithstanding the Presidential instruction.
Should the Federal official refuse to comply with the subpoena, the committee chairman could seek authorization from the particular House to initiate a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the subpoena.
The district court would be given jurisdiction over such actions and the power to enforce the subpoenas by mandatory injunctions or other appropriate order. The court also could modify the subpoenas or set them aside entirely.
Many Americans were shocked 2 years ago when Attorney General Kleindienst came before a joint hearing by the Government Operations Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and the Judiciary Subcommittees on Separation of Powers and Administrative Practices and Procedures and asserted that the Congress could only obtain information the President consented to disclose. He maintained:
Your power to know what the President knows, is in the President's hands.
We have attempted to answer that sweeping claim with this legislation. It is designed to implement the fundamental constitutional principle of the checks and balances between the three branches of Government.
I do not anticipate that many conflicts will arise. When they do, however, this legislation can help to assure a method for responsible congressional action — since no court suits can be initiated without the approval of at least one House — and to require that the executive branch also act responsibly in considering and setting forth its reasons for withholding information the Congress seeks.
Mr. President, the Congressional Right to Information Act is the product of legislative effort which extends back to the 92d Congress. It draws its provisions from other bills introduced in the 93d Congress by Senator Ervin (S.J. Res. 72) , Senator Fulbright (S. 858) , Senator Ervin and myself (S. Con. Res. 30), and Senators Ervin, Mathias, and Mansfield (S. 1923). Extensive hearings on the subject of withholding executive information from the legislative branch were held in both Congresses by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Judiciary Subcommittees on Separation of Powers and Administrative Practices and Procedures, and the Government Operations Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations.
An identical bill, S. 2432, was reported out by the Committee on Government Operations and adopted by the Senate near the end of the first session of the 93d Congress. We are hopeful that this measure will meet with the interest and support in the House with which it was received in the Senate and soon will become public law.
In particular, I want to express my thanks to the distinguished Senator from Delaware (Mr. ROTH) for his leadership on this vital issue and for helping so much to make this legislation "a bipartisan approach" and to former Senator Ervin for the indispensable and excellent work he has contributed over the years in finding a means to resolve this serious constitutional problem.
At the request of Senator ROTH and myself, Senator Ervin was generous enough to provide us with his views on the importance of this legislative effort.
In a recent letter he said:
My experiences as Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, and my long study of executive privilege have convinced me that some remedy short of the drastic alternatives of contempt of Congress or the power of the purse is necessary for proper congressional access to information. The Congressional Right to Information Act would have provided a very reasonable remedy.
In the absence of a jurisdictional statute applicable to all committees, we are left with begging an executive agency to turn over information or resorting to more severe alternatives every time a committee needs information to carry out its legislative functions.
Even more recently, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities has met with considerable resistance in its efforts to obtain information to carry out its mandate from the Senate.
Upon learning of our intention to reintroduce this bill, the distinguished chairman of that committee, Senator CHURCH, wrote:
... I have come to appreciate the need for swift determination of controversies between the legislative and executive Branches over access to information in the hands of federal agencies. The Select Committee and its staff have spent weeks, indeed, months,locked in debate with the federal intelligence agencies over this matter, and I cannot say that even now we have evolved procedures which will provide the Committee all the information it needs to fulfill its mandate.
... had a bill with the purposes of the Congressional Right to Information Act been on the books, the Committee would have had the benefit of carefully refined procedures and the means to receive prompt judicial enforcement of its requests for information.
I ask unanimous consent that the letters from Senator Ervin and from Senator Church be printed in the RECORD at the end of my remarks, together with the text of the bill.
Mr. President, the exercise of a privilege by one branch of the Government cannot be automatic at any level. It may be presumed but not bestowed by law. The hearings held on this issue demonstrated that there is no way to draw a line and declare by law which Federal officials or Presidential intimates acting in what capacity on which policy matters are to be guaranteed confidentiality for their conduct.
Responsible government must insure accountability of public servants to the people through the political and legal processes. The legislation we introduce today does much to foster that accountability.
There being no objection, the bill and letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
S. 2170
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Congressional Rightto Information Act".
SEC. 2. (a) Title III of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new part:
"PART 4 – KEEPING THE CONGRESS INFORMED
"INFORMING CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
"Sec. 341. (a) The head of every Federal agency shall keep each committee of the Congress and the subcommittees thereof fully and currently informed with respect to all matters relating to that agency which are within the jurisdiction of such committeeor subcommittee.
"(b) The head of a Federal agency, on request of a committee of the Congress or a subcommittee thereof or on request of two-fifths of the members thereof, shall submit any information requested of such agency head relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the committee or subcommittee.
"PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION
"SEC. 342. (a) When an officer or employee of the United States is summoned to testify or to produce information, records, documents, or other material before either House of Congress or a committee of the Congress or subcommittee thereof, that officer or employee shall appear at the time and place specified and shall answer all questions propounded to him, or produce all information, including records, documents, and other material sought, unless, in the case of an officer or employee of a Federal agency in the executive branch, either within twenty days of the date of the summons, or, in the case of any such information which was first requested at an appearance, within ten days after that appearance, the President formally and expressly instructs the officer or employee in writing to withhold the information requested, including answers to specific questions, or specific records, documents, or other material, in which event such Presidential instruction shall set forth the grounds on which it is based.
"(b) Each written Presidential instruction pursuant to subsection (a) shall be transmitted to the House of Congress or committee of the Congress or subcommittee thereof requesting the information, proposing the questions, or seeking the records, documents, or other material.
"SUBPOENA OF INFORMATION
"Sec. 343. (a) If a House of Congress or a committee of Congress– "(1) determines that an officer or employee of the United States has failed to comply with the provisions of section 342 (a); or
"(2) upon consideration of the Presidential instruction transmitted pursuant to section 342(b), determines that the information requested is needed to enable it to exercise a legislative function under the Constitution, it shall prepare a written report setting forth such determination. In the case of a committee, the chairman is authorized, subject to the approval of the committee, to issue a subpoena requiring such officer or employee to appear before the committee at a time specified and to provide the information requested by answering the question or questions propounded and to produce any information, including records, documents, or other material requested. In the case of a House of Congress, the majority or minority leader shall introduce a resolution citing such determination and authorizing the majority or minority leader of that House to issue a subpoena requiring such officer or employee to appear before such House and to provide the information requested by answering the question or questions propounded and to produce any information, including records, documents or other material requested.
"(b) (1) If a committee of the Congress determines that an officer or employee of the United States has failed to comply with a subpoena issued pursuant to subsection (a) within fifteen days after such officer or employee receives such subpoena, the chairman of such committee is authorized, subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), to bring a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce such subpoena.
"(2) If a committee of the Congress referred to in paragraph (1) determines that the chairman of such committee should institute a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the subpoena issued by it pursuant to subsection (a), the chairman shall introduce a resolution in the House or Houses of Congress concerned citing the failure to comply with the subpoena of the committee and authorizing the chairman to bring a civil action in such court for such purpose. If such resolution is agreed to by the House or Houses of Congress concerned, the chairman shall institute a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the subpoena.
"(c) If a House of Congress determines that an officer or employee of the United States has failed to comply with a subpoena issued pursuant to subsection (a) within fifteen days after such officer or employee receives such subpoena, the majority or minority leader of that House shall introduce a resolution citing such failure to comply and authorizing the majority or minority leader of that House to bring a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce such subpoena.
"(d) (1) A resolution introduced pursuant to subsection (a), (b) (2),or (c) shall not be referred to a committee and shall be privileged business for immediate consideration. It shall at any time be in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. Such motion shall be highly privileged and not debatable. An amendment to the motion shall not be in order, and it shall not be in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.
"(2) If the motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, debate thereon shall be limited to two hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. A motion further to limit debate shall not be debatable. No amendment to, or motion to recommit, the resolution shall be in order, and it shall not be in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to.
"(3) Motions to postpone, made with respect to the consideration of the resolution, and motions to proceed to the consideration of other business, shall be decided without debate.
"(4) All appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to the resolution shall be decided without debate.
"(e) The provisions of subsection (d) of this section are enacted by the Congress–
" (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such they shall be considered as part of the rules of each House, respectively; and such rules shall supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and
"(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change such rules (so far as relating to the procedure in such House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of such House.
"JUDICIAL REVIEW
"Sec. 344. (a) The United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall have original jurisdiction of actions brought pursuant to section 343 of this Act without regard to the sum or value of the matter in controversy. The court shall have power to issue a mandatory injunction or other order as may be appropriate, and to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the subpoena issued pursuant to section 343 of this Act.
"(b) Any congressional party commencing or prosecuting an action pursuant to this section may be represented in such action by such attorneys as it may designate.
"(c) Appeal of the judgment and orders of the court in such actions shall be had in the same manner as actions brought against the United States under section 1346 of title 28, United States Code.
"(d) The courts shall give precedence over all other civil actions to actions brought under this part.
"PROTECTION OF INFORMATION
"Sec. 345. (a) Each House of Congress and each committee or subcommittee of the Congress shall take appropriate measures to insure the confidentiality of any information made available to it under this part which, in the judgment of the Federal agency providing it and the House of Congress or committee or subcommittee of the Congress receiving it, requires protection against disclosure which would endanger (1) personal privacy, (2) trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information, or (3) the conduct of the national defense, foreign policy, or law enforcement activities.
"(b) The Select Committee on Standards and Conduct of the Senate shall investigate any breach of confidentiality of information made available under this part by a Member or employee of the Senate, and the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct of the House of Representatives shall investigate any breach of confidentiality of information made available under this part by a Member or employee of the House of Representatives. Such committee shall recommend appropriate action such as censure or removal from office or position.
"DEFINITIONS
"Sec. 346. For purposes of this part:
"(1) The term `committee of the Congress' means any joint committee of the Congress or any standing committee, special committee, or select committee of either House of Congress.
"(2) The term 'Federal agency' has the same meaning given that term under section 207 of this Act, and includes the Executive Office of the President.
"SAVINGS PROVISIONS
"Sec. 347. (a) Nothing in this part shall be construed to require the furnishing or production of any information, records, documents, or other material to either House of Congress if such furnishing or production is prohibited by an Act of Congress.
"(b) Nothing in this part shall be construed as in any way impairing the effectiveness or availability of any other procedure whereby Congress may obtain information needed to enable it to exercise a legislative function under the Constitution."
(b) Title III of the table of contents of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
"PART 4 — KEEPING THE CONGRESS INFORMED
"Sec. 341. Informing congressional committees.
"Sec. 342. Production of information.
"Sec. 343. Subpena of information.
"Sec. 344. Judicial review.
"Sec. 345. Protection of information.
"Sec. 346. Definitions.
"Sec. 347. Savings provisions.".
MORGANTON, N.C.,
July 1, 1975.
Hon. EDMUND S. MUSKIE,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations,
Committee on Government Operations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR ED: During the last Congress, it was my privilege to join with you in working for the successful Senate adoption of the Congressional Right to Information Act. It was with considerable disappointment, therefore, that upon my retirement from the Senate that the entire Congress had yet to adopt this important procedure whereby the Committees of the Congress could gain access to information in the possession of the Executive Branch.
My experiences as Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on President Campaign Activities, and my long study of executive privilege have convinced me that some remedy short of the drastic alternatives of contempt of Congress or the power of the purse is necessary for proper congressional access to information. The Congressional Right to Information Act would have provided a very reasonable remedy.
Had that legislation been public law in 1973, the Select Committee's job would have been much simpler. As you know, our initial lawsuit to enforce a subpoena of the Watergate tapes was dismissed by Judge Sirica on the grounds that his court did not have jurisdiction of such actions to enforce congressional subpoenas. After Judge Sirica's ruling was upheld upon appeal, Congress passed an act specifically granting jurisdiction of the Select Committee's suit to the District Court.
In the absence of a jurisdictional statute applicable to all committees, we are left with begging an executive agency to turn over information or resorting to more severe alternatives every time a committee needs information to carry out its legislative functions.
I am gratified to learn that you are again reintroducing this important legislation, and I hope that it will meet with both Senate and House approval in the 94th Congress.
With all kind wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours,
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr.
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
July 22, 1975.
Senator EDMUND S. MUSKIE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR ED: I am pleased to hear that you are reintroducing the Congressional Right to Information Act – the so-called "Executive Privilege" bill. That legislation, which passed
the Senate in the last Congress, would provide the Congress with a mechanism for prompt resolution by the courts of issues related to the withholding of information by Executive Branch agencies.
As Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, I have come to appreciate the need for swift determination of controversies between the Legislative and Executive Branches over access to information in the hands of federal agencies. The Select Committee and its staff have spent weeks, indeed months, locked in debate with the federal intelligence agencies over this matter, and I cannot say that even now we have evolved procedures which will provide the Committee all the information it needs to fulfill its mandate.
In the absence of legislation formalizing the relationship between the Legislative and Executive Branches with respect to access to information, the Committee is forced to formulate its own procedures without the benefit of a regular procedure recognized by the Courts. However, had a bill with the purposes of the Congressional Right to Information Act been on the books, the Committee would have had the benefit of carefully refined procedures and the means to receive prompt judicial enforcement of its requests for information.
I strongly support this legislation and hope that the Government Operations Committee and the Senate will move quickly to ratify their action in the last Congress.
Sincerely,
FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senator MUSKIE in reintroducing the Congressional Right to Information Act. In 1973, Senator MUSKIE, Senator Ervin, and I worked closely together in our Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee to develop this bill in a bipartisan manner. Although it was adopted by the Senate without dissent, it did not receive attention in the House.
This bill provides an expeditious and equitable means of deciding questions of executive privilege, but it is more than just an executive privilege bill. Had it been law during the Watergate controversy, the Watergate tapes would have become available sooner, ending this shabby chapter of our history at an earlier stage. It will also help solve a problem that has grown steadily with the growing size of bureaucracy — how Congress can obtain information it needs for legitimate legislative or oversight purposes from bureaucrats who want to withhold it to avoid revealing waste, inefficiency, corruption, or ineptitude. When I first came to Congress in 1967 and began working on a catalog of Federal domestic assistance programs, I was appalled at the way some Government agencies could almost just ignore legitimate requests for basic information about their programs. One agency even denied me a copy of a telephone book on the grounds that it was classified. It is my impression that even the White House cannot get all the information it wants from the "fourth branch" — the administrative bureaucracy.
Disputes over information are built into our constitutional system of separation of powers and checks and balances. They have been part of the history of this country since the beginning of the Republic. George Washington's administration, for example, complied with a congressional demand for information related to the ill-fated St. Clair expedition, but it rejected a request for papers relating to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty.
At one time or another, both the Congress and the Executive have made excessive claims.
Former President Nixon's attempts to extend the doctrine of executive privilege to cover every employee of the executive branch and all activities of the President were totally unacceptable. I believe that there should be an area of executive privilege covering confidential policy advice a President receives from his advisers about matters involving the constitutional duties of the President. But I am absolutely opposed to any assertion of executive privilege to protect illegal activity, malfeasance, or wrongdoing by any member of the executive branch.
Congress, too, in the past has over-stepped its proper bounds, most notably after the Civil War, but more recently in the early 1950's. The New York Times and Washington Post then praised President Eisenhower when he finally rejected Senator McCarthy's demands for personnel files and other executive branch information. In a book published in 1955, Alan Barth wrote:
It is the purpose of this book to show that the legislative branch has acquired a dominance which has become a peril to liberty. The imbalance has been brought about in large measure through an old and necessary instrument of legislative action which lately has got altogether out of hand — the congressional investigating committee. Congress has, increasingly during the past decade, ominously in the past five years, used its indispensable investigating power in ways that encroach upon the jurisdiction of the executive branch of government ...
Each branch must protect its own prerogatives from excessive incursions from the other. It is no better to have a strong Congress and a weak President than to have a weak Congress and a strong President. The country needs a strong President and a strong Congress.
I believe the Congressional Right to Information Act gives Congress the power it needs to get information for the full functioning of its constitutional responsibilities, while protecting the President and executive branch from any over-reaching demands from Congress. The bill does not try to define either the scope of the congressional right to obtain information or an executive prerogative to withhold; it does establish a procedure under which there can be a speedy court determination of cases involving legitimately conflicting and countervailing powers. Under this bill, no one in the executive branch can legitimately withhold information from Congress except by explicit instruction of the President, and committees may challenge withholding sanctioned by the President in the courts. The bill, however, authorizes such a challenge only when the committee chairman has obtained a resolution authorizing the challenge from a full House of Congress. This is to insure that just as the executive branch cannot lightly withhold information neither can the Congress lightly go to court to challenge him.
If this bill becomes law, we will have, for the first time in our history, an expeditious and equitable judicial procedure for Congress to obtain the information it needs without punishing individuals either through contempt of Congress or some other alternative. I hope the Congressional Right to Information Act will receive speedy attention.
Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I join with Senator MUSKIE in introducing S. 2170, the Congressional Right to Information Act, to help preserve the separation of powers and to insure to the Congress the means of acquiring that information necessary to its legislative function.
The Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, which I now chair, has long been concerned with the problem of governmental information practices, particularly the asserting of executive privilege. The exercise of this so-called privilege not only encroaches upon congressional prerogatives but erects a bar to the effective acquisition by the Congress of information needed to perform its designated tasks. Under the aegis of Sam Ervin, the subcommittee first held hearings in 1971 on executive privilege and the withholding of information by the Executive. Then in 1973, in joint hearings with the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Government Operations, we inquired into executive privilege, secrecy in Government, and freedom of information. The Separation of Powers Subcommittee will continue to play an active role in the consideration of the executive privilege issue, and will work closely with the Government Operations Subcommittee on this legislation.
The problem of determining the limits of executive privilege can no longer be considered a subject suitable only for esoteric treatment in the law journals. The difficulties encountered by the Congress in ferreting out the scope of executive activities in connection with the Watergate episode vividly illustrate the practical aspects of the issue.
The doctrine of executive privilege has developed without constraint, exacerbated both by the enormous expansion of the size and the powers of the executive branch and by the failure of the legislative branch to assert its constitutional powers. By this abdication, Congress has actively encouraged the aggrandizement of Executive power.
Separation of powers is the hallmark of our constitutional Government, but recognizing that strict separation, if scrupulously followed, would be unproductive, the framers provided for separate but balanced power. Governmental responsibility must be shared if the plan envisioned by the framers is to be accomplished. The bill we propose today establishes an obligation in the head of every Federal agency to keep congressional committees and subcommittees informed with respect to all matters relating to that agency which are within the jurisdiction of such committee or subcommittee. In addition, the head of each Federal agency shall, on the request of such committee or subcommittee, submit information relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the committee or subcommittee. These provisions should contribute to the creation of an ongoing cooperative exchange of information between Congress and Federal agencies. Such a regular procedure will replace the frequently adversarial exchanges which now take place when the executive branch is called upon to provide information to Congress. In the course of such cooperation, each branch must respect the obligations and duties rightfully exercised by the other branches so that no one branch of the Federal Government will amass undue power.
This bill provides safeguards that accord respect to the special interests of both the Congress and the Federal agencies. Officers and employees of the Federal agencies may withhold requested information when the President so instructs and such instruction shall include written grounds.
The committee requesting information may, upon consideration of the grounds for withholding information, issue a subpoena and if it is determined that the subpoena has been ignored, may seek enforcement in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The reviewing court has authority to issue a mandatory injunction or other appropriate relief and to enforce or modify or set aside, in whole or in part, the congressional subpoena. In addition, provision is made to insure the confidentiality of information secured under this bill which, in the judgment of the Federal agency and the congressional committee, requires protection against disclosure.
Cooperation between the Congress and the Executive is necessary if the Government is to operate effectively. The legislation which we introduce today establishes a procedure assuring Congress full, prompt, and effective disclosure of information necessary to its legislative function. The procedure allows both branches the opportunity to weigh and to discuss their conflicting interests, with eventual resort to the judiciary for resolution if necessary, and protects each branch from the arbitrary acts of the other. Imposition of a regular process will provide the means for achieving a peaceful settlement of the problems provoked by arbitrary invocation of executive privilege.
It is my hope that Congress will seize this opportunity to reassert its constitutional powers and speedily enact this vital legislation.