June 6, 1975
Page 17618
PATROL FRIGATE PROGRAM
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to comment on the Navy's patrol frigate — PF — program. This bill before us today authorizes an additional seven ships in this program, supplementing the three ships authorized last year. I have a special familiarity with the patrol frigate since the lead ship is now being constructed at Bath Iron Works in my home State. I participated in the ceremonies at Bath marking completion of the first structural unit of that ship, and I have kept in close touch with the Navy and with officials at Bath on progress ever since.
Like any Senator, I have a special interest in any Federal program which is helpful in creating jobs and stimulating economic activity in my own State. The patrol frigate program is no exception, since I hope and expect that Bath's experience with the lead ship will result in a significant share of the work on the followup ships.
In the case of the patrol frigate, however, I am in the comfortable position of being able to give it my full support, in good conscience, quite apart from any special parochial interest I might have in jobs for Maine people. The PF is an excellent ship, and I think the Navy should be commended for its imaginative approach in developing the patrol frigate concept. For this ship maximizes the ability of the Navy to carry out one of its key missions at minimum cost to the American taxpayer. If all our defense planning were characterized by this same sensitive concern for economy, I think we would have a much less expensive defense budget for a comparable degree of military strength.
The Navy this year requested funding for 10 new ships and the House approved the full request. The Senate Armed Services Committee, however, decided that seven new ships for fiscal year 1976 represented "an adequate increment in this proposed 56 ship program." I supported the Navy's full request, and I made my reasons known in a letter to Senator STENNIS during the committee's consideration of this bill. I ask unanimous consent that my letter be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the United States is increasingly dependent on the use of sea communications for foreign trade vital to our economic health, including materials essential to our Nation's security. The Soviet Navy is growing rapidly, both in terms of numerous modern ships capable to extended deployments and in terms of modern weapons. Our own Navy has not kept pace. We have had to retire most of our World War II ships, while the cost of ships and weapons systems has made it impossible to acquire adequate numbers of large new destroyers to protect our sea communications on a world wide basis.
Recently, the Soviet Navy engaged in worldwide fleet exercises which our intelligence analysts believe simulates naval interdiction of the free flow of men and material between allied nations. Our own strategists were greatly impressed – and deeply concerned – by the Soviet capabilities demonstrated during these exercises. I believe that those capabilities require a U.S. naval posture sufficient to deter a Soviet conventional threat in time of international tension and, if necessary, to provide a U.S. naval capability to control the sea lanes in the event of hostilities.
While many critics of naval power in the contemporary world find it hard to imagine any extended confrontation at sea between the United States and U.S.S.R., it is noteworthy that the Soviets clearly believe a rapid buildup of their own naval forces is very much in their interest. I believe we must avoid any situation from developing in which the Soviets are encouraged to use a margin of naval superiority to force unwise diplomatic concessions in particular areas of the world during times of international tension. The Middle East is a good example of a region of high tension where our interests could be adversely affected by an unfavorable balance of naval strength.
To illustrate the continuing relevance of our naval forces, it is useful to recall that the Navy and the Marine Corps have participated in 29 of 33 significant overseas military actions since World War II – the most recent being the Mayaguez incident. There is no reason to believe that our naval forces will not be called on to protect vital American interests in the future. Yet the Navy has suffered a steep decline in surface combatant force levels in recent years. Without the patrol frigate, the Navy will have only 64 surface combatants available in 1980 to protect our open ocean sea lanes.
Mr. President, the patrol frigate is the most important new ship at the lower end of the Navy's high-low mix of surface combatants. The high-low mix concept is a simple concept which applied even during World War II. At that time, we operated our most capable ships – carriers, battleships, cruisers, and the like – in the Pacific where we faced our principal naval challenge from the Japanese. In the Atlantic, where we faced a more dispersed submarine threat from the Germans, we relied on large numbers of smaller aircraft carriers and surface ships. Even though we were on a full war footing, we simply would have been unable to build enough of the large, highly capable platforms to do the job in the Atlantic.
We are in a similar situation now. In the highest threat areas, the Navy is relying on the DD-963 and nuclear frigate programs to provide protection for our carrier task groups. The patrol frigate,
on the other hand, is designed to protect our essential sea communications in areas other than those of primary threat. It is directed toward providing adequate surface combat capability to defend non-carrier missions such as amphibious forces and military convoys. Obviously, neither the Soviet Union nor any other potential adversary can mount a high-level of threat simultaneously in all ocean areas. They do have the capacity, however, to apply varying degrees of pressure on our sea lanes all over the world.
The PF is an efficient and low-cost way of allowing our Navy to counter Soviet or other naval pressure on a worldwide basis. In short, the PF has been designed to provide maximum improvement in our naval escort capability at minimum expense. Its design results from a computer analysis of over 300 combinations of possible equipments, and the final selection has produced a modern and effective ship, tailored for the sea control role. There are no frills and there is no gold plating. It is a simple, tough ship which will do the job.
Mr. President, I am disappointed that the Senate Armed Services Committee did not authorize the full 10-ship request for fiscal year 1976. I hope that the Senate conferees will reexamine this program during negotiations with the House, and I hope that the Navy's full request will receive close consideration.
EXHIBIT
MAY 5, 1975.
Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I understand that naval shipbuilding program will be taken up in your Committee's mark-up during this week and that the members will be considering, among other requests, the Navy's request for ten new patrol frigates (PF). As you know, Bath Iron Works in my home state is working on the lead ship in this program, and so I have both a special interest and some familiarity concerning this fine new ship. In fact, I participated in the ceremonies at Bath marking completion of the first structural unit of the first ship.
I want to thank you for allowing Mr. Donald Lynch of the Committee's staff to brief my Administrative Assistant on the current status of the PF program. I understand that there is some concern at the staff level that the Navy may be attempting to move too rapidly on production of the PF and that the ten-ship request for this year is unrealistic and should be trimmed. I understand that these concerns are based on the fact that there has been some slippage in the testing of the fire control system on the PF which has delayed contracting on the three ships authorized last year. I also understand that there are additional concerns that the shipyards which will be involved in this program will be unable to meet the Navy's production schedule.
I am not in a position to pass judgment on the Navy's past record of production slippages. There may be some merit in the view that the Navy has pushed too rapidly on some programs in the past. But I have carefully examined the PF program, and I am convinced that the Navy's production schedule in this case is realistic. Moreover, the PF is an extremely important new ship for the Navy at a time when our surface Navy has shrunk to disturbingly low levels, and I would hope that there would be no unnecessary delays in its production when our shipyard capabilities are more than adequate.
I would like to comment in this letter on the concerns which have been expressed, and I would be grateful to you if you would share my letter with other members of the Committee or otherwise convey to them the observations which follow.
First, with respect to delays on the fire control system (FCS): Whereas the testing and evaluation schedule has slipped about four months, I understand that the results thus far have been most encouraging and that there is no reason to believe that the final results will not support a favorable production decision. The MK 92 FCS and 76mm gun technical testing has been successfully completed. Although the operational evaluation results will not be in until this summer, the performance of systems and equipment to date strongly suggests that there would be a very low risk in proceeding with additional ships.
Obviously, there could conceivably be further minor problems in the evaluation program, but I understand that even your Committee's skeptical staff analysis anticipates nothing that would be crucial or disqualifying. Further delay in authorizing the follow-on ships at this point would waste both time and money, and so I hope the Committee would not deem it appropriate to trim the program this year because of this inconsequential slippage in the testing program. Since the PF program has proceeded according to the lead ship concept ("fly-before-buy"), there are greater assurances than ever before that the PF is now ready for stepped-up production.
Secondly, with respect to the capacity of our shipyards to meet the Navy's production schedule for the PF: The capability to produce warships depends on four key factors: (1) the requisite shipyard facilities; (2) the requisite manpower and manpower mix; (3) the maturity of detail design and procurement planning; and (4) the capability and approach to outfitting the combat equipment.
With respect to the first two, I am certain that recent surveys of American shipyards will demonstrate clearly that they are already adequate to support the Navy's PF production plan. The fact that the PF is both smaller and less complex than other warships now under construction should also provide some reassurance in this regard.
Maturity of design and procurement planning is obviously essential if there is to be a sustained and uninterrupted delivery rate from the follow-on shipyards. I believe that the PF program is exceptional in this respect. At the time of the follow-on ship awards this fall, the detail design will be over 85 percent complete, the lead ship under construction nearly one year, and all major items of equipment in an advance state of procurement – delivered or nearing delivery for the lead ship. The same key items of equipment are standard for the class, and they will be procured through the exercise of options on Bath's subcontracts, thereby reducing much of the procurement workload and saving time for the follow-on shipyards. As you may know, the Navy deliberately extended the time interval between lead ship to first follow-on ship to two years in order to avoid premature start-up risks in the follow-on ships.
With regard to combat system outfitting, the advantage of the PF program is that it has already established its land-based test sites. I understand that installation problems will have been worked out and test procedures refined and verified for combat systems in the lead ship two years prior to the start of checkout procedures on the first follow-on ship. Moreover, the test sites will be available for training shipyard test crews. Lastly, the Navy is providing to each shipyard the services of competent combat system specialists who understand the roots of the design and can readily cope with local test problems.
So in these four areas, the PF program already receives high marks. Preparations for production have been meticulous. The Navy plan has a very conservative lead time and construction period for each follow-on ship. I believe the Navy has learned from problems which occurred, for example, in the DE-1052 program, where the follow-on ship contract postdated the lead ship contract by only six months. At the same time, it is noteworthy that once the start-up problems in the DE-1052 program were overcome, the follow-on yards (Todd and Avondale) each sustained at least a four-ship annual delivery rate, with Avondale delivering six ships per year under a 27-ship package.
In fact, you may be interested to know that Bath Iron Works has advised me of their concerns that procurement of the PF is not moving rapidly enough and that the current schedule is excessively long. Bath believes, subject to confirmation that materials would be available, that their first follow-on ship could be delivered in less than 40 months. Bath's record on the last four destroyers built for the U.S. Navy confirms that 4 ships per year is achievable – for in 1967, four ships (DLG 34, DEG 4, DEG 5, and DEG 6) were delivered within an 11-month period.
Finally, I would like to call your attention to the issue of PF procurement costs. The basic unit cost of the PF was initially estimated to be $45.7 million in constant FY 1973 dollars. The unit cost today in those same FY 1975 dollars is $51.1 million. This relatively small increase is based on the following improvements in the design: (1) addition of a fourth electric generator; (2) provision for capability to land and hangar two large helicopters; and (3) addition of the Phalanx close-in weapon system. It is clear to me that the Navy has enforced exceptionally tight design and characteristic control to remain within established cost constraints.
I have the greatest respect and admiration for the work of the Senate Armed Services Committee, under your leadership, in overseeing our Nation's defense programs. The quality of the work has been excellent, and I appreciate the deep concern which the Committee has shown for controlling the size of the defense budget. I share those concerns, and I agree that every item in the budget, including the PF program, should receive the most careful and skeptical scrutiny.
But I am convinced that we should move ahead with the full ten-ship request this year in the PF program. The Navy is ready, and the shipyards are ready. After the cutback last year from the Navy's seven-ship request, any additional cutbacks this year could have an extremely adverse psychological impact at a time the Navy is securing competitive proposals and trying to encourage shipbuilder participation. The Navy needs the ships as soon as possible. I hope the Committee will give favorable consideration to the full request.
With best wishes, I am,
Sincerely,
EDMUND S. MUSKIE,
U.S. Senator.