August 1, 1975
Page 26685
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
At the outset, I ask unanimous consent that Hal Gross and Dan Twoomy of the staff of the Committee on the Budget have the privilege of the floor during this debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD my statement evaluating S. 920, which is the Senate bill, on June 4, 1975. I think it may be helpful to Members to evaluate my comments today in the context of my evaluation at that time:
There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
Mr. President, it seems to me that at this point in the debate on the first of the amendments to reduce S. 920, I have some responsibility as chairman of the Senate Budget Committee to try to undertake to identify the budget impact of S. 920 and the pending amendment.
This is the first major annual authorization bill to be considered by the Senate since we adopted the first concurrent resolution on the budget, and so S. 920 represents a test run.
It is not our function as a budget committee to tell the authorizing committees or the Appropriations Committee how to split up the pot, but we are concerned with keeping a running record of the spending decisions taken by Congress, so that we may evaluate their impact down the road on the budget ceiling.
The targets recommended in the statement of the managers for national defense are these: for budget authority, $100.7 billion and outlays of $90.7 billion. S. 920 clearly represents a significant portion of those amounts.
While the Budget Control Act specifies that beginning next year the concurrent resolution set target totals for each functional category, the resolution will not instruct the authorizing and appropriating committees as to the allocation among individual bills of the amounts contained in a particular functional category. Thus, for example, in the national defense function the Armed Services Committee with regard to the amount which should have been included in the military procurement bill or the components of that bill. Nor would it tell the Appropriations Committee how much should be contained in the military construction appropriation, compared to the regular defense appropriation bill. The resolution simply would set an overall target for the national defense function, within which all of these spending decisions should be accommodated as we dispose of individual defense authorization and appropriation bills.
The Budget Act clearly intends that other standing committees decide which bills to propose for enactment within each functional category, as long as the sum of the spending provided in all these bills does not exceed the functional targets contained in the first resolution.
The budget resolution Congress adopted last month does not itself break down the aggregate Federal spending ceiling into individual spending priority targets. The statement of managers on the budget resolution does contain the spending priority target upon which the aggregate spending figure contained in the resolution is based. Adherence to these individual spending targets will be necessary to stay within the overall spending ceiling the resolution contains.
The role of the Budget Committee is to assist committees and the full Senate in staying within those targets. We cannot state flatly that a particular bill is "within the resolution" or "outside the resolution," but we can advise as to the effects of a particular bill in the context of the overall legislative outlook for the function of which it is part. Where the passage of a bill or resolution, compared to other legislation which must be accommodated within the appropriate target, poses a threat to the targets contained in the first resolution, the Budget Committee may be required to recommend opposition to it.
In this connection we must take account of the fact that the House recently approved H.R. 6674, a companion bill to S. 920 which authorizes approximately $1.5 billion more in budget authority and at least $300 million more in outlays than does S. 920. Adoption of the House totals would probably result in a breach of the national defense target, since it is unlikely that in the legislation remaining to be considered in the defense sector additional cuts can be made to accommodate the higher levels contemplated for procurement in the House bill. Even if only half the difference between S. 920 and its House counterpart is authorized and appropriated, the total for military procurement would pose a serious threat to the budget targets which we recently recommended.
With regard to the national defense function, the first concurrent resolution on the budget assumed cuts from the President's request totaling $7 billion in budget authority and $3.3 billion in outlays. S. 920, as reported to the Senate, is in line with the assumptions of the Budget Committee regarding those elements of the defense program that are covered in this bill.
S. 920, as reported, assumes cuts of $5 billion in budget authority and $1.8 billion in outlays from thePresident's request. For comparable items, the First Concurrent Resolution assumed cuts of $5 billion in budget authority, the same as S. 920, and $2 billion in outlays, which is close to the S. 920 mark. This comparison is based on the assumptions that were made by the Senate Budget Committee and the conference committee. The Senate ought to consider those when it is voting on this and other amendments.
It must be pointed out, however, that there is a strong likelihood of additional requirements in the national defense function over and above the President's request.
For example, the House of Representatives has voted to remove the 5-percent pay cap on DOD military and civilian pay. That involves$1.2 billion in budget authority and $1.2 billion in outlays.
Removal of the 5-percent cap on military retired pay would involve $600 million of budget authority and $600 million of outlays.
Third, if, as a Congress, we should fail to enact legislation to continue the sale of commodities from the strategic stockpile — and the effect of that would be to reduce receipts that are deducted from budget authority outlays — if we were to fail to enact that legislation, which the President has requested and has assumed in his budget, then the effect would be to add $400 million in budget authority and $400 million in outlays to the President's budget estimates.
Then, the final item is this:
The President proposed legislation to authorize petroleum sales from the Elk Hills Naval Petroleum Reserve. The effect of that, if we do not get the full impact in the 1976 fiscal year, would be to reduce receipts that are deducted from budget authority and outlays, the same way as the sale of commodities from the strategic stockpile. That legislation is pending in two committees, as I understand it. The form of the legislation, as it may finally pass is unclear, so the budget impact is unclear.
We think that, responsibly, we ought to consider the possibility of $200 million being added to both budget authority and outlays this year.
All of those items — four of them in total — total $2.4 billion in budget authority and $2.4 billion in outlays.
The details are as follows:
Additional national defense requirements (fiscal year 1976)
[In billions of dollars]
Budget authority Outlays
Removal of 5 percent cap on DOD military and civilian pay1.2 1. 2
Removal of 5 percent cap on military retired pay .6 .6
Failure to enact legislation to continue the sale of commodities
from the strategic stockpile (reduces receipts that are deducted
from budget authority and outlays) .4 .4
Delay in enactment of legislation to authorize petroleum sales
from the Elk Hills naval petroleum reserve (reduces receipts
that are deducted from budget authority and outlays) .2 .2
Total 2.4 2.4
If these additional requirements materialize, the overall reduction in the national defense function that would be required to arrive at the First Concurrent Resolution target is $9.4 billion in budget authority and $5.7 billion in outlays.
As I have already mentioned, S. 920 as reported provides cuts of $5 billion in budget authority and $1.8 billion in outlays from the President's request. If the additional requirements I have described materialize, that leaves us with a need for further cuts of $4.4 billion in budget authority and $3.9 billion in outlays elsewhere in the defense program if we are to stay within the national defense targets accompanying the first concurrent resolution on the budget. As we consider S. 920, we must also consider the possibilities for arriving at these further cuts. Mr. President, I have prepared a list of possible additional cuts that might be considered by the Senate. I am not prejudging their cuts, but will simply try to itemize the areas where we will have to look for further cuts in the national defense function in areas other than those covered by S. 920. Cutting will not be easy and the following is only illustrative of the kinds of cuts we will have to consider. I will not list items that I believe are impossible to attain — such as holding the 5-percent cap on military retired pay and accelerating the sale of petroleum from the Elk Hills Reserve. Here are some examples of the realistic options :
Possibilities for further reduction in the national defense function (fiscal year 1976)
[In billions of dollars]
Possible savings
Budget authority Outlays
Retain the 5 percent cap on DOD military and civilian pay, as
requested by the President 1.2 1. 2
Enact legislation, as requested by the President, to continue the
sale of commodities from the strategic stockpile .4 .4
Defense appropriations bill:
Cut below the President's request in several areas +4.3 +2.8
Cut the operations and maintenance funds other than pay (funds for
maintenance of real property, ship repairs and overhauls, office
supplies, fuel, minor construction projects and other housekeeping
items) (1.5) (1.4)
Reduce procurement other than that authorized in S. 920
(trucks, automobiles, other non-combat equipment) (1.0) (.2)
Financial adjustments such as:
Transfer unobligated balances of prior year budget
authority to fiscal year 1976 ( .5) ( .2)
Increase receipts from sales of excess military
equipment and foreign military sales (reduces budget authority
and outlays) ( .5) ( .5)
Reduce stock fund cash balances as a result of reduced war reserve
procurement ( .5) ( .5)
Reductions in special pay allowances and travel funds for military
personnel ( .3) ( .3)
Further cuts in personnel over and above those recommended by the
President and S. 920 (fiscal year 1976 savings of $100,000,000 per 20,000
jobs) ? ?
Cut military construction authorization and appropriations (funds for new
facilities at military bases) .2 .1
Cut military assistance and foreign military sales .7 .5
Cut out military assistance for Cambodia. ( . 4) ( .3)
Maintain fiscal year 1975 level for foreign military sales ( .3) ( .2)
These options add up to $6.8 billion in authority and $5 billion in outlays — plus whatever amounts might be saved from the unpriced options such as further personnel cuts.
These options, if we exercise them, give us enough latitude to cover the remaining cuts of $4.4 billion in authority and $3.9 billion in outlays if S. 920 is passed as reported.
As the Senate considers S. 920, I believe each Member must consider these or other possible cut options carefully, for we are certain to be faced with difficult choices later on if we are to stay within the first concurrent resolution target.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 2 extra minutes to the Senator.
Mr. MUSKIE. As I view these options, I come to this conclusion: it seems unlikely to me that the 5-percent cap on DOD military and civilian pay will be retained. I recognize that the conference report states that the totals are sufficient to permit removal of the pay cap if Congress so decides, but this means that most of the other options I have outlined have to be exercised.
So, to me, therefore, as one Senator, prudence dictates that I vote to cut S. 920 below the level reported. In addition, I intend, as an individual Senator, to vote for cuts in some of the weapons systems.
Because of the lack of specificity in the Symington amendment, I am concerned that the impact of that amendment may fall on shipbuilding, manpower, or other high priority programs.
I prefer, therefore, to focus whatever decisions I make to cut on more specific programs. So, I intend to vote against the Symington amendment for this reason, although I intend to vote for other specific cuts that are consistent with a sound defense policy.
May I say this to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi that as the Committee on the Budget considers these matters more thoroughly — and I think we will be establishing a task force on defense matters — in the coming months, we hope to be able to identify more specifically and selectively areas of low priority or waste.
Finally, Mr. President, we ought not to overlook the fact that the Committee on the Budget already has recommended and Congress approved in the first concurrent resolution substantial cuts in both budget authority and in outlays of the defense function.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for a question, as I understand the situation that exists now, this Senate bill, as presented to the Senate by the Committee on Armed Services, comes within the guidelines of the Senator's resolution of the new budget of the Committee on the Budget; is that correct?
Mr. MUSKIE. That is correct, if one puts aside the four other items that I have described.
Mr. STENNIS. These items the Senator has mentioned, are about what Congress may do in the future. The Senator made the same assumption when he presented his figures in the committee. The Senator took facts as they were, rather than what they may be after the Congress has acted.
Mr. MUSKIE. In the committee we assumed nothing with respect to these four items. In the conference it was assumed that pay caps could be lifted, but we did not consider, I do not think, the other two items.
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator took those facts as to those items as they were then.
Mr. MUSKIE. Yes, that is right.
Mr. STENNIS. That is what we are going to do here, if I may say so.
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator is correct. There is no way for us to reach a decision, I take it, on those four items in connection with this pending bill.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.
Mr. SYMINGHTON and Mr. McCLELLAN addressed the Chair.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. MUSKIE. I will yield the time if I have time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Maine, which consisted of 2 additional minutes, has expired.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, does the Senator from Missouri wish to yield him a minute to ask questions?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yielded some of my time to the Senator from Georgia (Mr. NUNN). If the Senator wants to yield his time he may.
Mr. KENNEDY. What is the time remaining?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield a couple minutes.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I would like a couple minutes.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield a few minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi has 24 minutes remaining.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Did the Committee on the Budget get into the procurement questions in any detail which we are discussing today?
Mr. MUSKIE. No, we did not.
May I say to the Senator that we did not feel we ought to supersede the responsibilities of the authorizing committees in that kind of detail. So, as to S. 920 I think this is an appropriate debate that has been conducted, and the Senate now has to make those decisions.
I simply want to make sure that when the Senators vote on this they understand that down the road there appear to be four likely legislative decisions that are going to put pressure on the defense budget, and they ought to take those into account. If they do, that may well move them in the direction of the Senator's amendment. But I think those pressures ought to be understood so that we will not be asked the question down the line: "Senator, why did you not warn us that these were coming and what their budgetary effect might be?"
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator, and I thank the Senator from Mississippi.
THE MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND SCHOOL LUNCH CONFERENCE REPORTS
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the Senate has pending two important conference reports which have major implications for the new congressional budget.
I am compelled, as a Member of the Senate and as chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, to vote against both.
I will vote against the military procurement conference report because it authorizes military expenditures which translate into appropriations which exceed our congressional budget targets.
I will vote against the school lunch conference report because it is automatic spending legislation which, as it comes back from the conference, would result in 1976 spending almost $430 million in excess of our budget target. I hope other Senators will vote likewise.
It is no discredit to our Senate conferees on these bills that we vote to reject these reports. Each bill, as it passed the House, exceeded the budget totals to an even greater degree than do these conference reports, The Senate conferees were able to reduce that excess spending but, regrettably, not to eliminate it.
But a vote to approve these conference reports is a vote to exceed the budget targets we set for ourselves in May. It is a vote for a larger deficit.
It is perfectly clear that Congress made a very conscious judgment in adopting the budget resolution to hold the budget deficit under $70 billion. The budget Congress adopted was based on 17 spending targets for items such as national defense, health, income security, and so on. It. is true that none of the individual spending priority targets is written in stone. But it is a pernicious fallacy to assert that we can be true to the budget process if we exceed a budget target in one area without deciding at the same time where we are going to cut the budget in another area.
Members may say that Congress is free to exceed the defense spending target or the income security spending target. Those Members must tell us where congress is going to cut the budget to compensate for these increases. Those Members must take responsibility for exceeding the $70 billion deficit we have agreed upon.
Congress can change its mind about budget targets after they are adopted. But I have not recently heard anyone suggest that we should spend more than the $367 billion targeted in our congressional budget as the total Federal spending. And I have not recently heard anyone advocate that we should exceed the $69.6 billion deficit ceiling it contains. So let us avoid exceeding any budget target unless we simultaneously decide where Congress will make appropriate reductions in other spending targets.
I call every Member's attention to the Senate budget scorekeeping report which clearly shows that there is very little slack in any spending category in which cuts can be made. As I have said over and over again, both at the time we adopted the Congressional Budget Resolution and after, this is a tight budget.
As chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, I must say that I do not see where spending will be cut in any spending target we have adopted. And I believe that, if Congress decides to breach a spending target, it is actually making a judgment to increase the deficit. That belief compels me to vote against both of these conference reports.
But there is another factor which compels votes. The Budget Reform Act has two purposes — to control Federal spending and cut waste, and to reorder our national priorities within an overall spending ceiling. These two conference reports provide both guns and butter — more in each case than Congress has targeted. Both should be rejected.
What if we reject only one report and not the other? Are we prepared to say to America's families and their children that we will break the budget to buy bullets, but we are going to cut back on the budget at the school lunch counter?
It can be argued that the defense bill we are considering is only an authorization for spending — that it must have a subsequent appropriation bill to translate it into actual Federal outlays. Some may feel free to vote for this bill even though, when it is appropriated for, it will exceed the budget. I think we must reject that argument. When the Senate approves an authorization for major military programs in July, the public has a right to expect we believe them necessary for our national defense — that we want those programs funded in September.
These bills test whether we are serious about the budget reform process. They test whether we intend to hold the line on Federal spending this year. They test whether we are going to deal even-handedly in holding the line, both for defense and domestic spending.
I believe both reports should be returned to conference for further changes, to make them more consistent with the Budget resolution. And I will so vote.
Mr. President, I shall try to make my comments on the Military Procurement Conference Report as brief as possible. We are on restricted time.
MILITARY PROCUREMENT CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 6674
Mr. President, I must oppose the conference report on H.R. 6674, the military procurement authorization bill.
I take this step with some reluctance. The conference report is the product of a long, hard fight.
The Senator from Mississippi and his colleagues among the Senate conferees won some important concessions from the House. In particular, I am delighted that the Senate side was able to keep out of the bill House provisions which would have effectively ended the practice of full funding for Navy shipbuilding programs. Had the House position prevailed, it would in my judgment have seriously undermined congressional control of an important segment of the defense budget and established a very bad budgeting precedent.
But as chairman of the Budget Committee, I must oppose this bill because if it is adopted and if the programs and personnel strengths which it authorizes are fully funded, it is my judgment that we will not be able to achieve the budget targets which the Congress adopted in May.
Mr. President, the Senate took to conference a bill which was compatible with the congressional budget targets. The conferees have come back with a bill which is roughly $0.9 billion higher in budget authority and $0.3 billion in outlays higher than the bill we passed in June.
When the Senate version of the procurement bill, S. 920, was before us I pointed out, as the Senator from Mississippi quite rightly said that it was consistent with our budget targets if most of a list of other possible defense cuts were made. In making this statement, I assumed that it was highly unlikely that we would retain the 5 percent cap on active pay. I think this assumption is still valid and prudent.
If this conference report were adopted, and we subsequently took all of the additional cuts on that list — and the other possible cuts which I assume are becoming less and less likely every day — we would be some $200 million below the budget authority target for national defense, but still be some $300 million above the outlay target. It is my judgment that if we adopt this conference report, we will inevitably bust the budget target for national defense.
The budget other than defense is very tight because we are now faced with increases of some $2.7 billion in outlays due to administration reestimates for mandatory programs over which the Congress has no control. My colleagues are aware that in October we will be voting on the second concurrent resolution on the budget. If, at that time, we find that we are over $367 billion outlay target we set for ourselves in May, and wonder what happened to our efforts to keep the deficit under control, we can look to bills like this one and know the reason why we failed. And the responsibility will belong to no one but ourselves.
I would like my colleagues briefly to review with me the reasoning behind my judgment that this bill threatens our budget targets. Our latest information on the national defense function indicates that we must cut $9.6 billion in budget authority and $5.4 billion in outlays from pending requests if we are to reach the defense target guidelines set forth in the statement of managers on the first concurrent resolution of the budget. These targets allowed $100.7 billion in budget authority and $90.7 billion in outlays.
This bill, the first major piece of legislation to be considered in the national defense function, would accomplish $4.2 billion — or 43.8 percent — of the total cut necessary in budget authority, and $1.3 billion — or 24 percent — of the total cut necessary in outlays. So you can see that this bill accomplishes a good deal less than half of the needed cuts. But H.R. 6674 covers well over half of the total defense function. We must remember that this bill not only authorizes $25.8 billion in budget authority for procurement and research, development, test and evaluation for the Department of Defense, but also authorizes nearly 3.1 million full time, direct employees for defense, including both military and civilians, as well as another 915,000 reservists drawing drill pay.
If these men are on the payroll, they must be paid. And the estimated pay costs — including removal of the 5 percent cap — come to roughly $34 billion in budget authority.
This pay fund, like all the other authorizations in this conference report, is subject to further action by appropriations. But it can be fairly said that this bill authorizes programs and personnel strengths which will cost approximately $60 billion, or roughly 60 percent of the national defense target for budget authority.
The outlays associated with these programs will come to $43 billion or 47 percent of the national defense outlay target.
If this bill is adopted and fully appropriated, we will have to find another $5.4 billion in budget authority or $4.1 billion in outlays to cut from the remaining defense requests.
On June 4, I provided the Senate with a list of possible options for further reductions in defense. I would like to go over that list again for the benefit of my colleagues, and I ask unanimous consent that that list be printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
[Table omitted]
Mr. MUSKIE. I ask my colleagues to listen carefully to it. The list detailed possible cuts totaling $6.8 billion in budget authority, and $5 billion in outlay. As I said at the time, it is my judgment that we are not likely to achieve the first item on the list, the 5 percent cap on active pay. That, of course, is something for my colleagues to consider. It is a decision they will have to make come October.
At this point it is virtually impossible that we will realize the $400 million of stockpile sales which the President recommended, which is the second item on that list. That knocks out a total of $1.6 billion in both budget authority and outlays, leaving a remaining possible cut list of $5.2 billion in budget authority, and $3.4 billion in outlays.
Mr. President, there are some other very doubtful items on that list. For example, we are not likely to achieve an outlay reduction approaching anything like $100 million in the military construction area. I listed several financial adjustments totaling $1.5 billion in budget authority and $1.2 billion in outlays. Now it seems to be highly doubtful that all of these adjustments will materialize. A large part of the adjustment depends on actions, administrative actions, over which Congress has no direct control, and our latest information indicates that these items should be discounted by at least $500 million in budget authority and outlays. So that is another $600 million savings which we cannot realistically expect.
If, therefore, the conference report on the bill is adopted and fully funded, and if we assume cuts from the list I have been describing which are realistic, we have to expect to exceed the defense target by about $700 million in budget authority and $1.3 billion in outlays.
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator yield for a moment?
Mr. MUSKIE. Yes, I yield for a moment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yield on whose time?
Mr. MUSKIE. I am just yielding to the Senator from Ohio for a moment. I had not finished my statement.
Mr. TAFT. The distinguished Senator mentioned a number of weapons systems, and I think it might be appropriate to bring up at this time it seems to me a matter of judgment which weapons system we are going to cut and which we are not.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine's 10 minutes have expired. Are we on the time of the Senator from Ohio?
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, can I ask the Senator from Ohio to ask his question on his own time? I am overcommitted on time already.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield 2 minutes now, Mr. President, to the Senator from Ohio.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On the Senator from Mississippi's time the Senator from Ohio is recognized.
Mr. TAFT. I note the fact that on June 6 the distinguished Senator from Maine said:
Mr. President, I am disappointed that the Senate Armed Services Committee did not authorize the full 10-ship request for fiscal year 1978. I hope that the Senate conferees will reexamine this program during negotiations with the House, and I hope that the Navy's full request will receive close consideration.
I looked down the budget and I find that is $151 million, so maybe it is a question of which items we think are the sounder.
The other question I have is, can we do anything about this? Could the committee have done anything about this? The arguments of the distinguished Senator from Maine would have been pertinent it seems to me, with regard to the budget and the situation when the bill first came to the Senate because we could only go between the Senate and House figures. We could only — we split just about evenly between the Senate and the House votes. How could we go lower than the lower figure between the House and the Senate to get down to $22 billion the Senator is talking about?
Mr. MUSKIE. Let me make two points, the Senator seems to have raised two: One, I am not undertaking here today to suggest to the conferees, you know, the line item cuts they ought to make or try to make when they go back to conference. I understand the difficulty of negotiating points of view that differ as to the priorities of various weapons systems. I am not undertaking to do that, and I would not suggest that the Senate tie the hands of the committee.
The second point I make on what the Senator has said is these first concurrent budget targets were set by Congress. They were adopted by the Senate and the House. These are not subject to further negotiations. The House is as much bound by them as the Senate, so I think from now on when you go into conference what every committee faces is the challenge not only of accommodating House and Senate differing views about the particular piece of legislation before them but the budget targets that both Houses have adopted. That is the purpose of my rising, may I say, to the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 2 minutes of the Senator from Ohio have expired.
Mr. TAFT. Would it be possible, I would ask the distinguished Senator, without changing radically the rules of the House and the Senate and the rules particularly with regard to conferences, for the conferees to have done what the Senator is asking that we do? How could we take into account any figures but those that have been given to us in the authorization bills sent to us by the House and Senate?
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator could have adopted the Senate numbers, may I say to the Senator; at the very least, that is consistent
Mr. TAFT. We attempted to do that, but I assure the Senator we would have no conference report to take up.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 1 minute of the Senator from Ohio has expired.
Who yields time?
Mr. MUSKIE. I will yield him a moment to answer his question.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield a minute, Mr. President, if he wants to ask another question or if he wants to answer.
Mr. MUSKIE. The point I am trying to make, may I say to the Senator, is if we are going to proceed with our legislative business as usual, as we have done it customarily, and just treat the budget process as some kind of a nuisance over to one side, and not significantly change our habits or our ways of doing things, it is going to be meaningless. You just cannot continue to do business as we have, for the 18 years I have been in this body, for the years the Senator has been in this body, and make this process work.
I do not particularly enjoy standing here and saying to members of the committees on which I do not serve, "Gentlemen, the budget requires that we do better." When I say that, I am not denigrating the efforts that were made. I understand it is traditional, when you go into a conference. to split the difference.
What I am saying to my colleagues is that when you have got a budget target that is binding on both Houses tradition has to give way to a greater extent to the imperatives of the question of the budget.
Mr. TAFT. I do not want to prolong this. What I am really asking the Senator is, is it possible under the rules of the Senate or the House to have done what the Senator asks? Maybe our budget resolution is wrong, maybe it ought to prevail. But, if I understand, there is no way in which we could have done what the Senator is asking: I am sympathetic with–
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. MUSKIE. I gather the Senator is saying to me that the rules would have prevented the House conferees from adopting the Senate version. I find that incredible. I do not understand that to be the rules. The Senate version at the time we sent it over was consistent with the budget guidelines. Is the Senator really saying to me that the House rules would have prevented the House from simply adopting S. 920 as it came to the conference?
Mr. TAFT. If the Senator will yield, Mr. President, just a moment, I think the Senator is wrong about that. We would have had to go way below the House version or the Senate version, both, in order to do what the Senator is asking.
Mr. MUSKIE. I guess I did not get–
Mr. TAFT. The figures here of the Senate are $25 billion, the House $26.5 billion. We could not go below the $25 billion figure. The Senator wants us to go to a $22 billion figure.
Mr. MUSKIE. I have not mentioned a figure. What I have tried to give to the Senator is an evaluation as of now of the budget implications of the conference report.
I take it that it is my duty to do so, and I take it the Senator would not want me to breach my duty. Those numbers — I yield myself 2 minutes to make this point.
Now, that is my duty. The Senator is saying to me that he does not want me to perform my duty. That is his prerogative but I regard it as my duty.
Second, I have not mentioned a number, but implicit in what I am saying is that we have got to come closer to the budget target — which is as much a House budget target as a Senate — than we have done.
I think the budget process mandates that.
Mr. BELLMON. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield to the Senator from Oklahoma at this time, but I do want to say a word later about the nuclear powered strike cruiser, inclusion of which in the conference report violates any rational notion of a budgetary process.
It was not included in the President's budget. It was not considered by Senate committees. The President sent an amendment to his budget to cover the nuclear strike cruiser after this bill had gone to conference. It comes here now before the Senate, committing us if we accept the report to a long-term cost of $1.2 billion per ship by today's figures, and to 8 to 18 units at that cost into the distant future without any proper evaluation having been made of the weapons systems, of its cost implications, of its relationship to the rest of the defense posture.
I think it is incredible that here, when the President and the Congress are committed to budgetary reform, that that kind of budgetary action is acceded to by the Congress, and I would hope on that one ground, wholly apart from these other considerations, the conference report will be rejected vehemently as a protest against that kind of budgetary procedure.
I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President–
MUSKIE (continuing) . Unless at this time Senator STENNIS would like me to yield.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes, if the Senator will yield, I have had an understanding with the Senator from Oklahoma, and he is willing that we use some time now, is that correct?
Mr. BELLMON. That is agreeable.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Missouri, and if he wants more I am glad to yield the time.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I thank my able colleague from Mississippi and I commend my colleague, Senator MUSKIE.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order so that those who wish to listen can do so?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair requests that the Senate be in order. The Senator will please suspend.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I commend my colleague, Senator MUSKIE, the able chairman of the Senate Committee on the Budget for so carefully evaluating the budgetary implications of the conference report on military procurement.
May I say as one of the conferees that the Senate made every effort to keep the final reported authorization as low as possible; and looking at the results of our conference, it would appear that an equitable resolution of differences was achieved.
The conference bill is $751 million above the Senate-passed figure and $756 million below the House-passed figure.
Mr. President, I have spent some time on these bills on this floor, 23 years, and at the same time as a member of the executive branch, I defended five military budgets in earlier administrations, and I have become convinced that the only way this can be handled in a manner that prevents log-rolling incident to the clever methods used to put various contracts in various States is to have an overall ceiling placed on the military budget.
As we know, at an earlier date I introduced a "ceiling" amendment on the Senate bill which would have reduced the Senate bill by some $1.2 billion and hence may have resulted in an even lower conference figure than we now have.
This is what is done in all businesses that I know anything about, when times get bad one puts an across-the-board ceiling, because each department is certain in its own mind why its particular position should not be reduced.
That was my hope, that we would use a normal business practice under sound accounting principles.
But that "ceiling" amendment was defeated 59 to 36, with the able chairman of Budget Committee joining those in opposition.
Now the budget chairman urges us to vote against the conference bill, and with great respect I say that this would appear to be somewhat inconsistent with his previous position.
Mr. MUSKIE. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I will be glad to yield, I am nearly through, and I would like to yield then and perhaps we could have a discussion.
Mr. MUSKIE. Well, I do not know about the time situation.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Well, I would ask unanimous consent to have time to respond. I do not like to see a good many dollars like this under a time limitation regardless of the conditions, but there it is.
Now, what I worry about and what I have seen happen consistently is that we will end up with a continuing resolution.
That is a trick used consistently and often. In turn, it ends up by giving various executive departments nearly all, if not all, they originally asked for.
So I would hope that in consideration of this amendment, and I shall support it although there are some things in it that have been well brought out by the able chairman of the Budget Committee, I signed the conference report and I shall support it, but I would just respectfully point out, let us see what happens in September and October, if we do this, with respect to our activities in the House as against what we plan now.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield 1 minute more, or 2 minutes more.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two more minutes to the Senator from Missouri.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I would say with all respect to my friend from Maine that next year, I hope, although I can understand why, it is excellent procedure, to analyze request by request in detail, I would ask him to note the votes on particular items that go into particular States, and one way we can avoid that parochial approach which has been very effective in the past, it has been utilized by the Defense Department for many, many years, including the 5 years I spent in the Pentagon Building, if there is some way we can get an overall ceiling I think we could accomplish more along the lines of what the able chairman of the Budget Committee wants.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I myself used less time than I expected. I thought the time I was yielding was monitored. I find now it ended up as 20 minutes without my knowing it.
The distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, in his eloquence and colloquy with the Senator from Ohio, used it up, but I would like to use 1 minute because of my fondness for the distinguished Senator from Missouri simply to reply.
I understand his position, of course. I never challenge his positions. I do not always agree, he does not always agree with mine, but I would simply like to say with respect to the approach that he mentions that the budget process is just that approach.
When we report out next year a concurrent resolution, it will have an overall target in the defense function as it did this year informally. This year it was $90.7 million, I think, informally in the committee report, and that is the approach he is urging and I concur in that.
Now, when we reduced the President's request to that figure in the Budget Committee markup, we did so after wide-ranging discussion of the implications in terms of what would come out when we got to that figure. So I really do not think we are that far apart, although we have had some difficulty accommodating our difference on this point.
But I want to say to the Senator that I am sorry I disappointed him in the vote on his amendment. I am sorry he is disappointing me in his vote on this proposal. But, as always, I have found the Senator a man of integrity and conviction, and I do not challenge his view at all.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I deeply appreciate those remarks, and I want to assure the Senator from Maine, regardless of any difference here, I will work with him to the best of my ability to accomplish what I think his committee can do, and that could be the most important single problem the Senate faces today.
Mr. MUSKIE. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, it is true that we are considering here an authorization bill, which does not provide budget authority directly. But this bill covers the major portion of the defense function and sets the pattern for spending bills that follow.
It is also true that the programs and manpower covered by this bill could be cut further in the appropriations process. This has happened in the past. We are, however, making judgments here not only on weapons systems and defense manpower levels, but on budget priorities. In my judgment, if we accept these numbers, we will have to live with the consequences.
Furthermore, we should note that the conferees on this bill have stipulated that military pay will not be increased by more than 5 percent unless civilian pay caps are lifted. The conferees have stated what is already in the law, since military pay increases are tied by the Rivers amendment to civilian pay raises. As I think the cap is not likely to happen, it is my responsibility, looking toward the second concurrent resolution and the budget-busting implications of this bill, to vote against the conference report on H.R. 6674.
Part of our job — our collective job — under the new Budget Act is to keep our spending legislation within this year's targets. I have spoken frequently on this subject, and it is my principal reason for opposing H.R. 6674.
But the Budget Act imposes other tasks as well. One is to begin taking the long view by insisting on a full assessment of the future costs of new programs. Another is to require the executive branch to give full information as to the substance and cost of new programs, and adequate time to review the facts.
As I reported to the Senate on July 9, the $60 million item for long-lead time procurement related to a strike cruiser, which the House included in its version of the procurement bill, has very large consequences for the future shape of the Navy and for future defense budgets if the Congress should decide to go ahead with the nuclear strike cruiser.
This item was not included in the President's budget for 1976, nor was it identified to either the House or Senate Budget Committee as a potential budget item. The Department of Defense offered no testimony to the Congress defining the ship to which this procurement would be applied, or addressing the shipbuilding plan into which it would fit. The Senate in particular had no opportunity to give the matter its consideration.
Then on June 24, the executive branch submitted to Congress an amendment to the President's budget requesting authorization and appropriation of the $60 million item in fiscal 1976. This amendment was proposed less than a week before the fiscal year in which it would take effect, for a bill that was already in conference. From a purely procedural point of view, this sequence is unacceptable.
I am informed that the strike cruiser will, in all likelihood, be slower than a conventionally powered alternative under consideration by the Department of Defense, but will cost 50 percent more to build and operate. I am also informed that it may be slower than existing Soviet attack submarines. Authorization of a strike cruiser in 1977 would lead to concurrent development of both the ship and the production version of its main weapon system. Moreover, I am told that there is good reason to question whether the strike cruiser can, in fact, be out under contract on schedule or at the prices which are currently being quoted, due to a serious dispute between the Navy and the only shipyard capable of building this ship. These are serious questions. We simply do not have the information before us on which to make a judgment on the merits of the strike cruiser.
But whatever the merits of the ship, its inclusion in this conference report sets a very bad precedent for the future. If we are to achieve real congressional control over the budget, we must firmly resist such departures from the spirit and letter of the 1974 Budget Impoundment and Control Act.
I recognize that in dealing with this item, the Senate conferees were faced with a very difficult situation. The House had approved, in effect, two nuclear ships, while the Senate bill contained neither.
The Senate conferees are to be commended in excluding from the final version of this bill another nuclear ship authorized by the House, thereby saving a total of $332 million, and for their efforts to limit the $60 million item to long lead time components only.
I also support the requirement that the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense submit their long-range plans for this program and other shipbuilding goals for congressional review next year. These plans will provide an opportunity to review in depth the very serious question of the future shape of the Navy. Next year is time enough to consider the nuclear strike cruiser.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute and then I propose to yield to the Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. President, let me specially thank the Senator from Missouri for the long, long hours that he puts into these programs year after year, digging deep and coming up with strong recommendations. Like me, he did not get all he saw and wanted in the preparation of this conference report, but he gladly signed it and supports it here in the Chamber, as the best, as I understand it, that can be had under the circumstances.
Mr. President, the idea of charging this bill with $40 billion in the salaries of uniformed and civilian people in the Department of Defense is, to me, just unthinkable. I had not heard it mentioned until this challenge came up.
The year the Senator from Missouri was acting chairman of this committee, in 1973, they were requested in committee to set some kind of a ceiling number.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FORD). The Senator's 1 minute has expired.
Mr. STENNIS. One additional half-minute, please.
They wanted some kind of a ceiling number on the civilians as well as on the uniformed services. That was done, and we have followed that mandate of the Congress. But the Appropriations Committee all these years, and now, to this minute, controls the amount of money appropriated. I think the record will show their reduction.
I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from Arkansas.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 8 minutes.
Mr. McCLELLAN. I will try to finish in that time.
Mr. President, I want to compliment the Armed Services Committee for what I think is the excellent job that it has done in a difficult situation in working out the conference report.
The Senate bill, as passed, was some $1.5 billion, in round numbers, I believe, under the House bill. That meant they had to go to conference with those differences to be resolved.
As I understand, there were some 305 different items that were in disagreement between the House and the Senate, and also some 53 language disagreements that had to be worked out.
I also understand that the conferees on this bill continued working from June 11 until July 25. Over that period of time they had 17 meetings of the conference, finally working out what is now the conference report.
With respect to the figures in the bill — and I do not know how they came out on the language — the Senate went up some $750 million and the House came down some $775 million. So it was about a split.
I am sure they would not have achieved that except for the long hours of labor, hard work and the dedicated effort made by the conferees on the part of the Senate.
Mr. President, I hope the conference report will be adopted.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order? Senators want to hear this.
McCLELLAN. I do not believe that for the very small issue in contention here today, it warrants a repudiation of the work of this committee.
I do not feel that it justifies us imposing on the conferees the burden of trying to go back after the House has approved the results of the conference, and especially when the Senate certainly came out even. It lost nothing; it gained something; it saved $775 million in authorization in its labors.
I just feel it would be such a burden — and it would be a burden, if not torture, in a fashion — to send these conferees back and have them go through this long ordeal again, when everything in this bill, if it does exceed the budget, will have a review.
It still has to be appropriated, and anything in the appropriation bill that exceeds what the Budget Committee thinks is proper is subject to amendment, subject to change, subject to debate, and the issue can be resolved. I do not feel that we should impose on these fine Senators on both sides of the aisle who have worked so hard and achieved such a fine result.
Mr. President, I do not have time, but I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD certain pieces of relevant information.
Earlier this year I had printed in the RECORD a table showing how expenditures of Government have progressed during the past 10 years.
I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that this be printed in the RECORD again.
There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
[Table omitted]
Mr. McCLLELAN. I call attention to the fact that out of the $214 billion in the cost of Government during past10 years, only 17.82 percent of was for the military. The rest of it was
for programs other than the military.
We should keep that in mind.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed, in the RECORD part of a statement I made at that time with respect to expenditures.
There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
Military personnel costs have in recent years also escalated as a result of inflation and the all- volunteer services concept. In fiscal 1976, personnel and related costs will account for 53 percent of the Department of Defense outlays, or $49.2 billion of the $92 billion estimated. This represents an increase of $2.4 billion in spending on personnel in one year alone to maintain a smaller force.
Although the number of military personnel will have been reduced from 3.5 million men in 1968 to 2.1 million in 1976, average per capita cost is expected to double due principally to pay increases and inflation — from $5,500 to $12,000 in 1976. As a result, total active duty pay costs for our military personnel have risen from $19 billion in 1968 to $25 billion in 1976.
Spending for national defense is up almost $9 billion over last year, but nearly one-third of this, $2.4 billion, will go for military and civilian pay and related personnel costs. Of the remaining $6 billion, about $1.8 billion will go for procurement; $2.6 billion for operation and maintenance; about $1 billion for research and development, and about $400 million for military construction and family housing.
Mr. McCLELLAN. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that there be printed in the RECORD at this point a table showing what we have accomplished in the Appropriations Committee during the past 3 years since I have served as chairman. With the cooperation and fine support of the members of the Appropriations Committee, we have reduced Defense budget requests by $13,718,000,000 below the budget.
There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
[Table omitted]
Mr. McCLELLAN. The only other agency that showed an overall decrease under the budget during that time was the foreign assistance appropriation. During that same period of time, they reduced their budget by $4,994,000,000.
It is a total, Mr. President, of $18,712,000,000 cut in those two areas, defense and foreign spending. During the same period of time, however, the other agencies of Government exceeded the budget by $1,154,000,000.
We are making an effort, a conscientious effort. Whatever is in this authorization bill will be reviewed. I do not know, I do not say it will be cut a nickel, and I do not promise that it will be financed fully, either. We are going to look at it. When we have done our job, the Senators will have their opportunity here in the Chamber, item by item, to strike them out, if they wish to do so.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD a table showing the Department of Defense operating costs, how they have increased during the past few years, with a statement explaining it.
There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
Department of Defense operating costs
[In billions of dollars]
Fiscal Petroleum
year Subsistence fuels
1968 (Vietnam peak) 1.777 1.432
1973 1.497 1.380
1974 1.471 1.827
1975 1.704 2.991
1976 1.714 3.424
At the peak of the Vietnam war, it cost $1.777 billion to feed 3,547,000 men; the fiscal year 1976 estimate is about the same ($1.714 billion) to feed 2,100,000 men (41 percent less men).
Food which cost $1.00 in 1967 now costs $1.70 – 70 percent increase.
Housing which cost $1.00 in 1967 now costs $1.60 – 60 percent increase.
Overall items which cost $1.00 in 1967 now cost $1.55 – 55 percent increase.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement showing how we have reduced total military personnel since 1968, the peak of the Vietnam war. We have reduced military personnel by 1,447,000.
There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
[Table omitted]
Since 1968, peak of the Vietnam war, to date, there has been a reduction of 1,447,000 military personnel (41 percent), while total outlays for military manpower have increased by $11.5 billion (52 percent).
ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE
For the period fiscal year 1971-1974, an estimated $4.0 billion was spent on All Volunteer Force incentives. Annual AVF costs for fiscal year 1975 and fiscal year 1978 are approximately $325 million per year.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a table showing the Department Defense military personnel budget authority. That is for financing the personnel of the military, Mr. President. We have cut that each year since fiscal 1972.
There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MILITARY PERSONNEL BUDGET AUTHORITY
[In millions of dollars]
BudgetAppro-
Fiscal year request priation Difference
Military personnel:
1971 21,032.8 20,734.8 -298.0
1972 21,292.0 21,024.6 -267.4
1973 23,658.6 23,140.9 -517.7
1974 22,706.5 22, 375. 0 -331. 5
1975 24,651.9 24,124.1 -560.4
Mr. President, I hope the labors and the work of this committee will be sustained by the adoption of this conference report. And may I say this, Mr. President: There occurred on the floor of the Senate a few days ago — and I am not criticizing anyone, everyone is entitled to his own judgment—
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. McCLELLAN. I ask for 1 more minute.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield the Senator 2 minutes.
Mr. McCLELLAN. I voted against the public works countercyclical assistance authorization bill because there was a movement on the floor of the Senate to increase next year's expenditures by $1.25 billion, or by $1.125 billion, I forget which.
Mr. President, we are not going to be able to do justice to our country if all we are going to do is reduce the military, and not give comparable consideration and conscientious effort to making reductions in other areas of government. The military cannot stand all that the Senators wish to impose upon it without impairing and imperiling, to some degree, more or less, the security of our Nation.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from pages 25735 and 25736 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of July 29, 1975.
There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I observe on page 9 of the committee report it sets forth the amount of authorizations contained in the bill, the total authorizations, and the anticipated expenditures for fiscal 1976.
There have been some amendments adopted here this afternoon. Will the distinguished manager of the bill state for the record a revision of these totals on page 9, taking into account amendments that have been adopted to this measure.
Mr. MONTOYA. I say to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas that the original bill which came out of the committee called for an authorization of $2,125,000,000. This was a 1-year authorization. Then in the Chamber today, as a result of the action of the Senate on the Muskie amendment, we have added what is estimated to be an outlay of $1,250,000,000 for the first year, and it is estimated, in view of the fact that the Muskie amendment carries an authorization for 3 years, the second year will be approximately $2 billion, and the third year will be approximately another $2 billion
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. MONTOYA. Yes, I yield.
Mr. MUSKIE. Of course, that depends on what happens to the unemployment rate.
Mr. MONTOYA. Yes, that is correct. We have some projections from the administration that indicate that unemployment will remain high for the coming 2 years. If that proves to be the case, then there will be an outlay under this authorization of approximately $2 billion annually. For the first year, we will not have that kind of an outlay because with the late date of enactment of the bill, it will probably be October before we start making any outlays or commitments.
Mr. McCLELLAN. If I understand correctly, we are now undertaking to authorize for 3 years instead of for 1 year anticipating what may happen and what conditions may be during the 3 year period.
Mr. MONTOYA. That is correct.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Whereas the bill originally authorized for only 1 year, it now would authorize appropriations over a period of 3 years.
Mr. MONTOYA. The bill that came out of committee was an authorization for public works for $2,125,000,000 for fiscal year 1976.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Of which $900 million would be outlays in fiscal 1976?
Mr. MONTOYA. That is correct.
Mr. McCLELLAN. After the amendments that have been adopted, what are the anticipated outlays for 1976 under the bill as amended? Is it $1.25 billion, if I understood the Senator correctly?
Mr. MONTOYA. Plus $900 million.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Plus $900 million.
Mr. MONTOYA. That is correct.
Mr. McCLELLAN. In other words, instead of being $900 million outlays for fiscal 1978 as in the committee bill under the bill as now amended it would be $2.15 billion.
Mr. MONTOYA. That is correct.
Mr. McCLELLAN. That is how much we are increasing the bill for fiscal year 1976 alone. I thank the Senator. I think the amendments provide entirely too much. I think it is unwise to do this. Mr. President I support the committee bill as reported, but I cannot vote for this bill as amended. I shall now vote against it.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. MONTOYA. I yield.
Mr. MUSKIE. I will make the point which I made earlier when some of the Senators now present were not present. This is almost precisely the amount that was allowed in function 450, the congressional budget, $2.1 billion public works and emergency assistance to State and local governments. So we are within the congressional budget.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, Jr, and Mr. TUNNEY addressed the Chair.
Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Virginia.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, Jr. I ask for clarification. Is the total of the bill now before us, as a result of the Muskie amendment, $5½ billion added by the amendment plus $2 billion in the original bill? Is the, total then $7½ billion?
Mr. MONTOYA. As I stated before, the outlay anticipated for the first year, under the Muskie amendment is $1,250,000,000. The outlay expected for the second year of authorization would be approximately $2 billion, depending on the rate of unemployment, and for the third year another $2 billion, depending on the constancy of the unemployment rate.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, Jr. That is correct. The point I am not clear on is this: Is that on top of the original $2.1 billion?
Mr. MONTOYA. That is correct.
Mr. HARRY F. BYRD Jr. Now we have it. I thank the Senator.
Mr. MUSKIE: Mr. President, I give myself 1 minute.
First, I gather from what the distinguished Senator from Arkansas has said that he believes we do not have to worry about authorization bills as they go through. As a matter of fact, last week, on the health authorization bill, he expressed concern to me about the budgetary implications.
Mr. President, the same kind of concern has to be directed to defense authorization bills. The bill to which the Senator referred., that the Senate passed last week, was specifically within the budget. The public works countercyclical assistance bill was within the budget. We cannot rewrite that budget every week of the session. We wrote it in May, and I think we honor the priorities that Congress has established, and we try also to honor the target ceilings.
Today we are concerned about a target ceiling. Particular Senators may wish it was higher, and many think it is too high. But whether we honor that ceiling in Congress or not, that is the simple issue before us today, and all the rest of rhetoric should be taken with that issue in mind.
I yield now to the Senator from Oklahoma, the ranking Republican Member of the Budget Committee, who has been kept waiting far too long.