February 24, 1975
Page 4098
A BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, last week I spoke at the University of Delaware on the subject of American foreign policy.
My remarks were intended as a response to President Ford's recent appeal for a return to the bipartisan spirit in our external affairs. I have noted similar remarks in recent days by some of our distinguished colleagues, so I thought I would add my own to the RECORD. I ask unanimous consent that my speech of last week be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY: A RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT
(Remarks by Senator EDMUND S. MUSKIE)
I would like to respond tonight to President Ford's recent call for a return to the bipartisan foreign policy which characterized the era of President Truman.
That spirit was typified by the late Republican Senator Arthur Vandenburg, who urged in the post-World War II period that we "unite our official voice at the water's edge so that America speaks with maximum authority against those who would divide and conquer us and the free world."
Invoking the spirit of Senator Vandenburg in a speech last week, President Ford claimed that partisan politics are now threatening "to bring our successful foreign policy to a standstill." He said he did not mean to exclude Congress from the foreign policy process, but that a distinction must be drawn between the making of policy – in which Congress should participate – and the execution of policy, which should fall within the exclusive domain of the Executive Branch.
It is a useful distinction, and I would like to respond tonight in a positive way to the President's initiative.
My mission tonight as a spokesman for bipartisanship is a role I have played before. Less than a year ago, in a speech at the U.S. Naval Academy, I expressed my own belief that "we are on the verge of a new coherence in American foreign policy, a new sense of direction and common purpose, and a restoration of the bipartisan tradition in America's foreign relations."
On that occasion I said that Americans were united on four fundamental principles of U.S. foreign policy: First, that an isolationist policy is not a viable option for America; second, that the general direction of detente is an important American interest; third, that our alliances with Europe and Japan are still vital, notwithstanding progress toward detente; and fourth, that our foreign policy must reflect the increasing interdependence of the developed and underdeveloped world.
I reaffirm those principles tonight. Obviously, a restored bipartisanship in American foreign policy must not stifle constructive debate on the day-to-day issues which confront our nation abroad. But a restored bipartisanship should recognize the broad base of agreement concerning our purpose in the world and the great tasks before us. We must draw upon the strength that such unity gives us in order to fulfill the role which history has assigned to us as the most powerful nation of the present era. We cannot shrink from those responsibilities. We must, in President Kennedy's words, welcome them.
And so I give my own measured support to President Ford's appeal last week for a restored bipartisanship in our foreign affairs. I understand his criticism of recent congressional actions. But a more effective working relationship between Congress and the President will require improvements on both sides. I have some suggestions which I would like to share with you tonight.
I.
The Congress has been reasserting its constitutional authority in the foreign policy area in recent years, and I am convinced that historians will look back on this period with favor. As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the last two Congresses, I was privileged to be a part of this process. I am proud of the role Congress played in forcing an end to direct American involvement in Indochina. And I am proud to have floor-managed the War Powers bill – which was designed to prevent future Vietnams – and to have helped guide this historic legislation through a difficult House-Senate conference and over a Presidential veto. This bill, which resulted from thoughtful and persistent efforts of many Senators and Representatives, was one of the great legislative accomplishments of the 93rd Congress.
The purpose of the War Powers bill was not to alter the Constitution, but to restore and fulfill the intent of the Constitution in matters of war and peace. The essential purpose of the bill was to define – more exactly, to reaffirm – the constitutional authority of Congress to decide whether and when our country will go to war. In no sense was the legislation intended to encroach upon or to detract from the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief. It merely reaffirmed what the framers of the Constitution intended, and the reasoning of the founding fathers is a matter of historical record: dismayed by the arbitrary power of the British Crown to drag the American colonies into unwanted wars, they vested the authority to initiate war in the legislature, transferring that power, as Jefferson put it, "from those who are to spend to those who are to pay."
The War Powers bill is properly regarded as legislation which should not have been necessary – and would not have been necessary – if Congress and the President had remained within their respective constitutional spheres. But three decades of total war, limited war, and Cold War had propelled the American political system far along the road to executive domination in the conduct of foreign relations. This had been the result, in part of presidential usurpation. But it had also resulted from congressional lassitude and unquestioning support of presidential leadership. Most of all, it resulted from war itself, and from these past three decades of constant crisis and disruption.
The events of recent years have shifted the balance between Congress and the Executive Branch in significant ways. Congress, with broad public support, rebelled successfully against the Executive Branch on the issue of Vietnam. Passage of the War Powers bill over a presidential veto restored the original constitutional design of checks and balances between the two branches in the area of war and peace. And Watergate left the American people more distrustful than ever before of presidential power. So the pendulum has swung.
But there remains the question of how far we should allow the pendulum to swing. Two recent congressional actions, undertaken for legitimate and valid reasons, have now led to unintended and unfortunate results. I refer to the Jackson Amendment to the Trade bill and the termination of military aid to Turkey. The failure of these congressional initiatives to achieve their purposes should cause us to reflect honestly upon what has happened, and to learn the lessons which might guide us more prudently in the future.
I supported the Jackson Amendment, along with over three-fourths of the Senate, because I believed it to be an effective expression of our legitimate concern for the rights of Soviet Jews. I need not cite examples of Soviet government abuse of those rights – which were guaranteed both under Soviet and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Those abuses are well known.
The purpose of the amendment was to force the Soviet government to moderate its policy in exchange for a normalized trading relationship with the U.S., which it clearly wanted. During the early months of negotiations over the amendment among the various parties, there were hopeful signs of progress. For example, the Soviets responded to U.S. pressure by allowing an increased flow of Jewish emigrants during 1973-up to a total of 35,000 for the year.
But as the issue dragged on, the flow of emigrants began to drop. Only 20,000 made it out of the Soviet Union in 1974, a drop of 40 percent. This year, with formal Soviet repudiation of the trade agreement, the January emigration figure of 1,250 signals a further 20 percent reduction over the previous year's monthly average. The Soviet government says officially that applications are down, but U.S. sources say that at least 130,000 Soviet Jews have filed applications for exit visas, and that harassment of Jews seeking to leave and pressure on their families have increased.
I had always believed – and said so on several occasions – that the value of the Jackson Amendment would be proved or disproved in the process of implementation. Clearly it would be a failure – a tragic failure for Soviet Jews and a serious setback for proponents of detente – if it were pushed to the point of Soviet repudiation of the trade agreement. Compromise and accommodation were obviously required in the final stages of negotiation – but that is precisely where the negotiations broke down.
American idealism is rightly engaged with the question of personal liberties in the Soviet Union, if only because some minimal moral framework is essential to a stable peace. The practical question for American policy is not whether a degree of pressure for human liberties is warranted, but at what point pressure may become excessive, and therefore detrimental to its own purpose.
Clearly, there are limits to what we can demand of the Soviet Union in areas which they regard as matters solely of domestic concern. At the same time, we cannot be indifferent to those aspects of the Soviet system which are repugnant to our own social and political values.
But those of us who support the policy of detente believe that the steady normalization of political and economic relations provides the greatest opportunity for bringing about constructive changes in the Soviet society in the long run. Consequently, I look forward to a renewed partnership between Congress and the President in the pursuit of this vital foreign policy objective which we share in common.
A second congressional action which raises questions of judgment and timing was the cut-off of military assistance to Turkey. As in the case of the Jackson Amendment, the purpose of Congress was reasonable and legitimate. Turkey had in fact invaded Cyprus. The Turkish use of American- supplied arms in Cyprus violated the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, and the agreement under which Turkey accepted the arms. Under the law, the aid cut-off was supposed to be automatic. When the Administration failed to implement the law, Congress simply moved to ensure that the law was observed.
The problem is that the law itself – and congressional action to enforce it – may not have been a constructive contribution in this particular set of circumstances. The Cyprus tangle is enormously complex. The Turkish invasion followed a clumsy military coup on Cyprus under the thinly- disguised sponsorship of the Greek military junta. The prospect of a rapid move toward union with Greece seemed plausible, and the rights of Turkish Cypriots appeared threatened. When British efforts to mediate the crisis broke down, the Turks acted. So the Turkish invasion, whether or not it was justified, was at least not totally unprovoked.
With the Turkish invasion and the subsequent fall of the Greek military junta, world opinion shifted against the Turks. Negotiations were slow and unproductive, and the Congress became exasperated with the spectacle once again of U.S. arms aid being used for purposes contrary to American interests. So the congressional response in cutting off arms aid to Turkey was understandable.
The problem was that congressional action limited the Administration's flexibility in dealing with the crisis. The international consequences have subsequently gotten out of hand, with Turkey's proclamation of an "autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration" on the island. It is extremely doubtful that the Greek Cypriots will agree to a companion Greek Administration within what the Turks envisage as a "Bi-Regional Federation." More likely, Greek Cypriots will now press for union with Greece, completing the destruction of sovereign Cyprus. Another possibility is guerrilla warfare, complicated by Archbishop Makarios' threat to seek support from Moscow.
Continued American military assistance to Turkey might not have guaranteed effective American leverage over Turkish actions – but the unilateral termination of aid was an important factor contributing to the present diplomatic mess.
II
If Congress can be faulted for some of its recent actions, I would like also to caution the President with respect to his handling of the most enduring burden of our recent foreign policy – the war in Indochina.
The outlook for Cambodia and South Vietnam is gloomy. The Cambodian capital is now isolated and under siege. In South Vietnam, an estimated 175,000 North Vietnamese regular combat troops have been infiltrated during the last two years of the so-called cease fire. The Communists have captured eleven district capitals and one provincial capital during the same period. Another major battle now appears to be shaping up for control of Tay Ninh Province, only 45 miles northwest of Saigon.
The United States has paid an extraordinary price in helping to preserve friendly governments in Indochina over the last decade: about $150 billion and 56,000 American lives lost. We have done so for no other reason than stubborn, faithful support of allied governments under siege. For it cannot be said that the outcome of the Indochina war – whatever it may be – would measurably affect American security or our interests in the world.
So let no one say that we have not stood by our friends in Indochina. I do not know of any great power in the history of the world which has sacrificed so much for so little national gain as we have done in Indochina for more than ten years.
And that, I'm afraid, says a lot about the quality of our leadership in this whole sorry episode of our nation's history.
The failures of American policy in Indochina were bipartisan. If the future brings the final collapse of regimes which have been friendly to us – as I fear it will – let us accept that fate without shame or partisan recrimination. For it has always been true that the ultimate outcome in Indochina has depended on political realities unique to those peoples – realities which no amount of U.S. military or economic assistance could ever fundamentally transform. We have tried and failed. Let us accept our failure maturely – without bitterness and without self-recrimination.
As the situation in Cambodia and South Vietnam deteriorates, the atmosphere in Washington is becoming more tense. The President wants emergency assistance for those two governments amounting to $522 million – $300 million for South Vietnam and $222 million for Cambodia. In a desperate effort to show the Congress a glimpse of light at the end of the tunnel, he has pledged to end all aid within three years, regardless of the circumstances then prevailing.
And there is another sign of desperation – a chilling sign which troubles me deeply. It is the beginning of an Administration attack on the Congress, which is reluctant to provide the emergency assistance requested, for partaking in a sinister betrayal of our friends in Indochina.
I urge the President to put a stop to such mean-spirited demagoguery.
Last week, 82 members of the House and Senate sent a letter to President Ford which reflects the deep concern of Congress over what is happening. I would like to quote a passage from that letter: "another prolonged disagreement over events in Vietnam and our policy there may lead to acrimonious accusations over who 'lost' Indochina reminiscent of the China debate over two decades ago. The result of that earlier experience was to freeze U.S. options in Asia for a quarter of a century. We must at all costs avoid a repetition of such a struggle which would set the Congress against the Executive. ... This is not the time for another divisive debate that can only impede the development of the cooperation so necessary in dealing with the complex problems of global inflation, domestic recession, and growing shortages of necessary raw materials. Instead, we need, to work together."
III
And so I call tonight for a return to bipartisanship in its most constructive form – with Congress and the President working together in making foreign policy, and with Congress giving adequate flexibility to the President for the execution of policy.
Such a relationship is possible because we are a nation which is united behind certain fundamental principles of foreign policy as well as on our purposes in the world and the great tasks before us.
But the President and Secretary Kissinger must give to Congress more than simply rhetoric about consultation and cooperation. The penchant for secrecy and surprise, for clandestine operations abroad, for misleading testimony before Congress if not outright lies – all this has been a part of the record of recent years.
We have a new President. Let us also have a new standard of honesty and candor in dealing with the Congress, the press and the public.
Given such an atmosphere, bipartisanship can flourish. Let's give it a chance.