October 10, 1974
Page 35083
ERDA AND PASSAMAQUODDY
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, as a nation we learned last winter the economic and political costs of reliance on a single energy source. We discovered that other nations, by controlling our access to their resources, could control the availability and prices of energy products in this country.
The experience was a shattering one for all of us who had come to take for granted a stable energy supply for the indefinite future. Quite bluntly, the experience caught us off our guard.
In order to minimize the chances of an increasing succession of energy crises like the one of last winter, the Congress set about trying to devise a broad, coherent policy for dealing with energy problems of the future. One major result of that effort will be the Energy Research and Development Administration – ERDA – which is currently in the final stages of the legislative process.
As its broadest function, ERDA is intended to consolidate the Federal Government's fragmented energy research and development functions into a workable blueprint for the future. As part of this effort, one of ERDA's most important specific functions will be to provide support for a wide range of energy related activities.
For example, ERDA would guarantee funding not only for fossil and nuclear energy programs but also for solar, geothermal, and other advanced energy sources as well.
The impact of this mandate will be immediate. Proponents of such potentially important projects as a reasonably priced solar heating and cooling unit for residential use or the practical utilization of wind power for the production of electricity will no longer be forced to go "door to door" among the various Federal agencies in futile attempts to convince bureaucrats of the efficacy of their ideas.
ERDA's mandate to encourage diversification of energy sources will affect a number of other advanced energy projects which have been heretofore declared impractical, but which now must be judged in light of the new practicalities of the energy crisis. One such project is the proposal to harness the powerful ebb and flow of the tides, and its foremost example is the Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project in Eastport, Maine.
The Passamaquoddy project was first proposed in 1919 by an American engineer, Dexter Cooper. Cooper saw in the powerful tides of "Quoddy" Bay the potential for the production of great amounts of electrical energy. Cooper's plans called for the use of dams and spillways which would have made Passamaquoddy Bay an upper pool to hold the high tide, and Cobscook Bay a lower pool which would drain at low tide. Power would have been generated by flow between the two pools.
Work began on the "Quoddy" project in the 1930's but was halted shortly before World War II, never to begin again in earnest. It became our policy instead to promote the utilization of the pollution producing, nonrenewable fossil energy sources. Quoddy and the other advanced energy producing projects like it were shunted aside as we spent more money looking for more ways to use more oil, more natural gas and more coal.
We have learned now that we must change our wasteful and greedy ways. How these changes are accomplished depends to a large degree on the decisions that will be made by the officials of the Energy Research and Development Administration.
I hope that they take a serious new look at the Quoddy Project and other advanced energy projects such as the practical utilization of wood for home heating, wind energy and solar energy that have long been the objects of serious discussion and experimentation in my home state.
And I hope they will bring a breath of fresh air to the whole realm of Federal energy policy.
In many ways, the Federal Government is the last passenger aboard. Experimental efforts have been going on at the State and local levels for some time now. My own State of Maine has already established an Office of Energy Research and Policy, to deal with Maine's own unique energy resources.
The energy resources of the individual States and the innovative energies of their citizens are as vast and varied as the Nation itself.
I hope that the ERDA will pay close heed to these creative resources, for they are closely tied to a better future for all of us.
For those of my colleagues who are not completely familiar with the Passamaquoddy Project, I ask unanimous consent that an article published in the Ellsworth American, entitled "Passamaquoddy! The Dream That Won't Die," be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
PASSAMAQUODDY! THE DREAM THAT WON'T DIE
(By George R. Marvin)
(NOTE.– Twice a day, more water than flows down the Mississippi in two weeks ... Almost as much as passes over Niagara Falls – day after day.
With such untamed might, the dreamers of Passamaquoddy envisioned a great power project. After years of planning and persuading, easier, cheaper sources of energy shut out serious action on the Passamaquoddy Bay project.
The tides did not stand still. Day after day, night end noon, in and out, the tides at Passamaquoddy ebbed and flowed. And the dream of harnessing such might from the sun and the moon, to turn it to man's purposes, never died.
The idea of a tidal power project in Passamaquoddy Bay is still very much alive. This story, taken from a series of articles in The Ellsworth American, describes the project, its history, hopes and disappointments, and how it would work.
"The Passamaquoddy Bay Tidal Power Project and The New Deal" was written by George R. Marvin at Bowdoin College.)
QUODDY DREAM DIDN'T DIE WITH NEW DEAL
Preface
My interest in the Passamaquoddy Bay Tidal Power Project stems primarily from the years of cruising which I have experienced along the Maine coast. One of my favorite cruising areas is the Bay of Fundy, including Passamaquoddy and Cobscook Bays. This area is still wild and virtually untouched. The gigantic tides of this region provide a further enticement for the yachtsman who seeks adventure.
The Passamaquoddy Project is also of interest to me because it represents the most significant New Deal project in Maine, if not all New England. It clearly shows the political scene in Maine as it was in the 1930's.
In many ways, it is unchanged from the situation which exists in Maine today.
My research has carried me from Eastport, Maine, to Hyde Park, New York, in quest of answers to my questions about the project. I believe that this paper answers all these questions and I am satisfied that I have written as complete a history of this period of the project as is possible with the materials which were available to me.
Along the way, I have become indebted to a number of people who helped me with my project. I would like to express my gratitude to: Professors Herbert Brown and Albert Abrahamson of Bowdoin College; the archivists of the University of Maine and Bowdoin College Libraries; Miss Joyce Emery, daughter of R. C. Emery, Eastport; the entire staff of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York; Congressman William Hathaway and his staff for furnishing me with materials from the Library of Congress; and my sister, Patricia McIsaac, for her diligent typing job. Without the assistance of the above people this project could not have been undertaken.
Introduction
The term "Down East" stems from the days of the old coasting schooners. Because of the prevailing southwest winds these vessels would have to beat upwind to Boston and then sail downwind to the eastward in order to reach Maine. New Englanders generally regard the entire State of Maine as "Down East" but to Mainers the term really means Washington County, the communities of Machias, Calais, Eastport and Lubec. Washington County is a wretchedly poor area. Its residents have to hoe rocks trying to earn a living farming, or else risk their lives along the treacherous coast while fishing. Otherwise the people of the "Sunrise" County turn to poor relief.
Calais is the border city best known for its similar spelling but different pronunciation from the French city. Machias is the county seat. Lubec's one item of notoriety is that it boasts West Quoddy Head, the easternmost point in the United States. Eastport, of course, is the mythical place referred to in so many marine weather broadcasts. These latter two cities look over the beautiful Passamaquoddy Bay region (locally known as "Quoddy") which separates Maine from New Brunswick, Canada.
Eastport, which is actually located on Moose Island, is but two miles from Lubec by water, but over 40 miles away by land. The reason is that behind these two cities is Cobscook Bay which empties into lower Passamaquoddy Bay through the two-mile stretch of water separating Lubec and Eastport. In the War of 1812 there was a boundary dispute between the United States and Great Britain over the ownership of Eastport. While the two countries argued many people packed up and founded a new town called Lubec. Cobscook Bay has an area of about 40 square miles while Passamaquoddy Bay has over 100 square miles.
The tidal currents in this are fantastic. Between Eastport and Lubec is one entrance into upper Passamaquoddy Bay. This passage is less than a mile in width and over 300 feet deep. At certain times of the tide this is the site of the second largest whirlpool in the world, so well described in the following poem entitled "The Sow."
The Bay, the Bay when we put out
To make the factory
Lay little lack high-water slack
As still as still could be.
A ton of herring brought us deep,
Two men and gear beside;
A nine-mile full to sail or pull
And use the ebbing tide.
As soft as falling leaf, fog fell
On water smooth as oil;
With labor sore we broke one oar
A ring began to boil.
The whirlpools had us sure enough,
We drifted near the Sow;
Ug-oo-oo-om, we heard her boom;
And I can hear her now.
Heave out the fish! Our harvest won
Through bitter day and night
A scattered hoard cast overboard
Was swallowed from our sight.
We hung a moment in that maw,
We twisted, torn with fear;
Then came a blast, the peril past;
A white squall swept us clear."
The range of the tides at Eastport and Lubec varies but the average is about 20 feet. The maximum height approaches 30 feet while the minimum is around 12 feet.
It is small wonder that some men have entertained the idea of harnessing these enormous tides. There is something wildly romantic about harnessing the moon. Yet to some men the idea is sheer lunacy. The use of tidal power is not new. Before Maine was a separate state, there were little estuaries where men harnessed the tides.
One such plant was at Somesville at the head of Somes Sound on Mt. Desert Island. There were a half dozen other such plants from Kittery to Lubec, where there was a small mill powered by the tides. In 1734 there was a tide mill at Chelsea, Mass. There have also been tidal power experiments dating as far back as 1740 in England.
On a large scale, however, there are only about a half dozen areas in the world where tidal power is even remotely economically feasible. In England there is the Severn River, site of the Severn Barrage project; the U.S.S.R. has three areas, the Kola Peninsula, the Mezen Gulf, and the Sea of Ohhotsk; and North America boasts two sites, the upper Bay of Fundy and Passamaquoddy Bay.
In the 1920's the idea of harnessing the tides of Passamaquoddy persisted in the minds of at least two men. One of these men had watched the tides of Passamaquoddy Bay as a youth from the steps of his family's summer home on Campobello Island and was struck by this romantic idea of harnessing the moon. The other never saw the area until he was 32 years old, but since he was an engineer of exceptional ability, he immediately realized the vast potential of these gigantic tides.
Through the combined efforts of these two men, Passamaquoddy Bay almost became the site of a vast hydro-electric plant. This paper will describe this near achievement.
Chapter 1
The first hint that Passamaquoddy tides might be harnessed was made in 1920 during a speech at Library Park in Eastport. The speaker was a young politician campaigning for the vice- presidency. His name was Franklin Delano Roosevelt. His visit to Eastport was not really made to garner the city's few votes, but rather it was a public relations gesture, since the Roosevelt home was located on nearby Campobello,
Roosevelt at this time had been discussing plans to harness the tides with a young engineer named. Dexter P. Cooper. Cooper was born in Rushford, Minn., in 1880. At the age, of 17 he started a blacksmith trade on a small hydroelectric development at Elenville, N.Y. Fascinated by the development of water power, Cooper studied at and graduated from the Royal Technical University at Karlsruhe, Germany. He first visited Campobello in 1912 and moved there in 1923. In the meantime Cooper served as an assistant to his brother, Col. Hugh Cooper, on such hydroelectric projects as Muscle Shoals, Niagara Falls, Keokuk, Salonike and later the Dnieperstroy project in Russia! But Dexter P. Cooper was enthralled with the idea of harnessing the tides of Passamaquoddy. Twice a day over 70 billion cubic feet of water flowed past Cooper's home on Campobello into Cobscook and Passamaquoddy Bays. That is more water, Cooper realized, than flows down the Mississippi in two weeks.
Cooper went to work on the project. His original plan was international in scope, as it entailed the damming off of the entire upper Passamaquoddy Bay, with dams from Eastport to Deer Isle and from Deer Isle to the New Brunswick mainland. Also included in the plan was the damming off of Cobscook Bay, thus creating two separate pools. Passamaquoddy Bay, the upper pool, would be drained into Cobscook Bay, the lower pool, with a generating plant located at Carrying Place Cove on the Eastport shore. The 'head' a would be 22 feet at maximum. The volume of water flowing in and out of Passamaquoddy Bay over 24 hours would be almost as much as passes over Niagara Falls in the same time span. Also included in Cooper's plans was a group of factories to be established near the project for the production of nitrates, electrochemicals, and aluminum. These factories would provide a ready market for Quoddy Power.
Roosevelt and Cooper, because of their common interest in Quoddy, began to work together on the project. They took the plan to the heads of some of America's largest power companies, Gerald Swope, Owen Young, and Charles L. Edgar. The proposal sounded feasible enough to General Electric, Westinghouse, Alcoa, and Boston Edison that they were willing to pledge $400,000 for exploratory work. With this money, Cooper was able to begin organization and make detailed studies of the project. Significantly the project was to be built entirely with private funds at a cost of approximately $1,000,000. It was expected that Cooper would become a powerful banker of power for every industry in the state. At time of drouth and depression they would come to him with their various power needs.
In 1924, Cooper filed an application with the Federal Power Commission for a preliminary permit to construct the project on an international scale. And in 1925, the Maine Legislature passed an enabling act incorporating Dexter P. Cooper, Inc., "for the purpose of developing and utilizing the power and the tides in the Bay of Fundy and waters adjacent thereto." Also in September of that year, a charter was passed in the Legislature permitting an exception to the Fernald law, which prohibited the export of power from the State of Maine. There was a division of opinion on this matter however. The Governor of Maine, Ralph Owen Brewster, a Republican, was opposed to the export of power from the state because of a commitment to the Republican platform upon which he had been elected. "We recognize that the established policy of this state is to retain Maine's hydroelectric energy within the state for use of our people and our industries." Therefore a referendum clause was attached to the charter. Under its items, the people of Maine voted 53,000 to 7,000 in favor of allowing the export of power from the state, most of the votes being cast in Washington County.
Brewster at this time was also leading a dogged fight against Insull power interests in Maine. The propaganda put out by these Insull interests caused a certain amount of prejudice against the Quoddy project. Brewster mentioned the Insull struggle a decade later when he was serving in Congress. "Into my State, while I was Governor, came Mr. Samuel Insull, of Chicago. In the height of his power, he not only dominated two thirds of our utilities, but five of our newspapers through interests closely allied with him, forty of our banking units – thirty-eight of which were subsequently closed – and many of the major industries of our state."
In 1926, the New Brunswick Legislature passed an act also incorporating Dexter P. Cooper, Inc.
The charter stipulated that active construction of the project had to begin in three years and work had to be completed no later than 1932. Also in May, 1926, the Federal Power Commission granted a preliminary permit for three years of tidal development.
Progress was interrupted when the market crash of 1929 intervened and several companies withdrew their support. The Canadian charter expired in 1929 and was not renewed on the grounds that the dam project would seriously harm the fisheries on New Brunswick. This objection stemmed from a fear that the dams would decrease the turbulence of the water and thereby upset the environment of the young herring by harming the rich foods available. At this time, the fisheries of the Charlotte County area employed some 12,000 people and were the basis for a $2,500,000 industry. In Washington County, the fish catch was worth $600,000 and manufactured fish products were worth $3,000,000. The Canadian and Pacific Railway interests felt Quoddy would ruin the resort business, and fishing interests were afraid it would harm their industry. American fishing interests were, however, in favor of the project. In 1930, to meet these objections, the United States and the Dominion Parliament each put up $45,000 to finance the International Passamaquoddy Fisheries Commission.
On August 6, 1930, the 84th Legislature passed an amendment to the act incorporating Dexter P. Cooper, Inc., empowering the corporation to develop and utilize tidal waters wholly within the boundaries of the United States. This marked the beginning of the so-called "All-American" project which Cooper planned to construct as a two-pool theme entirely in Cobsook Bay. He applied to the F.P.C. for a new application to build the All-American project. But the results of the market crash and the continued Insull interests served to minimize interest in the project.
Cooper then left the United States to join his brother, Hugh, on the Dnepropetrovsk project in Russia. Quoddy lay dormant.
Chapter 2
Dexter Cooper returned home from Russia in 1933 to find the nation beginning to recover from the effects of the depression. New government programs were creating jobs and injecting much needed money back into the economy. One such program, created in 1933,was the Public Works Administration. When Franklin Delano Roosevelt visited Campobello on June 29, 1933, rumors began to circulate that the President intended to revive the dormant Quoddy project. Upon his return Cooper added strength to these rumors by starting work on the project again. He realized that it would be hopeless to try to build Quoddy with private funds, but new programs, like the P.W.A., might be the answer. With public funds available at low interest rates, power costs would be reduced to a more attractive level.
In July, Cooper traveled to Washington with his chief engineer, Moses B. Pike, to discuss Quoddy with Roosevelt. Several weeks before, Cooper's brother, Col. Hugh, had also discussed the project with the President, laying before him two proposals. The first was the International development which would provide 800,000 horsepower and cost$100,000,000. The second proposal was the Cobscook Bay, all-American plan costing$40,000,000 and generating 400,000 horsepower.
The people of eastern Maine, who heard of these developments, began to get interested in Quoddy again. This area of the state desperately needed some sort of economic recovery program as unemployment was at an all-time high. In a sense the depression had hit Eastport before the rest of the country. Following World War I, Eastport children often went away to school and never returned because there was no industry and no employment for them there. Then Portland went into the fishing and canning business and the rival industry at Eastport all but collapsed.
Eastport fell from a thriving town of 6,000 to a virtual ghost town of 2,800, with all but 1,000 on relief. "You could stand on Water Street, which is the only real street in town," claimed a local citizen, "and throw stones all day without hitting anybody." The Quoddy project, indeed, might serve two purposes. It could become a gigantic relief program while at the same time remaining a truly unique engineering accomplishment. The Eastport Sentinel reported in August, 1933 that, "should it be endorsed ... it would do much to relieve unemployment in New England, and would contribute tremendously to the permanent rehabilitation of northern and eastern Maine, since it holds enormous possibilities for industrial development."
On September 19, 1933 Dexter P. Cooper, Inc., applied to the State Legislature for further amendment to its charter. Under the new charter which resulted, the project also was changed in scope from the previous plan, approved in 1930. That earlier charter had allowed five years for the completion of the project but because it required at least 3 months for completion, a new charter was needed. The new charter, good for 20 years, also gave Dexter P. Cooper, Inc. the right of eminent domain for extending its transmission lines. The new charter was passed by the Legislature and signed by Governor Louis Brann in late December.
Cooper placed an application for a $43,000,000 loan before the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works on September 11, 1933. The application was for a project identical to the one which Dexter P. Cooper, Inc. had placed before the State Legislature for a new charter. In a letter dated October 20, 1933 the F.E.A.P.W. asked Federal Power Commission to examine the application for the loan and to submit a report. This application (P.W.A. Docket 1641) was also submitted to the State P.W.A. engineer, George Williamson, for a report. On October 5, 1933 he responded that a project of this character could not stand an interest rate of 5 percent or even 4 percent and 50 percent of the obligation could not be amortized in 10 years. He recommended a program of financing at 2 percent over a period of 50 years, feeling that the project would not prove feasible on more rigid terms.
Governor Brann, a Democrat, seemed slow in publicly endorsing the Quoddy project however. He finally did so, in November 1933, when he sent telegrams to both the F.P.C. and P.W.A. indicating his primary concern for the project's job potential. "It is beginning to look as though the Quoddy project, talked of for so long that it is almost legendary in the State of Maine, is all that Maine has, besides its road construction program to look to for real public works relief." George Williamson also assured people of Brann's sincere interest in Quoddy. Frederick Hale, Republican Senator from Maine, came out in favor of Quoddy and secured Roosevelt's promise to see Dexter Cooper when the latter visited Washington. Hale was unimpressed with Col. H. M. Waite, Deputy Administrator of P.W.A., for he charged that Waite was "as dumb as an oyster" when queried on the chances of the Quoddy project getting approval from Public Works. The rest of the Maine delegation to Congress also supported the Quoddy project.
On January 3, 1934, the F.P.C. made its report to the P.W.A. The F.P.C. reported that the project was unsound and unjustified because (1) it would cost approximately $40,000,000 while a comparable steam generating plant would cost only $16,000,000; (2) steam-electric power would be cheaper at higher load factors; (3) Passamaquoddy power could not compete with steam electric power rates in export; (4) there was no present or prospective market for Passamaquoddy power at any price. The report also included this brief description of the proposed two pool all-American project.
"The initial installation would be 10 units of equal size, having an aggregate wheel capacity of 175,000 h.p. and a generator capacity of 100,000 kilowatts. At the Haycock Harbor plant the total initial turbine capacity would be 180,000 h.p. and the generator capacity 135,000 kilowatts. Provisions would be made for future installation of 10 additional units in the main plant, having the same capacity as the original 10 units. The main, or parent plant, would be constructed with the Haycock Harbor pumped storage plant by a transmission line extending from the generation. station to Tewksbury, Mass., almost 20 miles northwest of Boston. The applicant gives the length of the transmission line as 287 miles, but it is possible that its length would exceed 300 miles. It is not entirely clear, however, from the wording of the application for loan whether the applicant has fully decided that the transmission line will be necessary, since it appears that hope is entertained for sale of power to new industries in the vicinity of Eastport."
One of the problems in a tidal power plant is that there would be times when power could not be generated. In a two pool system, such as the one proposed for Cobscook Bay, the upper pool was to be filled at high tide. Then as the upper pool drained in the lower pool, electricity was to be generated. The lower pool was to be subsequently drained at low tide. But a problem would arise when the level of the lower pool increased to a point where the head became too small to generate electricity. In a plant such as Quoddy there are about 10 hours out of every 24 when power could not be generated. Dexter Cooper thus planned to build an auxiliary plant at Haycock Harbor, sixteen miles southeast of Eastport. While the main plant was in operation, excess power would be utilized at Haycock Harbor to pump water to a storage reservoir 130 feet above sea level. When the main plant was shut down, power could easily be generated using the storage reservoir and an auxiliary generating plant. It should be noted, however, that in the international two-pool project originally proposed, power could be continually generated. This would be possible because each pool would be possible because each pool would be many times larger than those in the all-American plan and hence the level of the lower pool would not rise appreciably nor would the level of the upper pool fall a great deal. The amount either pool fell or rose could easily be negated at the following low or high tide by draining or filling the pools to the level of the ocean.
On March 30, 1934, the P.W.A. Board of Review reported adversely on the application for a loan to Dexter P. Cooper, Inc. The Engineer Examiner of the P.W.A. had recommended on March 16, 1934, that the P.W.A. disapprove the project because it was "economically unsound." The Board's report stated that there was simply not enough evidence that the electricity produced could be sold. Since Cooper had planned to sell 68 percent of the electric power to metallurgical plants, which did not then exist, the whole market question was not adequately answered In conclusion the Board concurred in general with the adverse reports of the Maine Advisory Board, the State P.W.A. engineer, the Engineering Division of the P.W.A. and the F.P.C. The Board also concluded that, from an economic standpoint, the time had not yet arrived for the development of this project.
The New England Council of Governors also opposed the project with the following resolution passed at its March 16th meeting in Hartford, Conn. "Resolved, that the New England Council, assembled in its 34th Quarterly Meeting, hereby records itself as opposed to the use of approximately $40,000,000 of Federal funds for the development of the so-called Passamaquoddy Bay Tidal Power Project, as an example of unsound economic principle."
In early April Cooper was called to Washington to appear at a hearing of the Technical Review Board of the P.WA., which was still considering his application for the loan. Cooper defended his plans for aluminum and stainless steel plants to be established near Quoddy. He also cited Eastport's harbor as being among the best deep water ports on the East Coast, as well as being 400 miles closer to Liverpool, England than New York City. Cooper also stated that there was little available power in this section of Maine. On March 5th he stated that he had requested 7,000 to 10,000 kilowatt hour from Bangor Hydro-Electric Company which served Washington County, but this amount of power was unavailable. Maine Representative. Edward C. Moran of Rockland said that the Democratic State Convention had unanimously adopted a resolution favoring Quoddy. "It would drain the pool of unemployment in Maine." Moran also rapped the adverse P.W.A. report. "The P.W.A. says the outlook for success is not bright for this aluminum venture because there is an aluminum trust which would be hostile and would fight Cooper. In other words, we should lie down, do nothing, and suffer at its hands."
The P.W.A. nevertheless rejected the Cooper proposal and reaffirmed the adverse report of the F.P.C. The board, however, felt that Quoddy might be feasible if the cost of fuel increased to a point where Quoddy power would be cheaper than that of a diesel or steam-electric plant.
All hope for the possible international Passamaquoddy Bay tidal development was lost early in April when President Roosevelt submitted to Congress the report of the international Passamaquoddy Fisheries Commission appointed in 1930. The findings of the commission were: (1) that construction of the proposed dams would practically extinguish the herring fishing inside the dams, comprising 2.5 percent of the annual catch from St. Mary Bay, Nova Scotia to Cape Elizabeth, Maine; (2) that the fishing in the adjacent area outside the dams (Quoddy area) would be affected to an unknown degree, either adversely or favorably; and (3) that there appeared little probability of the dams affecting the fisheries along the coast of Maine or even seriously of Grand Manan.
The findings of this commission definitely restricted the Quoddy project to the national Cobscook Bay two pool plan as Canada feared too much for her fisheries to risk the international project. Cooper hoped that the Cobscook Bay plan would be just a step toward the eventual development but the Fishery Commission's report appeared too great a stumbling block. In fact, in April, 1934 the hope for even the American project was very dim indeed. Unless immediate action was taken by the President of the United States, the Quoddy project appeared destined to die once more.
Chapter 3
When the Public Works Administration turned down the application for a loan to build Quoddy, all eyes turned to the President for the next move. It seemed natural that Roosevelt would take some sort of action because of his sincere personal interest in the project.
At this time, one of Quoddy's main backers was Frederic A. Delano, Chairman of the Natural Resources Board and the President's uncle. Delano had spoken out in favor of the project when it was being considered by the Technical Board of Review of the P.W.A. "I see no insurmountable obstacles in the Quoddy project. The big industries are looking for cheap power at the seaports where they can make long term contracts."
Delano also prepared a "Brief" on the Quoddy project, dated April 26, 1934, outlining a case for the project. Delano pointed out the fact that Quoddy, like all great pioneering enterprises, needed something more than the usual to put it through, such as strong Government support. In addition, this "Brief" listed numerous reasons,why the location of Quoddy was perfect. The reasons were : (1) the well known height of the tides in this region; (2) the existence of a great natural harbor; (3) the fact that this harbor was international as it was between two great trading nations; (4) all the materials for construction were at hand; (5) it would serve a great and hardy New England settlement which could be drawn upon to furnish manpower for expanding the project as it developed; (6) it was on a great trade route between America and Europe with a 20 percent shorter distance than that be tween New York and Europe; (7) it was an ideal place for assembling raw materials and for distribution of finished products; (8) the suitable factory sites and salubrious sites for the houses of employees could be secured at moderate prices, and this also included moderate costs for suitable building materials. Delano answered the problem of a market for Quoddy power by claiming that cheap and abundant power would make its own market. "Can anyone doubt that the State of Maine would have been a populous state if a great field of coal of good quality had been discovered there? This 'white coal' should do for Maine what it has done in Italy and Scandinavia. To fail to realize its great possibilities would be shortsighted."
Delano sent this memorandum to Arthur E. Morgan, Chairman of the Board of the opinion. Morgan felt that Quoddy had striking disadvantages when compared to T.V.A. Its principal disadvantages were that it was not near any American center of population, nor was it near any materials or chemicals, with timber as the only nearby resource. On the other hand it would be one of the few large water power plants near sea lanes so that raw materials could come by water and finished products leave the same way. There would also be sufficient potential force of good quality to man the industries. Morgan also hit upon the problem of a surplus of power created at Quoddy. "A great surplus of power would be an interesting social-economic phenomenon – something unprecedented in the world's history. It would not hurt my feelings to see several centers of such surplus – New England, the far north, the far west, the far southwest, the upper Missouri Region, and the Tennessee Valley. Such a distributed surplus would have far reaching effects on our civilization – more significant effects than a multitude of post office buildings."
Delano submitted both this "Brief" and Arthur Morgan's opinion to the President for his consideration. "If the Quoddy project is given up because there is no nearby market, it will be because those who condemn it do not see that it will create its own market, just as great irrigation
projects in the West have done."
Cooper also took his case directly to the President. Since the creation of a market for Quoddy power was the major obstacle, Cooper outlined two possible outlets for the power. In the first he cited the fact that within a hundred-mile radius of Eastport, there lived 290,000 people, who because of high electric power rates had a per capita consumption rate much lower than the national average. The second outlet for power would be the future aluminum and stainless steel plants at Eastport. Cooper also reminded the President of the need for rehabilitation in Eastern Maine. Cooper also claimed that a market could be developed after the project was completed as
was the power projects. According to a report on the development of rivers of the United States, "2,366,000 kilowatts of new capacity, equal to approximately twice the present installed capacity in the tributary market area (of Bonneville and Grand Coulee), will be available for future requirements."
Members of the Maine delegation in Washington also began to bring pressure on the
administration. Representative Moran said he felt New England was entitled to a piece of the New Deal. The Bangor-Brewer Democratic Club drafted a resolution and sent it to Public Works Administrator, Harold Ickes, "Therefore Be It Resolved that we respectfully ask those in authority to remember the public weal, to throw off the domination of private greed and give to the Quoddy project the same consideration in the interests of the Tennessee Valley and other
projects for national development." Governor Brann promised his support and left for Washington where he said he had been promised a hearing by Col. Waite, Ickes' assistant.
Events followed in rapid succession. Cooper was called to Washington to confer over Quoddy. Cooper made a proposal to the President for the United States Government to take over Quoddy on the basis that: (1) the Government would take an option for six months on Quoddy to purchase all rights, charters, engineering plans, patents, and property of Dexter P. Cooper, Inc.; (2) The Government investigate the proposal at once with the help of Dexter P. Cooper, Inc. at the rate of $5,000 monthly beginning July 1, 1934; (3) the purchase price of the Quoddy project would be $1,000,000, which sum represented the actual cash expenditures to date of approximately $500,000, $375,000 to reimburse Dexter P. Cooper for his equity in Quoddy, and the balance to pay certain indebtedness now carried on the books; (4) Dexter P. Cooper be awarded the engineering and direction of the project on a fee basis and he should operate the plant for a period after construction. Secretary Ickes also expressed hope that Quoddy might soon get underway. "It is important first to ascertain if there is a market for the power to be developed. It cannot be self-liquidating unless there is such a market."
In a statewide radio broadcast on July 23, Governor Brann spoke about Quoddy. He read a letter, dated July 1, which had been sent to him by the President asking him to appoint a commission of leading Maine citizens to investigate Quoddy. Roosevelt reiterated his sincere interest in Quoddy.
"I am in full accord with your conviction that this is the proper time to take up in a serious way the possibility of developing the enormous latent electrical energy of the tide waters of the Bay of Fundy, for the benefit of not only the citizens of the State of Maine but of the entire nation. With my home near Eastport for so many years, I have been interested in what is known as the 'Quoddy project' for a long time, and it has been my hope that eventually the State of Maine would become not only a great industrial center of the nation but that its agricultural population would be among the first to enjoy the manifest advantages of cheap electric power on the farm as well."
Brann also announced the appointment of a five man commission: E. S. French, president, Maine Central and Boston and Maine Railroads; Harry B. Crawford, master of the Maine State Grange; Wingate F. Cram, treasurer, Boston and Aroostook Railroad; William N. Campbell, executive, Sanford Mills; and as chairman, Kenneth C. M. Sills, president of Bowdoin College. Brann closed the broadcast by saying that the Sills Commission would have the aid of a P.W.A. expert in its study. Brann spoke of the members of the commission as "practical, experienced businessmen" who would "weigh the advantages" and "recommend action to be taken."
The commission chairman, Kenneth Sills, was a well known public servant. He was, however, a bit hesitant about undertaking the chairmanship of the Quoddy HydroElectric Commission as he had also been appointed chairman of a school finance commission by Governor Brann and he did not want to overextend himself. But Sills also had a personal interest in the project, for as a youth he had been fascinated by the waters of Passamaquoddy Bay while he was vacationing with his family at St. Andrews, New Brunswick. He thus accepted the appointment.
At the request of Governor Brann, Harold Ickes also agreed to visit Quoddy. Ickes made the trip in order to inspect the site and meet with the Sills Commission. His August 21st visit was greeted with great celebration at Eastport. Ickes expressed great interest and hope that Quoddy might be built soon. "It is not often that the great dream of an engineer comes true in his lifetime, but I hope for your sake Quoddy will go through as one of the great engineering feats in the world."
Ickes also urged the citizens not to give up their fight for Quoddy and cited the apparent lack of a market as Quoddy's main weakness. K.C.M. Sills spoke briefly and said that his commission was a nonpolitical, quasi-judicial body. He quoted from Horace, "This corner of the world smiles at me almost beyond all others."
Sills and his commission began to meet regularly during the Fall of 1934. The initial problem and the one which presented the most difficulty was the securing of funds with which to operate. Sills told Governor Brann that $25,000 was required in order that the commission might intelligently inquire into all aspects of the project and employ some expert advisors. The Sills Commission also met with K. S. Wingfield, Senior Finance Examiner of the P.W.A. who was specifically detached by the P.W.A. to aid the Maine commission. Wingfield prepared a memorandum which the commission used as a guideline. The need for a potential market again was stressed.
In September Roosevelt wrote Sills, "I am informed by Administrator Ickes, as I understood he advised your Commission when he was in Maine, that there are no funds now available for the Quoddy project, even if the questions should be resolved in favor of the project." Roosevelt had earlier stated in his letter to Governor Brann on July 1st that there were at the present time "a considerable amount of Government funds available for public works, some of which, of course, could be diverted to this purpose." It should be noted that the latter commitment was made in an election year.
It was not until November that the Sills Commission was granted any money from the State of Maine. Until then the board had become bogged down with interest charges, kilowatt hours, and generally technical aspects of the project. It was then decided to enlist the services of the Maine State Planning Board to report on Quoddy's technical aspects. The all-Republican Governor's Executive Council, however, only allotted $5,000 to the commission instead of the requested $25,000, as it was obvious that they did not wish to encourage a project threatening the profits of public utilities.
The Administration took another step in Quoddy's behalf in November when Harold Ickes appointed the four man Passamaquoddy Bay Tidal Power Commission comprised of Dexter P. Cooper; Moses B. Pike, Cooper's top engineer; H. T. Cory, consulting engineer, P.W.A.; and Henry T. Hunt, general Council, P.W.A: This commission, along with the Sills Commission and Maine Planning Board, was expected to report in January, 1935.
On November 27th, the Sills Commission met with the Hunt group. The latter group expressed the feeling that as much emphasis should be put on the "social desirability" of the project as on the question of a market for the power. Wallace H. White, Republican Senator from Maine, also communicated rumors from Washington that the project might be better off if it were pushed on social grounds of public welfare than if it remained on the same basis as when the P.W.A. rejected it. And Sills answered White by saying, "So far we have been maintaining a judicial attitude leaning toward sympathy."
During the Fall of 1934 Dexter P. Cooper suffered a breakdown and became badly discouraged over the slow progress of the Sills Commission. A somewhat discouraging letter from K. C. Sills reached his hands and caused a mild setback. Frederic Delano also became concerned over the delay and sent the President a memorandum suggesting that he contact some outstanding manufacturers of electric equipment or someone knowledgeable about chemicals to discuss the future of Quoddy. Delano also believed that he could put forth a plan of procedure which would result in work being done on a low cost basis. There is strong evidence that opposition came from other sources. For Delano felt that the real reason for Quoddy's delay was very complex. "I am convinced myself that the fundamental opposition to this enterprise arises from a group of power plants which sold out to Insull and received Insull certificates." This suspicion was widespread but it is almost impossible to prove.
Chapter 4
The political scene in Maine during 1934 was by no means quiet. Quoddy became THE issue during this election year and the old adage, "As Maine goes so goes the nation" appears never to have had the significance it had during that year. Because the Maine elections were held in September it was widely felt that they would serve as a political barometer. If this traditionally Republican state voted heavily Democratic it would be a clear indication that the New Deal was catching on. Maine, of course, had gone for Hoover in 1932.
Up for grabs that September would be the Governorship, one Senate seat, and three seats in the House. Governor Brann was attempting to become the first two-term Democratic Governor of Maine since the Civil War. Brann was generally considered an anti-New Dealer but he nevertheless campaigned on a platform calling for the establishment of Quoddy because it would bring some fifty million dollars into a section of the State that badly needed relief funds. Former Governor Ralph Owen Brewster was attempting to unseat Democratic Congressman John Utterback in Maine's third district, wherein Quoddy was located. Brewster demanded that the Democratic administration approve Quoddy.
"The Quoddy development in which all Maine and to some extent all New England is concerned has failed of realization; first because of the seemingly anti-New England bias of some high in authority; second because of the machination of power interests; and third because of the grotesque ineptness of our Representatives."
Utterback, however, was running on a platform supporting the New Deal along with Representative Moran, seeking reelection; F. Harold Dubord, seeking the Senate seat held by Republican Frederick Hale, and Simon Hamlin, seeking to unseat Republican Congressman Carroll Beedy in the first district.
The announcement by President Roosevelt in July that he wanted a Maine commission to study Quoddy gave the project some hope. This appeared to be just what the Administration intended. In June, John Utterback wrote to the President, "As we approach the Primaries in Maine, to be held on June 18th, it becomes more and more apparent that Governor Brann and the two Democratic Congressmen are going to have a hard fight, if not defeat, unless something is done by the Administration between now and the September election." Utterback also wrote to Jim Farley, "You may rest assured that my battle to retain my seat in Congress is going to be a strenuous one, and if the National Democratic Committee is not disposed to take any more interest in this campaign than they did in 1932, all of which is indicated by the attitude of the Administration toward me, it will be a losing fight."
Harold Ickes' visit to Eastport in August coincidentally came less than a month before the September elections in Maine. Ickes speaks of this trip in his Secret Diary.
"The plan to go up at this time was set out by Colonel Louis Howe, who is very anxious about the result of the election in Maine on September 12. The Public Works Administration does not have the money necessary to finance this project, even if we should approve it, but Louis thought that at least a graceful gesture could be made with beneficial results on election day." Howe also got Farley to send a skilled manager and lots of money to Maine to promote a program of rallies, advertising, and sound tracks all of which Maine candidates could not usually afford. He also pressed Roosevelt for a dramatic approval of Quoddy.
All of this extra fanfare did not go unnoticed. Two days before the election the Republicans levied a charge against Roosevelt that the Administration was trying to bribe voters of Maine into support of the New Deal by holding out hope of a $47,000,000 P.W.A. project. Henry P. Fletcher, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, said, "The fake revival of the Passamaquoddy power project is a gesture of despair. The Administration knows it is a bluff."
These charges did little to offset the Democratic sweep in Maine. Governor Brann defeated Alfred Ames of Machias, 156,917 to 133,414; Simon Hamlin ousted incumbent Carroll Beedy, 48,235 to 46,636; Edward Moran defeated Judge Duvinal 52,491 to 46,200. The Republicans did manage two victories as Senator Hale barely won re-election over Dubord, 139,834 to 138,133 and Ralph O. Brewster, the popular former Governor, defeated John Utterback, the incumbent. It was clearly a Democratic victory, however, and seemed to confirm Maine's approval of the New Deal.
Throughout this turmoil over Quoddy, K. C. M, Sills remained aloof from politics. When Sills was appointed as chairman of the commission, a few eyebrows were raised over the connection of his name with a New Deal project. Maine had, after all, gone heavily for Hoover in 1932. But Sills maintained his promise that the commission would be a non-political body. Sills was the lone Democrat of the group but this seems to have been of little importance. Because of the sticky political situation and rumors that Quoddy was being used to re-elect Governor Brann,
Sills postponed all activities of the commission until after the election.
The political turmoil surrounding Quoddy did not fade away following the election. Instead Quoddy was frequently mentioned in connection with graft and vote-buying. In October, Col. Theodore Roosevelt launched to date the most sensational attack against the Democrats. He declared that the Maine election "was bought and paid for" with "millions of dollars of the taxpayers money." A group of concerned Maine citizens formed the Maine Quoddy Association to speak in behalf of the project. In a bulletin dated November 5, 1934, the association defended Franklin Roosevelt.
Quoddy seems to have become a bone of contention. Just at present it is being assailed by the press all over the country. To opponents of the Administration "Quoddyism" seems to stand for the lowest order of political fraud, it being claimed that Quoddy was held out to the people of Maine, with no intention on the part of the Administration to carry it through. Notwithstanding all this, supporters of Quoddy have no reason to believe that the President's interest has been anything but sincere. Far from seizing on Quoddy as a mere political trick of 1934, Franklin D. Roosevelt foretold the harnessing of our great tides in a public address delivered in Eastport as long ago as 1920.
Harold Ickes also hit the term "Quoddyizing" and defended his position. "If I did buy Maine, we will have to lay aside the expression, 'Yankee shrewdness' and substitute for it 'Yankee naivete.' " This remark marks an abrupt about-face from the tone of Ickes' reference to his Quoddy trip in the Secret Diary. An editorial in the Portland Evening News entitled, "What! No Santa Claus?" said that since "Honest Harold's visits to Eastprt there had been no action. If Santa was going to come he had better hurry for he was way overdue, or was perhaps Ickes' talk just talk?"
Chapter 5
The report of the Sills Commission was expected in January 1935. Chairman K. C. M. Sills had been uneasy about not being swift in completing the report, but the slowness in getting funds and technical problems had considerably hampered the work of the commission. Yet Roosevelt cautioned Sills to take all the time necessary for "full and proper consideration of the project." It was decided that January 1935 would be the best time for the commission to report. Not everyone was satisfied with waiting that long, however. Roscoe C. Emery, editor of the Eastport Sentinel, Republican mayor of that town, and a long time supporter of the Quoddy project, felt that the commission was taking too long and the members, if they were too busy, should resign from the commission. The Quoddy Association also called for an early answer from the commission.
The Sills Commission Report, along with the findings of the Maine State Planning Board in a 256-page report, were submitted to Governor Brann on January 4, 1935. The Governor sent the report back to Sills by a state police messenger and asked that one sentence be reworded; otherwise he was pleased with the report. He requested that the sentence reading, "It is our opinion that Quoddy power would not be very cheap power but that it would be cheap enough to act as a yardstick and to be an important factor if properly developed in the whole problem of power in New England," be changed to, "It is our opinion that Quoddy power would prove to be an important factor if properly developed in New England." Brann obviously wanted nothing adverse to appear in the commission's report which might harm Quoddy's chances at the national level.
The conclusions of the Sills Commission were: first, that the Quoddy project could only be constructed at that time as a federal project; and second, as a federal project, should be undertaken at once and carried to completion as promptly as efficiency in construction would permit. The report skillfully avoided the question of market for power by saying, "It would, however, require a prophet of the first order to predict the possible use of power a few years hence." The report further stressed the "pork-barrel" aspect; that is, since other areas of the country are receiving New Deal money, Maine should get her fair share. The reason for the use of federal funds for the project was because of the low interest rates available for projects of public interest and social desirability.
The Maine State Planning Board report was submitted to K. C. M. Sills on January 4th by Alfred Mullikin, a planning consultant. Sills in turn forwarded it to Governor Brann along with the report of his commission. The Planning Board report dealt primarily with aspects of the project peculiar to Maine. The engineering details were left to the committee of the P. W. A. of Hunt, Cory, Cooper and Pike. The report of the Planning Board focused upon the five following topics: (1) physical conditions; (2) financial security; (3) legal aspects; (4) social values; and (5) recreation.
The State Board made a number of points not yet mentioned in Quoddy's favor. In 1930, the recreational industry in Washington County was worth $879,913 or about one per cent of the State total of $85,684,741. Neighboring Hancock County, smaller in area with equal recreational facilities, had a $19,190,944 recreational industry in 1930. The development of the Quoddy project would open up a new influx of summer visitors to Washington County. Tourists would be attracted to Quoddy because of its uniqueness and novelty. The development of a recreational area in Cobscook Bay would be an ideal way to bolster Washington County's economy. The Planning Board predicted that, with Quoddy as a stimulus for recreational development, the industry could reach $10,000,000 in a decade. It was estimated that this new industry alone would use $300,000 worth of electricity each year.
The Board also pointed to a possible market for power with the limited supply of electric power available in Aroostook County and the southeastern part of the state. If Quoddy provided reasonable rates there would be a great demand for power by the present electric utilities, many communities without service, and the paper mill at Woodland. A high transmission line, about 110 miles long from Quoddy to Houlton, interconnecting with lines of the Maine Public Service Co. and furnishing electric power at low cost, was seen as possibly opening up a market of 20 to 30 million kilowatt hours in the near future. Since the Bangor Hydro-Electric Company, which provided power for Washington County, had to purchase power from other sources if the demand exceeded their capacity, it was felt that the company could purchase their electric power nearer the demand at Quoddy and hence save construction of other transmission lines. The Board generally was very favorable towards the project.
In contrast with power developments dependent for prime power on unregulated rivers and others with limited storage reservoirs and wide variations in their natural flows, the Quoddy development is not affected by droughts or floods but can be depended upon for peak power load up to the capacity of the plant at any hour or day of the year. It will be in a class by itself.
The final report of January, 1935, and probably the most important one in terms of influence came from the P. W. A. group of Hunt, Cory, Cooper and Pike. The Passamaquoddy Bay Tidal Power Commission submitted its favorable report to Secretary Ickes on January 17th. This report, the so-called "Hunt Report," recommended that: (1) the project be included in the comprehensive program of Pubic Works and $30,000,000 be allotted to the War Department
finance the construction of Quoddy; and (2) an authority be created by the State of Maine, empowered to lease the project, when completed, from the United States, construct transmission lines and other necessary facilities, sell electric energy in and out of Maine, and to issue revenue bonds to finance construction of the project. The project contemplated consisted of an "immediate project of a single basin, tidal power installation utilizing Cobscook Bay, a power storage plant near Haycock Harbor, and a 16-mile electric transmission line connecting the two,
within the State of Maine, near Eastport and Lubec".
This was only a part of an "ultimate project; consisting of a two-basin power installation by adding to the initial installation, additional works, embracing the Passamaquoddy Bay, located partly in Maine and partly in New Brunswick, Canada." The initial project, the one to be constructed immediately, differed from the earlier all-American project. Instead of damming Cobscook Bay across to form two pools, the project, now planned only a single pool project.
Cobscook Bay would be the upper pool and the ocean would become the lower pool in this plan.
The findings of the commission did not differ greatly from the Sills report or the State Planning Board. They found that: (1) the immediate project was socially desirable, for it would provide 20 to 25 million manhours in useful work at an annual expense of $7,500,000; (2) it was economically feasible, since it was being promoted on the grounds of national defense and general welfare, and because the commission felt a market would exist within five years; and (3) it was based on sound engineering.
This last aspect of the project had never been questioned from the day the project was set forth. The development of tidal power, although different from regular hydroelectric plants, utilizes the same principles of generation that have been accepted for centuries.
The figures for actual construction put forth in this report are important, for these figures were used in starting actual construction. The total cost was set at $30,125,000 to generate 248,000,000 K. W. H. per annum. The actual construction costs were as follows: tidal basins, including dams, power house, navigation locks, highways and railroads over dams, $9,782,000; sluice gates, $3,248,000; hydraulic electrical equipment, $6,518,000; power storage reservoir, $5,340,000; storage unit hydraulic-electrical equipment, $3,737,000; transmission lines, $1,500,000.
The importance of these reports cannot be overemphasized for it was upon the recommendations of these three groups that Quoddy was finally begun. The Hunt Commission was undoubtedly the most significant since it was a special committee of the P.W.A., which had previously rejected Quoddy. This board would later come under fire as a prejudiced group or a "stacked" commission since half of its members had a very personal interest in Quoddy. On the other hand there was no one more knowledgeable about Quoddy at the time than Dexter Cooper or Moses Pike. At the moment however, the stage was set for the final approval of Quoddy and the allocation of long awaited funds.
Chapter 6
With the favorable Quoddy Commission and Hunt reports, the approval of funds by the President seemed virtually assured. On January 9, 1935, the Maine Legislature presented a memorial to the President of the United States urging the undertaking and completion of the Quoddy project in Eastport.
The only problems left facing Quoddy were the passage of the $4.8 billion Emergency Works Relief Appropriation Act, out of which Quoddy funds would be taken, the creation of a State Authority to operate Quoddy, and the final approval of Harold Ickes. The Authority was necessary because the State of Maine was constitutionally unable to borrow large sums of money. The Federal Government would actually finance the project and the Authority would issue income bonds to discharge and amortize the debt. The Authority was declared necessary because the Federal Government had already faced a similar situation with the Muscle Shoals project. In that case no authority had been created and as a result the government was left "an idle white elephant" on their hands for many years. The same mistake was not going to be made again with the Quoddy project.
It was strongly felt that the creation of the Quoddy Authority would prove to be the least of Quoddy's problems. The drafting of the Authority Bill was left up to P.W.A. legal advisors in Washington. Governor Brann then brought the bill back to Maine to oversee its introduction to the State Legislature. On February 12, 1935 Senator Worcester of Jonesport introduced "An Act to Incorporate the Passamaquoddy Bay Authority and to Define Its Powers and Duties." The Authority was to consist of a board of directors of five members, each serving five years. The powers defined by the Authority Bill covered a wide range of topics related to the operation of the Quoddy hydro-electric plant.
Maine Supreme Court Chief Justice William Pattangall lashed out at the bill. In a letter to the Bangor Daily News on February 18th he warned Eastern Maine to carefully consider the obligation of the Quoddy Authority Bill:
It is not dependent upon the Public Utilities Commission for its rate schedule. It is not bound by limitations of the Fernald Act with regard to the exportation of power. It contains not a single word that indicates any intention on the part of anybody to build Quoddy Dam. It places under the control of government every resource of this state, and the authority thus given is without limit as to time or amount of money involved so long as the capital may be furnished by either private agencies or Federal agencies. In other words, for a possible expectation of governmental aid in the Passamaquoddy development, the people of Maine are to place their industrial assets in the hands of five men to be named by the Governor of Maine, who are given more authority than is now possessed by the State government itself. This would be a tremendous price to pay for the building of the Cooper Dam, even if that was assured.
The Authority Bill could not have any concrete action taken on it by the Legislature until the Works Relief Bill was passed by Congress. If it did not pass there would be no money available for Quoddy. The bill was passed, however, in early April, virtually assuring that Quoddy would be allotted some funds by President Roosevelt. Senator Hale had been in favor of cutting the bill from $4.8 to $2.8 billion. "I cannot, however, for the sake of the benefits that the people of Maine will receive from the development of the Quoddy power sacrifice my convictions
and vote to spend 4 billion dollars of the people of the United States for an uncertain and in my opinion wasteful program of public works construction which I do not believe will bring back prosperity to this country." Senator Hale, although he claimed he was in favor of Quoddy, also was a man of strong principles. Before he was through, his principles would put the kiss of death on Quoddy.
The Quoddy Authority Bill meanwhile was meeting with more opposition than expected in the Legislature. Governor Brann and Representative Brewster sensed the problems facing the Authority Bill. Besides attacks, such as Justice Pattangall's, Republicans in the Legislature outnumbered Democrats nearly two-to-one and their opposition was proving stiffer than anticipated. Brann and Brewster consulted with those in charge of consideration of the project in the P.W.A. and suggested that due to the difficulty the legislation was now undergoing, the matter should be referred to an indefinite time in the future. On April 4, 1935 Brann communicated the following to the Legislature.
"Quoddy: Yesterday in Washington I interviewed various Federal officials interested in the Quoddy Project. It is my belief that Quoddy will be constructed. Those in charge of the project in Washington do not believe that Legislature action is necessary at this time. I have communicated this information to the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, Senator Blaisdell, Chairman of the Committee on Legal Affairs, and to Senator Worcester, who introduced the Bill."
The Committee on Legal Affairs the next day reported that the Passamaquoddy Bay Authority Bill might not be passed as it was "inexpedient." The Legislature then adjourned on April 6th with the next regularly scheduled session not until January, 1937. At a future moment, however, when the Governor felt the time was right, he could call a special session of the Legislature and re-introduce the Authority Bill. The bill would have to be passed eventually since the existence of the Authority was necessary to operate the project. But if the bill had been allowed by Governor Brann to be defeated in the Legislature before the project ever got off its feet, it would have meant a certain end for Quoddy.
As it stood, the failure of the Legislature to act on the Authority Bill still remained the major obstacle. In an all-out effort in Maine, Congressman Brewster called three eminent Maine attorneys to Washington at his expense. With these men's combined efforts to reinterpret Maine laws and a promise by Brewster, they were able to work out an agreement to start work on Queddy. This agreement was reached during the early morning hours and after the same day the President announced the allocation of $10,000,000 to begin work on the project. Brewster's promise was that he would use his influence and that of Senator Wallace White, a Republican to prevent suits being brought by Republican forces or power interests pending the passage of the required legislation and he would cooperate to the limit to ensure favorable action by the Republican majority of the Legislature at a special session in the Fall.
Brann immediately telegramed Roosevelt. "Your interest has made Quoddy possible. The credit belongs to you. Eastport, Washington (County), eastern Maine and all Maine is overjoyed at the outcome. Heartfelt thanks for your assistance." Eastport began to make plans for a gala celebration on July 4, 1935, the date set for opening ceremonies at the project. Cooper returned home from Washington and said, "we brought home the bacon." Perhaps the best comment came from an unidentified local resident, "Cripes, that fool Cooper feller's put it over! Darndest man I ever heard of." Roscoe Emery expressed the feelings of the town when he said:
"You're familiar with the aphorism of Ralph Waldo Emerson: 'Hitch your wagon to a star.' Well, as a matter of fact Emerson made that remark while he was visiting Lubec after observing the tides. What he meant was, chain industry to the laws of the universe and let the heavens do your work. And that is just what we're going to do."
The failure of the Legislature to create the Quoddy Authority still loomed in the way of the project's final approval in Washington. Roosevelt had already announced the allocation of $10,000,000 for the first year's work, but there were still legal problems to be ironed out. Homer Cummings, the Attorney General, saw two real problems. The first was that the Comptroller General might hold that the proposed expenditure by the Federal Government was unauthorized without the Authority to take over the funds as a 'loan'. The second problem concerned the possibility that land might have to be condemned and the Government would then become vulnerable on the grounds it had no constitutional authority to construct and operate the project. E. H. Foley, the director of the Legal Division of the P.W.A., therefore urged that Governor Braun be forced to call a special session of the Legislature to establish the Authority.
Comptroller General McCarl did release the $10,000,000, however, and the interest shifted from the Authority to the opening of work on Quoddy. Dexter P. Cooper's dream was rapidly becoming a reality.
Chapter 7
Controversy Over Quoddy
Meanwhile, the details of the actual construction were being worked out. The project was to be undertaken by the War Department, not because it had anything to do with defense but because the Army Corps of Engineers were traditionally assigned to such federal projects. Major Phillip B. Fleming was put in charge of the project. Dexter P. Cooper was to serve as a consultant to the engineer with a firm agreement to be worked out later. Cooper also was appointed as an advisor to the National Power Policy Committee. Most of the work on the project was to be done with local labor, all of which, it was stipulated, had to come from relief rolls. Monthly earnings were tentatively set at $40 to $55 for unskilled labor; $45 to $65 for intermediate work; $55 to $85 for skilled labor; and $61 to $95 for professional and technical work. These rates were in keeping with other New Deal relief projects. Representative Brewster revealed tentative plans for the President to push a button at the White House which was to set off a blast signalling the start of work on Quoddy.
As planned by the Army engineers the initial construction was to include the following features:
(a) Two rock-filled dams to be constructed across the entrance to Cobscook Bay by dumping material in open water without cofferdams. The dams to have a crest width of 40 feet, lengths along the crest of about 3,000 and 3,400 feet, and a maximum height of 140 feet. These were to be founded upon a clay stratum ranging from 30 to 100 feet deep, overlaying basalt rock.
(b) A gate structure consisting of 25 submerged sluices of the "Venturi-throat" type controlled by structural steel gates 30 by 30 feet, equipped with individual hoists. An overhead traveling gantry crane and emergency stop-logs to be provided for service requirements.
(c) A two-way navigation lock having a chamber 360 feet long, 56 feet wide, and with 12 foot depth over the sill at mean low water.
(d) A main generating station containing 10 units initially, with partial substructures to be provided for the subsequent installation of 10 additional units. Each unit to have a capacity of 16,667 kilovolt amperes at 0.90 power factor, corresponding to a discharge of 7,800 cubic feet per second at 12-foot average head.
(e) A pumped-storage plant equipped with nine 15,000-kilowatt centrifugal pumping units and two 22,500-kilowatt regenerating units, to operate at about 120-foot head. A storage reservoir to be constructed having an area of about 8,000 acres, with a corresponding energy storage of 15,000,000 kilowatt hours for a 20-foot draw-down, which will be sufficient to insure complete equalization of tidal cycles over any required period of time
Invitations to the opening ceremonies were sent to Secretary of War, George Dern, Governor Brann, Senators Hale and White, Representatives Brewster, Hamlin, and Moran and Cooper and his staff. In fact, Army engineers actually began to conduct test boring and field work well before the July 4th ceremony. Of immediate need to the project appeared to be the construction of some sort of low cost housing to take care of the influx of workers into Eastport. Plans were thus begun for a model village to be built on Moose Island. In addition, one of the initial acquisitions by the Army engineers was the forty-five foot cabin cruiser, "Sea King" upon which the project officials made their headquarters.
As July 4th approached, the Democrats were faced with a sticky problem. Ralph Owen Brewster was arrogating to himself much of the credit for the success of the project. Brewster had asked the President if he could announce the approval of Quoddy, but Roosevelt declined on the grounds that it might cause prejudices from other Congressmen. Governor Brann was becoming concerned about Brewster. He wired Col. Howe on July 1st, "So far Quoddy is entirely in Republican hands and under Republican officers. A continuation of this policy will cause loss of Maine by fifty thousand in thirty six." Brann was also concerned that Brewster had the inside track with Fleming and Roosevelt, who deserved all the credit, would receive none.
The Democrats should have known when to be content. For Ralph Owen Brewster, a thorn in the sides of Democrats for fifteen years, soon became involved in the most sensational controversy over Quoddy yet seen. On the second of July, after receiving the Floor of the House by unanimous consent, Brewster charged that Thomas G. Corcoran, of the legal staff of the P. W. A., and a member of the 'Brain Trust', and co-author of the Wheeler-Raymond Holding Company Bill, had threatened him with stoppage of Quoddy if he did not vote with the Administration on the holding company bill. This bill included the so-called "death sentence" for public utility holding companies which could not justify their existence as producers. Brewster, nevertheless, voted against the bill which was narrowly defeated in the House.
Shortly thereafter, the Brewster charge was referred to the Rules Committee of the House for special consideration. Brewster claimed Corcoran had told him to "play ball" or risk losing Quoddy. Roy T. Haines, Brewster's personal secretary, confirmed this threat and also claimed that Dr. H. T. Cory (of the Hunt Commission) had told him that until the bill was passed, nothing more would be done on Quoddy. Brewster was actually accused by Congressman Rankin of Mississippi of selling out to the Power Trust by not voting with the administration. This was an unjustified charge. For Ralph Owen Brewster was not about to support any power trusts without good reason. While he was Governor, for example, he had spoken out against several holding companies and he of course was well known for his struggle against Insull interests in Maine.
Corcoran had worked closely with Brewster on the legal aspects of Quoddy, particularly the Authority Bill. He claimed that Brewster had been behind the Administration's program at first, but as the day of the vote approached, had left Washington and could not be reached. When he had returned on the day of the vote Brewster had made no attempt to get in touch with Corcoran although the latter had left messages for Brewster to do so. Cocoran claimed he finally saw Brewster just before the vote was to be taken. There, in the presence of Dr. Ernest Gruening, an old friend of Brewster's and former ally during the Insull struggle Corcoran claimed Brewster said that he was no longer "a free man politically" since his situation in Maine had changed and he could not vote with the Administration. Corcoran then replied, "If, as you say, you are not a free man politically and must take power company support into your calculations, then you'll understand perfectly that from now on you can't expect me to protect Quoddy or trust your assurances that we'll get the Maine Power Authority out of the Maine Legislature." Dr. Gruening then explained to Corcoran that Brewster's political situation was difficult; that he was seeking the support of the Administration to garner some "liberal" Democratic votes to replace the conservative Republican votes he might lose if he kept supporting the Administration policies. The Administration apparently would give Brewster no assurances, so he simply changed his vote.
At one point during Corcoran's testimony in the committee hearing Brewster shouted, "You're a liar!" He said he could not be "bought" and had therefore voted as he did.
If you eliminate Mr. Corcoran and Quoddy, I believe these gentlemen are warranted in believing I acted very cavalierly. But when people in my district are starving, I am perhaps willing to sacrifice everything, perhaps even my reputation, to save this project. And perhaps that will bring out the impropriety of having an Administration official handling $36,000,000 and asking me to cast my vote for the bill.
Dr. Gruening supported Corcoran's testimony, but Brewster was backed by his reputation and years of fighting power interests. Had Brewster been able to prove his allegations it would have done much for the Republican cause. It would have proved that New Dealers would resort to arm twisting and a form of bribery. But even without evidence Brewster came out on top. He may have misunderstood Corcoran somehow, but his intentions were good and Quoddy did not suffer. If anything the affair was a blot on the Administration's reputation and Brewster was to be congratulated for bringing this threat into the open. People could not deny the possibility that Corcoran had made the threat and for the New Deal skeptics that was sufficient reason to support Brewster.
The fact that Vice President Garner actually touched the button to start work at Quoddy went virtually unnoticed because of the Brewster-Corcoran affair. Nevertheless, the engineers continued to make progress with their test borings and surveys. The plans were completed for the model which was to be called Quoddy Village and all the streets were named. Original plans called for bids to be entertained for the village but when the bids were found to be too high, approval was secured for the Army engineers to build the town. Harry Hopkins also issued an exemption order to Fleming allowing laborers to be employed who were not on relief rolls. This actually became necessary because of a severe shortage of workers from relief rolls.
With the project underway Maine was finally receiving a fair share of much needed relief funds. During the depression Maine was the 3rd state in distress relief; the 33rd in per pupil expenditures on common school education; and the 33rd in its wage scale for teachers. By late August the number of people employed on the project was up to 1000 with a payroll of $18,000 per week. Quoddy was booming along with the myriad problems once blocking it now apparently overcome. There seemed little that could derail the project now.
Chapter 8
Quoddy, unfortunately, could not avoid its major problems for long. The clamor once again arose for the establishment of the Authority. Stanley Reed, acting Attorney General, expressed his reservation about land condemnation because of constitutional barriers. Secretary of War Dern recommended that no work other than of an exploratory nature be done at Quoddy until the State Authority had been established. Rumors also were circulating that the Administration would threaten Governor Brann with complete work stoppage unless he called a special session of the Legislature. Brann still refused to call that session for he realized that the political situation in Maine at that time would not allow the bill to pass.
This impasse essentially revolved around the tight control of the electric power industry in the state by several private companies. Ninety-five per cent of all electric power in Maine at this time was developed and distributed by three companies, Bangor Hydro Electric Co., Cumberland County Light and power Co., and Central Maine Power Company. These concerns were backed by people who held considerable political and economic influence in Maine. This apparently gave the private power companies enough lobbying power, and enough political leverage to easily defeat the Authority Bill. An article appearing in the Boston Herald had the following to say about this matter.
"Officials of the Bangor Hydro Electric Company and the Central Power Company were frank in stating that the utility companies who have adopted a policy of watchful waiting for the present, would take every possible step to protect their rights and the rights of their stockholders. It was definitely said that this policy would be pursued until the dam was completed, if it ever was."
These private companies feared that the power of the Authority would enable it to take many or all territories served by existing power companies as the Tennessee Valley Authority was attempting and that the Authority could then set its own rate schedule undercutting the rates set by the Public Utilities Commission for private concerns. By blocking the Authority Bill these companies felt sure Quoddy, "would hang itself."
Brann did not actually refuse to call a special session. Rather he delayed just long enough that Administration officials might realize that it was unnecessary and unwise to force the issue at this time. Brann wrote to Roosevelt, "With the Maine election so near at hand, the risk of political equation beclouding the merits of the case is a possibility. Furthermore, it seems advisable, human nature being what it is, that Passamaquoddy be considered by a new Legislature elected with full understanding of the facts – perhaps on the very issue."
In fact, in December Governor Brann reached a "gentleman's agreement" with members of the Legislature over the creation of the Authority at the next scheduled session. A memorial was sent to Roosevelt.
We, the subscribing citizens of Maine, concerned with the welfare of the Nation and the State and desirous of beneficial cooperation between the United States and the state, and vitally interested in the endeavors of the Federal Government to construct the Passamaquoddy Dam project and recognizing the fact that legislation will be necessary in cooperating with the Federal Government in carrying on the work to completion, hereby give assurances that we will lend our best endeavors to securing passageby the Legislature of Maine meeting in regular session, of such Act as will set up an authority to deal with the construction and operation of the Passamaquoddy Dam project and to promote passage of such an Act as will best be calculated to assist the Federal Government in the successful consummation of the project while safeguarding the rights of the people of Maine.
The memorial was signed by Governor Brann, members of the Executive Council, department heads, and members of the Legislature. There were 154 total endorsements of the memorial, 139 of which came from the Legislature. In favor of the memorial were 117 Representatives and twenty-two Senators out of a body of 181. Only six members opposed the measure.
The Authority question was thus settled for the moment. The Administration had a strong pledge that the Authority would be passed and that was a major accomplishment. For the interim Quoddy would have to proceed for a year on its own without the supporting Authority.
This delay had immediate consequences, however. In October 1935, $5,000,000 was removed from Quoddy's first year allotment of $10,000,000. The money was part of $16,000,000 in work relief funds in rivers and harbors projects released for immediate use by the Work Progress Administration. The cut was due to the then indefinite status of the Authority legislation. Col. Fleming, who was recently promoted from Major, felt the cut would not hinder progress since only $2.2 million had been spent so far and the $5,000,000 just released could not have been spent before the following year. The $5,000,000 having already been earmarked for Quoddy, would be returned at a later date, it was felt. No one at Quoddy seemed to have been terribly upset at the cutback. Roscoe C. Emery, Mayor of Eastport, said, "There is no indication anywhere that Quoddy is not going forward, and going forward as rapidly as the circumstances will permit. $5,000,000 will probably be sufficient for that purpose for the time being and that is all anyone can ask." Work indeed was proceeding on schedule. There were now over 2,500 persons employed on the project. Quoddy Village was rapidly nearing completion with the first occupants ready to move in during December.
Shortly thereafter, another stumbling block was removed. The War Department finally came to terms with Dexter Cooper for the sale of the right to develop Quoddy. The War Department purchased all the rights, privileges, franchises, engineering plans, data and equipment belonging to Dexter P. Cooper and Dexter P. Cooper, Inc. The price reached was $60,000. Cooper agreed to serve as a consultant at an additional salary above what he received as advisor to the National Power Policy Committee. Government auditors found that Cooper's organization had spent $406,852 on the project. Cooper deserved much more than $60,000 as payment for over ten years of work. But he apparently accepted the meager terms in order to see his dream fulfilled.
In January, 1936 Quoddy received an additional $2,000,000 from the President's work relief funds. Workers who had been laid off the week before were called back to the job. It was expected that the additional $2,000,000 would keep the employment level at 4,000 through April 1st. Army engineers had already requested an additional $5,000,000 and this was expected before the present funds were used up. Col. Fleming optimistically predicted that $20,000,000 would be spent in 1936. As soon as the $2,000,000 was released work was begun on the Carlow Island and Pleasant Point Dams.
War Department Engineers decided to substantially change the project. Instead of utilizing Cobscook Bay as a low water pool which they had planned to do in their original plans, the new plans released in late 1935 called for Cobscook Bay to become the high water pool. As a high water pool Cobscook Bay would be more picturesque and would enhance the value of the pool for recreation. Also included in the changes outlined by the Army engineers was an increase in the size of the navigation locks, the abandonment of the Haycock Harbor auxiliary plant in favor of a steam or a diesel plant, and relocating the power house at the draw in the ridge separating Carrying Place and Johnson Coves. A slightly smaller but less costly development would have the power house located between Treat and Dudley Islands. The revised cost estimates of the project, if constructed as the Hunt Commission had planned, would now be $61,500,000. The revised tidal project recommended by the engineers which would have approximately the same prime power as the original project and would fit into a future expansion of the project would cost $40,600,000. A project of less maximum power with the same prime power would cost $35,600,000 although it could not be included in a future expanded development.
These costs were much discussed and Secretary Harold Ickes, always cost conscious, appointed a special board to review all estimates of the project thus far. This commission was made up of hydraulic engineers Charles H. Paul and Joseph Jacobs, with Professor William Durand of Leland Stanford University as chairman . The report of this Durand Board was submitted to Ickes on May 8, 1936. It found that the cost estimates of the Hunt board of $30,125,000 and the War Department of $61,500,000 were inadequate. Using the same project considered in the Cooper plan of the Hunt Board and the War Department estimate, the Durand Board found the likely cost.to be $68,158,000. The Board also reported the total cost of Quoddy Village at $2,400,000 with an estimated $750,000 recoverable through rentals, utility services, and final salvage of the property. Both these estimates and the War Department estimates were pigeonholed by the Administration. With Quoddy facing problems enough in getting more money for construction, there was no need for these figures to get into the hands of Quoddy's opponents. Opposition to Quoddy was mounting and with an election year approaching Roosevelt apparently could not allow Quoddy to become a major issue again.
The demand that a market be found for Quoddy power should have been quieted in early 1936 when Dexter Cooper announced that he had completed the sale of all power to be produced at Quoddy and more if it were available. He declined to announce publicly to whom the power would be sold, other than to indicate that it would be industries locating at Eastport. No contracts could be signed until either the Quoddy Authority or a district commission was established. The district commission was actually an idea set forth by Cooper to avoid the need of the Authority.
The district commission would have jurisdiction over an area of 800 square miles including Eastport, Lubec, Perry, Pembroke, Woodland, Calais, and Cutler. The commission would regulate industrial development and operate the Quoddy project and market its power. Otherwise its authority would not be as great as the State Authority.
Cooper actually had definite assurances from companies that they would purchase Quoddy power. The project was planned to produce 260,000,000 KWH per annum. Cooper had commitments from the St. Croix Paper Company, Merrimac Chemical Company and Dow Chemical Company for 320,000,000 KWH per annum with another 100,000,000 KWH for local use in Maine and New Brunswick. This total of 420,000,000 KWH per annum far exceeded Quoddy's expected output. In order to sell the power, Cooper outlined four requirements: 1) a State agency be created; 2) the cost of the project be kept within the $36,000,000 estimate of engineers; 3) large consumers of Quoddy power need assurances of power reserves at Quoddy; 4) a schedule be set up for completion of the project since contracts call for date of delivery.
The future of the Quoddy project, however, was beginning to appear cloudy. It was an uncertain thing when and if more money would be allotted to the project. The skyrocketing estimates of the War Department and the Durand Board further complicated matters. It was rapidly becoming a question of how far the Administration was willing to go on faith. If they sank another $20,000,000 into the project for fiscal 1937 then it would probably become too late to turn back. On top of these problems adverse rumors began to come out of Eastport. Quoddy was entering a very serious and crucial period. Still Governor Brann, cooly optimistic, reassured the people of his state, "I do not believe that Quoddy will be abandoned. The matter of the cost, not to exceed the original estimate, has been satisfactorily worked out."
Chapter 9
With costs rising the whole project had increasingly inspired cries of extravagance. Quoddy Village often came under fire as it was felt that money was being wasted on a nonessential project. The village itself included 120 temporary cottages of one, two or four families costing $3,000 each; two apartment buildings containing forty apartments and costing $115,000; one dormitory with eighty seven rooms for 145 occupants costing $181,000; and streets, utilities, a central heating plant, fire station for about $120,000. Also built were nine colonial homes on Rice's Hill, often called "Snob" Hill, for the officials of the project. These cost $150,000. The engineers on the project made it clear that, while the village was constructed as temporary housing, it would nevertheless be properly built so that the Government could recover some of the expense when Quoddy was finished.
The citizens of Eastport were generally upset by the village, for they felt that the workers could have been housed in existing structures in Eastport. The construction money could instead have been put into Eastport's schools and roads and might even have built a hospital and fire station. Instead these facllities were constructed at Quoddy Village, over two miles from the actual town of Eastport. The people did have a very legitimate argument, for Eastport received very few benefits from the project, outside of employment for her people. The project engineers had dreamed up this village and thereby given the entire project a gigantic headache. The rumors of grandfather clocks and love seats included in the homes delighted Quoddy's opponents. "There are some unaccountable omissions," the Philadelphia Inquirer said acidly, "Where are the gold plated bathtubs? And the electric elevators? ... If a Government is going in for boondoggling deluxe, let's do it right!"
The first hint of possible wrongdoings came in June, 1935, before the project ever began. At that time Mrs. Gertrude Cooper, Dexter's wife, wrote to James Roosevelt, the President's son, and a longtime family friend, about a meeting she had with Col. Fleming, just prior to his takeover of the project. Fleming told Mrs. Cooper that the other Army engineers were planning to "rook" her husband. Fleming felt that the $65,000 then being offered Dexter Cooper was ridiculous. Mrs. Cooper said of the offer, "He has personally borrowed $85,000 so if he took the $65,000 they now are offering he would be left morally and legally owing $20,000 more – naturally the security was Quoddy so if he sells out for less he would be responsible for the rest and left penniless – a fine reward for fifteen years of work." Cooper, of course, finally settled for only $60,000. In 1961 Mrs. Cooper broke twenty-five years of silence and publically stated that the engineers had sabotaged the project. "The Army engineers double-crossed not only my husband but President Roosevelt. They disregarded his plans and did not consult him at all."
In truth Cooper was really left out once the project began. He was given the task of finding a market for the power, which, of course, he did. Otherwise he was not consulted about the project by the engineers. It was partly because of the engineers' woeful inexperience that Quoddy was not completed, but Dexter Cooper should share none of their blame.
Mrs. Roosevelt received an interesting letter from two pastors of Eastport churches, Albert Blaney and George MacKay. In the letter dated February 4, 1936 they brought out several facts which they felt were being overlooked by officials in Washington. First they cited rumors and gossip about the excessive drinking by those in charge of the project; second they mentioned repeated charges of inefficiency against those in official capacities at the project, as they were referred to as "boy scouts," who "are in a constant state of jitters"; and third there were rumors of favoritism in acquiring jobs. This letter was considered serious enough that the Administration ordered an investigation into the alleged charges.
Other types of rumors were also circulating around Quoddy. Project officials were allegedly all provided with new chauffeur driven automobiles. A newspaper reporter was supposedly bribed not to write about the big parties, which many thought were being paid for with government funds. The $16,500 paid for the power boat also raised a few eyebrows. This latter charge was probably true and certainly was a well-founded complaint. The engineers were instructed by Roosevelt to acquire a boat from some other government department such as the Coast Guard or Navy, but General Markham, chief of the engineers, claimed such a vessel could not be located.
The report of the investigations entitled "Alleged Improper Official Activities in Connection with the Passamaquoddy Project, Eastport, Maine" was ready on February 19, 1936, after just one week of investigations. It was addressed to the three charges stated in Messrs. Blaney's and MacKay's letter, namely, excessive drinking, rumors of inefficiency, and favoritism in employment. The investigations disclosed that the first two allegations were based primarily on small town gossip which became magnified after the second or third telling. As to the third allegation, that of favoritism in employment, it was found that there were a few cases of husband and wife both being employed but for legitimate reasons, and that a man had been refused employment due to chronic addiction to drinking.
The testimonies of local citizens in this investigation did not, however, concur with the results of the investigations. Most of the testimony, in fact, was directly contrary to the findings of the investigators. Some of the testimonies had light moments, such as provided in the statement of Reverend Hutchins.
"This evening another specific story has come to my ears and I hasten to incorporate it in this report while it is fresh in my memory. It concerns a young woman, now at Quoddy Village, who, until recently, has had a room in a Boynton Street home. The charge is made that she frequently drank to excess and, in at least two instances, when out in the company of a young man also employed on the Project, became so drunk that, not daring to come home, she and the young man procured quarters for the night in a rooming house on Washington Street."
But the Government apparently was sufficiently satisfied that the charges were exaggerated and so conducted a superficial investigation of these problems at Eastport The findings in this report seemed almost as though they had been all the while expected. The Government clearly did not wish to find that the allegations were true, for that would only have provided fuel for Quoddy's opponents. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the report of the investigations was not released and the letter from Blaney and MacKay was pigeonholed, and classified as confidential. The Blaney and MacKay letter, in fact, was not declassified until February 25, 1972. It seems clear that the Government was trying to contain these rumors as well as perhaps hide some of the inefficiency of the Army engineers. In either case the rumors persisted and finally reached the. point where Roosevelt could no longer allot more money to the project without approval of Congress.
Chapter 10
As rumors continued to circulate about Quoddy, there emerged more outspoken critics of the project. Quoddy's most vociferous opponent in Washington was Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the powerful Michigan Republican. Vandenberg felt that $200,000,000 could be saved by stopping further appropriations to five projects, including Quoddy and the Florida ship canal, until each was separately approved by Congress. The Ship Canal Project was similar in its relief aspects to Quoddy. Vandenberg also asked an appropriations subcommittee that no money be included in the War Department appropriations bill then before Congress for Quoddy, or the other projects. Vandenberg's opposition to the project was primarily based on the failure of Congress to appropriate money specifically for Quoddy. He wanted the matter settled by Congress before work proceeded.
Roscoe Emery, Mayor of Eastport, among others, was concerned with the progress of Quoddy in Washington. He wrote to Senator Hale. "It is too bad something can't be done to silence Vandenberg and other prominent Republicans who are placing the Republican party in a position of opposition to this project, and thereby creating an issue that will have unfortunate repercussions in Maine." In February, the House Appropriations Committee report omitted recommendations for nonmilitary public works of the War Department, the category in which Quoddy was included. In March, a Senate Appropriations subcommittee rejected a $29,000,000 proposal for continuing work on the Canal and Quoddy. The vote was six to five against an amendment to the $545,000,000 War Department appropriations bill. Brewster remained confident, however, that Quoddy would not be abandoned.
"While I regretted having the Quoddy project submitted to Congress at this time, I was very gratified at the action of the committee, as it leaves the matter to be carried on from relief funds, exactly as it was first contemplated. The chief cornerstone of the project has been relief aspects and on this basis its continuance for next year is warranted."
Roosevelt at this point stated that Quoddy would receive no more money unless Congress appropriated the funds. With an election year at hand the President felt he could no longer supply the money to build this controversial project on his own. The increased estimates for the cost of the project were one of the deciding factors for the President.
Support evaporated elsewhere, even within Maine. In April, 1936 the Committee of Resolutions of the Maine Republican State Committee refused to include in their platform, a plank favoring the construction of Quoddy. Hale and Brewster had urged the Resolutions Committee to adopt the plank. The Democratic State Convention did, however, include a Quoddy plank in their platform. Quoddy was rapidly approaching a climax on the national level. Governor Brann left for Washington with 700 telegrams in support of Quoddy and pledged to remain there until some decision had been reached about the project.
Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, Democratic Floor Leader, on May 13th introduced Senate Joint Resolution 266, "for the appointment of boards to study and report upon the Atlantic-Gulf ship canal project, Florida, and Passamaquoddy tidal power project, Maine, and for other purposes." If the conclusions of the boards were favorable, $10,000,000 would be allotted to continue the canal and $9,000,000 for Quoddy. The funds, if approved, would have come from the Relief Deficiency Bill now being reported on by the Senate Appropriations Committee.
On May 20, 1936 the Senate Committee of Commerce met to discuss the Robinson Bill. Governor Brann presented the 700 telegrams and emphasized the project's critical relief value to eastern Maine. "Whether or not you discontinue Quoddy you are going to spend money there for relief. I think it is simply a question for the Congress to determine whether money spent there will be spent through the avenue of the Quoddy project or whether it will be spent through some other relief instrumentality." Vandenberg questioned Brann on the relief aspect of the project. "Would you say that we are justified in spending $36,000,000 to produce power that could be produced for $16,000,000?" Brann replied: "Under the assumption of work upon it; yes." Vandenberg also asked, "Would you say that for the sake of relief Congress was entitled to pursue an uneconomic project?" Brann again replied in the affirmative. Following Brann's statements Congressman Brewster also was questioned by the committee. He also expressed his feelings that Quoddy was justified for its relief aspects.
By a vote of 12 to 5 the Committee on Commerce decided favorably on the Robinson resolution and sent it to the floor of the upper chamber for early action. In the Senate on May 29th and 30th the Quoddy and Ship Canal projects were debated. Once again the most vociferous opponent of the projects was Senator Vandenberg. He began a refutation of all the points in favor of Quoddy.
He( Governor Brann) presented a stack of telegrams and said there were 700 telegrams from Maine; 'Look at these; Maine wants you to build Quoddy; Maine begs you to build Quoddy.' What Maine sought was that we continue to spend $42,000,000. The popularity of $42,000,000 will produce 700 telegrams from any section of the country."
Senator Hale defended the project.
Much abuse has been heaped on the Passamaquoddy project. Senators have referred to it repeatedly with scorn and ridicule. Long before the depression hit our country, great power interests in this country were considering the very practical question of harnessing the tides on both American and Canadian shores of Passamaquoddy Bay to develop a great tidal power, through the use of private funds.
Later he and Senator White demanded that when the vote came, Quoddy and Ship Canal not be included on the same amendment. On a matter of principle, because they felt that the Canal was a waste of the public's money, the separate vote was demanded. Hale said, "I will have no part in saddling on our Govrnment an ultimate expenditure of more than $150,000,000 for a project in which I do not believe in order to save the Maine project, dearly as I should like to see the latter put through. If the two projects are coupled together, therefore, I must vote against the amendment." The presiding officer, however, assured them that the votes could be taken separately.
Vandenberg continued his attacks against Quoddy. He cited the recent rumors that the costs were going up.
What good is an estimate that the expense is $42,000,000? It does not amount to the paper on which it is written. It is just one more nice little piece of window dressing to make it easy for those Senators who wish to turn their backs upon their obligations to the citizens of the United States and change their minds upon his proposal to do so and have an excuse for doing so.
Vandenberg said that he would feel obligated, if he supported Quoddy at that time, to vote for it whenever it came up again in the future. He felt he could not do so because of the tremendous uncertainty of the project. Vandenberg also rebutted Quoddy on the grounds of the unfavorable P. W. A. report of March 16, 1934, the unfavorable Federal Power Commission report of January 3, 1934, and the fact that the F.P.C. said Quoddy should not be considered until all of Maine's river potential was developed. He also objected to the "Presidential boards" reporting on Quoddy, such as the Hunt board, feeling that they were not all unbiased.
When the Maine Senators demanded the separate votes they stirred up a wave of sectionalism. The Ship Canal amendment was passed 35 to 30 even though Hale and White voted against it. Then a bloc of Southern Senators voted against Quoddy and it was defeated 39 to 28. It was almost certain that together Quoddy and the Canal would have passed. Senator Duncan Fletcher of Florida, a longtime friend of Quoddy, said, "The friends of Quoddy were responsible for its defeat." Fletcher, incidentally, in spite of Hale's and White's maneuver, had voted for Quoddy. Governor Brann summed it all up, leaving nothing to chance as he attacked the actions of the two Senators from Maine.
Senator Hale's insistence upon the separation of the Maine and Florida projects was fatal and was the betraying kiss of death to the Maine project. Senator White's speech in opposition to the spirit of the Robinson resolution was the fatal stab of annihilation. Senator Hale inserted the first screw of the lid and Senator White drove it home, that the corpse of Quoddy might not escape.
Representative Brewster also made it clear that he did not approve of the actions of his fellow Republicans. Roscoe Emery, the outspoken editor of the Eastport Sentinel, sharply attacked Senators Hale and White. "They had a chance, ready-made and hard to muff, to do something for their constituents when the Quoddy resolution came up in the Senate, but they booted it with the result that thousands of Maine men are being thrown out of work and the hopes of the whole eastern section of the State lies in ruins ... They both own luxurious homes in Washington. One at least comes to Maine only in the summer and some years not even then. His representation of Maine is and has always been a standing joke in Washington."
All the charges which were levelled at the two Senators from Maine were justified. At a time when they really could have done something for their constituents, they decided to act on a matter of narrow scruple. Quoddy certainly was in dire straights when two of its supporters deserted it at its most critical point. Indeed, thanks to these 'friends' of Quoddy, the project's future was hanging in the balance. Unless a near miracle occurred, Quoddy appeared to be on the way to a certain and painful death.
Chapter 11
With the defeat of Quoddy in Congress all of Maine turned to Roosevelt for help. He remained Quoddy's resort. Brewster wired the President.
"Discontinuance of work at Passamaquoddy power plant leaves eastern Maine in dire distress. Project is amply warranted both as emergency relief and also as a permanent rehabilitation of a depressed area ... Allocation of $29,000,000 now from old and new funds will guarantee prompt completion with all major contracts now ready for prompt letting. Cessation of work now or small allocation of funds will mean deterioration and imperiling of entire project and tremendous prejudice to all interests in Eastern Maine."
But Roosevelt was taking a political beating for supporting the controversial scheme and he realized it. With elections only a few months away he could not afford to handle such a 'hot' issue as Quoddy. In a July press conference, when asked if he was abandoning the project, he replied, "I cannot devote any money to it. How can I? I don't know ..."
A very apropos remark was made by a Lynn, Massachusetts resident in a letter to the President.
"Did I understand you to say 'Dam Quoddy'?" Later in the month Roosevelt visited Campobello and the Quoddy project speaking to a very despondent group of people he said,
"Some of you remember me at that time (at age two visiting Campobello for the first time) and I can remember when some of you were only two years old. You are interested in Quoddy. Quoddy will be completed. It may take some time for it is necessary to educate the people of this country and of Canada to its value and possibilities. I believe in Quoddy and I believe you do too."'
Roosevelt also visited with Canadian officials to discuss the possibilities of the construction of the international project at a future time. After the President had departed the people of this area were left with but another false hope as they turned to face the realities of a depression, once again alone.
There was also some concern that the two Republican Senators were somehow attempting to shift the blame of Quoddy's defeat. Roscoe Emery warned Governor Brann.
"Republican effort to shift responsibility for a Quoddy defeat apparently gaining ground in Maine. Hale's strategy is first to deprive you of benefit of project and second to confuse issue as to who killed it. Your safest course is to put Quoddy over regardless. Maine Senators are wide open to attack from this direction. They have definitely signed off from any credit should Quoddy go on."
Governor Brann, who had announced that he was a candidate for the seat presently occupied by Wallace White, challenged the Senator to a Washington County debate of the question, "Who betrayed Quoddy?" White declined the invitation.
By June 30, 1936 all of the $7,000,000 appropriations had been spent, and only a small crew working on the demobilization of the project remained under contract. Harry Hopkins, National Relief Administrator, vainly sought a suitable use for Quoddy Village. "I feel that Quoddy has been generally understood by myself and by the general public. I am certain that something can be done with the village and that it will not be left to rot to pieces just because Congress has refused the funds needed to finish the power project." The Village ultimately was left to the National Youth Administration for use as an instructional center.
The demobilization of Quoddy continued for the remainder of 1936. By late August, however, there were only about 700 people left on the project, with the number decreasing weekly. At the peak of activity there had been some 5,500 employed from relief rolls.
These cutbacks had some humorous consequences. In August a report came out of Quoddy that excess pies and bread were being fed to pigs. According to the report some 500 pies and 800 loaves of bread were being delivered to Quoddy under existing contracts, but only a few pies and loaves of bread were actually needed. Since there was nothing in New Deal regulations for the distribution of surplus food, the bread and pies went to the dump. Farmer Ed Pottle of Perry, who had one of the contracts to collect garbage at Quoddy Village, also owned pigs. His pigs were allegedly feeding on eight kinds of pies. The Army engineers denied the report and stated that the pies and bread had been cut back. A garbage man, not Pottle, however, also denied the rumors. The War Department blamed the story on "politics."
Col. Fleming left Quoddy in August. He was the best liked figure involved with the project. He hoped that Quoddy could be started up again but felt that it Quoddy were abandoned for a long period, added start-up costs might run as high as $15,000,000. Included in this estimate was the time loss, but of greater importance was the effect of dispersing the expert staff in charge of the project.
A rock blast set off by Vice President Garner had signalled the beginning of the project in 1935. Ironically another rock blast in December, 1936, marked the beginning of the end. Just a few hundred men remained at work on the Carlow Island and Pleasant Point Dams. The figures for actual construction were given as follows: total cost, $7,000,000; engineering, $2,000,000; actual field construction, $2,000,000; Quoddy Village, $1,500,000; and $1,500,00 for acquisition for the construction plant, field shops, stocks, supplies, and necessary land and rights of way.
The Maine elections in September and the national elections two months later produced no real surprises. The Republicans won heavily in the State elections as Lewis Barrows defeated F. Harold Dubord for Governor by 43,000 votes. White also was reelected but by a scant 5,000 votes returned Governor Brann. Brewster also was returned to Congress. Brann's near defeat of White, during heavy Republican voting, can be taken as a tribute to this fine man and his excellent record as Governor. The national elections also went to the Republicans as Maine became one of only two states to support Landon. Landon had spoken out strongly against Quoddy. "I might add that whatever I do in the matter of utility and power projects, when elected President, I will not use the money of the people to attempt to harness the tides." Maine, in her own quiet way, rejected the New Deal which she had supported in 1934. Too many political hassles and too many broken promises finally caused Maine to return to the conservation stance it had maintained before Roosevelt and the New Deal.
For Dexter Cooper, the end of Quoddy meant the end of his life-long dream. Mrs. Cooper said in 1961 that her husband had urged Roosevelt to stop the project because the engineers were ruining it. This may be slight exaggeration for there is no conclusive evidence to support this claim. Cooper's relationship with the engineers was clearly very cool as they virtually ignored him and ran the project as they saw fit. In 1937 Cooper was vainly trying to collect $10,000 which the engineers still owed him from the June 26, 1935, agreement promising him $60,000 for his interest in Quoddy. Roosevelt recommended that Cooper should take on other employment for a year or two since it would be at least that long before any action might be taken on Quoddy again. In March, 1938 Dexter P. Cooper died a penniless and broken man
Quoddy had its final chances in Congress in 1939. On January 19th of that year Senator Vandenberg introduced Senate Resolution 62, requesting the Federal Power Commission to review its previous report on the Passamaquoddy project and report to the Senate the relative costs of steam generation or tidal generation plants, and the existence of markets for power. The F.P.C. reported April 7, 1941 that Passamaquoddy power could not compete with river hydroelectric power or steam generated power. Finally Senator White introduced Senate Joint Resolution 57 on February 7, 1939 to authorize the Secretary of War to complete surveys of the Quoddy: project and determine the advisability of putting in an experimental plant at Passamaquoddy. No action was taken on this resolution.
This was the end of Quoddy under the Roosevelt Administration. The Federal Government finally disposed of Quoddy Village in 1949 for a total of $131,755 thus officially severing all ties with the Passamaquoddy Bay Tidal Power Project and leaving this potentially great project a scant memory for Eastern Maine.
Conclusion
Although the project was defeated, Quoddy has become an issue several times since the days of the New Deal. Margaret Chase Smith has been a long-time advocate of the project. Under the Kennedy Administration a detailed study was conducted by the Corps of Engineers and Quoddy was discussed in Congress. And most recently Robert Monks, candidate for the Republican senatorial nomination in Maine in 1972, revived the discussion of the project. At this time it is thought the cost of the project would be in the neighborhood of $70 billion.
With this renewed interest, increasing power rates in Maine, and the environmental threat of the Yankee Atomic Power Plant at Wiscasset, perhaps one day the Passamaquoddy power project will be completed. After the studies conducted in 1963-64 it was said of the project, "It is not unlikely that Quoddy will die once more in Congress. But if it does, it will be proposed again in future years. Its very boldness is like a life jacket, preventing it from ever sinking into oblivion."
Quoddy had behind it a wide variety of people. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was the most influential supporter but Louis Brann, Ralph Owen Brewster, Frederic Delano, and others in Maine were equally enthusiastic. Quoddy's greatest supporter was of course Dexter P. Cooper who had developed and nurtured the idea.
Roosevelt's interest was indeed personal and in some sense sentimental. Because of the family home on nearby Campobello, Roosevelt had gotten to know the entire Passamaquoddy area. When the opportunity thus arose, Roosevelt took every opportunity to help the people of this area, many of them friends of the President. But Roosevelt's interest in the project was not just because of its relief features. This was also tied to the romantic notion of harnessing the moon. Furthermore, he believed Quoddy had the potential of becoming a great industrial development as well as the most unique hydro-electric plant in the world.
As President, Roosevelt had the power and opportunity to do something about Quoddy. This project might never have gotten off the ground under a different Administration, for Roosevelt was able to allot funds without Congressional approval for this P. W. A. program. The Quoddy project also fit in nicely with the total New Deal power program. The project was similar in many aspects to T.V.A. The New Deal's understanding of utilities fit in perfectly with the high power rates in Maine and the tight control of the industry by a few private companies. Quoddy might have broken monopolistic practices through much lower companies rates. The Quoddy project also meshed nicely with the New Deal's public works relief programs.
Roosevelt abandoned the project because of political pressures during an election year, as has been shown above. Republican charges of waste were hard to counter. Yet with $7,000,000 already given to the project it should have been able to proceed on its own merits. And it indeed might have done so had it not been for the betrayal by two Maine Senators and the mismanagement of the project by Army engineers. I believe it was a great deal of sadness that Roosevelt turned his back on Quoddy. Yet he continued to press for an international scale project after Quoddy had died in Congress. Roosevelt's interest in Quoddy may once have been enhanced by possible political gains in Maine but in fact he carried through his initial promise as work began in 1935. Another fact should not be overlooked when considering Roosevelt and Quoddy. In 1920 Roosevelt had first mentioned Quoddy and he had worked in behalf of the project during the 1920's. So while there may have been political overtones in his interest in Quoddy during the New Deal, his interest in Quoddy was genuine and this should not be overlooked.
Roosevelt's uncle, Frederic Delano, is particularly interesting for he simply seems to appear on the scene in behalf of Quoddy in the middle of the controversy. Because he was a member of the Roosevelt family his interest may well have been generated for many of his nephew's reasons. Delano also had a very sincere interest in the project, and continually urged the President to take positive action. His position on the Natural Resources Board may have contributed to his interest in Quoddy or it may have been strictly personal. Nevertheless he had the vision to foresee Quoddy as it might have been if the project had been approved.
Governor Louis Brann was one of the most ardent supporters and hardest workers for the project. Whether in Augusta or Washington, Brann was continually working for Quoddy. The Governor generally pushed the project on grounds of social welfare. He felt that since Maine deserved relief funds, why not build Quoddy and have something to show for the money spent on relief. This sort of public works boondoggling was not uncommon during the New Deal. Because of. the way in which he instructed Kenneth Sills to word his commission's report, it is obvious that Governor Brann was not as concerned with the economic aspects of the project as its social desirability.
Brann's most important role in the Quoddy development revolved around the creation of the State Authority necessary to operate the dam. He allowed the regular session of the Legislature to end in 1935 before the Authority Bill was acted upon. He did so, out of necessity however, because of the mounting opposition to the Authority. The outbrust by the Chief of the Maine Supreme Court and the pledges of the private power concerns to block the Authority Bill were valid reasons for concern and Brann was wise to act as he did. Under pressure from Washington to call the Legislature into special session he arrived at a compromise, the "gentlemen's agreement" to work for the Authority in the next session. Brann could not be faulted for failing to create the Authority. The time was simply not right and Brann wished to take no chances with Quoddy.
One of the unfortunately ironic things about the Authority controversy, was the pledge by private power companies that given enough rope, Quoddy would "hang herself." This is precisely what happened. Had the Authority been established, there would have been much tighter control and supervision of the funds for Quoddy. The engineers would not have been able to squander the funds on the village, on unnecessary frills, and on design refinements and probably the critical $5,000,000 would not have been removed from the allotment. In fact, Quoddy probably would have been built but for lack of the Authority.
Congressman Ralph Owen Brewster also seized upon the project because of its social desirability. He mentioned time and time again that people in his district were starving and that Quoddy would have provided jobs and much needed relief in Maine's easternmost county. But Brewster was also a steadfast opponent of private power interests. He had been against them during the days when he was Governor and had pushed for Quoddy then. His opposition to the repeal of the Fernald law was based upon protection of the people. He did not want to see all the power produced at Quoddy leave the state. Brewster's opposition to Insull interests is a very important factor in the development of power in Maine. These Insull interests did exist, but the extent to which they were dominant is nearly impossible to measure precisely.
Brewster's open break with the Administration over the alleged Corcoran threat provides an important insight into the mentality of this man. At a time when his constituents were desperate, Brewster cast aside his longtime principle of opposition to public utility holding companies, and stood up in behalf of Quoddy. There is no firm evidence that Corcoran actually made the threat as charged by Brewster, but the probability is good that Brewster was correct in his charge. The Administration desperately wanted the Wheeler-Raymond Holding Company Bill passed. Since Corcoran had had dealings with Brewster he indeed may have made a remark, perhaps not officially, leading Brewster to level the charges. Brewster, of course, had promised the Administration that he would use all his influence in seeking passage of the Authority Bill and upon this promise Quoddy was begun. But because of his break with the Administration Brewster was no longer considered trustworthy and Governor Brann was given the task of passing the Authority legislation by himself.
Ralph Owen Brewster could not have done more for Quoddy. He was a popular figure and he lost none of his popularity over the Quoddy issue. Brewster was indeed a valuable ally in any struggle and Quoddy advocates were only too grateful that he remained on their side.
Finally, no discussion of Quoddy supporters would be complete without mention of the 'father of Quoddy,' Dexter P. Cooper. Cooper's tremendous engineering ability led him to begin Quoddy. When a man of Cooper's great engineering background and proven ability was willing to spend his life devoted to Quoddy, there indeed must have been some merit to the project.
One fact stands out above all others: this project was technically and engineeringly possible, No reports, not even the adverse P.W.A. or F.P.C. reports, ever questioned this aspect of the project and that is a major plus in favor of Quoddy. The propect was, however, turned down at first, and later attacked, because it was not economically feasible; the cost would be too great to make the power costs competitive. It was also rejected because there was no market for the power.
During the period, the power rates across the country averaged $4.78 per 100 KWH of domestic electricity. The New England average was about $5.25 and the Maine average $5.37. Something should have been done to lower these rates and Quoddy was a solution.
By writing off part of the cost of the project as relief funds, Quoddy power could have been competitive. But more important, really, is the fact that Dexter Cooper found a market for the Dower. He tentatively sold the output of the project even while his detractors maintained that there was no market for the power.
Other questions were raised with regard to Cooper and Quoddy. The $30,000,000 estimate that Cooper and the rest of the Hunt Board reached was found woefully inadequate by the War Department and the Durand Board. Yet Cooper knew more about Quoddy than any man alive and he should have been able to present a reasonable estimate. Cooper's first estimate in the 1920's was $100,000,000 for the international project. Then he estimated the two pool Cobscook Bay plan at $40,000,000. So his one pool Cobscook Bay project estimate of $30,000,000 is in keeping with the figures set forth in his other plans.
The key to the increasing estimates certainly appears to have been the Army Corps of Engineers. For example, Cooper's original plans did not include $1.5 million for Quoddy Village and $2 million for extra engineering. Cooper and his staff had competed most of the engineering but they were scarcely consulted by the War Department engineers. Instead the engineers changed the project and totally disregarded Cooper's plans so the basis upon which Cooper had made the $30 million estimate was no longer even valid. Quoddy Village was another way in which the engineers sabotaged the project. The rumors surrounding the village hurt Quoddy far more than the actual cost of the village.
Dexter P. Cooper should have been put in charge of the project or at least his plans should have been rigidly followed. There was nothing to control the course of action taken by the engineers. There should have been a much tighter control of the project by officials in Washington. $7,000,000 should not have been spent with only a few rock-filled dams built. Had these funds been prudently used, a great deal of progress could have been made on the project. But when a Senator Vandenberg saw $7,000,000 spent for a couple of rock-filled dams, there is little wonder that Quoddy lost future appropriations.
The charge was also made that the Hunt Board was prejudiced and biased, and that President Roosevelt appointed them because he wanted a favorable report. But the Sills Commission and Maine State Planning Board were not biased and they released favorable reports too. Sills was a principled man and both commissions were by no means predisposed to favor the project.
Cooper and Moses Pike had, of course, long association with the project. Because of this long association, they also knew more about the project than anybody else. The Hunt Board also consisted of two P.W.A. members, H. T. Hunt, general counsel and Dr. Cory, an engineer. The Hunt Board was unanimous in its findings. I do not honestly believe that this commission was biased beyond what could be expected with Cooper and Pike as members. Again, I believe their findings were realistic and Quoddy could have been built on the basis of their recommendations.
What really did kill Quoddy then? Was it the actions of Senators Hale and White or was it really Quoddy's own lack of merit as many people claim? It was a combination of all the aforementioned factors, with Hale and White applying the final blow. It was the result more of the incredibly intricate political circumstances in Maine and the nation than anything else. It was a New Deal project, par excellence, and for this it received much natural opposition.
Quoddy should have been built. The War Department engineers did a superb job of sabotaging the project, whether intentionally or not, and had it not been for this, Quoddy today might be a reality. It is of course easy to say this in retrospect but this project had immense potential in Maine. With the discussions about oil refineries and supertankers surrounding us in 1972, Quoddy now looms as a distinct possibility. Environmental harm never was an issue with Quoddy, save for the harm to fisheries which today would not be much of an issue. And with scientific technology and careful stocking, the harm to fisheries could probably be minimized.
But this is not the first time since the New Deal that Quoddy might have been warranted. In 1947 tragic forest fires struck the state because of a widespread drought. There ensued a critical power shortage in Maine as river levels fell markedly. The shortage was so great in some areas that naval vessels had to be sent to supply certain towns with power from auxiliary plants on board. Quoddy power, however, would have been available ever constant and unaffected by droughts as it was.
In the end I believe Quoddy could have been built and should have been built under the Roosevelt Administration. One cannot help but feel sorry for Dexter Cooper who worked so hard only to see the fruits of his efforts vanish. But perhaps one day the Quoddy project will become a reality rather than a hope. We have finally been able to put people on the moon; now, let's make use of the moon's power on earth.