April 29, 1974
Page 12157
SENATOR MUSKIE'S SPEECH AT THE NAVAL ACADEMY
Mr. HART. Mr. President, last week Senator MUSKIE delivered the keynote address at the 14th Annual Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference in Annapolis.
In his perceptive remarks, the Senator said that the United States is "on the verge of a new coherence in American foreign policy, a new sense of direction and common purpose, and a restoration of the bipartisan tradition in America's foreign relations."
He argued that there is now a broad popular consensus in four areas of our foreign policy: First, that an isolationist policy is not possible; second, that the general direction of detente is a proper one; third, that our alliances with Europe and Japan are still vital; and, fourth, that our policies should reflect the growing interdependence of the developed and underdeveloped world.
Senator MUSKIE's speech calls for a restored bipartisanship in our foreign policy based upon these areas of agreement. For the interest of my Senate colleagues, I ask unanimous consent that Senator MUSKIE's address be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TODAY: RESTORING THE BIPARTISAN TRADITION
(Remarks by Senator EDMUND S. MUSKIE)
It is a great pleasure to be back in Annapolis and in such distinguished company. It's quite a change from the first time I was here, and it may take me a minute to get oriented.
It's a little hard for me to believe it now, but in 1942 I came here as a 120-day-wonder. The wonder was that I survived those 4 months, and that the Navy survived the aftermath.
As a 28-year-old lawyer who was already getting set in his ways, I was about as comfortable with Navy rules and with teenaged midshipmen as your admirals are these days with the equal rights amendment and the prospect of giving orders to "midship-persons."
Those of you who have dipped into ancient history may recall that during the war, things were done in something of a hurry. After Annapolis, I was sent to Penn State on a four-month course in diesel propulsion, and after that, I was ordered to an engineering billet on a YP. I've never been certain whether it was my lack of proficiency with diesels or just the Navy way, but my ship ran on gasoline engines. Of course, I know that sort of foul-up never happens any more.
However, I know you are not here to listen to reminiscences of the good old days when Z was just the last letter in the alphabet and Diego Garcia was a mess steward, not an island. Unlike old soldiers who supposedly just fade away, sailors, I suspect, talk themselves to death. This evening, at least, the talk will be serious. I hope it will not be fatal.
The United States is emerging today from one of the most difficult periods in the history of its foreign policy.
The older of us remember the active internationalism which characterized U.S. policy during the Cold War; the idealistic optimism; the clear perception of the forces of good and evil at work in the world – all these qualities seemed to evaporate in the military and moral quagmire of the Vietnam War.
Before Vietnam, America seemed to have a sharper focus: our foreign policy objectives were easier to define, and they enjoyed broad popular support. From Truman to Kennedy, the country seemed to share a strong sense of direction and a common purpose.
Vietnam ended all of that. The experience of that war was shattering to our morale, and only time will tell how deep and lasting the wounds have been. But one consequence of the war is already clear: Vietnam has changed our outlook on world affairs, has changed our image of ourselves, and has changed our view of the proper American role in the world today.
These changes in our world outlook have been accompanied by some of the most extraordinary internal changes we have ever seen in the fabric of American society. Many of our values have been radically altered in what historians may later call an American cultural revolution. The whole process has produced sharp generational gaps – including differing views of the U.S. role in world affairs.
Like all sudden change, the internal and external events of recent years have been upsetting to many Americans who view these new trends with alarm and even despair. The nation is viewed by many as having slipped its moorings, drifting on a sea of political and moral uncertainty. The words of the novelist, Hermann Hesse, may have a special meaning in our current condition:
"Human life is reduced to real suffering, to hell, only when two ages, two cultures and religions overlap ... There are times when a whole generation is caught in this way between two ages, two modes of life, with the consequence that it loses all power to understand itself and has no standard, no security, no simple acquiescence."
I
This bleak introduction will serve as a sharp contrast to the central argument I wish to make tonight. Despite a confusion of values after Vietnam; despite the current domestic trauma of Watergate; despite the dangerous Middle East conflict and spreading hostilities again in Indochina; despite an apparent cooling of detente even as our relations with Europe are heating up – despite all of this, I believe we are on the verge of a new coherence in American foreign policy, a new sense of direction and common purpose, and a restoration of the bipartisan tradition in America's foreign relations.
The reason for my optimism is that I perceive today a broad popular consensus on four fundamental principles of American foreign policy.
First, there is a general consensus that an isolationist policy is not a viable option for America. Despite our new and sensible aversion to entangling involvements in marginal regional conflicts, most Americans believe in a global interdependence which necessarily requires a significant American role in the world's political, economic and security affairs.
Second, there is general support for the principle of detente – relaxation of tensions and normalization of relations with our primary Cold War adversaries, the Soviet Union and Communist China. The terms of detente – and its pace – are appropriate subjects for public debate. But most Americans are for detente in principle.
Third, there is widespread agreement that our alliances with Europe and Japan are still vital, notwithstanding progress toward detente, and should be emphasized. Those alliances are widely perceived to be consistent with the policy of detente, and to have purposes which go beyond the provision of mutual security.
Fourth, there is a new awareness of the interdependence of the developed and undeveloped world. This fact was brought home painfully during the oil embargo, and it has received careful attention in the recent special U.N. session which was convened at the request of President Boumedienne of Algeria to consider the critical issues of world economic development. The session was most notable, I believe, in a remarkably enlightened address by Secretary Kissinger on problems of the world economy and world development. The Secretary's remarks were especially welcome in view of his past record of relative indifference to both these major problems of our times.
These four principles, in my view, form the basis of an emerging American consensus on the direction of our foreign policy and on our fundamental national purpose. Now is the time to seize what may be an historic opportunity – arising, ironically, in the wake of a bitterly divisive foreign adventure and in the midst of a poisonous political scandal at home.
The opportunity is to forge a new bipartisanship in the pursuit of common goals – goals which we can share not only among ourselves, but with the world at large.
II
The first of these principles is that a policy of isolation is not a viable option for America today.
The option of an essentially isolationist policy has always been something of an optical illusion.
The argument for such a policy has rested on the notion that in a world of nuclear arms, a nation's physical security does not depend on its geopolitical positioning and that a global foreign and defense policy is therefore no longer necessary. In fact, it is sometimes argued, such global policies can reduce one's physical security by risking involvement in local conflicts which can escalate into global war.
The argument has a certain abstract attractiveness, but it is irrelevant to the actual condition in which we find ourselves. A small power may have the luxury to be concerned primarily with its physical security and the preservation of its independence. But a great power must be concerned not only with these minimal goals, but also with the creation and preservation of a favorable international environment. This does not require an interventionist policy – a policy which is neither possible or desirable – but it does mean that withdrawal from our major commitments in Europe and Japan is untenable.
U.S. withdrawal from those commitments would most certainly involve, in the long or short run, nuclear proliferation. In theory, a few more nuclear states might not make the world any less stable, and one could even argue that the U.S. could stay out of regional nuclear conflicts in such a world should stability break down. While one could imagine such a system in theory, most historians would find it doubtful that a major power like the U.S. could always stay out of conflicts involving other large states – conflicts which would unquestionably affect our political and economic interests.
Moreover, one must realistically consider the practical consequences of such a U.S. withdrawal. An independent Japanese nuclear force, quite apart from its possible impact on Japanese society internally, would likely be disruptive of what may be an evolving Asian stability. In Europe, a total American withdrawal from our security guarantees could be extremely destabilizing. In the
present stage of European development, one can easily imagine the great strains that would occur in the Anglo-French-German relationship when confronted with the need to find a means, some kind of joint nuclear force with a shared decision-making mechanism, to replace the American shield.
It is clear that most Europeans, and especially the Germans, regard the American military presence as essential to their security. It is not that they fear aggression in the traditional sense.
Rather, they fear – and I think properly – a loss of their freedom of action if the European balance is disturbed in a significant way – a freedom of maneuver which they feel is based on a mutual military paralysis of the great powers in the European arena.
We may debate energetically such questions as burden-sharing in the alliance, and insist – I think rightly – that the Europeans assume a greater share of conventional defense responsibilities on their own continent. There is nothing magic about the present number of American troops in Europe, and I believe we can consider significant U.S. troop withdrawals without undermining the fundamental commitment we have made to our N.A.T.O. allies. But such a debate – which will occur again this year in Congress – will not call into question our basic commitment to European defense or challenge the principle that a certain number of American troops should remain in Europe to guarantee that commitment.
Apart from these strategic considerations, there are economic realities which prevent us from seriously considering an isolationist policy. Economically, the United States is now the leading international investor in the world, both in the developing and advanced industrial economies.
Moreover, we are increasingly dependent on outside resources, importing 26 out of some 36 basic raw materials consumed by an industrial economy. And despite the rhetoric of Project Independence, we are inevitably becoming more dependent on energy imports. Add to this a central monetary role in the world financial system, and it is clear that the stakes are simply too high in world economic affairs for us to seriously consider a policy of withdrawal.
And so there is a broad consensus, I believe, that an isolationist thrust is not relevant to the American condition. The issue today, as Professor Brzezinski of Columbia among others has argued, is not internationalism versus isolationism – but rather the forms and degrees of global interdependence.
III
Secondly, I believe there is a broad national consensus on the main thrust of our policies of detente with the Soviet Union and China. Here, also, there are sharp disagreements on the form and degree of interdependence we are seeking to establish with the Communist world. But detente – viewed, in Secretary Kissinger's words, as "a process of managing relations with a potentially hostile country in order to preserve peace while maintaining our vital interests" – is widely supported by the American people.
Detente is not founded on agreement on values – rather, it is based on the awareness by each side that the other is a potential adversary in a nuclear war. In such a world, the pursuit of peace, as Dr. Kissinger has said elsewhere, must begin with the pragmatic concept of coexistence – not an overly pragmatic policy which lacks humanity or vision, but a policy which shuns the moralistic excesses that obstruct negotiation and accommodation.
Detente, according to Hans Morgenthau, has been successful in at least three areas: First, it has reduced the ideological fervor in the overall Soviet-American relationship which, until recently, made negotiated settlements virtually impossible. Second, it has resulted in a substantial settlement of the German question through West German recognition of the territorial status quo in Central Europe and of the East German state, and through agreement on the international status of Berlin. Third, it has resulted in the 1972 agreements on strategic arms, which have reduced the tensions of an unregulated nuclear arms race.
To be sure, detente has been less successful in other areas, and there is a current drift in the Soviet-American relationship which raises serious doubts about its future development. There is pessimism on SALT II, an apparent hardening of Soviet domestic repression, and a growing awareness in both countries that detente has its limits.
We are caught today in a conceptual dilemma regarding those limits. Last month, in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Secretary Kissinger argued that our country has a right to demand of the Soviet Union responsible international behavior and to demand that agreements are observed in good faith. But he took issue with the purpose of the Jackson Amendment to the Trade bill – an amendment which I and over three-fourths of the Senate cosponsor – by arguing that it is fruitless for us to insist on basic changes in the Soviet internal system, and that in so doing, we risk other vital international objectives which we can constructively pursue together.
Proponents of the Jackson Amendment have argued that American concern with Soviet domestic policies is not meddling. Rather, it reflects that a stable peace must be based on a common moral framework. Detente, it is argued, can only be limited and precarious in the absence of such a common moral framework.
The Jackson Amendment confronts us with a moral and practical dilemma which will not be easy to resolve. But there is some possibility that a satisfactory compromise may be worked out which will permit the normalization of U.S.-Soviet economic relations without requiring us to turn our backs on those who are suffering most from Soviet repression at home. Proponents of the Jackson Amendment have indicated a willingness to compromise on the demand for totally free emigration in exchange for a substantially increased flow of emigrants and an end to the harassment of individuals applying for emigration. The Administration has indicated a willingness to link the trade and emigration issue by means of an annual congressional review.
While the two sides have not reached agreement, there is some reason to believe that a compromise may ultimately be possible.
Whatever the outcome, the American people are in no mood to return to the confrontation policies of the Cold War era. Short of extreme Soviet provocation, the debate over detente has already been largely settled. In a nuclear world, there is no enduring alternative.
IV
Thirdly, I believe that there is a general consensus that our alliances with Europe and Japan are still vital, notwithstanding progress on detente, and must be emphasized. This consensus exists despite economic tensions with Japan and the increasing acerbity which has characterized our relations with Europe in recent years. These tensions have in large measure been a price we have paid for the pursuit of detente with the Soviet Union and China – for our policies were too shrouded in secrecy, pursued too unilaterally, and sprung on an unsuspecting world with too much flair and diplomatic surprise. Such a style inevitably caused resentment in Europe and Japan.
Our current relationship with Japan has improved somewhat after the diplomatic shocks of recent years. But our relations with Europe have continued to decline, and the harsh words spoken recently by both the President and the Secretary of State reflect the exasperation felt by American policy makers.
The U.S. grievance concerns the alleged failure of the nine-member Common Market to consult with the United States adequately before important decisions affecting our interests are made. There has been an increasing tendency; it is said, for the Europeans to follow the Gaullist dictum that Europe can avoid American domination only by making its decisions without consultation.
This has led, in Secretary Kissinger's words, to "a tendency to seek European identity in opposition to the United States." The underlying cause, he says, is the internal weakness of most European regimes, which tempts them to side with Paris in anti-American positions involving little domestic risk.
It is difficult, in the present mood of the alliance, to measure the depth of these divisions. My own view is not pessimistic, for I believe there is a profound sense of psychological and cultural community at the heart of the Atlantic relationship which transcends the friction which will always exist.
V
The fourth principle which forms part of an emerging consensus on foreign policy is that we and our allies in the developed world are linked in a relationship of growing interdependence with the underdeveloped world.
This renewed awareness was manifested only recently in the special U.N. meeting on current problems of world development. I welcome the remarks Secretary Kissinger made on that occasion, and it may be useful to review the six problem areas the Secretary identified at that time.
He first stressed that the global economy requires expanding energy supplies at equitable prices, and pledged the cooperation of the United States in reducing energy waste and in developing new energy supplies. Second, he urged the cooperation of producing and consuming nations in overcoming the cycle of raw material surplus and shortage – opposing any efforts which may be mounted by cartels of raw-material producers to negotiate artificially high prices. Third; he committed the United States to a major effort to assist the developing countries in food production and population control so as to bring about a stable balance, and called for a worldwide food reserve to meet food emergencies. Fourth, he called for special assistance to the poorest nations – those which are neither industrialized, nor produce raw materials or sufficient food – so as to prevent them from being overwhelmed in the current circumstances. Fifth, he committed the U.S. to a major scientific effort in developing farming technologies which are productive and labor-intensive, in improving the technology of birth control, and in expanding energy research and development. And sixth, he called for a worldwide trade, monetary and investment system which will sustain industrial civilization in the present era of scarcity.
The Kissinger speech, while providing little of substance in itself, is nevertheless a welcome rhetorical departure from earlier indifference to the problems of the developing world and the world economy. I believe that the disparity between rich and poor on a worldwide scale is the central moral problem of our time. The gap between rich and poor is widening, and there is a growing awareness of this global inequality and a determination to erase it. To the extent that we do not seriously address this problem, we are risking increased social strife on a worldwide scale and global anarchy.
A renewed awareness of global interdependence comes at a time when foreign aid, in the traditional sense, has lost most of its domestic constituency in America. But the popular disillusionment with our bilateral foreign aid programs is not entirely unjustified. What we need now is a massive effort on a multilateral scale, not simply to provide capital transfers to the developing world but to sponsor a variety of technical assistance of world aid, trade, investment and finance so as to cope realistically with the historic task before us.
Secretary Kissinger has spoken of a mood in the country in the early 1960s when he was first exposed to the higher levels of foreign policy decision-making in Washington. The mood may have been brash and over-confident, he said, but a spirit prevailed which was "quintessentially American: that problems are a challenge, not an alibi; that men are measured not only by their success but also by their striving; that it is better to aim grandly than to wallow in mediocre comfort."
A restored bipartisanship in American foreign policy does not exclude active partisan debate on the day-to-day issues of American foreign policy. But a restored bipartisanship recognizes the broad base of agreement concerning our purpose in the world and the great tasks before us. We must draw upon the strength that such unity gives us in order to fulfill the role which history has assigned us. We cannot shrink from those responsibilities. We must, in President Kennedy's words, welcome them.