June 6, 1974
Page 18054
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I believe that we can reduce our forces stationed in foreign countries significantly without jeopardizing our security interests or our political objectives.
Like most Americans, I believe that an isolationist policy is neither wise nor possible. I believe that we need to maintain an important military presence in areas of vital interest, and that precipitate, large-scale troop reductions in such areas would not serve our foreign policy objectives.
This is not to say, however, that all proposed reductions would be unwise. The trend in recent years has been toward further reductions – a trend supported both by the administration and by the Congress. We have now disengaged from South Vietnam. Our allies have become stronger, and they are carrying a greater share of their own defense burden. Moreover, the Nixon doctrine foresees a much less interventionist foreign policy than we have had in the past. For all these reasons, our military presence abroad has declined in recent years in a manner which has been consistent with our overall foreign and defense policy.
The dilemma which confronts us today, as in years past, when Senator MANSFIELD's initiatives on overseas troop reductions have come before the Senate, is the size of such reductions. The Senate Armed Services Committee this year has recommended a 20-percent reduction in Army non-combat troop strength in Europe by the end of fiscal year 1976, with half of this reduction to be implemented by the end of fiscal year 1975. The committee's recommendation would involve a cut of some 23,000 support troops, although the committee would allow their replacement by combat troops should the Secretary of Defense deem it appropriate.
I believe that no more than that number should be withdrawn from European areas over the next 2 years. In relation to our total European force commitment of nearly 300,000 – including 25,000 afloat – a reduction of this kind would neither be precipitate nor politically destabilizing.
With respect to our military presence in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia, however, I believe significant reductions can be made – reductions of 50,000 to 75,000 land-based troops or roughly one-third to one-half of our present land-based forces of 151,000 in these areas. The latest Defense Department figures – March 31, 1974 – show that we still have 35,000 troops in Thailand; 57,000 in Japan, including Okinawa Prefecture; 38,000 in South Korea; 17,000 in the Philippines; and 5,000 in Taiwan. I believe that significant reductions can be made in our troop presence in each of these countries.
I would like to take just a moment to state my own reasons for not making major reductions in our European forces at this time as well as my reasons for recommending a significant cut in our land-based forces in the Asia area.
With respect to Europe, I believe that NATO needs a strong conventional capability and that the United States must make a major contribution to such forces in Europe in addition to providing a nuclear shield for our European allies. But there is nothing magic about our present land-based force level of 275,000, and I would hope that this number will be reduced substantially in the future.
For a variety of reasons, however, I do not believe that now is the time for major European troop reductions. The reasons were well stated in Secretary Kissinger's letter to Senator STENNIS which was released yesterday. First, negotiations are now in progress in Vienna between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on the possibility of mutual force reductions. These are difficult negotiations, and I have my own doubts as to whether they will ever produce meaningful results.
But Secretary Kissinger assures us that they are proceeding with great care and seriousness, and he warns us that large unilateral reductions at this time might remove Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously. I believe we should give these negotiations a chance to produce results, since it is certainly in the interests of NATO to achieve a reduced Soviet troop presence in Eastern Europe.
Second, there is the additional problem that the last 8 months have been a period of unusual stress in the alliance, and recent changes in European governments add a further element of uncertainty to the future. These facts suggest that it would be untimely to make major reductions at this time – that such reductions could be destabilizing and could create political advantages for our adversaries.
Secretary Kissinger also warns us against large cuts in Asia, but I find his reasons less convincing. Troop reductions in Thailand, he says, will be made as the situation in Southeast Asia permits. Major reductions in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, according to the Secretary, could seriously jeopardize our efforts to achieve a more permanent structure of peace in that area, and such reductions should be made only when we have firm evidence of improved relations among rival nations in the area.
Secretary Of Defense Schlesinger testified before the House Appropriations Committee on March 1 that the major reason for keeping American forces in Asia at their current high level "lies under the heading of political rather than military considerations." The reason, no doubt, is that the Chinese threat to our Asian allies simply does not equal in any way the possible Soviet threat to our European allies – where very large numbers of Soviet troops are deployed in Eastern Europe. Secretary Schlesinger's remark seems to recognize this fact, implying that our current troop presence is needed instead to reinforce the internal political stability of certain weak regimes in Asia.
It is this kind of reasoning which led to our Vietnam intervention, and I believe it is time to state unequivocally that U.S. policy does not include the option of intervening in Asia to protect
our friends from internal threats. In keeping with such a policy, we should not design our force structure to include the possibility of becoming involved in another land war in Asia.
Unlike the situation in Europe, where our allies openly express their opposition to any large American troop reductions, such key Asian allies as Japan and Thailand have publicly encouraged further U.S. troop reductions in those countries. South Korea, which outnumbers North Korea in troop strength by about two to one, hardly needs 38,000 American troops for assistance in their own defense. The Philippines faces no external threat, and our forces on Taiwan have already been reduced to almost a token level.
I am not suggesting that we withdraw completely from any of these countries. I am suggesting that the size of our forces in each of these countries is a good deal larger than required to fulfill the political mission which both Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger have described.
On balance, I believe the second Mansfield amendment is consistent with the considerations I have outlined. I intend to vote for it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOMENICI). All time has expired. The question is on agreeing to the substitute amendment offered by the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD). On the question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
The result was announced – yeas 44, nays 46, as follows:
[Roll call vote tally omitted]