February 19, 1974
Page 3406
THE DICKEY-LINCOLN DAM – ITS TIME HAS COME AT LAST
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, in recent days, I and my colleagues in the New England congressional delegation have been contacted by the New England electric utilities pointing out the serious economic impact on our region caused by the skyrocketing cost of imported residual fuel oil. The utilities have urgently requested our assistance in obtaining price relief from the Federal Energy Office.
The Energy Emergency Act which we are debating this afternoon includes provisions which I am hopeful will alleviate this situation.
At the same time, however, I cannot help but note the irony of the private utilities’ request when, in virtually the same breath, they continue to oppose the construction of hydroelectric power projects in New England which would lessen our region's dependence upon fossil fuels.
I refer in particular to the Dickey-Lincoln School hydroelectric project, authorized by the Congress, but never fully funded – in large part due to the persistent efforts of the private utilities.
I would call the attention of my colleagues to section 301(2) (C) of the legislation before us which would require the Administrator of the Federal Energy Office "to conduct a study of the further development of the hydroelectric power resources of the Nation, including an assessment of present and proposed projects already authorized by Congress."
Dickey-Lincoln is needed more today than ever before. This provision, I sincerely hope, will enable the administration and the Congress in 1974 to move the project off dead-center where it has been since 1965.
I want to place the private utilities on notice that if they expect to receive continued congressional support of their requests for "equitable" treatment from Federal energy officials, they also ought to consider carefully their position on Dickey-Lincoln.
In this regard, I would like to call the attention of the Senate to a series of articles which have appeared in the Boston Globe in recent days pointing out not only the significance of Dickey- Lincoln in the context of the current energy shortage, but also the extreme lengths to which the private utilities in New England went to oppose the project in the halls of the Congress.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these articles be printed in the RECORD, along with a February 5 letter from the New England power pool.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
[From the Boston Globe, Feb. 10, 1974]
DICKEY-LINCOLN DAM, LOBBIED TO DEATH, LOOKS GREAT IN 1974
(By Stan Wallerstein)
Over the years, New Englanders have paid more for their electricity than residents of any other region of the country. In the last two years, numerous rate increases forced our bills still higher, and now, because of the fuel adjustment clause, they are increasing every single month.
Some of the reasons for the high rates are both obvious and valid – rising fuel costs, labor costs, and the cost of money. But one important reason why our bills are so high, hasn't received the attention it deserves – that over the past ten years, New England's privately-owned utility companies, acting together, have worked to prevent low cost power projects from being built in the region.
They have fought on many fronts: against the municipal utilities in Massachusetts, against the importation of low-cost power from Canada and from New York, against the Maine Public Power Authority. But perhaps the clearest case of the utility company effort to keep power costs up in New England involves the Dickey-Lincoln hydroelectric project in Maine.
MUCH CHEAPER POWER
If the dam had been built, it would today be supplying New England with 1 billion kilowatt hours of electricity annually – electricity not dependent on Arab oil, high-sulphur coal, or nuclear reactors.
Because its fuel supply would have been both unlimited and free, Dickey-Lincoln's power would have cost about .4 cents per kilowatt hour instead of the 1.7 cents per kilowatt hour for the private plants built to take Dickey's place. How the private utilities managed to kill this money- saving job-creating project through a lobbying effort of over $500,000, of which you and I picked up the entire tab, is the subject of this article.
Since 1919, engineers have been interested in the possibility of harnessing the tides of Passamaquoddy Bay in Maine for power production. Numerous studies were undertaken, but each time the Passamaquoddy project was written off as economically unfeasible. However, in 1963, the Interior Department reported to President Kennedy that the project might be feasible on the St. John's River (Dickey-Lincoln). President Kennedy ordered further study.
Shortly after the Interior report to Kennedy was made public, the presidents of the 16 largest private utilities in New England held a meeting and formed the New England Electric Utilities Presidents’ Conference. The stated objectives of the organization included "finding and implementing the most effective means to defeat the Passamaquoddy-St. John's project," and "developing a regional climate of public opinion which would prevent any expansion of government-owned or tax subsidized electricity within New England," and instead, "permit the gradual elimination of government power operations presently existing in the area."
On July 9, 1965, the Interior Department recommended construction of the Dickey-Lincoln dam. Three days later, the Senate Public Works Committee approved the project's inclusion in the Omnibus Rivers and Harbors bill, which passed the Senate on a voice vote on July 27.
LOBBYING CAMPAIGN
Having failed to stop Dickey in the Senate the utilities began an intensive lobbying campaign to kill the bill on the floor of the House, enlisting the support of utility companies throughout the country. An amendment to kill the project failed on a 100-100 vote, but an amendment to require a restudy of the project passed by 134-132.
It is a testament to the political power of the utilities that, although the project would have meant over $200 million in Federal funds for New England, would have lowered the cost of electricity throughout the region, and would have created thousands of construction jobs in economically depressed Maine, only four of the region's Congressmen – Macdonald, Stafford, Tupper, and Hathaway – supported the project.
Congressman Tupper remarked after the vote: "There was Boston Edison up in the galleries ready to put on the pressure. There were more lobbyists on the Hill against Dickey than there were Congressmen."
Although the House had rejected the project, the Conference Committee, appointed to resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill, decided to keep the project in the bill. Because the conference report, which contained pork barrel projects throughout the country, could only be voted up or down without further amendment, Dickey-Lincoln was finally approved by the Congress on Oct. 20.
The private utilities had failed in their effort to prevent the dam from being authorized, but the Corps of Engineers would still need yearly appropriations of funds to actually construct the project.
The Electric Coordinating Counsel of New England (the lobbying arm of the private utilities) set up a special unit to draft a battle plan for the appropriations fight. The plan was entitled, "A Report for Action on the Dickey-Lincoln Project" and outlined the utilities’ strategy for killing the dam. Included were the following actions:
Continuing and personal contact with each member of the New England Congressional delegation, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of the Budget. Receptions and dinners would be given on a regular basis and a "tote board" would be maintained to record assignments and progress.
Development of a media program backed by personal visits to newspapers, radio, and television stations by local utility officials. The program would "contain persistent reference to the publicly stated goal of a 40 percent reduction in electric rates by 1980."
Development of contacts with unions, suppliers, industrial allies. Among the companies mentioned were Westinghouse, GE, Allis Chalmers, US Steel, and Bethlehem Steel.
In addition, an advertising program, speakers bureau, and the solicitation and writing of "nonpartisan" articles were also proposed in the report.
COUNTER-PLANT DRIVE
As a political lobbying strategy, the Call for Action is hardly unique, except for the fact that the cost of the program ($567,057.97) was entirely paid for by the utilities' customers. (The Federal Power Commission does not permit lobbying and public relations expenses to be included in the rate base, but the utilities classified their Dickey-Lincoln expenditures as "miscellaneous general expenses" which could be passed on to customers).
But, like the major oil companies who have deliberately shut-in their wells to drive the price of petroleum up, the utilities did not restrict their campaign against public power only to public efforts.
On Dec. 22, 1965, a meeting of utility executives was held in Boston. It was chaired by William Dunham, president of the Central Maine Power Company. He proposed to the group that they publicly announce plans to construct a large, jointly owned nuclear power plant somewhere in Maine.
The announcement of the plant would have to be made before January 7, 1966, because the "incorporation schedule objective is to announce the new company and its plan of operation as much in advance as possible before the special session of the Maine legislature is convinced on Jan. 17." (The special session had been called to consider the creation of a Maine Power Authority, similar to the one recently voted down in Maine after a massive advertising campaign by the state's private utilities).
According to a memorandum prepared by one of the participants at the meeting: "Dunham believes – and several of those present agreed – that a large low-cost power plan by the private companies must be announced at once, or else the Maine Power Authority will be approved."
Dunham suggested that the publicly announced price for electricity from Maine Yankee would be .450 per kilowatt hour. (The actual cost of Maine Yankee power is 1.7c per kwh, almost 400 percent higher). At the close of the meeting, Dunham asked for commitments from the other utilities to participate in the project, though even the site for the plant hadn't yet been determined.
However, all the utilities except Boston Edison agreed to participate. Among the reasons why Boston Edison didn't participate were the following: "Its investment in Maine Yankee couldn't be included in the rate base"; "There wasn't any important public relations value to Boston Edison with its own customers"; and "Maine Yankee would not lower the cost of power to its customers."
On Dec. 31, representatives of Eastern Utilities Associates and the New England Gas and Electric Association visited Boston Edison to persuade the company to change its position.
According to a Boston Edison interoffice memo, both representatives "stated that their basic motivation for participation in Maine Yankee is, in effect, 'self-serving publicity' for investor owned utility industry. They both feel that the public power thrust is in Maine and must be met in Maine, and in particular, they consider Dickey-Lincoln the chief threat."
To its credit, Boston Edison did not reverse its position.
Not content with the announcement of just one power plant to combat Dickey-Lincoln, the Electric Coordinating council three weeks later announced plans for the "Big 11 Power Loop, a $1.5 billion regionally planned construction program the utilities claimed would lower the cost of power in New England by 40 percent by 1980."
The council lost no time in informing every member of Congress about the project and in approving a six-month, $380,000 advertising budget to publicize the program. Only in 1968 did the House Appropriations Committee discover that:
"Although representatives of the Council advised that they have planned to meet the problems of supplying the power needs of New England on a central coordinated basis, they have not produced any document supporting this central planning with the exception of an advertisement that appeared in the public press in January 1966."
Meanwhile on Capitol Hill, the Senate passed a $1.2 million appropriation for the Corps of Engineers work on the project, while the House approved only $800,000. A compromise appropriation of $800,000 was finally approved, with a proviso to the funds added by Cong. Boland calling for an independent investigation of Dickey-Lincoln by the House Appropriations Committee staff.
That study was completed on June 5, 1967. The Appropriations Committee staff concluded that Dickey-Lincoln was needed to help meet New England's need for electricity, and that Dickey- Lincoln could provide that power at less cost than any other alternative, including those submitted by the private utilities. It also found that the project would return about $1.80 in power revenues and other benefits to the Federal government for each $1 invested in construction costs.
The staff study was a setback to the utility interests. Congressman Boland, who had previously opposed Dickey, was now advocating construction of the dam. But the utilities found a way to undercut the Appropriations Committee study with the other members of the House.
On July 7, 1967, Connecticut Congressman Robert Giaimo, a member of the Appropriations Committee, sent a "Dear Colleague" letter to every member of the House.
Attached to the letter was a document entitled: House Appropriations Committee Reveals Dickey-Lincoln Project Economically Inefficient, Economically Unfeasible. What followed was a collection of what we now call "misstatements" – distorted and incorrect facts about the project. To the casual reader, it appeared that the report was actually written by the Appropriation Committee staff. Only if one persevered to the end of the long and complex document, did one find that the report was actually prepared by the Northeast Utilities Company of Connecticut.
The document, together with still another intensive lobbying effort, had its effect. On July 25, 1967, Congressman Giaimo introduced an amendment to the appropriations bill deleting Dickey- Lincoln. It passed the House. And once again, the Senate and the Conference Committee restored funds for the dam.
However, this time, the House refused to compromise and voted down the conference report by a 236-162 margin. In Nov. 7, the Senate voted to restore the funds again, but two days later, the House rejected the project by a vote of 263-118.
Dickey-Lincoln was dead.
It is now 1974. The cost of power in New England has not fallen 40 percent, it has risen out of sight. Our nuclear power plants have not lived up to expectations. Vermont Yankee has been shut down because of safety problems, and, when operating, sells its power at a cost 800 percent higher than Dickey-Lincoln would have.
The output of the Pilgrim Station nuclear power plant has been severely limited by the Atomic Energy Commission. New England's oil burning plants are now being converted to coal and our environmental laws are being changed to permit this dirty fuel to be burned.
Clearly, Dickey-Lincoln with its free, unlimited fuel is a project whose time has come. If it had been built on schedule it would be operating today. If Congress appropriates funds for it this year, it can be ready in the 1980's when New England's electricity consumption will be close to double what it is today.
Right now, the chances for getting the necessary money to start the project look good. The Energy Emergency act, now before the Congress, contains a provision requiring the President to develop all existing hydroelectric sites in the country.
The latest Corps of Engineers study shows that, with the cost of fossil fuel skyrocketing, Dickey- Lincoln is a better project today (returning $2 for every $1 invested) than it was 10 years ago.
And as strong a private power advocate as John Nassikas, chairman of the Federal Power Commission, recently gave his support to the project.
But in no sense is it certain that Dickey-Lincoln will get funded this year. For a variety of reasons and the sincere belief of many Congressmen that the utilities did have the best interest of the region at heart, the utilities were able to convince the majority of New England's Congressional delegation to unite solidly to prevent a $200 million public works project from being built in their own region.
Whether in 1974 that situation can be reversed – whether New England's Congressmen will unite to fight for a project vital to the region's economic health – will depend on whether members of Congress realize that by having accepted without serious question over the past 10 years the statements and positions of the nation's utility oil and gas corporations, we have contributed to the energy crisis we now find ourselves in.
[From the Boston Globe, Feb. 11, 1974]
DICKEY-LINCOLN DAM NEED NOT CLEAR
(By Torbert Macdonald)
The suddenness with which the energy crisis has enveloped the country tempts us to look at many of the "roads not taken" and to ask whether they might have made "all the difference". And it is not a paradox to say that a look back could really be a look ahead.
In the early 1960's, I introduced legislation to authorize the construction of a flood control and hydroelectric project at Dickey and Lincoln School on the upper Saint John River in Maine. The introduction of this bill touched off a long and bitter controversy which has left the fate of the Dickey-Lincoln project still undecided.
The value of the project, especially in light of the current energy crisis, is painfully apparent. Had the efforts to construct DickeyLincoln not been frustrated by the opposition of the private utilities and by the indifference of the public, the consumer in New England could be paying up to $40 million less this year for electric power. With energy in short supply, it is estimated that the annual output of hydroelectric power from the Dickey-Lincoln project could be the equivalent of 300 oil wells.
But instead of benefiting from the DickeyLincoln project, New England remains the only region of the country without a Federal power project. Coupled with the lack of indigenous supplies of coal, oil and natural gas, the failure to utilize government resources leaves New England to the whim of the producer states who may be inclined to allow us to "freeze in the dark," as they have publicly threatened.
The turning point on Dickey-Lincoln came in 1967. At that time, a preliminary study by the Corps of Engineers had been completed under funds appropriated in 1965. Supporters of the project sought further funding so that planning could be concluded and construction could begin.
Despite a favorable report by the staff of the House Appropriations Committee, the funds for Dickey-Lincoln were deleted from the Public Works appropriations bill during debate on the House floor.
Some New England congressmen opposed the funding while others stood by silently as critics from outside of the region attacked the project. Rep. John Rhodes (R-Ariz.), who recently became the House Republican leader, was among those who spoke against Dickey-Lincoln, and he criticized the committee staff's report for not having given "more weight" to the position of "the private power companies".
Outside of the Maine delegation, only three New England members – Ed Boland of
Massachusetts, Bob Stafford of Vermont, and myself – spoke in favor of the project. A year earlier I had been the only other member to support it during the debate.
Despite repeated efforts in subsequent years to revive the project and despite the active support of several more New England members, Dickey-Lincoln remains unbuilt.
The primary opposition to Dickey-Lincoln has come from the private utilities who have argued that they were capable of meeting New England's energy needs without government involvement.
Just how close they came to being proven wrong in 1972 is frightening to consider, and the latest round of rate increases indicates the price which consumers are being forced to pay for the continued autonomy of the private power companies. Their opposition to Dickey-Lincoln and to other sources of low-cost power, such as Churchill Falls, has virtually guaranteed the steady escalation of the price of electric power in New England.
In recent years, the private power companies have not been as vocal in their opposition to Dickey-Lincoln as they were during the early years of the project, although there is no doubt in my mind that their basic stance remains unchanged. Their voices have been replaced by those of the environmentalists who, after six years of silence on the matter, became concerned about the impact of Dickey-Lincoln on the natural beauty and wildlife of the Maine woods. There is more than a little irony in that position since the project was conceived as one of the largest Federal flood control efforts in New England.
It is worth considering from the perspective of today's energy crisis the major misconceptions on which the opponents of Dickey-Lincoln have based their arguments. First, there was the promise by the private power companies that they were capable of producing cheaper power for New England, largely through the user of nuclear and pumped storage plants. The realities of 1974 show this to have been an empty promise. Even by the most conservative estimates, the cost of nuclear-generated electricity in New England is 200 percent higher than predicted by the private utilities eight years ago. Power generated by pumped storage plants, such as the one at Northfield Mountain, which are relied on for peak power needs, have similarly proven to be far more expensive than originally estimated. As a result, the cost of power in New England continues to mount, notwithstanding the impact of the oil shortage.
The second misconception was that Dickey-Lincoln would amount to another TVA with the Federal government assuming the role of marketing agent for New England. Dickey-Lincoln cannot be compared to TVA in terms of size or impact. Its total contribution to the power needs of New England would be small in terms of the composite picture, but it would provide an invaluable source of peaking power (power needed during high demand periods) which could be relied upon to alleviate blackouts and brownouts. As I said during the debate in 1965, "The project will supplement, rather than supplant, private developments in this field."
A related misconception was that there would be no economical method for utilizing Dickey- Lincoln's power even if the project were completed, unless the government was to spend millions more for transmission facilities. This is no longer a fact. The New England Power Pool now interconnects 95 percent of New England's power plants. A relatively short tie-in is all that would be required to connect Dickey-Lincoln to the NEPOOL line running from New Brunswick. This tie-in would make Dickey-Lincoln's power available throughout New England at a time when it is most needed.
The advantages of Dickey-Lincoln remain as before. It would provide peaking power which is relatively low in cost and which is non-polluting. It would be safer than nuclear plants and more reliable than those which use oil or coal.
The need for Dickey-Lincoln has grown greater every year. Power rates in New England continue to rise twice as fast as rates throughout the country, and the burden on the consumer has become excessive. By 1978, the capacity of present facilities will be inadequate to meet the needs of New England.
Dickey-Lincoln may not make "all the difference", but it world be a big step in the right direction. Dickey-Lincoln is not an idea buried in the past but rather an idea whose time has finally arrived.
[From the Boston Globe, Feb. 12, 19741
THE DICKEY-LINCOLN DAM – ITS TIME HAS COME AT LAST
It has to be said, and said with some degree of burning indignation, that if ever the time has come to start construction of the Dickey-Lincoln Dam project on the St. John's River in Maine, that time is now. Not tomorrow, or the day after, but now.
It should have been started 10 years ago. The Globe repeatedly campaigned for it editorially as far back as 1966, and through the years since. But ours was then a lonely voice. Just as lonely were the five out of our 25 New England congressmen who supported the project – Torbert Macdonald (D-Mass.), who introduced the bill; Stafford (R-Vt), Tupper (R) and Hathaway (D) of Maine, and, later, Edward Boland (D-Mass.).
Dickey-Lincoln was a project that could have been in operation by now, supplying New England with a billion kilowatt-hours annually at a cost of about .4 cents per kilowatt-hour instead of the 1.7 cents for private plants built instead of it, and saving New England consumers, according to Macdonald, up to $40 million a year for electric power.
It could be supplying badly needed peaking power, the equivalent of what 300 oil wells could produce, in the country's only region that does not have a Federal power project and whose power rates continue to rise twice as fast as they do in the rest of the nation.
Then why was the project killed? The details of the answer can be found in Stan Wallerstein's article in last Sunday's Globe and Cong. Macdonald's in yesterday's Globe. But the details can be summed up fairly in one short sentence. The private utilities lobby killed it.
They killed it in spite of studies by congressional committee staffs and the Corps of Army Engineers showing that it was not only feasible, but would provide power at less cost than any other alternative; and that for every Federal dollar invested in. its construction, the government would get back about $1.80 as of 1967 and as of today, according to the latest study, it would double its money.
They killed it with lobbying on such a massive scale that, as Cong. Tupper described it after a crucial vote, "There were more lobbyists on the Hill against Dickey than there were congressmen." And they killed it with a lobbying program that cost $567,000 but was paid for by the consumers, since it was classified as "miscellaneous general expenses" to get around a Federal Power Commission regulation that is supposed to prevent lobbying expenses from being included in the rate base.
With today's energy shortage, and the certainty that it will continue unabated until long after the years it will take the $200 million Dickey-Lincoln project to be built, Congress must lose no time at all in voting the necessary money. The Energy Emergency Act, now before that body, contains a provision requiring the President to develop all of the existing hydro-electric sites in the country.
Dickey-Lincoln is, as Cong. Macdonald has written, "an idea whose time has finally arrived," and an indignant people all ever New England should acquaint their representatives with their feelings about it.
FEBRUARY 5, 1974.
PETITION ON BEHALF OF THE NEW ENGLAND POWER POOL WITH RESPECT TO THE PRICE OF IMPORTED OIL
To: New England Congressional Delegation.
The diligent and effective efforts of the New England Congressional Delegation in seeking to insure fair treatment of New England, in view of the region's heavy reliance on imported oil, in the distribution of available supplies of residual fuel have been commendable. While it is yet too soon to judge whether the goal of equitable distribution among regions, a stated objective of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, will in fact result from the operation of the allocation program being administered by the Federal Energy Office, the program for residual oil was designed to achieve that objective. The voluntary efforts of the people of New England in conserving energy, going far beyond the national average, are assisting greatly in this effort.
The 1973 Act also states the objective that oil be made available to all regions of the nation at "equitable prices" [Section 4(b) (1) (F)] . Like the quantity provision this price criterion resulted from recognition that the current energy crisis is a national problem resulting from national policies. No steps have been taken to implement this objective with respect to residual oil and New England utilities and industry have been faced with staggering increases in the price of residual oil since the Arab embargo. As an example, one member of NEPOOL now is being charged $11.05 per barrel for residual oil by one supplier (whose pre-embargo source was Libya and price in September 1973 was $4.64) and $12.37 per barrel by another major supplier with Venezuela as a source (and an early September 1973 price of $6.13 per barrel). These outrageous increases by exporting countries have resulted in industry and utilities of New England, and their customers, being required to carry a grossly disproportionate and unfair share of the economic burden of the energy crisis.
It is imperative to the economy of New England that this region not be required to continue to pay the extortionate prices being charged for imported oil. Until a reduction in such prices can be accomplished by efforts on the international scene, the excess of such cost over the cost of domestic fuels available to utilities and industry in other regions of the country should be assumed as a national burden.
Failure promptly to relieve the excess economic impact on New England resulting from the skyrocketing imported oil prices will place this region at a competitive disadvantage which will result in a deterioration of its economy with loss of jobs and income.
We urge prompt and effective action dealing with this urgent problem.