August 21, 1974
Page 29630
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the problem of rising Federal expenditures is nowhere more dramatically presented than in the budget for national defense. A strong American Defense Establishment has proved necessary to the safety of our people, and the preservation of world peace. But principles of fiscal prudence demand that in defense, as in all other areas of Federal spending, unnecessary Federal expenditures be cut from the budget.
My distinguished colleague from Missouri, Senator EAGLETON, has proposed that the level of defense funding in the appropriations bill pending before us today be restricted to $81 billion. His proposal would set the level of defense spending $1.2 billion below the $82.1 billion recommended by the Senate Committee on Appropriations. It would still allow an increase of $3.1 billion from the level of appropriations in the last fiscal year.
Whether or not a defense spending level of $81 billion is sound depends on two kinds of considerations – whether or not that gross figure reflects an appropriate allocation of national resources compared with other Federal programs, and whether or not the specific reductions in defense activities which would have resulted from the funding level are justified. I believe that the case has been made for the $81 billion funding level on both these grounds.
From the standpoint of total national priorities, the prudent reduction proposed by Senator EAGLETON makes sense.
Of the $140 billion of this year's fiscal budget which is controllable by the regular appropriations process, well over half will go to national defense. National security is certainly a high-priority need, but there are others. Just as we must be prepared to pare down spending for social programs to an appropriate level within the total budget amount, we must be prepared to make tough budgetary choices in the area of defense. A reduction of defense funding to $81 billion
would still allocate 27 percent of the entire Federal budget, and 57 percent of controllable funding, to this purpose.
And with respect to specific cuts, I believe that the careful analysis of the defense budget reveals that additional savings from the level recommended by the Senate Appropriations Committee can be justified.
The underlying case for a substantial defense spending reduction has already been made by the Appropriations Committee in its current recommendations to the Senate. That committee, and its Subcommittee on Defense, both chaired by the able Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN) have made a compelling argument for the $5 billion reduction it proposes from the level of the budget request.
In presenting this amendment calling for the $81 billion level, however, Senator EAGLETON has argued that additional, specific cuts are justified. He points out, for instance, that the $1.2 billion reduction in defense spending could be accomplished by cuts that can be attributed to 10 specific defense programs. This analysis concludes, in fact, that over $2 billion in additional savings can be achieved – more than enough to meet the $81 billion ceiling. I do not agree with Senator EAGLETON on all these proposals.
But, earlier this year, on May 30, 1974, I had occasion to prepare my own analysis of the Defense budget in preparation for a debate sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute on defense spending. At that time, I concluded that significant additional reductions amounting to at least $5 billion would not be unreasonable, and would certainly not be unsafe to our national interests.
Among the examples I cited at that time were cuts in manpower costs; cuts in spending for conventional weapons for general purpose forces through elimination of "gold plating" weapons with expensive and unnecessary "extras," and increased emphasis on less expensive weapons systems; cuts in strategic weapons spending, including costly programs for development of the B-1 bomber and counterforce capability of our long-range missiles; and cuts in wasteful foreign military assistance. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that the statement I made to the American Enterprise Institute on May 30, containing this analysis, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. MUSKIE. Our consideration of appropriations bills this year, and my endorsement of an $81 billion defense spending level proposed in this amendment, must of necessity be made without the benefit of the budget review process. That newly established process will be based on detailed analysis of the individual components of the budget, and comprehensive study of the effects of specific ceiling levels on the ability of the Government to meet its responsibilities to the American people. The budget review process now being implemented, which will be fully effective for the fiscal year 1977 budget, will be based on a year-long, and continuing analysis that will provide us with the information to allow us to make judgments about whether specific budget cuts are appropriate and effective.
A "ceiling" approach to budget cuts, without the background of that analysis, must be based on a careful balance of the information we do have available now. The most important component of our existing budget decision making process is the work of the Appropriations Committee. But the report of the Appropriations Committee, of course, should not be the last word in the Senate on the spending level we approve. It is perfectly appropriate that the committee's proposals should be open to review, and subject to revision or approval by the Senate as a whole. In the debate on this defense appropriations bill, and the amendment proposed by Senator EAGLETON, I believe a case has been made for a deeper defense budget cut than that committee recommends.
EXHIBIT 1
MAY 30, 1974.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE
Earlier this year, I spoke at the U.S. Naval Academy on the subject of our foreign policy. My thesis was that the United States is on the verge of a new coherence in its foreign policy, a new sense of direction and common purpose, and a restoration of the bipartisan tradition in America's foreign relations.
This restored bipartisanship, I argued, is based on a broad popular consensus on four fundamental principles of American foreign policy: first, that an isolationist policy is not a viable option for America; second, that the general direction of detente with the Soviet Union and China is an important American interest; third, that our alliances with Europe and Japan are still vital, notwithstanding progress toward detente, and should be emphasized; and fourth, that our policies must reflect the growing interdependence between the developed and underdeveloped world.
A foreign policy based on these principles requires that America be strong militarily. I believe in a strong national defense. The issue in this debate is not whether America should be strong or weak – rather, it is whether the Congress can make any significant cuts in the Administration's defense spending request for fiscal year 1976 without undermining our security interests or our foreign policy objectives. I am prepared to argue that it can.
The President's total budget request for FY 1975 is $304.4 billion. Of that, $141.8 billion is controllable by Congress through the regular appropriations process. Of this portion of the budget which Congress can control, well over half goes to national defense. That is a sizeable amount.
Fiscal conservatives who have spoken eloquently on the tendency of government to overspend – and of modern bureaucracies to develop their own entrenched interests – should surely look with some skepticism at a defense budget of this magnitude.
Economists may disagree among themselves on how large the federal budget should be in a particular year – whether we should have a budgetary surplus or deficit, and how large the balance or shortfall should be. But within any given budget ceiling, we politicians cannot look to economists to tell us how to order our budgetary priorities. That is an obligation we have as representatives of the people, and how we make decisions on budgetary priorities affects not only our own political futures but, far more important, the future well-being of the entire nation.
It is the job of the President to propose a distribution of federal priorities, and it is the responsibility of the Congress actually to make the hard choices. The Congress, through the appropriations process, must decide how much to spend on defense; how much federal assistance to give to state and local governments; how much assistance should go to health, transportation, education, or environmental improvement.
Congress has the responsibility to make spending decisions which reflect the needs of the people. The nation's security is certainly a high-priority need, but there are others: federal funding for education is now only $7.5 billion; funding for drug abuse enforcement and prevention is only $750 million; for community development and housing, only $6.4 billion; for pollution control, only $700 million; for energy research, only $2.1 billion. Compare these figures to the Administration's defense budget of $92.6 billion.
In ordering our budget priorities, the Congress must be prepared to trim back in one category in order to increase spending in another. My own view is that significant cuts can be made in the President's proposed defense budget for FY 1975 which would free up several billion dollars of additional resources for helping to reduce the present tax burden, for reallocating to other areas of the federal budget, or possibly for both.
There is a pernicious view among those who habitually oppose cuts in defense spending reflected in the oft-heard slogan "Where national security is concerned, money is no object." This is a fine-sounding platitude, but the fact is that our total resources are always limited and must be allocated among many competing needs in our society. The nation has always compromised on national defense – even in wartime.
So tough budgetary choices must inevitably be made in defense, as in all areas of federal expenditure. While no President or Congress wishes to shortchange the defense effort, the unavoidable fact is that our society has other needs besides military power. Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara expressed it well when he said some years ago: "I do not mean to suggest that we can measure national security in terms of dollars – you cannot price what is inherently priceless.
"But if we are to avoid talking in generalities, we must talk about dollars. For policy decisions must sooner or later be expressed in the form of budget decisions on where to spend and how much."
THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975
The Nixon Administration has proposed to Congress the largest peacetime military budget in our history. The total request for the Department of Defense is $92.6 billion. To this figure, one can legitimately add the military budget within the AEC – for nuclear weapons programs and the like – which amounts to over $3 billion, and some additional funds used by other agencies for defense-related purposes. For purposes of this debate, however, I will use the Defense Department's own figure of $92.6 billion as the total request for FY 1975.
This spending request is an increase of about $10 billion over last year's request: a $10 billion increase notwithstanding the fact that we have withdrawn from Vietnam – the costliest war in our history; notwithstanding the fact that we have an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union and that we have entered into a new era of negotiation; and notwithstanding the fact that the Nixon Doctrine calls for a much less interventionist foreign policy than we have had in the past.
Only recently President Nixon sent to the Congress a message, accompanying the Report of his Council of Economic Advisers, in which he said: "Too much government spending is the spark that most often sets off inflationary explosions ... We must work together to cut where we safely can. We must so discipline our present decisions that they do not commit us to excessive spending in the future." What I propose is that we apply the President's tests to the defense budget.
Secretary Schlesinger testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February that this year's defense budget request in real terms "means doing no more than holding our own as compared to 1974." The basis for this remark is that the difference between the FY 1975 request of $92.6 billion and the FY 1974 budget of $87.1 billion – an increase of $5.5 billion – is barely enough to cover pay and price increases. Technically, the Defense Department's figures are correct – except that there has been some dubious manipulations of the statistical data.
The figure used by the Defense Department as representing the 1974 defense budget includes two items which really do not make sense for comparative purposes with respect to the FY 1975 request. The first of these is last year's $2.2 billion emergency aid to Israel. This figure is not a direct part of US defense costs, and the Defense Department has already announced that Israel will be expected to pay back $1.2 billion of this arms aid. As a one-shot aid effort, these funds should be subtracted from the FY 1974 defense figure so as to provide a fairer comparison to the FY 1975 request which includes no such amount for Israel.
The second statistical manipulation which serves to inflate the FY 1974 budget is the retroactive inclusion of $2.1 billion contained in the Supplemental Appropriations request for purposes of buying new capability. Normally, Supplementals are reserved for such things as emergencies or cost overruns. Out of the total Supplemental request of $6.2 billion for defense, several billion dollars can legitimately be considered part of the FY 1974 budget – including, for example, a $3.4 billion figure for pay increases. But $2.1 billion of the Supplemental request is intended to increase inventory items such as ammunition and other supplies, increase airlift capability, accelerate production of the Trident submarine and, in Secretary Schlesinger's words, to "buy certain high-value weapons and equipment which are now in short supply in our services." These funds clearly represent an increase in real defense resources and should require a new authorization. This kind of request is normally submitted in the regular budget as a new proposal, rather than in a Supplemental.
Despite the attempted distortion, the FY 1975 request is still higher in absolute terms than any peacetime military budget in our history. The Administration has attempted to create the impression that this increase results largely from military pay and the cost of the volunteer force.
But compared to FY 1974, other areas of the budget have been increased even more: procurement is up 23.4 percent; research, development, test and evaluation is up 15.9 percent; and operation and maintenance is up 13.7 percent. By contrast, the costs for active duty military personnel have increased only 6.5 percent. If the volunteer force were terminated, no more than $750 million would be saved.
Finally, I should point out that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stated last February before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that outlays for defense "might have been a billion or a billion-and-ahalf dollars less in 1975" were it not for the fact that additional spending was deemed necessary to stimulate the economy. I do not believe that increased defense spending – which is not essential to our security – is the wisest fiscal tool for stimulating our economy. This is so for several reasons: First, military spending is generally slower in impact than increasing other programs because of built-in lags necessary for cost-effective contracting. Second, countercyclical spending is less desirable through the Defense Department than through other agencies, because it cannot be targeted to particular geographic depressed areas as effectively.
Third, military spending goes largely to industries employing skilled, well-paid workers, whereas unemployment is most severe among unskilled, low-income people. Fourth, military spending as a stimulus to the economy is particularly wasteful, because instead of creating social capital and providing services vitally needed in our states, cities and rural communities, it creates only superfluous military hardware.
When economic circumstances require a stimulus, a more effective and fairer way to pump demand into the economy would be to put extra spending power directly into the hands of working people who are hardest hit by both recession and inflation. This could be done through expanded and extended unemployment compensation benefits, public employment programs in hard-hit localities, a temporary reduction of the social security withholding rate or a reduction in income taxes in the lowest brackets.
WHERE CUTS CAN BE MADE
The format of this debate will not permit a detailed analysis of the defense budget or a systematic presentation of budget alternatives. There are a number of public policy organizations which have done excellent work in this field – and their proposed cuts range as high as $15 billion. I believe that reductions amounting to at least five billion dollars are not unreasonable – and certainly not unsafe.
Let me give some specific examples. First, in the area of manpower costs, which amount to over 55% of the total defense budget: The number of men in uniform has been dropping in recent years, in line with our withdrawal from Vietnam, the growing strength of our allies, and our new determination to avoid military involvement in regions which are not vital to American interests.
Still, far too many military personnel are involved in performing direct or indirect support tasks such as administration, logistics, training, or maintenance. Some of these support troops should be reduced.
Moreover, the U.S. should make significant reductions in the number of troops stationed abroad – bringing these men home and demobilizing them. The United States at present has 480,000 men in foreign countries – 300,000 in Europe and 180,000 in the Western Pacific and Asia. We have 36,000 men in Thailand, for no apparent purpose other than possible reinvolvement in Indochina. We have a full division in South Korea, 24 years after the outbreak of the Korean War, even though the South Korean Army already outnumbers the North Korean Army by two-to-one. Our troops in Europe can be pared down as well as our allies assume a greater share of the burden for their own conventional defense. A 25 % reduction in U.S. forces overseas would hardly signal an isolationist policy.
This year, the Administration is asking for a further increase in the number of civilian positions in the Defense Department even though there are already over 1.1 million such employees – nearly one civilian for every two in uniform. Excluding the Postal Service, the Department of Defense has roughly as many civilians as all other federal agencies combined.
The Senate Armed Services Committee has already recommended a two percent cut in military manpower and a four percent cut in the civilian bureaucracy this year. I would recommend additional manpower cuts beyond this, emphasizing reductions in support troops and civilian bureaucrats, saving our taxpayers well over two billion dollars in payroll and attendant operation and maintenance costs.
Moreover, it is time that something be done about "grade creep" in the military. Surely it is not essential to our nation's security to have more field grade and flag officers to command a force of 2.2 million men today then we had in 1945 to command a force of 12.1 million. Nor is our security enhanced by having 400,000 more sergeants than there are privates in the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Marine Corps doesn't have this problem – it has twice as many second lieutenants as lieutenant colonels and 23,000 more privates than sergeants. If our Armed Services had the same grade structure today as they did in 1964, we would save about $700 million annually.
Second, in the area of conventional weapons systems for our General Purpose Forces: Here, defense planners have gradually moved toward what is called a high-low mix – certain very expensive, maximum-capability weapons systems complemented by less expensive and less-capable alternatives. I welcome the trend toward less expensive alternatives at the lower end of the mix. Past procurement trends have been too spendthrift, favoring new weapons systems equipped with all the most advanced technologies regardless of expense, even when gains in performance were marginal.
For example, new fighters like the F-14 cost 15-25 times what the jets of the Korean War cost.
Even taking into account inflation, a Korean War sabre jet would cost about $690,000 today - - which happens to be about the same price as the average total cost of the new Phoenix air-to-air missile being placed on the F-14 fighter. This tendency to goldplate new weapons systems out of proportion to real military necessity must be controlled.
Substantial savings – ranging from one to four billion dollars – could be realized by stretching out procurement of more expensive weapons systems at the higher end of the mix and by emphasizing the lower end of the mix where possible. Examples of expensive weapons systems for which procurement should be stretched out include the SSN688 nuclear attack submarine and the DD963 destroyer. Systems which might be cancelled altogether include AWACS, the Navy's F-14 aircraft program and the Phoenix missile being developed for it, and the Army's renewed proposal for the Main Battle Tank (XM-1)-which the Congress wisely killed in 1971. Examples of weapons systems at the lower end of the mix which should be emphasized are the patrol frigate, the sea control ship and the VFX "austere" carrier aircraft proposal.
While the Pentagon has made much of the alleged decline of our conventional forces since the mid-sixties the truth is that our "peacetime" force for the seventies though quantitatively somewhat smaller is qualitatively far more powerful than in the mid-sixties. We maintain essentially the same number of tactical air wings. The Navy has the same number of attack carriers and three times as many attack submarines.
The small decrease in the number of ground divisions from 19 to 16 during the last ten years has reflected deactivation of forces remaining from the earlier Berlin buildup and abandonment of plans to fight 2½ land wars simultaneously in Asia and Europe. Given this perspective, the cries of alarm about the alleged decline of our conventional power should be viewed with skepticism.
Third, I believe that cuts can be made in the budget for strategic weapons systems. I recognize that strategic forces account for only about 20 percent of the U.S. defense budget. But we are engaged in negotiations with the Soviet Union designed to stabilize and hopefully to achieve reductions in strategic nuclear weapons systems. We need not accelerate our own weapons development at this time on the theory that this would strengthen our position at the negotiating table.
I am not suggesting unilateral reductions in the strategic defense budget which might undermine an overall equality between ourselves and the Soviet Union. I support a limited Trident submarine program – although the pace of its development should not be geared to producing bargaining chips in the SALT negotiations. I also support the Navy's request for funds to develop a smaller submarine to succeed our present Polaris/ Poseidon force. Our undersea deterrent is the backbone of our strategic nuclear forces.
But I have serious doubts about the directions being taken in our strategic bomber programs. The B-1 bomber is a typical example of a goldplated weapon system in financial difficulty. The unit cost of these planes has been rising steadily – now amounting to over $60 million per plane. I am concerned as to whether its ability to penetrate enemy airspace might be outpaced by advances in air defense technology before the aircraft is ready for development. My own preference would be for the Air Force to develop a less expensive stand-off bomber capable of firing its missiles from a position outside of enemy territory. Cancellation of the B-1 bomber program would save $500 million this year.
I also have serious questions about the Administration's relatively modest request for development funds to improve the counterforce capabilities of our strategic missile forces. These funds are to implement Secretary Schlesinger's new strategy, involving improvements or changes in the targeting, the command and control, the accuracy, and the yield of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons.
The military reason for this change is the assumed need to fill a perceived "gap" at the lower end of the spectrum of strategic nuclear deterrence. Along with this, there is the requirement, often mentioned by President Nixon, to multiply the options available to national leaders in the event deterrence fails. Both of these requirements can be satisfied, we are told, by the institution of greater flexibility in our targeting capability and in our hardware. With more rapid retargeting, with greater terminal accuracy, and with greater warhead yield, national leaders will obtain the ability to fight controlled or limited nuclear war by concentrating, if deterrence fails, on so-called military targets in a tit-for-tat fashion. This capacity, it is said, will also enhance the psychology or credibility of deterrence.
On the political side, a paradiplomatic function is claimed for the recommended changes in U.S. strategic forces. Their advent is expected to disabuse Soviet leaders of any notions that they may have that their new missile programs (the SS-X-16, SS-X-17, SS-X-18, and SS-X-19) will gain them a commanding lead in strategic weapons, assuming that this is their perception or motivation in this matter. If the Soviets see our willingness to commit our long lead in technology to the arms race, so the scenario runs, they will give up their own programs and negotiate more productively in the strategic arms limitation talks. Further, it is anticipated, this U.S. posture will reassure our friends and allies, convincing them that they can continue to rely on the American nuclear umbrella despite Soviet buildups.
I feel certain that there are few, if any, members of Congress who doubt the desirability of improving our command and control systems and our retargeting capacity. What causes concern are improvements in accuracy and yield, especially simultaneous improvements in these areas.
Here I would like to recall the previous and emphatic statements of this Administration, both
President Nixon and former Secretary Laird, that the U.S. would resist any initiative that gave even "the appearance" of going for a first-strike or "silo-smashing" nuclear force, because it would be destabilizing and provocative. Accuracy and yield improvements, of course, give precisely this appearance. Thus, it is crucial that we know what now prompts this dramatic reversal in national policy.
A question also arises as to what price the U.S. will have to pay to get the increments of security which yield and terminal accuracy improvements are said to give us.
What are the system-life costs of these programs? Can we be sure that we are really getting a greater degree of safety and security for our money? Or are we in fact buying programs which will increase the risk of nuclear war rather than diminish it?
The initial cost of following Secretary Schlesinger's recommendations for providing such options – new warheads, new guidance systems, and advanced work on a new ICBM – is not large in relation to other defense costs. The Senate Armed Services Committee has approved $77 million for research and development in three programs, $32 million for accuracy improvements of the Minuteman; $25 million to increase the yield of Minuteman warheads; and $20 million for MARV (maneuverable reentry vehicles). But these relatively modest funds could be the opening wedge for programs which in time could cost billions. I believe we should scrutinize this proposal carefully before appropriating these funds this year.
Finally, there is the Administration's request for military assistance funds for foreign countries – amounting to nearly $3 billion. I believe that at least $1 billion can be cut from that figure, with more than half coming out of the Administration's $1.45 billion request for Vietnam. The American people have been led to believe that our involvement in Southeast Asia is at an end, and yet our continued assistance to South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos is extraordinary. It is time that we ask tough questions concerning the relationship between all military assistance and our real foreign policy objectives.
To summarize, I believe that some cuts can be safely made in these four areas of the Administration's defense spending request for FY 1975: manpower, conventional weapons, strategic weapons, and military assistance. Such reductions can be made, in my view, without jeopardizing our national security or our overall foreign policy objectives.