June 4, 1974
17445
COUNTERFORCE STRATEGY
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, for many years the declared strategic doctrine of the United States has been deterrence – a policy which seeks to persuade a potential aggressor not to initiate nuclear war by confronting him with the certainty of unacceptable destruction in return. It has been generally assumed that such a policy is most effective when our retaliatory forces are targeted against the civilian population and industrial centers of the adversary.
During this same period, our strategic nuclear forces have developed the capacity to fulfill other roles. For over 10 years we have had, in addition to the deterrent forces, weapons capable of destroying military targets or capable of damaging our adversary's missile reserves so that they could not be used against us. With progress in technology – such as MIRV, improved command control and retargeting systems, smaller warhead size and the like – the ability of our forces to perform these secondary functions has advanced to a very sophisticated level, while we still maintain an overwhelming deterrent capability.
In recent months, Secretary Schlesinger has initiated a national debate on the question of whether the United States can improve the character of its deterrent by improving and stressing what have heretofore been de-emphasized as the secondary characteristics of our nuclear forces. He has proposed, among other things, changes in the structure of our forces, further improvements in their accuracy and destructive capacity, and shifts in our declaratory policy.
This week, as the Senate considers the military procurement bill, we will consider these proposed changes in our strategic thinking – the necessity for them, their costs, and their likely effects. During the debate, I am hopeful that the Senate will not lose sight of the primary purpose of our nuclear forces – to deter aggressors from initiating hostilities.
In this regard, I believe we must do everything possible to enhance the survivability of our deterrent forces and to lessen tensions with such potential aggressors. I have serious doubts whether Secretary Schlesinger's proposed changes in our strategic forces will help achieve these goals. Improvements in the accuracy and yield of our land-based missiles and the development of a terminal guidance MARV program at this time may well lead to an escalation of the arms race with the Soviets taking countermeasures which could increase the threat to our land-based forces and heighten tensions between the world's two major nuclear powers.
Within the last 24 hours, two articles have been written about Secretary Schlesinger's proposed changes in our strategic doctrine that make this argument most persuasively. One of these articles, "Increasing the Nuclear Danger," was written by Senator McINTYRE and appeared in this morning's Washington Post. The other article, "New Strangelove Scenario," was written by Richard Wilson and appeared in yesterday's Washington Star. During the last several months, Senator McINTYRE, as chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, has played a constructive role within committee analyzing and questioning the wisdom of Secretary Schlesinger's proposed counterforce measures and will undoubtedly make a major contribution to the discussion of these measures on the floor.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that both of these articles be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, June 4, 1974]
INCREASING THE NUCLEAR DANGER – OUR THREAT TO SOVIET ICBMs MIGHT MOTIVATE THEM To STRIKE FIRST IN A PERIOD OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION
(By Thomas J. McIntyre)
(This week, or possibly next, the Senate will be voting on an amendment to the military procurement bill, drawn up by Sen. Thomas McIntyre of New Hampshire and designed to eliminate funds for three new nuclear weapons programs the Senator considers to be dangerous.
The following is an adaptation of remarks Sen. McIntyre made on the subject, which were printed by the Senate Armed Services Committee.)
Buried in the obscure details of the military procurement bill's Research and Development section are three programs which, if approved, would drastically and dangerously alter our national strategic policy.
These programs would greatly increase the accuracy of our Minuteman III landbased intercontinental ballistic missiles, double their yield, and develop a terminally guided MARV (maneuverable re-entry vehicle) which would give our submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as our Minutemen, nearly perfect accuracy. The net effect of these programs would be to give us the ability to destroy large numbers of Soviet missiles in their hardened silos.
I have opposed these counterforce programs in the Armed Services Committee and will continue to do so on the floor of the Senate for the following reasons:
(1) These counterforce programs will put a hair trigger on nuclear war. The stable nuclear peace that the world has enjoyed in recent years has been secured by the confidence each side has had in the survivability of its retaliatory force – even after an all-out attack. This stability would be undermined by greater counterforce capabilities on either side.
Our threat to Soviet ICBM's might motivate them to strike first in a period of international tension. These programs would, therefore, produce an international wild-west filled with the fears and dangers of a nuclear "fast gun."
(2) Whatever the Soviet threat to our Minuteman, these counterforce programs would do nothing to meet that threat. Our real choice is not between strength and weakness but choosing a kind of strength that will meet the threat. And no matter how accurate or powerful our Minuteman may become, these improvements would not make them one iota less vulnerable to any projected Soviet threat against them. In fact they would make them less secure since they might draw Soviet fire.
The effective counter to any projected threat to our Minutemen from Soviet MIRVed heavy missiles are programs that will insure the survivability of our own deterrent. This is our critical Research and Development task in strategic arms.
The Military R&D Subcommittee, which I chair, therefore recommended support of all Department of Defense requests, even some questionable ones, which will insure the survivability of our strategic forces. R&D programs in this bill would give us a number of alternative ways to deny the Soviets any real counterforce advantage – by mobile deployment of our ICBM's in the air or on the ground; defending our ICBM's with a special missile defense; or augmenting our strategic force through alternative systems such as the air launch cruise missile.
The continuation of the R&D arms race is unattractive no matter what route we choose. But R&D programs dedicated to survivability do meet the threat and they do not add to nuclear instability.
(3) There is no military requirement for these counterforce programs. The R&D subcommittee I chair held searching hearings into our strategic requirements.
The Defense Department's witnesses assured us that we can now confidently destroy all Soviet civilian targets, all soft military targets, and a number of hard military targets. The only thing we cannot do is confidently destroy a large number of very hard military targets (hardened silos) efficiently. Such an increased counterforce capability is not necessary to our deterrent even as defined by the new flexible response doctrine.
(4) These programs don't give us the kind of strength we need to succeed at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. These counterforce programs will give the Soviets a military reason to go ahead with their MIRV deployment and will, therefore, work against our key goal at SALT – a Soviet acceptance of a verifiable agreement to restrict deployment of their new MIRVed heavy missiles.
Moreover, since these programs will require the Soviets to further harden their silos, their earth moving and construction will complicate any independent verification by obscuring detection of MIRVed deployment or other modernization they might do at the same time.
Our imposing, dynamic Trident program plus our continued development of B-1, plus continued modernization and improvement of our Minutemen, plus our active retention of the option of MIRVing additional Minutemen, plus our R&D of Mobile ICBM's, plus our R&D of missile site defense, plus our continued MIRV conversion of our submarine fleet, plus R&D on sub- and air-launched cruise missiles, will insure that our military position at SALT II will be a powerful incentive for the Soviets to come to a serious and secure agreement.
But most important, concentrated support of those R&D programs which would enhance the survivability of our deterrent speaks with unmistakable clarity and force to the Soviets that we will never let them put a substantial part of our strategic force at risk. We, thereby, give them the most compelling motive to restrain their destabilizing MIRV technologies and come to a secure agreement at SALT. If they refuse, we will have technologically prepared ourselves to take whatever practical steps are necessary to assure the survivability of our deterrent.
[From the Washington Star, June 3, 1974]
NEW STRANGELOVE SCENARIO
(By Richard Wilson)
People don't like to think about or talk about The Bomb but perhaps their attention can be drawn back to it by some quite audacious policies which are under discussion in the Nixon administration.
Think first about this one point: the Defense Department wishes to develop crisis plans for the relocation of many millions from 250 critical target areas to appropriate host areas as far out of harm's way as possible. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger is quite sanguine about this, noting the vast population movements in and out of Manhattan every day.
Emphasis also is returning to fall-out shelters after the nationwide scare of a few years ago and the census surveys showing that running to the basement would be no good.
It clearly can be seen that high authority is trying to lead public thinking back to the theoretical plausibility of a nuclear attack on this country under certain circumstances. There is hellish and involuted logic involved as there is in all things nuclear.
If the Soviet Union can be made to believe that the United States has developed a plan for limited nuclear attack on military targets, one way to persuade them of this policy change would be preparations to suffer the probable consequences of doing so. Thus we get people ready for mass relocation and running to the fall-out shelters (which is what the Russians do also) to give credibility to the proposition that we might use nuclear weapons in some degree, and that will help to deter Russian gambles.
The common wisdom up to now is that any use of nuclear weapons will mean the whole shebang and the planet will be done with as a livable abode.
But Dr. Schlesinger and those associated with him have a different Strangelove scenario: The credibility of our use of weapons against military targets with pinpoint precision will make it all the less likely that adventures will be undertaken by our adversaries, nuclear or otherwise.
Bluff or not, the policy is going forward and will undoubtedly be very expensive in the end. The planning for mass relocation and surveys of fall-out shelters will cost relatively little, but such things upset congressmen who do not wish to comprehend nuclear celestial mechanics.
Making missiles pinpoint accurate will cost a great deal and the whole retargeting process won't be cheap but we have the technology to do it. It is estimated that as a starter, $250 million can increase accuracy, focus on military targets and put into effect Dr. Schlesinger's new strategy.
Theoretically, this backs up Dr. Henry Kissinger in his dealings with the Russians, but Kissinger seems to be a little nervous about the whole thing and there are recurrent reports of his differences with the Schlesinger doctrine.
It is probably a difference in emphasis more than anything else but actually the cost will mount up to the billions in due time which may make it appear that nuclear agreement with the Russians is not a budget saver.
Dr. Schlesinger is not too well understood, as may be suggested by Vice President Gerald R. Ford's stated inclination to replace him if Ford ever becomes president because he thinks Schlesinger's congressional relations are not good.
The rebuttal to Dr. Schlesinger is that his limited nuclear war doctrine will not reduce the threat of nuclear war but make it more likely because when the Russians comprehend what we are doing they will prepare countermeasures. The never-ending spiral of terror would thus continue.
If the results were well thought out in advance there would, of course, never be a nuclear war, but it takes only a little reading of history to appreciate that such logic does not apply and statesmen make bad mistakes.
Sometime, when Congress is relieved of its overwhelming preoccupation with impeaching Nixon, it will get around to examining anew what is likely to happen to the human race at this juncture in changing nuclear policy.