June 7, 1974
Page 18315
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1975
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (S. 3000) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads, and for other purposes.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, on Monday next, at 12:45, it is my understanding that the amendment No. 1380, which was cosponsored initially by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE), and now has 12 or 14 additional cosponsors, will become the pending business, and so it seems appropriate at this time to lay a little groundwork for the benefit of our colleagues as to what this amendment seeks to do.
Mr. President, we have had a week of thorough and important debate on many aspects of the pending bill. We have analyzed and discussed major weapons systems and manpower policies and their relation to other national priorities. Much of the debate has centered on economic arguments. This is understandable and wise, considering the current economic situation.
However, I would now like to focus the attention of my colleagues on a question which does not involve large sums of money in the pending bill, but which I believe to be the most important issue raised in this bill and perhaps the most crucial question before the Senate this year. I do not use these words lightly. Buried in the complex provisions of this bill are three programs, which if approved, would drastically and dangerously alter our national strategic policy – a policy which has given us nuclear peace and stability for two decades.
The three programs to which I refer are the proposals to greatly increase the accuracy of our Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles, greatly increase their yield, and develop a terminally guided MARV(maneuverable reentry vehicle) which would give our submarine- launched ballistic missiles (SLBMS), as well as our Minutemen, nearly perfect accuracy. The net effect of these counterforce programs would be to give us the ability to destroy efficiently large numbers of Soviet missiles in their hardened silos.
I question the wisdom of these proposals and have, therefore, introduced, along with the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) amendment No. 1380 to S. 3000. Our amendment would delay the spending of any funds for these programs until it was clear that our negotiations at SALT II had failed to reach an agreement containing substantial controls over offensive missiles. Thus our amendment would not only forestall development of several dangerous programs. It would also take a carrot and stick approach to SALT by sending a clear message to the Soviets that they should agree to full and fair arms control at SALT II.
In the last year, and in previous Congresses, the Armed Services Research and Development Subcommittee, which I chair, has held exhaustive and comprehensive hearings on the full range of R. & D. programs. This year alone our subcommittee has met more than 30 times. Much of our study was devoted to these counterforce proposals and their implications. I have not arrived at any conclusion frivolously or arbitrarily. Whenever our subcommittee had doubts about marginal R. & D. programs, we resolved these doubts in favor of the program and thereby tried to keep all options open for as long a time as feasible. However, the three programs mentioned earlier, which should be considered as a package since they all have the same ultimate purpose, raise too many questions and have little or no justification. Their potential danger makes it imperative, in my mind, that we delay development at this time.
I have opposed these counterforce programs in the Armed Services Committee, and continue to do so here on the Senate floor for the following reasons:
First. They represent a drastic change in our nuclear strategy;
Second. They will put a hair trigger on nuclear war;
Third. The ultimate costs of development and deployment will be in the billions; and
Fourth. There is no need nor military requirement for these counterforce programs.
I note the presence on the floor of my distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), who is a cosponsor of this amendment, and to whom I shall be happy to yield now so he may add his views to this debate.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, may I, first of all, compliment my good friend the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE) for raising this counterforce issue on the floor this afternoon. I could not agree more as to his evaluation of its importance as we face the years immediately ahead.
It is not an easy issue to explain or to understand. Hence, I think it is highly appropriate that the debate should begin this afternoon, even in the absence of so many of our colleagues, so that a record could be made which, hopefully, will be enlightening to us all.
I have joined in cosponsoring this amendment with the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire and the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE). I have done so on the basis of hearings that were held in the Foreign Relations Committee earlier this year on this subject, hearings which were conducted by the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), who is a member of both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, and myself as chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee.
We will on Monday, I suppose, get involved in much greater detail than we will this afternoon on the implications of this issue. I would like to take this opportunity, though, to outline briefly some of my concerns about Secretary Schlesinger's proposed changes.
Mr. President, for many years, the declared strategic doctrine of the United States has been deterrence – a policy which seeks to persuade a potential aggressor not to initiate nuclear war by
confronting him with the certainty of unacceptable destruction in return. It has been generally assumed that such a policy is most effective when our retaliatory forces are targeted against the civilian population and industrial centers of the adversary.
During this same period, our strategic nuclear forces have developed the capacity to fulfill other roles. For over 10 years we have had, in addition to the deterrent forces, weapons capable of destroying military targets or capable of damaging our adversary's missile reserves so that they could not be used against us. With progress in technology – such as MIRV, improved command and control, smaller warhead size and the like – the ability of our forces to perform these secondary functions has advanced to a very sophisticated level, while we still maintain an overwhelming deterrent capability.
In recent months, Secretary Schlesinger has initiated a national debate on counterforce strategy, or more specifically, on the question of whether this country can improve the character of its deterrent by improving and stressing what have heretofore been de-emphasized as secondary characteristics of our nuclear forces. He has proposed, among other things, changes in our targeting policies, improvements in our command and control structures, improvements in the power and accuracy of our Minuteman III ICBM warheads and development of a terminal guidance MARV program.
As the Senate debates these issues today and Monday I hope that my colleagues will not lose sight of the primary purpose of our nuclear forces – to deter aggressors from initiating hostilities.
What causes concern about the proposed new doctrine are the proposed simultaneous improvements in yield and accuracy of our land-based forces. And here I would like to recall the previous and emphatic statements of this administration, both President Nixon and former Defense Secretary Laird, that the United States would resist any initiative that gave even the appearance of going for a first strike or silo-smashing nuclear force, because it would be destabilizing and provocative. Accuracy and yield improvements, of course, would seem to give precisely this appearance.
In this connection, I think we must examine the implications of accuracy and yield improvements for the stability of our deterrent relationship, particularly at the upper end of the spectrum and during crises. We cannot be sure that the Soviets will see these improvements merely as enhancing deterrence at the lower, or limited nuclear, level of the spectrum. They may, indeed, be less likely to listen to our declared intentions about limiting nuclear war and more likely to make their judgments based on our capabilities, which will include weapons capable of destroying silos in a first strike if we go ahead with accuracy and yield improvements. While a disarming first strike may indeed be impossible in theory, our possession of weapons capable of damaging Soviet land-based missiles may nevertheless cause them grave concern about the survivability of these missiles. It may prompt them, in time of crisis, to use them rather than lose them. In sum, then, there can be a real question about the ambiguity of our aims and motives in seeking these improvements.
Mr. President, I believe we must do everything possible to enhance the survivability of our deterrent forces and to lessen tensions with any potential aggressors. I have serious doubts whether Secretary Schlesinger's proposed changes in our strategic forces will help achieve these goals. They may, in fact, lead to an escalation of the arms race, with the Soviets taking countermeasures which could increase the threat to our landbased forces and heighten tensions between the world's two major nuclear powers.
Mr. President, these considerations underlie my concern about this new proposed doctrine. I look forward to an opportunity to discuss my concerns in greater detail on Monday. In the meantime, I would again like to commend the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire for raising this most important and vital issue to the level of Senate debate in these closing days of consideration of the defense procurement bill.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I want to thank my good friend from the neighboring State of Maine. It is always helpful to have his strong arm and strong intelligence as a supporting Senator in one of these debates, particularly on an issue, as he has said, of this importance.
I would like to ask the distinguished Senator from Maine – I realize this is speculative – how does he think a conservative Soviet military planner, or one who is concerned about the security of his own country – and I understand in the Soviet Union they have the conservatives and they have those who are more philosophical – how does he suppose a conservative Soviet military planner would view these three programs?
Mr. MUSKIE. I think Soviet Marshal Grechko has already told us. Earlier today, I read a story in the press reporting the remarks made by Marshal Grechko in his election campaign in Moscow.
He is apparently electioneering despite the fact he is the only candidate on the ticket, not unlike some constituencies in this country, I might say. But, in any case, commenting upon the Soviet military posture, Grechko emphasized the need to go forward with the expanded Soviet nuclear program, which is so visible now in the new missiles developed recently.
His argument was that the United States is embarking upon a refinement of its enormous nuclear warmaking machine. That refinement could have had reference to nothing but the very items that the Senator has pinpointed with his amendment.
It is conceivable, of course, that Marshal Grechko is propagandizing against the Department of Defense budget proposals. But, on his record, I think not. I think he is making use of this argument to make the case in which he believes – the case to maximize the Soviet nuclear posture and to achieve superiority, if possible. And I think he will use developments such as this to fuel his arguments.
I ask unanimous consent that the article concerning Marshal Grechko's remarks be printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
[From the New York Times, June 6, 1974]
SOVIET DEFENSE CHIEF SAYS WEST PURSUES ARMS RACE
Moscow, June 5.– Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, the Soviet Defense Minister, has told a Moscow election rally that the West is pursuing the arms race and the Soviet Union is "doing everything necessary" to modernize its defense system.
The 70-year-old military leader, quoted at length in this morning's Communist party newspaper, Pravda, did not specifically mention recent tests of multiple-warhead missiles or the expansion of the Soviet strategic arsenal of land missiles and submarine-based missiles.
But his election speech, to a rally on Tuesday in the Kiev Borough of Moscow, sought to justify pushing ahead with the Soviet build-up. It combined routine endorsement of the Soviet policy of coexistence with a warning against complacency because "the danger of war remains a stern reality of our time."
U.S. WAR BUILD-UP SEEN
"Imperialism even now carries on material preparation for war, builds up production of military hardware and weaponry, relentlessly perfects the giant military machine it has created," Marshal Grechko said.
"The party and the people are doing everything necessary to maintain the country's defenses on the level of modern requirements", he said. The marshal is a candidate in the single-slate election to the Supreme Soviet, the nominal legislature, on June 16.
Since becoming a member of the party's ruling Politburo in April, 1973, Marshal Grechko has been gaining more publicity, and some Western analysts have interpreted his speeches as pressure on the Soviet leadership to push ahead with the build-up of its strategic arsenal rather than be drawn prematurely into another arms limitations agreement with the United States.
To these analysts, Marshal Grechko is the visible advocate of the Soviet military-industrial complex, exercising the same kinds of influence on Kremlin policy that the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise in the American political arena.
According to this view, the Marshal's speeches to military audiences, his March article in the Communist party's ideological journal, Kommunist, and his election speech contain more warnings about military preparedness than the public statements of the party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev.
Some Western diplomats have heard rumors that the military establishment objected to the soft tone of a speech that Mr. Brezhnev had planned to deliver on May Day and the speech was therefore canceled. They noted that in the May Day slogans a phrase describing the Soviet armed forces as a "reliable defender of the motherland" had been dropped, and speculated that this might signify a behind-the-screen debate over the defense budget.
A contrary view among Western diplomats and military specialists is that Marshal Grechko's speeches reflect his natural concerns as Defense Minister. These analysts are skeptical that any essential differences exist between the defense establishment and the party.
"This is a military state," one Western diplomat said. "The economy is set up to serve military needs. Defense costs are not some form of social overhead to be cut to the bone. Military output is an end-product, a basic objective of the Soviet economy. Grechko and Brezhnev are in league with each other."
Some analysts concede that Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin and other members of the leadership with responsibility for the civilian sector may seek to constrain defense spending to gain funds for their branches of the economy. In private talks with Westerners, Mr. Kosygin has emphasized the need to cut arms spending on both sides.
Mr. McINTYRE. May I ask the Senator from Maine, does he not think that the people of this country would like to see a limitation on arms rather than this escalation where, as you say, the Russians look at us and say, "They are refining their accuracy; therefore, we must make bigger missiles." It is the feeling of this Senator that if we do not push for arms limitations, and particularly at this point, that the answer some day is going to be that we are going to blow up the world and all in it.
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator from New Hampshire is absolutely correct. But I must say I find people confused. They have been told that we have signed one agreement with the Russians, yet all the evidence is that both sides have escalated the arms race, and these budget proposals are the latest evidence.
I think people are ready to lighten the burden of arms they have carried on their shoulders, every taxpayer of this country. I just think that like MIRV before it and other developments, these proposals will simply mean escalating the race to a higher level. The race will not go downward.
There is nothing in the history of the SALT negotiations up to now to suggest that a rollback of arms of any kind at any level is in prospect. The MIRV tests in this country were completed before the SALT talks started. Deployment was commenced after they had started; but now we are not talking about a SALT agreement at a pre-MIRV level. Any SALT agreement that we negotiate now is going to fix in place a MIRV capability on both sides.
So the very SALT talks that were designed to stabilize arms have resulted in escalating the arms race to a higher plateau, and I am afraid that this new proposal will escalate it to a still higher plateau. I think that is what the American people see. They do not really believe we mean what we say when we say we are going to try to stabilize the arms race.
Mr. McINTYRE. Does the Senator recall, that at the time that Secretary Laird, the then Secretary of Defense, returned with the SALT agreements about to be signed, there was also supplemental budget request of $120 million, and that the Armed Services Committee, on which I serve, and the full Senate, rejected a claim of $20 million for a new reentry vehicle?
Mr. MUSKIE. That is right.
Mr. McINTYRE. And that was in 1972.
Mr. MUSKIE. That is right. Secretary Laird attempted to trigger the nuclear arms race qualitatively as soon as the SALT accords had been signed.
Mr. McINTYRE. I thank the Senator from Maine.