June 10, 1974
Page 18488
Mr. McINTYRE. In the closed session we will get into some detail about the type of accuracy they are seeking, but I just wanted to ask the Senator: Is it not true, in regard to the policy of flexible response the Secretary of Defense has enunciated at our posture hearings, we have at the present time the full ability, the clear ability, to respond flexibility toward limited attacks upon us?
Mr. CRANSTON. We plainly have a flexible stance now, and I think the proposal by Secretary Schlesinger has the exact opposite effect of reducing flexibility, because it is quite likely to lead to a situation where any potential foe equipped with mighty missiles might feel it would have no alternative but to strike an all-out blow at us before we decided to strike an all-out blow against them. I think this has the potential of not only increasing the arms race but increasing the speed with which we would move toward nuclear war, rather than decrease the speed with which we would move toward nuclear war, as Secretary Schlesinger said.
Mr. McINTYRE. I want to affirm to the Senator that the Secretary, in his appearance in February before the Armed Services Committee, and then subsequently in his appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee – I think a subcommittee chaired by the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) – affirmed and stated that we had sufficient ability to follow a doctrine of flexible response today and we did not need any improved accuracy to fulfill that particular mission.
Mr. CRANSTON. It is really difficult to understand the real reasons. I wonder if there are other reasons that have not been stated that have led the Secretary to propose this move.
Mr. McINTYRE. I want to thank my colleague from California.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank my colleague.
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to my distinguished colleague from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE)
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I thank my friend from New Hampshire, and I compliment him for the effectiveness and the persistence of his fight on this issue. which I think is the key issue on the pending legislation.
To amplify what he has said about Secretary Schlesinger's testimony earlier this year, may I make the point that in response to the Secretary's call for a national debate on his new strategic doctrine, Senator SYMINGTON – as chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad – and I – in my capacity as chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control – held a series of joint hearings on U.S. nuclear strategy. In the course of the hearings, we held both a closed and an open session with Secretary Schlesinger, who was kind enough to agree to sanitize and release the transcript from the closed session.
In the context of today's debate on authorizations to significantly improve the accuracy and yield of our land-based ICBM's, I would like to emphasize three points that Secretary Schlesinger made in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee earlier this year.
First, the Secretary of Defense made it quite clear that improvement of the yield and accuracy of our warheads is not "essential" for the implementation of a targeting doctrine of selective and flexible response. And he has pointed out on several occasions since those sessions that with our present arsenal of nuclear weapons and our present targeting capability, we can now launch selective, small-scale strikes if we choose to do so.
A recent issue of Defense Monitor, which is published by the Center for Defense Information, carries two tables of interest in identifying the accuracy and hard target kill capability of U.S. strategic missiles and Soviet strategic missiles, and I ask unanimous consent that those two tables, and additional material relating thereto, be included in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
[Tables Omitted]
U.S. STRATEGIC MISSILES
STUDYING AND MEASURING DENSITY OF THE AIR
"Because density of the air has a great influence over the inaccuracies of a reentry vehicle. By these tests we hope to get some standard patterns so we might even be able to forecast density in target areas under hot war conditions, thus by using this data improve the accuracies of our ICBMs."
Major General P. T. Cooper,
Air Force Systems Command, 1971.
GEOPHYSICAL MOTION STUDIES
"Sophisticated testing of advanced inertial subsystems for the evaluation of geophysical and environmental effects in order to reduce missile CEP ... Initiate a geographical motion study of an entire operational guidance system at a missile site in support of missile circular error probability (CEP) reductions." Air Force environment R&D Program, 1972.
EXTRA-GALACTIC RADIO SOURCES
"A series of very long baseline interferometry experiments have been conducted using extra- galactic radio sources as a means of determining the distance between sites several thousand miles apart ... This achievement should have an immediate impact on improvement of the earth-centered world geodetic system serving the requirements of the ballistic missile systems, and aerospace defense."
Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1973.
PRECISE GEODETIC LOCATIONS AND GRAVITY DATA
"Defense Mapping Agency provides all the precise geodetic locations and gravity data required to build the missile trajectories for U.S. strategic missile systems ... Missile systems are provided precise launch positions, target positions and the variations in the pull of gravity on the missile from the time they leave the launch silo until they arrive at the target. This data is provided for strategic missiles such as Minuteman, Polaris. and Poseidon."
Lieutenant General H. W. Penney, Director,
Defense Mapping Agency, 1973.
THE U.S. FOURTH STRATEGIC FORCE: FORWARD BASED AIRCRAFT
In Europe: 72 F-111Es in the United Kingdom; 244 F-4Cs and Ds in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Germany; 72 A-7s, on board 2 aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean; 24 A-6, total 412.
In Asia: 72 F-4Ds in Korea; 36 F-4Ds in Taiwan; 108 A-7s on board 3 aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific 36. A-6s, total 252.
Grand total 664 tactical aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union and China.
EFFECTS OF RAIN AND ICE
Air Force requested $6.6 million in fiscal 1974 to study the effects of rain and ice on ballistic missiles to improve the reliability and accuracy of reentry vehicles.
CAN U.S. DEFENSE SECRETARIES COUNT NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS?
In 1972 then-Defense Secretary Melvin Laird said in his Posture statement that the Soviet Union would have 2,500 strategic nuclear weapons in mid-1972. In 1973 then-Defense Secretary Elliot Richardson said that the Russians had 2,500 strategic nuclear weapons in mid-1972 and would have 3,600 strategic nuclear weapons in mid-1973. The latter figure may have been a misprint for 2,600. At his nomination hearing in June 1973, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger said that in mid-1972 the Russians had 2,200 strategic nuclear weapons (300 less than what both Laird and Richardson had said) and that in mid-1973 the Russians had 2,300 strategic nuclear weapons (still less than what Laird and Richardson said the Russians had in mid-1972). In 1974 Defense Secretary Schlesinger said that in mid-1973 the Russians had 2,200 strategic nuclear weapons (100 less than he said the Russians had a year ago and the same number he had said they had in mid-1972). Secretary Schlesinger said that the Russians would have 2,600 strategic nuclear weapons by mid-1974 (only 100 more than Laird and Richardson had said the Russians had in mid-1972).
Laird (1972), mid-1972: 2,500.
Richardson (1973), mid-1972: 2,500, mid1973: 3,600 (2,600?).
Schlesinger (1973), mid-1972: 2,200, mid1973: 2,300.
Schlesinger (1974), mid-1973: 2,200, mid1974: 2,600.
Conclusion: the jump of 400 Soviet strategic weapons alleged by Secretary Schlesinger between mid-1973 and 1974 is suspect, particularly as the Soviets have not yet begun to deploy MIRVed missiles. Are numbers juggled to exaggerate Soviet "strategic momentum"?
STRATEGIC COMPARISONS
Perceptions of relative military capability are perhaps as important as actual relative military capabilities between the United States and the Soviet Union, says Defense Secretary Schlesinger. Paradoxically, however, it is representatives of the Defense Department who are most eloquent in exaggerating the Soviet threat and in running down and belittling U.S. strategic capabilities. The Center for Defense Information has prepared a list of strategic comparison between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. which indicates important U.S. advantages. These are all areas of real U.S. strength but which the Defense Department often overlooks or fails to highlight in its efforts to sell the American people and the U.S. Congress on buying new weapons systems by creating doubts about U.S. power.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
1. The U.S. has three times as many strategic nuclear weapons as the Soviet Union (7940 versus 2600). In 1971 the U.S. had 4700; the Soviets had 2100. The U.S. lead has increased since the SALT I agreement in 1972.
2. The U.S. is producing new strategic nuclear weapons at a rate of about 4 per day; the Soviets at a rate of probably less than 1 per day.
3. All new U.S. strategic missiles deployed since 1970 have been MIRVed. Continued U.S. MIRV deployments will mean that the U.S. lead will continue to grow at least through 1977.
4. The U.S. is superior to the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons technology. Our weapons are more efficient; we get more explosive power (bank) for the size and weight. This fact makes "throw weight" calculations almost meaningless.
MIRV
5. The U.S. has more than 750 operational MIRVed missiles; the Soviets do not have any. They have just begun to test the complex MIRV technology.
6. The U.S., having mastered and deployed MIRV, is moving to MARV (maneuverable nuclear warheads) and other new advances in strategic weaponry.
ICBM's
7. The U.S. has fewer land-based missiles (1054 versus 1575) but Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, estimates that over the next few years the number of Soviet ICBMs will decline toward 1400 as about 200 old Soviet ICBMs are retired. Soviet practice in the past has been to hang on to old missiles; U.S. practice has been to trade in the old missiles for better ones.
8. The U.S. has 1000 modern solid-propellant ICBMs with penetration aids and onboard computers. The Soviets have only 60 solid propellant missiles and no operational missiles with penetration aids and on-board computers.
9. U.S. missiles are much more accurate than Soviet missiles; we can destroy all kinds of targets, including Soviet missiles, with smaller weapons. U.S. advantages in accuracy will probably be retained for a long period because of the very advanced technology required to improve accuracy, particularly below about a quarter of a mile CEP.
STRATEGIC SUBMARINES
10. The U.S. has 41 submarines that carry 16 missiles each; the Soviets have only 33 submarines that carry 16 missiles each. The U.S. has 24 submarines with MIRVed missiles; the Soviets have none. The Soviets usually have far fewer submarines actually on-station.
11. U.S. strategic submarines are quieter and less vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare than are Soviet submarines. U.S. underwater technology for protecting its submarines and finding Soviet submarines is much superior to Soviet technology.
12. The U.S. has forward deployed bases for its submarines (in Scotland, Spain and Guam). The Soviets have no forward bases for submarines.
13. U.S. allies Britain and France have strategic submarines. The Soviet Union has no allies with strategic weapons.
14. The U.S. has submarine detection networks such as SOSUS for locating Soviet submarines; the Soviet Union has no such network and is at a severe geographic disadvantage for establishing such networks.
BOMBERS
15. The U.S. has almost four times as many strategic bombers as the Soviet Union (496 versus 140) and is testing a new model, the B-1. In fact, it is possible that none of the alleged Soviet strategic bombers have been configured as strategic bombers for the past 5 to 10 years.
ABM
16. When the U.S. ABM site in North Dakota is completed in about a year the U.S. will probably have more antiballistic missiles than the Soviet Union. U.S. ABM technology is far advanced over the Soviet Union.
FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS
17. The U.S. has about 650 aircraft in Europe and Asia and on aircraft carriers that can deliver nuclear weapons on the Soviet Union (and China). The Soviet Union has no such "4th strategic force" for threatening the United States.
EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE
18. The Defense Department makes much of the Soviet lead in megatonnage. The Soviet Union has in 1974 more than a 2 to 1 advantage in "raw megatons". However, when measured in equivalent megatons, which takes account of the fact that much of the explosive energy of very large weapons is wasted, the U.S. has about 4,100 equivalent megatons in its strategic forces versus about 4,300 equivalent megatons in the Soviet strategic forces.
U.S. STRATEGIC MOMENTUM: ASTONISHING BREADTH AND DEPTH
Contrary to impressions created by the Defense Department, the U.S. has not dropped out of the strategic arms race. The U.S. has not reached a technological plateau in searching for new ways to spend billions on strategic weapons. On the contrary, the U.S. is rushing forward into new realms of strategic weaponry that apparently far outstrip current Soviet efforts. In recent years, particularly since SALT I in 1972, the U.S. has been deploying new strategic weapons at a pace far in excess of that of the Soviet Union. The future holds more of the same if the DOD
momentum continues. Programs that are proposed in the fiscal 1975 defense budget add up to an extraordinary variety of continuing and new strategic innovations that include the following:
1. Continued installation of MIRVed Minuteman III ICBMs to reach 550 missiles and 1650 nuclear warheads by mid-1975.
2. Continued deployment of MIRVed Poseidon submarine-launched missiles to reach 31 submarines, 496 missiles, and 4960 nuclear warheads by 1977.
3. Preparation for installing tip to 1,000 MIRVed Minuteman III missiles.
4. Improving the accuracy and reliability of U.S. missiles through extensive and sophisticated testing programs.
5. Improvements in the existing guidance system for Minuteman III to increase its accuracy and hard-target kill capability.
6. Development of terminal guidance maneuverable reentry vehicles (MARV) for Minuteman III and other missiles to achieve extremely precise delivery of nuclear weapons with almost no margin of error. Could mean U.S. knock out capability against All Soviet fixed strategic systems.
7. Development of an entirely new strategic system, the air-launched cruise missile.
8. Development of an entirely new strategic system, the submarine-launched cruise missile.
9. Development of an entirely new strategic system, the land-mobile ICBM.
10. Development of an entirely new strategic system, the air-mobile ICBM.
11. Development of a new large throw weight ICBM to fit in Minuteman silo.
12. A new high-yield warhead for the Minuteman III and other advances in packing more explosive power into small packages (improved yield to weight ratios). These and other advances in miniaturizing make conventional conceptions of missile throw weight measurement almost meaningless.
13. Testing of Minuteman missiles from operational sites in order, among other objectives, to explore the possible multiple launch capability for Minuteman launchers. Exploration also of "cold launch" or "pop-up" launch techniques for attaining refire capability. This "MIRVing" of missile launchers would severely complicate efforts to control strategic weapons deployments through SALT.
14. Development of more than 3 MIRVs (possibly up to 10 warheads) for the Minuteman III missile.
15. Improvements in rocket motor technology to increase the amount of missile throw weight per pound of propellant (increased propulsion efficiency). This advancement also renders alleged Soviet throw weight "advantages" almost meaningless.
16. Improved Poseidon missiles (exact nature of improvements is classified but probably includes better accuracy and throw weight).
17. Continued deployment of the SRAM missile on U.S. strategic bombers to have 1140 operational by the mid-1970s. The SRAM missile significantly increases the capability of U.S. strategic bombers to attack Soviet military targets.
18. Development of an entirely new strategic bomber, the B-1.
19. Development of an entirely new strategic submarine, the Trident.
20. Procurement of the Trident I missile for 10 Poseidon submarines.
21. Development of an efficient counterforce SLBM, the Trident missile.
22. Improved guidance systems for SLBMs to increase their accuracy.
23. Development of an entirely new strategic submarine that will be smaller than Trident, the SSBN-X, using a Narwhal-type propulsion plant.
24. Increased emphasis on civil defense, including plans for rapid evacuation of U.S. cities and "high risk" areas in case of crisis. This will make it possible for U.S. leaders to more "credibly" threaten the use of nuclear weapons.
25. An operational ABM system in North Dakota by mid-1975.
26. Development of new ABM systems, including Site Defense, light area defense systems, maneuverable ABMs, and ABMs using lasers. Under SALT restrictions the U.S. is permitted to do anything except actually begin to deploy new operational systems beyond a total of 200 launchers.
27. A vast array of sophisticated ASW systems for locating and being able to destroy Soviet strategic submarines. These include sensor systems at points where Soviet submarines must transit, satellite sensors, and the Captor mine for bottling up Soviet submarines in or near their homeports.
28. Development of new strategic tanker armed with cruise missiles.
Mr. MUSKIE. It may be that classified information would indicate even more reassuring information to those who are concerned about the accuracy of our missiles, but these public tables disclose clearly, on the point of accuracy and hard target kill, we have a superiority over that of the Soviet Union at the present time without the implementation of the programs which are touched by Senator McINTYRE'S amendment.
The second point the Secretary made, Mr. President, in our hearings earlier this year was this:
Secretary Schlesinger pointed out that neither side can achieve "a high confidence disarming first strike," because both sides possess invulnerable sea-based missile forces. So no matter how we or the Soviets improve accuracy or otherwise improve ICBM warheads, the possibility of carrying out a first strike that would leave the opponent defenseless is foreclosed.
Third, Secretary Schlesinger as well as Secretary Kissinger has indicated that the accumulation of efficient counterforce weapons – that is, ICBM's with multiple, accurate, high-yield warheads – contributes to instability of the nuclear balance. The reason for this is that in a crisis, it puts both sides in a position of fearing that the other will be tempted to make the best of a threatening situation by launching its own missiles before they are destroyed in their silos. This is the condition that Senator McINTYRE aptly describes as "putting a hair-trigger on the launch console." And this is presumably what was on the minds of President Nixon and former Defense Secretary Laird when they stated a few years ago that the United States would resist any initiative that gave even the appearance of going for a first-strike or silo-smashing nuclear force, because it would be destabilizing and provocative.
In view of these three points made by the Secretary of Defense, I see no compelling reason to invite these risks by embarking on programs to improve the accuracy and yield of our land-based ICBM's. Accordingly, I intend to vote for the amendment before us today to defer approval of the requested $77 million in authorizations until the President reaches the conclusion publicly that the effort to negotiate with the Russians new limits on MIRV's has failed.
The argument is made that we need to spend money on these programs for the express purpose of enhancing the possibilities for agreement on MIRV's at SALT. I am concerned about the reverse possibility – that such new programs are more likely to weaken, rather than enhance, our national security. For if our goal is to encourage Soviet restraint in their ICBM development – and I agree that this should be our goal – we can hardly expect to accomplish it by showing no restraint ourselves. Indeed, plunging into these programs will more likely have the reverse effect of stimulating the Soviets to increase their own efforts. And if an arms control agreement is subsequently reached, it will be concluded at a higher plateau of arms spending, with each side enjoying less security.
Mr. President, I think it is of concern to us to understand the reaction of the Soviets to these developments.
On Friday, when discussion of the pending amendment began, the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire asked me in a colloquy how I thought a Soviet military planner would view our going ahead with these three programs. In response, I cited a press report on a speech by Soviet Marshal Grechko at a rally in Moscow last week. He warned that the United States is beginning an arms buildup by embarking upon a refinement of its enormous nuclear warmaking machine. That refinement could have had reference to nothing but the very items pinpointed by this amendment.
It is conceivable, of course, that Marshal Grechko was propagandizing against the Department of Defense budget proposal. But, on his record, I think this unlikely. I think he is making use of the argument to make the case in which he believes – the case to maximize the Soviet nuclear posture and to achieve superiority, if possible. I, for one, think he will use developments such as those under consideration today to fuel his arguments and enhance his bargaining power.
If I am correct, and if he had his way, what we will be doing by approving these programs is approving a further escalation of the nuclear arms race, in my judgment.
As the Senate debates the amendment under consideration, I hope that my colleagues will not lose sight of the primary purpose of our nuclear forces – to deter aggressors from initiating hostilities. In this regard, I believe we must do everything possible to enhance the survivability of our deterrent forces and to lessen tensions with such potential aggressors. As my remarks indicate, I have serious doubts whether Secretary Schlesinger's proposed changes in our strategic forces will help achieve these goals. On the contrary, improvements in the accuracy and yield of our land-based missiles and the development of a terminal guidance MARV program run the very real risk of escalating the arms race with the Soviets taking countermeasures which could both increase the threat to our land-based missiles and heighten tensions between the world's two major nuclear powers.
So in terms of adding to our security, I have serious doubts about going ahead with these improved warhead programs. I have no doubts, though, about the importance of going ahead with the strategic arms limitation talks on MIRV's. Indeed, it would be inconsistent, perhaps even self-defeating, if we were to proceed simultaneously with talks aimed at reducing nuclear war risks and with weapons programs which, by Secretary Schlesinger's own admission, may well increase those risks in future years by increasing instability. We must put these things in their proper sequence.
The amendment before us today does that. It emphasizes in unequivocal terms our primary interest in achieving limits on weapons which increase the instability of the nuclear balance. But it leaves open the option of our going ahead with the proposed warhead improvements if the SALT talks do not produce an effective MIRV limitation – one which will reduce doubts and fears about first-strike counterforce attacks.
Mr. President, it seems to me that to proceed on any other course will but serve to undermine the SALT negotiations by making it appear that we are bargaining in bad faith. Any other course will also give aid to Soviet military hardliners. And any other course will be but the first step down an even more destabilizing path that will likely see both sides afflicted with first-strike jitters. If we want to send a message to Moscow demonstrating this country's interest in its own defense and underlining our mutual interest in reducing nuclear war risks, the amendment before us today is the proper vehicle.
In October of 1971, the Senate rejected an amendment offered by the junior Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY) to improve the accuracy of our Minuteman missiles by a vote of 66 to 17.
In 1972, the Senate conferees were firm in insisting that a $20 million Pentagon request for silo kill accuracy be dropped in a post-SALT supplemental authorization bill. In both instances, there was an appreciation on the part of the Senate that the proposed programs would set this country on a new course, a course laden with so many military, political and economic uncertainties that the requisite expenditures were not in the national security interest of the country.
I am hopeful the Senate's action today will reflect a similar appreciation. For I am hopeful that the Senate will again have the good sense not to approve increased accuracy and yield warhead programs while there is still hope for a MIRV agreement with the Soviets and that it will support the McIntyre-Brooke amendment.