June 26, 1974
Page 21147
COUNTERFORCE STRATEGY
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, for most of the postwar period, the declared strategic doctrine of the United States has been deterrence – a policy that seeks to persuade a potential aggressor not to initiate nuclear war by confronting with the certainty of unacceptable destruction in return. In recent months, Secretary Schlesinger has played a leading role in stimulating a national debate on the question of whether the United States can improve the character of its deterrent forces by improving and stressing what have heretofore been de-emphasized as the secondary characteristics of our nuclear arsenal. He has proposed, among other things, changes in the structure of our forces, further improvements in their accuracy and destructive capacity, and shifts in our declaratory policy.
Earlier this month, when the Senate was considering the McIntyre-Brooke amendment to the military procurement authorizations bill, the general thrust of the administration's proposed changes in our strategic thinking was discussed on the floor. An excellent article in the July issue of Foreign Affairs, entitled "The New Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense," written by Ted Greenwood and Michael Nacht, makes a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate over the proposed changes in our strategic doctrine. I commend this article to the attention of my colleagues and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows
THE NEW NUCLEAR DEBATE: SENSE OR NONSENSE?
(By Ted Greenwood and Michael Nacht)
I
There is a widespread and deep-seated dissatisfaction today with many of the fundamental premises underlying American strategic weapons policy. The dissatisfaction stems in part from disappointment with the terms of the arms control agreements concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union at the Moscow summit meeting in May, 1972. The treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems is sometimes claimed to provide little more than a codification of the immoral relationship in which the population of each superpower is left hostage to the strategic nuclear forces of the other. The Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons is faulted for conceding numerical superiority to the Soviet Union.
The inability of political accords to keep pace with technological innovation is being cited as dooming strategic arms control agreements to obsolescence almost before the ink dries. In part, too, the dissatisfaction stems from the vigor of Soviet strategic weapons programs and from apparent Soviet intransigence at the second round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II).
Other aspects of Soviet policy – their stance during and subsequent to the 1973 war in the Middle East and their continued rigidity in dealing with the question of human rights within their own society – while perhaps logically decoupled from strategic issues, nevertheless reinforce a general skepticism of Russian intentions.
This dissatisfaction has provided the context for a new debate over the size and structure of the nation's nuclear forces. Origins of this debate may be traced to statements about the need for increased nuclear flexibility 1970. Last year's articles in Foreign Affairs by Dr. Fred Ikle, now Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, Director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, provided additional stimulus. Dr. Ikle questioned the desirability of continuing to rely on a policy of deterrence to prevent nuclear war and expressed the hope that alternatives be found to strategic doctrine and weaponry that, in the event of an attack, require a massive, instantaneous retaliatory strike against the enemy's civilian population. Dr. Panofsky responded that Dr. Ikle was greatly overstating the rigidity of both the doctrine and the weaponry, that an instantaneous, massive retaliatory attack was far from our only available option, but that, in any event, the call for alternatives to deterrence was futile in the face of the inability of either technology or strategy to alter the mutual hostage relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The debate claimed increased public attention following two press conferences last January by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and the subsequent release of his Annual Defense Department Report FY 1975. Secretary Schlesinger called for increased targeting flexibility, more accurate missiles and larger warheads as well as continuing or initiating the development of several new offensive weapon systems. These include larger intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to be launched from Minuteman silos, a mobile ICBM, the Trident missile and submarine programs, a smaller missile-launching submarine, air- and sea-launched strategic cruise missiles, and the B-1 strategic bomber.
The Secretary of Defense is clearly concerned with the recent Soviet deployment of a new, long-range submarine-launched ballistic missile and their extensive testing of four improved- accuracy ICBMs, three of which have been tested with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). He anticipates that the Soviet Union will eventually be able to deploy many thousands of large and accurate MIRVs that would threaten the American bombers and fixed land-based missiles. This capability would also provide the Soviets with an edge in the number of deliverable warheads to add to their previously acquired advantages in missile launchers and total megatonnage. He finds it unacceptable for the Soviet Union to be able to threaten major components of American strategic forces without the United States "being able to pose a comparable threat." While he does not require complete symmetry between the two forces, he does insist that all asymmetries should not favor the Soviet Union. "Essential equivalence" is his stated objective.
Unfortunately, much of the discussion responding to the Administration's position has failed to clarify the primary issues at stake. Terminology has been inconsistently and erroneously employed; concepts have remained ambiguous; and partisan views have tended to dominate analytical discussion. It is appropriate therefore to reexamine the elements of this new nuclear debate in a manner that will clearly identify the choices that actually confront us. We shall do this in four steps. First, we shall identify the central concepts relevant to the debate. Second, we shall set out the arguments in favor and against the pursuit of strategic nuclear options. Third, we shall evaluate these arguments and present our own position. Fourth, we shall set the debate in a broader context by critically examining the underlying premises of the Administration's current policy.
II
During the period that Robert McNamara was Secretary of Defense, the primary official justifications for the strategic nuclear forces were assured destruction and damage limitation, with the former gradually rising to ascendancy over the latter. In 1966 he stated that the assured destruction criterion required the maintenance of a force necessary "to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining, continuously, a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike."
Secretary McNamara and his staff distinguished carefully between the assured destruction criterion as a planning device for sizing the force and the doctrine that was to be followed in the event of war. There was no requirement that a massive nuclear response would automatically follow any level of nuclear attack against the United States or its allies. Nevertheless, the increasing emphases on assured destruction in official statements focused attention on scenarios involving massive destruction of urban populations. Other scenarios were relegated to a secondary position and received less serious consideration.
Use of the strategic forces for other than a massive attack was the subject of intermittent discussion and debate during the McNamara period. During the early 1960's the strategic contingency plans were altered to include other possible responses, and Secretary McNamara briefly advocated a targeting doctrine intended to discourage attacks against cities in the event of nuclear war. But concern for these matters waned throughout the tenure of the Johnson Administration. Only in recent years have they again come under significant scrutiny. Various high-level officials of the Nixon Administration as well as the President himself have publicly expressed the need to provide nuclear options other than the initiation of a massive nuclear attack involving large-scale civilian casualties.
Three scenarios in particular have received widespread attention: a massive Soviet attack directed against American strategic forces; a limited Soviet attack designed to achieve limited political objectives; and the escalation of a conventional or tactical nuclear war in Europe. In each of these cases a response other than a massive nuclear attack against Soviet cities might be desired. In the first instance the United States might wish to retaliate by attacking comparable military targets in a manner that would not encourage the subsequent destruction of population centers. In the second instance a limited response might be called for, including perhaps the destruction of military installations, selected urban areas, dams, power plants or pipelines. In the third instance means might be sought to influence directly the outcome of a European war without encouraging Soviet strikes against American and European cities. The strategic forces could be used, for example, in coordinated attacks against communication installations, transportation facilities, storage depots for nuclear weapons, petroleum supplies and military hardware in Eastern Europe or Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
In thinking about nuclear war scenarios, two factors need to be taken into account: the nature of the targets and the magnitude of the attack. Targets may be categorized as countervalue or countermilitary. Countervalue targets include urban-industrial areas (commonly referred to as "countercity" targets) and any non-urban civilian site of economic, political or cultural value.
Countermilitary targets include not only strategic nuclear forces (commonly referred to as "counterforce" targets) but also the many thousands of other assets that comprise a nation's war-making capability including troop concentrations, airfields, materiel depots, transportation networks and communications systems. Hardened missile sites and command and control facilities, an important subset of counterforce targets, are referred to as "hard targets."
Any of these target systems could be attacked at various levels of intensity, ranging from very restricted, using a few weapons, to very extensive, employing many thousands of warheads. It is especially useful to distinguish four separate categories of counterforce attacks, reflecting different political-military objectives: limited counterforce, that seeks to destroy only a selected portion of the opponent's strategic forces; substantial counterforce, that permits the destruction of a larger fraction of the opponent's forces but is not intended to reduce significantly his ability to inflict damage; extensive counterforce, that does seek to reduce the opponent's ability to inflict damage; and disarming first strike, that strives to eliminate completely the opponent's retaliatory capability. These categories call for successively increasing hard-target kill capability.
With these distinctions in mind, we can now address the substance of the current debate about nuclear options. Although participants in this debate have rarely afforded adequate attention to the views of their opponents, the absence of empirical evidence makes a complete and systematic examination of all relevant issues a precondition for reaching a responsible conclusion. It is to such an examination that we now turn.
III
The arguments concerning the increase of Presidential nuclear options can be aggregated into six categories. The first deals primarily with targeting flexibility and concerns the relationship between increasing the likelihood of nuclear war and improving its controllability. The second focuses on the extent to which improving counterforce capability is equivalent to the pursuit of a disarming first strike capability. The third deals with the linkage between counterforce capability and the nuclear arms race. The fourth addresses the feasibility of conducting limited nuclear war. The fifth concerns the effect of nuclear options on the credibility of American security guarantees to its allies. The sixth deals with the question of whether advances in Soviet nuclear flexibility require comparable measures by the United States.
The first argument addresses the advantages of being able to fight a controlled nuclear war and the extent to which having such a capability increases the likelihood of war. Proponents of targeting flexibility contend that since the possibility of nuclear war cannot be denied, the President must not be limited to choosing between surrender to an aggressor and touching off a massive slaughter of civilian populations. They argue that since there is great uncertainty about how a nuclear war might start, responses should be available to deal with a wide range of possibilities. Limiting targeting options to strikes against civilian population is said to be immoral, unwise and unnecessary. If a war begins on a small scale, there should be military responses that not only refrain from inviting escalation but also provide incentives against it.
Even if war were to be initiated by a massive counterforce strike resulting in relatively heavy casualties, an appropriate response must be available that would not automatically trigger subsequent attacks against population centers. In short, it is argued that contingency plans are needed to fight a nuclear war at whatever level and in whatever way is required.
It is not suggested that such plans should be implemented as substitutes for the pursuit of political and diplomatic efforts toward preventing, limiting or terminating hostilities. Rather, they are intended to provide credible military responses if diplomacy fails. In fact, it is sometimes argued that if a potential aggressor knows that usable military options exist, he is less likely to initiate a nuclear war or to resist its termination. Targeting flexibility is therefore said to strengthen the American deterrent. Indeed, some would say that it is essential for deterrence to be credible.
On the other side, opponents of targeting flexibility claim that as nuclear war becomes more manageable, it also becomes more likely. Increasing nuclear options is therefore viewed as not only undesirable but dangerous. This increased likelihood of war is said to come about in several ways. The argument is made that as the use of nuclear weapons becomes more thinkable it also becomes more acceptable; the horrors of such weapons would be obscured or forgotten; and the psychological barriers inhibiting political leaders from employing them would be weakened. A false confidence might be generated that nuclear war can be controlled and limited. In a crisis the very existence of a variety of seemingly clear-cut military contingency plans might suppress the inclination to pursue elusive and uncertain political initiatives that might otherwise defuse the situation. A nuclear strike might therefore be chosen instead of a diplomatic initiative. While such a course may seem very unlikely for rational leaders to adopt, proponents of this view stress that there is no guarantee that rationality will always prevail, particularly during times of crisis.
The second argument is one that dominated the debate about multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles from 1969 to 1971. It centers on the claim that seeking improved counterforce capability is equivalent to working toward a disarming first-strike capability. It is said that if missile accuracy continues to improve and the number of available warheads continues to grow, the ability to destroy an opponent's fixed land-based missile forces can eventually be achieved.,
Some view this development, especially when considered in conjunction with substantial effort to improve antisubmarine warfare, as movement toward the achievement of a disarming first-strike capability. Others claim that it will be perceived as such by the Soviets, even if American intentions are otherwise. Advocates of both views frequently suggest that heightened anxiety over the vulnerability of land-based missile forces would increase the likelihood of preemptive nuclear war. Each side might be tempted to fire its missiles before they could be destroyed.
The claim is also made that improvements in counterforce capability might lead to the adoption of a launch-on-warning doctrine. While the land-based missiles are currently felt to be capable of riding out a nuclear attack, in the future they might be launched early if only a small fraction were expected to survive. This would increase the probability that nuclear war might begin by accident or miscalculation. An extreme case of the launch-on-warning doctrine that is sometimes discussed imagines a system that launches the strategic forces automatically, without human intervention, upon receipt of electronic signals from the early-warning satellites or radars, thereby placing the fate of the world at the mercy of fallible sensors, computers and communications systems.
The equating of improved counterforce with disarming first strike has been challenged. The claim is made that the redundancy of the strategic forces precludes even a theoretical ability to destroy all land-based missiles from constituting a disarming first-strike capability. Those who make this argument frequently stress that there is no technology, either currently available or foreseeable, that would significantly reduce the invulnerability of ballistic missile submarines.
Even in the event of an all-out attack, sea-based missiles and the portion of the bomber force that could avoid destruction by becoming airborne upon receipt of warning would still be able to inflict overwhelming damage on the attacker. The conclusion is that improving counterforce capability neither moves the United States nor causes the Soviet Union to perceive movement toward the ability to inflict a disarming first strike.
The argument is also made that the difficulty involved in destroying a large fraction of hardened land-based missile forces has now been realized to be much greater than was once thought. This is not just because of the possibility that much of the force may be launched before the attacking warheads arrive, the so-called empty hole problem, but applies even under the assumption that the force rides out the attack. Careful analyses of the dynamics of a heavy attack against missile silos have suggested that the dust, debris or blast waves resulting from early explosions could damage or deflect subsequently-arriving re-entry vehicles.
While there may be techniques by which these "fracticidal" effects can be minimized, they certainly impose severe requirements of timing, coordination, reliability and accuracy on the attacker. To many analysts this suggests that high-confidence destruction of an opponent's land-based missiles would face significant practical impediments. For both these reasons it is claimed that improvements in counterforce capability should not provide an incentive to launch a pre-emptive attack or to adopt a launch-on-warning doctrine.
The third argument suggests that the improvement of counterforce capability would inevitably lead to an expensive and uncontrollable arms race. Given a counterforce doctrine, it is claimed that the military services can readily generate requirements for very large numbers of warheads and highly sophisticated weapons. This is precisely what happened in the early 1960's after Secretary McNamara endorsed a damage-limiting counterforce strategy, and it was undoubtedly an important consideration in the abandonment of counterforce rhetoric. Proponents of this view also foresee that if the United States deploys highly capable counterforce weapons, the Soviet Union will respond by increasing its own arsenal.
In part this response might derive from a rising level of anxiety touched off by American activity. In part, too, American actions might reinforce the position of those in the Soviet government who favor weapons deployments for other reasons. A variant of this argument suggests that the large force requirements generated by a counterforce doctrine are likely to inhibit the negotiation of meaningful limitations or reductions of strategic forces. Not only are some of the weapons systems that might result difficult to control because of verification problems, but diversification of each side's forces would also increase the degree of asymmetry and thereby make strategic arms limitation agreements more difficult to achieve.
Improvements in counterforce capability are defended against this charge in a variety of ways. Some concede that an arms race with the Soviet Union might result from such improvements, but they are willing to accept this eventuality. They argue that the United States is wealthier and technically more advanced than the Soviet Union and can almost certainly stay ahead in such a race. The current problem, as they see it, is for the United States to keep pace with the continuing Soviet advances in strategic weapons. Others suggest that technological momentum or bureaucratic and domestic politics have much more influence on weapons decisions than do actions taken by the other side. Denying the validity of the action-reaction thesis, they maintain that the pursuit of improved counterforce capability has little bearing on the strategic arms race. Still others contend that if only minor improvements are made, limited to flexible targeting and modest counterforce capability, and if an image of restraint is projected, the arms race should not be stimulated.
The fourth argument against increasing either targeting flexibility or counterforce capability claims that nuclear warfare is simply not possible. It is asserted that no nulcear war can be fought cleanly and with few casualties. For one thing, many military targets are in or near population centers. Attacks against them would necessarily kill a large number of people. It is frequently claimed as well that the number of fatalities resulting from even a low-level attack using strategic weapons would be so large that escalation into general and strategic warfare involving urban-industrial targets would be virtually inevitable.
Those in favor of improving nuclear options respond that while it is true that many people would almost certainly be killed in any nuclear attack and that a small war might become uncontrollable, there is nothing inevitable about either escalation or large scale destruction of populations. It makes a very great difference whether the number of deaths is measured in thousands, millions, or hundreds of millions. Contingency plans can and should be designed that would discourage escalation. The type of weapons available and the manner in which they are employed are said to influence the number of fatalities and the level to which a strategic exchange would escalate.
Although some proponents of counterforce targeting favor large nuclear weapons for use against hard targets, others would prefer reliance on small clean weapons and precision accuracy in order to minimize the collateral damage resulting from any nuclear exchange. While the proximity of some military targets to cities is readily admitted. it is pointed out that many others are far from population centers. Limited or even substantial countermilitary or counterforce attacks could therefore be made without inflicting enormous numbers of casualties. Furthermore, it is suggested that the Soviet Union might initiate nuclear war by means of a limited attack. In such a case the United States should not be the one to escalate the conflict.
A fifth set of issues relates to the continuing credibility of the American nuclear umbrella. It is argued that the United States must maintain a flexible nuclear war-fighting posture that could be employed in the defense of its allies. Otherwise they might perceive a gradual weakening in the American security guarantee. European countries and Japan might then loosen their economic and political ties to the United States and seek individual accommodation with the Soviet Union – a process referred to as "Finlandization." Some even foresee the emergence of independent German and Japanese nuclear forces as an end result of this process.
The contrary argument holds that although the credibility of American security guarantees does depend on the maintenance of rough nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, the conduct of diplomacy and economic affairs tends to dominate alliance relationships.
The maintenance of tactical nuclear weapons and sizable conventional forces in the local theaters and the linkages these provide to the strategic forces are said to be much more important than particular targeting plans or levels of counterforce capability. The Allies' perceptions are relatively insensitive to the detailed structure of the American strategic forces.
A sixth argument is that the Soviet Union has or will have great targeting flexibility and counterforce capability in its own strategic forces. The Soviets now have sufficient warheads for uses other than assured destruction and their numbers will continue to grow as MIRVs are deployed. Soviet strategic writers have consistently advocated a capability to engage in and to win a strategic nuclear war. With its large missiles, its demonstrated MIRV capability and its developent of improved accuracy technology, the Soviet Union could eventually have substantial nuclear flexibility. To some American analysts, this prospect is sufficient justification for the United States to improve its strategic forces. Others argue that if the United States does not have comparable options, the deterrent against limited countervalue and counterforce attacks would be weakened.
Opponents of increasing nuclear options claim that possession by the Soviet Union of a particular capability is insufficient justification for comparable American actions. This is particularly true of improved counterforce capability since it is said to be expensive, of little value and a probable
stimulant to the Soviet-American strategic arms competition. These critics argue that the likelihood of nuclear war would be less if one side rather than both possessed broad nuclear options.
Neither the arguments usually presented in favor of nuclear options nor those against seem to us to be fully acceptable. Targeting flexibility is said to be either desirable or not; counterforce capability is said to be either essential or dangerous. But structuring the debate in these absolute terms obscures the real issues. In the world of policy making and force-structuring the important questions are what degree of targeting flexibility is desirable, how much counterforce capability is needed and what costs are acceptable for such programs. A formulation is needed that integrates the advantages of flexibility with those of restraint and which seeks to avoid the major dangers of both. It would not be a policy of absolutes but one of compromise. It would take account of both existing capabilities and aspirations to achieve meaningful arms control.
The most important argument against increasing targeting flexibility is that it would make nuclear war more acceptable and therefore more likely. Whether or not this is so is impossible to demonstrate. One's conclusions on the issue must ultimately depend on personal judgment. While we would not claim that improving targeting flexibility would have no effect on increasing the likelihood of war, we would argue that the effect is very small and easily overwhelmed by other factors, many of which are totally unrelated.
The history of warfare suggests that decisions to initiate hostilities more frequently than not derive from perceptions and misperceptions of political will. They are rarely triggered by an increase in the real or perceived flexibility of available weaponry. Particularly in the nuclear age, details of military hardware and intricate war plans are unlikely to be crucial in decisions about war and peace between major powers. The uncertainties and risks of escalation would remain so large that the existence of even great flexibility should fail to tempt political leaders into a precipitate use of nuclear weapons.
Equally important is the pervasive psychological inhibition against any use of nuclear weapons. The precedent of almost thirty years of non-use remains a formidable barrier against future use. The primary firebreak is between conventional and nuclear weapons. Although there has been no lack of warfare since 1945 in which nuclear weapons might have been used, the fact is that they have not been used. Improvements in real or perceived flexibility would not obscure the nature of this firebreak and consequently would not significantly increase the likelihood of nuclear war. In fact, by permitting a controlled response if deterrence fails, the credibility of the deterrent would be enhanced and the likelihood of nuclear war might be decreased.
The arguments concerning counterforce capability deal with a different set of issues. If either the United States or the Soviet Union ever developed a disarming first strike capability, the strategic balance would be widely perceived as unstable. Even if it became feasible just to limit damage significantly by means of a pre-emptive counterforce attack, there might be an incentive to initiate a nuclear war in time of crisis. To prevent the other side from achieving either capability, both countries would surely be prepared to increase their spending on strategic forces. As Secretary McNamara once pointed out, the damage limitation problem of one side is the assured destruction problem of the other.
Neither of these capabilities is even remotely feasible, however. As Secretary Schlesinger stated in the Annual Defense Department Report FY 1975:
"Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union now has a disarming first strike capability, nor are they in any position to acquire such a capability in the foreseeable future, since each side has large numbers of strategic offensive systems that remain untargetable by the other side."
The same is true of significant damage limitation capability. The bombers, sea- and land-based missiles that would survive even the most devastating attack would be more than sufficient to inflict overwhelming retaliatory destruction on the attacker. This follows inextricably from the inherent difficulties in destroying all three elements of the strategic forces and from the devastating nature of thermonuclear weapons. It does not even depend on the operational uncertainties that an attacker must face or the possibility that the retaliatory force might be launched on warning. There appears to be no improvement in counterforce capability, anti-submarine warfare or anything else that would permit either a disarming first strike or significant damage limitation unless force levels were drastically altered or reduced.
Even if the fixed land-based missiles are in the future perceived to be vulnerable, there would be no incentive to launch them pre-emptively. The certain knowledge that overwhelming destruction could follow such an attack would act as a deterrent despite such perceptions. Moreover, the ability to launch the Minuteman force on warning has long existed and will surely be retained.
This option and the uncertainty about whether or not it would be exercised are important aspects of the deterrent. In no way is this meant to suggest that the United States should create the sort of automatic system that critics of a launch-on-warning policy sometimes imagine. The order to launch the force should and undoubtedly will continue to be the President's responsibility. There is a big difference between maintaining an option to launch on warning and installing a doomsday machine.
The logic of the situation, however, may not prevail. Either Soviet or American political leaders may become anxious about the improved counterforce capabilities of the other side. Ideological distortion, bureaucratic arguments and the momentum, emotion and ambiguities of political relationships have in the past propelled decision makers to formulate erroneous linkages between counterforce and first strike. What needs to be stressed, therefore, are the technological and operational impediments to the achievement of a disarming first strike or damage-limiting capability. At the same time, the United States should refrain from deploying systems that could cause anxiety in the Soviet Union and continue both its research and development and its intelligence gathering in order to hedge against unforeseeable advances that might alter this reality.
The situation with respect to limited and substantial counterforce capability without significant damage-limitation objectives is very different. Both capabilities are feasible, particularly in the absence of extensive ballistic missile defense, and in large degree exist for the United States today. The number of available warheads, while still growing, is large enough and the yield/accuracy characteristics of the force are such to permit substantial counterforce targeting.
All but hard targets can be readily destroyed in large numbers and even many of these could be eliminated if they were deemed sufficiently important to divert enough warheads from other targets. The only conceivable impediment to limited counterforce, as for any other limited war option, would be a lack of contingency plans. Secretary Schlesinger has indicated that even following an expansion of nuclear options in the early 1960's, contingency plans continued to involve large numbers of weapons. This deficiency is now being corrected by the inclusion of limited responses. Improvements in counterforce capability could of course be made, but only at great expense. Since significant damage limitation is unattainable and since substantial capability exists today, such improvements would enhance military effectiveness only marginally.
That the seeking of an improved counterforce capability might prove to be a stimulant to the arms race is difficult to dispute. Although the action-reaction dynamic is certainly not the only factor influencing Soviet-American competition in strategic weapons, the historical record suggests that one side rarely attains a new capability without the other side's responding. While the argument can be made that the many Soviet strategic weapons developments now in progress demonstrate unilateral initiatives rather than reactions to American strategic programs, the motivation and justification of these developments cannot be known with certainty.
To the extent that American activity might be an influential factor in Soviet weapons decisions, its role could probably be minimized if the United States adopted a policy of restraint in its pursuit of counterforce capability and undertook a concerted effort to project a conciliatory image. Rhetoric, tone and nuance are important in this task. Similarly, the establishment and clear enunciation of limited objectives should aid in the control of domestic constituencies that otherwise could justify a large number of expensive, new weapons programs on the basis of a doctrine of extensive counterforce.
The feasibility of waging a limited nuclear war is in many ways a false issue. The question is not whether a "clean" nuclear attack is feasible and escalation inevitable, but the anticipated number of casualties and the potential for escalation that would accompany a variety of scenarios and the degree to which these would be affected by changes in the force structure. The size and diversity of the American strategic arsenal is so great that, even were it reduced substantially, the President and the national command authorities could still have a wide array of options to respond to any type of Soviet attack. Continued improvement in targeting flexibility, contingency planning, accuracy and command and control systems and the availability of low-yield warheads would permit the selection of targets to minimize either the number of casualties or the risk of escalation or both.
The credibility of American security guarantees to Western Europe and Japan depends primarily on overall political and economic relationships. We would nonetheless agree with those who claim that the strategic nuclear forces play an important role in maintaining this credibility. It is, however, the size of these forces, both in absolute terms and relative to the Soviet Union, the rate at which improvements are made and the degree of American confidence in its deterrent as displayed in domestic debate that provide meaningful indicators. Details concerning the degree of targeting flexibility or counterforce capability built into the forces are not matters of central importance. Improvements in nuclear flexibility cannot be justified, therefore, as a means of strengthening alliance relationships.
One additional issue concerns the nature of Soviet doctrine and its emphasis on nuclear war- waging as a rationale for structuring American strategic forces. It seems probable that the Soviet Union will improve its strategic flexibility to the extent that its skills and resources permit. While American strategic debates may, over the years, have had considerable impact on Soviet strategic thinking, it would be unrealistic to conclude that an inflexible American strategic force would be mirrored by the Soviet Union. The United States should therefore maintain a flexible force both to deter the exercise of Soviet strategic options and to respond appropriately if deterrence fails.
The analysis so far leads us to make four points. First, more attention should be given, both in strategic analysis and in force-planning to scenarios in which strategic nuclear war breaks out at a low level or in the escalation of a conventional war. Of all the ways that nuclear war might start, a massive attack against either population centers or land-based missiles appears least likely. Exclusive concentration on these scenarios is unwarranted. It is the problems of deterring the low-level attack and preventing escalation that demand greater investigation.
Second, the United States should provide itself with a broad but restrained set of nuclear options. Improvements in contingency planning, retargeting capabilities, and command, control and communications that would increase nuclear flexibility are relatively inexpensive and worth the cost. Particular emphasis should be placed on creating systems that would enhance the maintenance of communications with the sea-based missile forces in the event of war. Such systems should preclude the use of these forces without Presidential approval and maintain submarine invulnerability. Limited and even substantial counterforce capability including some ability to destroy hard targets exist currently and should be retained.
Third, since it is not possible to achieve an extensive counterforce capability predicated on damage-limitation objectives, improvements in this direction are unnecessary and wasteful. Major development programs leading to higher yield MIRVs and larger missiles are very expensive and would provide little in additional military capability. As the Soviet Union continues to build up its invulnerable sea-based forces, the ability to destroy a large fraction of land-based counterforce targets, including hard targets, will progressively decrease in value.
Fourth, missile accuracy beyond current capabilities is, on balance, more detrimental than beneficial. While accuracy improvements could assist in reducing collateral damage if associated with lower yield warheads, they would nevertheless be very expensive and, in all likelihood, would contribute to anxiety about the vulnerability of Soviet fixed, landbased missiles. Given the existing accuracy of American guidance systems, additional capability is not worth the psychological and economic costs.
The strategy of restrained options outlined at the end of the previous section differs substantially from official government policy as enunciated by the Secretary of Defense. Implementation is not contingent upon any new offensive weapons programs other than those needed to replace aging hardware. The emphasis is on contingency planning, targeting flexibility and more effective command and control systems. Unlike the Administration's program, the strategy of restrained options does not require accuracy improvements, higher-yield warheads and larger missiles. This distinction results in part from differing estimations of the relative advantages and disadvantages of accuracy improvements, and in part from the Administration's desire for more counterforce capability than we believe to be militarily useful. More important, however, is the Administration's concern about Soviet offensive weapons programs and the American negotiating posture at SALT.
The objective of essential equivalence is based on the desire to match Soviet counterforce capability, to maintain momentum in American weapons development, and to prevent the Soviet Union from attaining numerical superiority in all "static" measures of strategic forces (namely, numbers of delivery vehicles, numbers of deliverable warheads and total deliverable megatonnage). This strategy can be best understood by considering strategic weapons, and even the apparently conscious decision to generate a public debate about them, as elements in a complex political process in which national images are projected to adversaries, allies and other powers. With respect to the Soviet Union, strategic weapons programs can be said to demonstrate
technological pre-eminence, a determination not to relinquish the initiative on the stage of world politics, and continued American resolve in the pursuit of its various foreign policy objectives.
These programs are also intended to reduce the likelihood of confrontation and crisis by dissuading Soviet leaders from believing that their superiority in nuclear weaponry, as measured by static indicators, is exploitable diplomatically or militarily.
With respect to the allies, the continuation of strategic weapons programs and the prevention of major asymmetries in favor of the Soviet Union are expected to maintain the credibility of American security guarantees. Preventing a significant disparity in counterforce capability may be of particular relevance to the traditional NATO concerns about Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles that are targeted against Western Europe. And, with respect to the rest of the world, American strategic forces help to project an image of overwhelming power and technological sophistication. Involvement of the United States in conflicts all over the globe, particularly those in which the Soviet Union also has interests, is increasingly legitimized on the grounds that, without American restraining influence at an early stage, military escalation might lead to Soviet-American confrontation and the threat of nuclear war.
Although the United States now seems to be willing to abandon its former objective of nuclear superiority, its political leaders show no willingness to appear less than coequal with the Soviet Union. Being or appearing to be number two is evidently unacceptable.
An additional underlying premise of the Administration's strategic weapons policy is the need to gain leverage for use at SALT. There is a broad consensus within the government that the American threat to deploy the Safeguard missile defense system was largely responsible for the ultimate Soviet acceptance of an offensive weapons agreement at SALT I. A similar bargaining strategy is thought to be the most likely means of achieving a favorable outcome at SALT II. The Administration's new weapons programs are intended to lend credibility to the threat that if the Soviet Union insists on increasing the levels of its forces, greatly improving its counterforce capability or even maintaining its numerical advantages, the United States is prepared to match them. The officially expressed hope is that Soviet leaders will be persuaded that major investments in offensive weapons are futile and will agree to a policy of mutual restraint codified at SALT.
There are several dangers inherent in the Administration's approach to these problems. By publicly endorsing the need for improved counterforce capability and by initiating the development of several new strategic programs, Secretary Schlesinger is unleashing forces that will be difficult to control. The Secretary of Defense appears to believe that any of the weapons programs can be terminated if a satisfactory arms control agreement is reached with the Soviet Union. But as these programs advance, powerful domestic and bureaucratic constituencies will coalesce behind them. Not only will cancellation become very difficult, especially once they have entered the engineering development stage, but their very existence will alter the formulation of the American bargaining position at SALT. The emphasis on developing "bargaining chips", therefore, may very well result in the deployment of weapons systems that could otherwise have been avoided. Moreover, by linking American weapons development directly to Soviet behavior, the Administration is needlessly constraining future policy choices while simultaneously running the risk of building Soviet over-confidence in their ability to control American procurement decisions.
The Administration's reliance on bargaining chips as the best means of encouraging Soviet agreement at SALT can be viewed with significant skepticism as well. It is by no means clear that the threat of Safeguard deployment was essential to the success of SALT I. Different explanations are possible and plausible. The Soviet leadership may have believed that accommodation at SALT was a prerequisite for access to American technology, economic support and other advantages of detente. Moreover, the constraints on offensive weapons agreed upon at SALT I may have fallen within a pre-established range set by the Soviet leadership in their strategic force planning. One cannot know with certainty, therefore, whether the ultimate success of SALT I was predicated on the use of bargaining chips. Given the fragility of detente and the need to include different weapons, confidence in the success of this tactic for SALT II is unwarranted.
The Administration has also failed to come to grips with the long-term relationship between its weapons decisions and ultimate arms control objectives. Is the preferred outcome of SALT merely to achieve essential equivalence, is it to freeze forces at or near current levels, or is it to bring about small or even deep cuts in the strategic forces of both sides? Are SALT agreements merely intended to be a symbol of the era of detente or are they expected to contribute meaningfully to an ongoing process of improved relations? Are the benefits to be primarily political or are they also to include future financial savings? There is no public evidence that these issues have been faced inside the government or that the announced weapons programs are part of an overall long-term strategy. Whether intended or not, the Administration's approach might inhibit rather than encourage Soviet accommodation at SALT. At best it is likely to produce a patchwork agreement to stabilize forces at current or higher levels.
What alternatives are available to present policy? The answer depends on one's opinion of the bargaining chip approach, one's views of the importance of strategic forces in projecting national images, and one's preferred outcome for SALT. Based on a deep skepticism of the utility of the bargaining chip approach and with the goal of ultimately arriving at lower force levels consistent with the strategy of restrained options, two courses of action seem possible.
First, if one rejects the assertion that strategic forces play a significant role in image projection and is unconvinced of the importance of Soviet strategic superiority as measured by static criteria, one should be willing to size and structure American strategic forces almost independently of Soviet force posture. So long as Soviet activities do not jeopardize the American ability to exercise a strategy of restrained options, the United States need not respond to Soviet deployments. Such a policy could be adopted unilaterally and need not be tied to agreement at SALT.
If one agrees, however, as we do, that national images are important, that the strategic nuclear forces play a significant role in the projection of these images, and that there is some risk of Soviet attempts to exploit a situation of perceived strategic superiority, then this decoupling of American force structure from Soviet actions should be rejected. Nonetheless, we are of the opinion that since the significance of particular force postures depends on a complex web of relationships, changes in the perceptions of the strategic balance occur slowly, over a long time frame. Without risking long-term goals, therefore, the United States could undertake short-term unilateral initiatives in the hope that the Soviet Union would reciprocate. Consideration could be given, for instance, to the suspension of selected weapons programs, to the limitation of the number of full-range missile tests or to the reduction of the land-based ICBM force, each to persuade the Soviet leadership through for a specified period of time. The goal would be positive incentives to join in a reordering of political priorities and perceptions that would permit gradual and continuing strategic arms reductions. In our view this approach deserves serious attention.
Nearly five years ago in these pages McGeorge Bundy stated, "... beyond a point long since passed the escalation of the strategic nuclear race makes no sense for either the Soviet Union or the United States." While it may be hoped that this realization will one day be reflected in the actions of both powers, it is no longer unreasonable to seek American self-restraint as a means to
that end.