June 20, 1974
Page 20158
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REFORM
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, tomorrow the Senate will consider the conference report on H.R. 7130, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
That legislation, upon which we have been working for more than a year, may be the most important bill Congress will consider in this session.
This morning's edition of the Washington Post carried an editorial analyzing the impact of that bill.
Calling the budget reform bill a "remarkable accomplishment," the Post editorial pointed out that it should, particularly in the anti-impoundment title, "bring about substantial changes in legislative-executive relationships."
And, the editorial states, that:
While this bill will not automatically insure sound economic policies, it ought to reduce the likelihood of inflation by inattention, and should curb the confusion and delays which have been so damaging to the economy, to the image of Congress, and to the agencies and individuals dependent on the timely, orderly flow of federal funds.
The Post editorial has well stated what the sponsors of the budget reform bill hope that legislation will accomplish. I ask unanimous consent that the Washington Post editorial entitled, "Managing the Budget on Capitol Hill," be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
MANAGING THE BUDGET ON CAPITOL. HILL
The congressional budget control legislation now on the verge of enactment is a remarkable accomplishment. The aim – recapturing effective legislative power over the federal purse – is easy to state and endorse. But working out the mechanisms and accommodating all of the congressional committees, interests and personalities involved is something else. So there is reason for the self-congratulations now being heard on Capitol Hill. President Nixon, also deserves substantial credit, though of a backhand sort, for without his vetoes of appropriations bills and his imperious impoundment policies the Congress might never have been spurred to cause such vast and systematic changes in the way its fiscal work is done.
Under its ambitious reform, new House and Senate budget committees will be created to review each year's budget proposals as a whole and to recommend overall levels of spending revenues and public debt, and the amount of budgetary surplus or deficit which seems appropriate.
Congress would be required to adopt these tentative targets by May 15, before taking up any individual appropriation bills. In September, after all money bills had been passed, Congress would review its budgetary goals, make adjustments reflecting economic changes since the spring, and bring outlays into accord if necessary, through a final reconciliation bill before the start of each new fiscal year Oct. 1.
The system demands a great deal of congressional self-discipline. The timetables are tight. Appropriations panels will be subject to some new constraints. Authorizing committees, too, will be called on to work more expeditiously and to propose their spending programs further in advance. Nor will the legislative panels keep their current option of avoiding appropriations fights by resorting to backdoor spending, such as contract authority, or by providing automatic entitlements for benefits. All such devices are to undergo appropriations review. Finally, dallying will be discouraged. If the reforms really take hold, there should be no more of those tedious Christmas Eve snarls over foreign aid or education assistance for the fiscal year already under way.
The new system should bring substantial changes in legislative-executive relationships. For one thing, the reform act would deny Presidents the broad impoundment power which President Nixon has claimed. Under the act, the Congress would have final say on whether appropriated funds could be withheld. Either house of Congress could override an executive decision to defer spending for a particular program, while programs could be terminated or overall spending levels reduced only with the consent of both House and the Senate. Thus the chief executive would have far less leeway to ignore the legislative will – but he should also have less reason or excuse for doing so, as Congress becomes more capable of making tough budget choices itself.
In economic terms, the impact of budget reform should not be overstated. The new procedures could produce either expansionary or restrictive congressional policies – and Congress could carry out all of the prescribed studies and reviews, on time, and come up with a carefully crafted budget which turned out to be very wrong. The new act won't prevent mistakes. But it ought to reduce the likelihood of inflation by inattention, and should curb the confusion and delays which have been so damaging to the economy, to the image of Congress, and to the agencies and individuals dependent on the timely, orderly flow of federal funds.