December 14, 1973
Page 41564
NATIONAL SECURITY WIRETAPPING
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, during its consideration of the nomination of Henry A. Kissinger to be Secretary of State, the Foreign Relations Committee began an examination of wiretapping in national security areas. On September 18, the same day it recommended confirmation of Dr. Kissinger, the committee adopted by a vote of 17 to 0 a motion that the senior Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) and I put forward:
Resolved, that the Foreign Relations Committee pursuant to its oversight duties undertake a full examination of the use of electronic and other means of surveillance of American citizens in connection with alleged intelligence gathering of other activities related to foreign policy and the areas of national policy over which this Committee has legislative responsibilities, to the end that more satisfactory guidelines and opportunities for more effective congressional oversight may be developed than those set forth in the letter of the Attorney General to Senator Fulbright dated September 12, 1973.
Ten days after this motion was passed, a Subcommittee on Surveillance was created consisting of myself as chairman and Senators PELL, MCGOVERN, CASE, and JAVITS. And now working with Senator KENNEDY's Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure and Senator ERVIN's Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, the subcommittee is undertaking a full investigation into the governmental practice of employing warrantless wiretaps of Government officials, newsmen, and other American citizens in the name of "national security" interests.
This issue which we are to explore is extremely sensitive, for it centers on the question of Presidential power and the efforts made to stretch that power to new extremes. All this year – in our debates on war powers, on impoundment, on executive privilege – we have been working to restore the constitutional balance that guarantees the individual liberties of all Americans against the abuse of concentrated power by any one branch of government. Our work on the question of government surveillance without court warrant continues that pattern of congressional activity.
One matter of specific concern to me is the President's authorization in May 1969, of the wiretapping of at least 17 Government officials and journalists as a device to stop leaks of sensitive information to the press. Even though former Secretary of State William Rogers has made public his disapproval of such activities, the administration continues to defend the legality and propriety of its actions, both in the courts and in official statements.
In our investigation, we will ask the administration to clarify the purpose of these wiretaps, to explain why they were judged necessary, to tell us what purposes were served and how effectively. But beyond these instances of which we know, we must try to find out how extensive such practices are and have been, and what formal procedures exist to control both the surveillance and the dissemination of information gathered by such wiretapping, and what actual benefit such surveillance has been to our security.
The problem is composed of two parts: what circumstances, if any, can justify the suspension of the Constitution's guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure and who decides that such circumstances exist. If the decision lodges exclusively with the President, there is a grave risk that Americans are forfeiting a basic liberty to the unrestrained discretion of one man or group of men. In a government of laws, such risks must be closely circumscribed, if they are to be tolerated at all.
It is clear that new guidelines and procedures must be developed which will, on the one hand, safeguard this country's legitimate national security interests and on the other hand, uphold the constitutional rights of all American citizens. It is my fervent hope that the joint Foreign Relations-Judiciary investigation will lead to the development of these guidelines and procedures.