July 20, 1973
Page 25085
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I should like to take a few minutes to respond, if I may, and I yield myself 5 minutes for that purpose.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BIDEN). The Senator from Maine is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I have listened to the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) and the distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT). I disagree with very little they have said. They have stated the basic policy issue which is addressed by the Eagleton amendment. The Senator from Missouri was kind enough to suggest that deep down in my heart I believe he is right. That is correct. He was kind enough to suggest that deep down in my heart I would like to vote for his amendment. I would, but at the right place, at the right time, and on the right piece of legislation.
I disagree with the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, in his comment that those of us who oppose the Eagleton amendment resist the establishment of an appropriate congressional role in controlling the CIA.
In my statement I indicated earlier this morning that my concern was at least as urgent as that of the Senator from Missouri. I agree with the Senator from Missouri that this legislation was conceived in blood. But our problem is how, and when, and by what means do we bring the loose ends together in the public policy field that led us to this tragedy?
The suggestion that we can, somehow, wrap them all up in one legislative package and enact it, without any doubts of a Presidential veto or our ability to override it, is simply unrealistic.
I have sat in this body for the past 9 years and watched Senators FULBRIGHT, MCGOVERN, HATFIELD, MANSFIELD, and so many other Senators trying to get a legislative handle on the problem so that Congress could end the war, only to see effort after effort end in frustration.
Mr. President, it is a matter of tactical judgment as to whether we can load this bill with that much more and still have it "fly." Of course, it is a matter of judgment. But that should not divert us into a debate over who is for what. It is a matter of tactical judgment.
The Senator from Arkansas suggested that it is inappropriate to consider what is legislatively achievable. That is a different kind of argument from the one I heard in the Committee on Foreign Relations a couple of weeks ago in connection with the Cambodian compromise.
Everyone except the distinguished majority leader and myself voted for that one, because, they said, "This is what is achievable."
The Senator from Missouri did not vote for this compromise on the floor, and I did not vote for it on the floor, because we both thought more was achievable. That did not mean either side was purer than the other, but it did involve consideration of the tactical question of what is achievable.
I happen to think that the war powers bill in its present form is of sufficient importance to reestablish the balance between the President and Congress, so that if it becomes law we will have achieved something important. I should like to achieve that. I think that to overload it, whether by this or some other amendment, is to risk the possibility of not having that achievement.
That is my tactical judgment. It could be wrong. But that is my reason. I think it stands up. My footnote is Senator FULBRIGHT's own reasoning in connection with the Cambodian compromise – that is, to work for what was achievable, and I honor him for it. He may be right.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Maine yield?
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. In that case, we already had a veto. There was no speculation about it. We had a veto. There was little doubt in our minds that we would have another. You have not had the veto on this. I do not know whether you will or not. I cannot imagine why the President would veto this Senate bill if we passed it.
Mr. MUSKIE. May I say to the Senator from Arkansas that the distinguished Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), earlier this morning, expressed complete confidence that the President would veto it. The distinguished majority whip, the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), told me off the floor yesterday that he expected a veto.
May I say further, in response to the Senator's point, that the veto in the case of the Cambodian matter had come close to the end of the fiscal year, and we were coming closer. It was my own "gut" feeling, after 9 years, that we had painted the President into a corner and that it was worth another test. It was worth another test to see whether we could get the 18 additional votes in the House which would be necessary to reverse the override decision on the first veto. That was my judgment. The Senator disagreed. But you certainly demonstrated with your position on this issue that the tactical question of what was achievable is a legitimate one.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not deny that at all.
Mr. MUSKIE. But you denigrated it earlier, and I am trying to raise it to the proper level of serious legislative consideration.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would think the merit of the amendment of the Senator from Missouri, if it is put in, is sufficiently great to make this piece of legislation significant. It would give it a much greater chance of overriding a veto than a measure which has really no very serious effect on the President's power.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BIDEN). The 5 minutes the Senator from Maine granted himself has expired.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 additional minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 2 additional minutes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, if the President is foolish enough to veto it, then I do not know why anyone should be too disturbed about overriding it. But if the bill has strength to it, as would be given to it by the amendment of the Senator from Missouri, I would certainly be in favor of overriding a veto.
Mr. MUSKIE. So the Senator acknowledges the importance of tactical judgment which he is now adding to his argument in favor of the Eagleton amendment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I never meant to deny the tactical. It is just, in this particular situation, that you are speaking of the generality. I admit to the tactical importance of this particular situation.
This is not similar to what we had in the case of Cambodia in the way of a veto. We have not had one yet. If you have a veto and you think this is worthwhile to override the veto, we can meet the question as to whether we weaken or strengthen it, or leave out various parts of it. That has always been acceptable.
If I gave the Senator the impression that the tactical consideration of this question was not significant, then I withdraw it or I mis-spoke myself. I have for 30 years, engaged in measures which have had that as part of consideration. It is foolish to pass any legislation that we know is going nowhere unless it is an educational matter and we are trying to inform people and it is necessary that it be passed. That is done sometimes. But this is part of legislation. It has been passed. It is not that kind of legislation at all.
I did not mean to give that impression. I certainly do not mean to give the impression that the Senator from Maine is not as entitled to his judgment as I am. In debate, every now and then, it is the nature of debate that differences of opinion crop up. I do not pretend to know any more about it than the Senator from Maine. He is a very distinguished former candidate for the Presidency. That gives him an elevation and a prestige far beyond an ordinary Senator. So I would not mean to insinuate that he is not entitled to his views.
I withdraw or I modify any statement I made that reflected upon the sincerity and good faith of the Senator from Maine in taking the position he does. I was only trying, in a clumsy way, to make an argument in support of the Senator from Missouri's amendment.
Mr. MUSKIE. I think the Senator and I understand each other. I simply want the record to reflect that what separates the Senator from Missouri and the Senator from Arkansas from the Senator from New York and myself is the tactical question of whether it is wise to load this much more on the bill.
Mr. JAVITS. On the veto question, I do not think we are left in any doubt about that. The minority leader of the House read to the House on Wednesday the President's declaration, in which the President said:
I am unalterably opposed to and must veto any bill containing the dangerous and unconstitutional restrictions found in section 4(b) and 4(c) of this bill.
Those are the key sections which relate to the 120 days – as contrasted with our 30 days – and the question of a sooner enactment by the House of a concurrent resolution shortening the time.
It seems to me that the argument made by the Senator from Maine, the manager of the bill, is entirely appropriate, in view of the fact that – and Senator STENNIS' views on this are critically important – we do want to muster the maximum support for a bill the thrust of which is methodology rather than the causes of war.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. JAVITS. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was only saying that those comments were directed at the House bill, not at this bill, and at two provisions which are not in this bill and which are restrictive. So I do not see that that is relevant to the discussion of this particular bill.
Mr. JAVITS. At the very least, it indicates that the President is unalterably against some basic policy and principle which is contained in this bill, as it is in the House bill.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am bound to say that this President would be opposed to any bill with the slightest restriction on his complete freedom of action to do as ho pleases.
Mr. JAVITS. Then, we agree. That does not denigrate from the fact that we say there is a real danger of a veto.
I say this as the author of this bill, with the great aid of Senator EAGLETON, Senator STENNIS, and other Senators in the fashioning which was done in the Committee on Foreign Relations. The purpose and intent I had was to arrive at a procedure on the major question of war, and I thought if we could accomplish that, we would have leashed what the Founding Fathers called the Dogs of War. I thought that was what I was doing.
The causes of war are many. If we are going to try to follow all those things, we will be chasing lots of rabbit tracks.
I agree as to the CIA, but I think that if we try to crank it into this situation, the fundamental thrust of the bill, its fundamental impact, could be lost.
One thing on which I should like to take issue with my esteemed chairman, with whom I work so closely, is that this is a critically important bill without the CIA amendment. It is an historic break with the past. At long last, we will say how this must be done. All I say is that now, today, there is nothing the President has to look at which tells him what to do. He has freedom of action, unless we stop him, and we have to find a way to stop him that is agreeable to a majority of the Members of Congress or to two-thirds of the Members.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the pending amendment.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, it is my understanding, pursuant to the previous order, that the vote on this amendment will occur at 12 noon sharp and that a vote will occur at 12:15 p.m. on the District of Columbia Appropriations bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. EAGLETON. I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield back the remainder of my time.