June 29, 1973
Page 22317
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, like other Senators who have spoken this afternoon, I have already had the opportunity to vote on this proposal – the amendment offered by Senators FULBRIGHT and AIKEN – in the Committee on Foreign Relations. I voted against it.
I think the nature of this debate is such that we ought not to presume to lecture one another. The nature of the decision on this vote is such that the best I can hope to do – that each of us can hope to do – is to make a judgment in conscience. And it is obvious from the debate that has taken place already that I will be in disagreement with some of my distinguished colleagues on this vote.
I take the floor primarily to explain why I voted "No" this afternoon.
First, I suppose that what concerns me most of all takes me back 9 years. For almost all of that time, I have had deep regrets about a vote I cast in the Senate, a vote that helped to launch a war.
I have had no real chance to express these regrets. What we then set in motion – in passing the Tonkin Gulf resolution – became a calamity for our Nation, which we must all regret.
But what is now going on in Cambodia has never had any basis in the action taken by this body or by Congress. I have never cast a vote that could be interpreted as a vote for a war in Cambodia. All the justifications that have been made by Presidents previously for the war in Vietnam have been wiped off the books by the events and agreements that have been referred to as a cease-fire, reached last January. That ended all justification for any hostilities, even by the terms of this administration's policy, as we have been reminded by some of the quotations read into the record by the distinguished Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE).
So I was faced with a vote this afternoon, in the Foreign Relations Committee, on a so-called compromise agreement. If I voted "aye," for the first time I would be giving my approval to what is going on in Cambodia, with consequences as unpredictable, in a sense, as the consequences which flowed from that vote 9 years ago.
It may well be that all of the assurances that have been given and received by members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and by other Members of the Senate, may indicate a change in heart and in policy in the White House which will mean that August 15 will, indeed, see the end of our involvement in all of Indochina. But having been burned once, I cannot bring myself to feel sure that there will be no events in Indochina that might not lead us again to continuing our involvement.
It has been the nature of our involvement in Indochina that when we have applied pressure to slow down the war or to stop it at one point, it has erupted in another. So, however remote the possibility of a continuation of the war might be, I could not bring myself to help to open up even a small door to the continuation by giving my approval to what is going on in Cambodia.
And it would be giving way, for the first time, to what is going on now in Cambodia, by permitting the war there to continue with our express authorization. For the Fulbright-Aiken amendment would give legitimacy to whatever bombing will take place between now and August 15, however agonizing or destructive it may be, and regardless of whether it may trigger some unpredictable reaction from other powers.
This amendment gives our blessing to this war for the first time. But I could not give mine.
Second, we are told we are buying, by condoning the war for 45 more days, a commitment to end military involvement in the rest of Indochina. But what combat activities by American forces are going on in North Vietnam and South Vietnam at the present time? I am not aware of any. We have been told that was all ended in January. Since the ceasefire, the violence has taken place at the hands of the North Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese, and the Vietcong. But American military forces are not engaged at the present time in military activities in South Vietnam or North Vietnam.
So what would we buy? We would buy something we were sold in January. Unless the President has something in mind for North and South Vietnam which he has not disclosed, we are not buying anything more than we thought we were buying earlier this year.
My third consideration is a constitutional one. We have a system of government with three coequal departments. Whenever there is tension and conflict between two branches over their constitutional powers, the foundations of government are naturally going to shake.
When the President, and we in Congress, are at odds about our respective constitutional roles, should we timidly ask him to return what is ours and expect him to give it back without a fight?
It is in the nature of such tensions and such conflicts that we have to stand up and he has to stand up, until somehow something gives.
I agree with my distinguished friend, the Senator from Missouri, that we have not tried hard enough.
When we first voted for his amendment to cease hostilities in Cambodia immediately, we had no assurance what results it would produce. But we knew that it was an opportunity – for the first time in many, many years – for us to throw down the challenge at the feet of the President. And he vetoed it.
We lost the override by 35 votes. But he lost the vote; 240 House Members against only 175, voted against the President and voted to override the veto. We lacked only 35 votes, which could be gained by a change in the votes of only 18 House Members. The assumption that those votes would not change as the end of the fiscal year approached, I think, is a premature assumption. So I guess my reasons can be summed up in this way:
First, I could not bring myself to cast a vote legitimatizing our involvement in Cambodia.
Second, I do not think we are buying anything with this so-called compromise by agreeing to the August 15 date for ending the war in Cambodia, and in the rest of Indochina.
And third, I believe we should stand firm in our assertion of the constitutional responsibility of Congress.
It has been suggested this afternoon that we can vote for the Fulbright amendment, and then try to attach the Eagleton proposal to some other measure. But the vote on this amendment tonight is the end of the fight. If this proposal passes, there is no chance for the Eagleton amendment to get serious consideration on the floor of the House or the Senate.
Mr. President, I wish to conclude by referring to the proposition laid down by the distinguished Senator from Colorado (Mr. HASKELL).
We have been involved all year long in conflicts with the President on constitutional issues. I have been struggling with some of them in particular – executive privilege, impoundment – trying to find a handle that would force the conflict to a point of decision. And we have not really found the proper handle for resolving those conflicts.
Now he has an appropriate handle for resolving a critical constitutional conflict. If we agree to this false compromise, if I read the mind of the man in the White House correctly, he will interpret our action as backing down. He will conclude that he won.
All one had to do was to see the joy on the faces of some of the President's supporters this afternoon, to know that they thought they had won something for the President.
I think they have. But not with my help.