July 25, 1973
Page 25905
U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, this morning the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on "Mutual Force Reductions in Europe." We were particularly fortunate to have with us two witnesses who have had a great deal of experience with and a long-standing interest in the issue of U.S. troops levels in Europe – the distinguished majority leader, MIKE MANSFIELD, and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush.
Mr. President, for three decades, the United States has been intimately involved with the political integrity and the military security of Western Europe. In the emerging post-Vietnam era, one of the most important elements in our foreign policy will be our political, economic, and military relations with our European allies.
A key issue in those relations is the U.S. military commitment to Europe. At present, we have more than 300,000 troops and 250,000 dependents stationed on the other side of the Atlantic. This represents the largest overseas deployment of American forces today. In all, we have nine active divisions earmarked for duty in the NATO theater as well as 40 Air Force Squadrons and the 6th Fleet – to say nothing of many other elements of our overall strategic nuclear deterrent deployed at home and abroad. The cost of maintaining American forces in Europe, together with those in the United States that have NATO missions, has steadily climbed from $12 billion in fiscal 1971 to an estimated $17.7 billion in fiscal 1973. The balance-of-payments deficit resulting from military accounts in Europe is estimated at more than $1.5 billion for fiscal 1973.
A number of events have recently occurred which have significantly altered the European political and economic landscape – the Moscow and Washington summit meetings and growing East-West detente; the SALT I Agreement; the Berlin Accords; the preliminary negotiations on European Security and on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions; the entry of Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark into the Common Market; and two successive devaluations of the dollar, to name just a few. Despite these changes, the Defense Department has indicated in its military manpower report for fiscal 1974 its interest in maintaining the same military commitment in Europe that we had this past year.
Few doubt the need for a strong, credible NATO. Few doubt that the military strength of the Alliance has played an important role in bringing about the much-improved East-West situation.
But in view of our improved relations with the Soviets, in view of our own economic problems, and in view of the failure of the now-prosperous Europeans to assume a significantly larger share of the NATO burden, a number of questions have been raised about our present policies which this subcommittee intends to examine: the rationale for the continued maintenance of our present force levels in Europe; the magnitude of the expenditures – and resulting balance of payments deficit – to maintain these forces; and the prospects for reducing American forces in Europe on a mutual basis at this time.
The administration has taken the position that this country would be unwise to reduce unilaterally our military commitment in Europe, even by a token number. The administration has argued that there is nothing "immutable" about the exact number of men we have stationed in Europe, but that any unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in Europe would start "the process of unraveling the peacetime defense of the West" and "cripple" future efforts to negotiate mutual cutbacks with Warsaw Pact nations.
Nearly 2 years ago, I stated my own view in a Senate speech that "mutual force reductions in Europe represent one of the most critical and important arms control possibilities in the near future." I urged the administration "to move forthrightly" toward this goal. I continue to support efforts on the part of our Government to negotiate a mutual reduction of forces in Europe. And I look forward with great hope to the NATO –Warsaw Pact negotiations on Mutual Force Reductions in Europe which are scheduled to begin in Vienna on October 30 of this year.
On the other hand, we should all remember that the preliminary Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions sessions, begun in January 1973, took 5 months instead of the planned 5 weeks; and that the upcoming so-called Mutual Forces Reduction talks will take 1 to 2 years at a minimum, by the administration's own estimates. In the short run, we must concern ourselves with very real economic, military and political problems which might not easily be filed away while our diplomats negotiate.
U.S. forces have been stationed in Western Europe in large numbers since Congress acted in 1951 to bolster our ground forces there by four divisions in the belief that hostilities in Korea might lead to a sharply increased Soviet threat to the nations of Western Europe. Since 1951, the number of military personnel stationed in Europe has been determined by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council. This is not as it should be.
Congress has the constitutional responsibility to review and reshape our force levels and our overseas deployment when necessary. I hope that the hearings which began this morning in my subcommittee will be to important step in giving Congress the information and understanding necessary to carry out its constitutional duty with respect to our security needs in Europe.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the testimony given this morning by Senator MANSFIELD and Deputy Secretary Rush be printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS,
JULY 25, 1973
Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by thanking you for the invitation to address this Committee on the question of U.S. forces in Europe – as well as on the broader context in which we must place our consideration, the question of U.S. military forces around the world.
The United States currently has stationed on foreign soil over 500,000 military personnel. In addition, over 100,000 military personnel are afloat off foreign shores. Almost 30 % of our military forces are stationed beyond our homeland. Not since the days of the British Empire or probably more truly, the Roman Empire, have so many been required to "maintain the peace" away from their shores.
I believe it is important to view the question in the broad context of U.S. forces stationed around the world. It has been painfully evident and generally agreed in the United States Senate for at least the last several years that the United States is badly over-extended abroad.
We must not forget the lesson of the tragic war in Vietnam; for that tragedy will only be compounded if we refuse to learn and guide our actions accordingly.
The National Commitments Resolution passed overwhelmingly by the Senate was significant evidence of the prevailing sentiment in the Senate: The War Powers legislation passed overwhelmingly by both Houses of Congress is another significant step.
But these vital actions reform and refine our institutional mechanisms. They serve notice of the Congressional threshold of tolerance. They demonstrate a Congressional attitude that seeks a greater share of responsibility. But these constructive changes are not enough. We must accept the realization that our commitments and policies are not always made in formal and traditional ways. In fact, some policies seem to "just happen."
The presence of so many U.S. forces on foreign soil is such a policy. Their presence presumes a policy that heavily favors the military option. The War Powers legislation expresses Congressional dissent to that emphasis. But the fundamental difficulty in discerning semblance to America's policy abroad is that the commitment and level of U. S. forces abroad has determined our policy rather than our policy determining the level of U.S. forces abroad. The intractability of executive branch attitude on force levels abroad during the past 25 years can only be explained by the incapacity of the policymakers to perceive that the troops on foreign soil was our policy and policy-makers were really articulating after-the-fact rationalizations. Members of the Executive Branch, whether in office for two weeks, two months, two years or two decades, have had the same theme, and it is always one that the world will fall if any of our soldiers return home.
But yearning to return home shall become more compelling with each passing month. The impoundment by this Administration of $12 billion for domestic needs; the closing of many U.S. military bases as an economy measure, putting many Americans out of work; the devaluation of the dollar by more than 25% over the past two years; all will join in marshaling attention to what heretofore has been considered an issue that should be left to the "experts." I believe the arguments this year will be heard.
As I stated above, the plain fact is that the United States stations over 600,000 military forces outside the United States and its territories and possessions. We maintain over 2,000 bases and installations on foreign soil. There are over 314,000 dependents stationed overseas accompanying these forces. The Defense Department employs directly or indirectly approximately 173,000 foreign nationals at these bases overseas to support these U.S. forces abroad. These are not reasons for bringing our troops home, but they are facts that should make America listen to the reasons.
The most detailed focus can be obtained on Europe. At least in 1950 the Congress was asked to participate in that decision of sending troops to that Continent. But equally forceful questions can be raised as well to the U.S. troop commitments in Thailand – now about 45,000; or in Okinawa, about 40,000; or Korea, about 42,000; or Taiwan, about 8,000; or the Philippines, about 15,000; or Japan, about 18,000; or even Bermuda where about 1,000 men defend our national interests.
Let us look at Europe where NATO was first structured. Let us look at the realities that faced this Nation at that time which precipitated the commitment of four divisions to Europe. Let us look at the premises upon which the Congress assented to this commitment of these divisions and the representations that were made at that time about the permanence of such a commitment of manpower abroad. Then let us look at Europe and the U.S. today, 28 years after the War, 23 years after the initial stationing of these divisions to NATO.
EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II
World War II left Western Europe in ruins. The general view in the West was that the communist monolith under Stalin had the domination of the entire planet as its goal. The United States moved swiftly with the most massive reconstruction effort ever attempted with its Marshall Plan – an effort that has proven successful beyond expectations. The institutions of Europe, political, economic as well as military, were in shambles. With these weakened conditions in Europe combined with the common perception of the threat of the hordes from the East a strong military presence in Western Europe to complement the economic effort was rational. But the North Atlantic Treaty itself did not commit U.S. troops to the European continent for deterrence. In fact, the treaty itself made no commitment of U.S. ground troops to Europe. It was not until 1951 that the decision was made to send four land divisions to Europe and Congressional assent solicited to this significant commitment of troops.
The history of proceedings before the Congress are very revealing.
Secretary Marshall claimed at that time that there was nothing magical about four divisions. The full level was selected based upon a judgment of our resources and their availability. If only the same standard were to be applied today. And why should it not be applied?
But even more revealing is the exchange that Senator Hickenlooper had with Secretary Acheson when it was made clear by Secretary Acheson that the original NATO Treaty envisioned no troops stationed in Europe by the United States and that it was clear that each signatory to the NATO Treaty would unilaterally make its own determination of its contribution of military equipment, manpower and facilities. In addition, Secretary Acheson envisioned the return of troops subsequently sent if the situation got better.
But what conditions were envisioned in 1951 that initially warranted the troops to go to Europe and what thorny questions should be resolved for us to expect their return. Senator Smith of New Jersey sought this information from General Bradley in 1951 and General Bradley felt the making of a peace treaty with Germany and the state of preparedness of the other nations of Europe as well as the aggressive intentions of the East were the chief irritants that justified U.S. action.
These were all valid concerns in 1951. In addition, it was a time when the Korean War was underway; China was an active enemy; the Soviets had come of nuclear age; the South East European flank was still threatened; the economies of Western Europe were just back on their feet; political instability was prevalent in most West European countries. Strong men replaced strong institutions and provided the cohesion for Western Europe. But even then the questions were raised: Should the U.S. commit four divisions to Europe as a deterrent to another European war at least until Europe is ready to assume its own defenses.
The Congress assented to that request and the American troops returned to Europe to meet the threat that was perceived at that time. However real the threat then, has it changed since that time?
EUROPE SINCE THE '50'S
When U.S. troops were initially committed to the European continent, total GNP of all European NATO countries was $46.9 billion compared to $831.9 billion for 1972. The era of confrontation was high and the national institutions were weak. Interrelationships were virtually non-existent. Let us look at and contrast the economic exchange:
(In millions)
1951 1972
U.S. imports from U.S.S.R. $27.4 $ 95.5
U.S. exports to U.S.S.R. 0.1 546.7
U.S. imports from Eastern Europe 63.8 320.1
U.S. exports to Eastern Europe 2.8 818.2
The total exports from all NATO countries to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe in 1972 amounted to $9.89 billion. The imports from the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe to NATO countries totaled $8.67 billion. In this one area alone of trade between the blocs, the most dramatic change in climate must be recognized.
But even more significant than evaluating not only the strength of Western Europe and appreciating the strong trade flow between East and West is the great number of events since 1963 that manifest as well as significantly contribute to the lessening of tensions between East and West. I have selected eighty-two events I consider significant since 1963. They range from the hot line to the Nuclear Test Ban to the Consular Convention to the Non-proliferation Treaty to the treaty normalizing relations between Germany and Poland; to the Soviet-West German agreement on consulates; to the German treaties with Soviet Union; to the SALT treaty; the signing of the treaty on relations between East and West Germany. But to many the threat of an all-out conventional war with the hordes from the East remains the same. Rigidity affects not only the rhetoric but the policy. General Eisenhower testifying in 1951 about Congressional responsibility in the determination and the evolution of the level of U.S. troops in Europe said:
"I do think that Congress ought to see a respectable, reasonable approach, and the second they see anything to be, let's say cockeyed and crazy, to get into the thing with both feet."
Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the time has come when Congress must recognize that in the words of General Eisenhower, something is cockeyed about U.S. troops stationed abroad. President Eisenhower later recognized that change was justified. He stated in1963 that one U.S. division would be sufficient to fulfill our commitment to NATO.
It is evident from these indicia of engagement with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that the tension that existed in the early '50's has changed significantly. Further movement has been proposed between East and West. As President Nixon stated to a Joint Session of the Congress on June 1, 1972:
"By forming habits of cooperation and strengthening institutional ties in areas of peaceful enterprise, these four agreements (Moscow summit, May 1972) to which I have referred will create on both sides a steadily growing vested interest in the maintenance of good relations between our two countries.
"Expanded United States-Soviet trade will also yield advantages to both of our nations. When the two largest economies in the world start trading with each other on a much larger scale, living standards in both nations will rise and the stake which both have in peace will increase,"
It is time that the U.S. recognized the existence of its own policy toward the East. The policy of this government should be consistent, not one of engagement with the Soviet Union in trade and cultural exchange and confrontation in military matters. There should be but one barometer by which this government guides its actions toward the East.
But we have many barometers that provide such different readings for the same phenomenon.
This dual standard for rationalizing our policies vis-a-vis the Eastern bloc cannot withstand thoughtful focus. If our policy toward the East is predicated upon a desire to open markets and develop a mutual interdependency of East and West upon each other, that policy will yield benefits beyond the economic sphere as they have with increased cultural and educational exchanges. It is a natural evolution of the events of the past decade. But in the military sphere – in the NATO structure – what remains is a stale rigidity; a resort to old rationalizations from bygone years.
But the double standard is not new, even within our own Alliance. Our European allies have permitted themselves to adapt to the changing mood between East and West. Not only does France withdraw all its forces from NATO – a measure I do not propose for the U.S. to follow – but Canada reduces her military forces substantially. Other NATO nations have in recent years come far shorter of target force levels to NATO than the U.S.; in fact, the U.S. has been the most faithful burden-sharer over the history of the Alliance. Just two weeks ago, Secretary Schlesinger stated that the U.S. is doing more than its fair share in Europe. But still the U.S. cannot take the unilateral action clearly called for in the Treaty – the unilateral action heretofore clearly contemplated by all the Treaty partners. Prior consultation would be ample, but the decision would be unilateral.
The time has come for the United States to realize that tensions have eased between East and West – and that this relaxation is a healthy and desirable change.
The time has come to set aside the rhetoric of the Cold War used to justify a status quo of military involvement around the world.
The time has come to recognize action that is long overdue, and to prevent deferral of that action under a cloak of multinational negotiations that could take a decade or longer to recommend less than what is justified today.
It is time now to respond to the spirit of detente, to the success of the Marshall Plan and the current economic vitality of Europe, to respond to the realities of the '70's, to respond more fully to the needs of its own people at home.
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
So the absurdity of the U.S.-NATO posture for a long war in Europe is indicative of the staleness of thought that has accompanied the American military position in the Atlantic Alliance.
While I have no intention of going into detailed arguments of a military character, there are a few points which I believe are directly relative to our consideration of the appropriate levels of U.S. forces in Europe. The main focus of these arguments is the so-called "flexible response" theory.
This policy was advanced early in 1965 by the United States but it was only formally adopted by NATO in 1967. I certainly have no quarrel with any policy which seeks to avoid automatic resort to nuclear war. And flexible response is a policy that should provide an expanded pause period before nuclear weapons are resorted to on either side.
Unfortunately, however, "flexible response" has been interpreted as a reason to prepare for a full-scale conventional war of the World War II variety. But is it again a case of the words replacing a thoughtful policy; of reducing the choices of NATO to either an immediate nuclear war or a prolonged and exclusively conventional war. Both are extremely unlikely.
The "Economist", one of the more conservative journals on European affairs, wrote on September 16,1972:
"The heart of the matter is that most people believe that the present allied forces in Western Europe, including the present American contingent, would not be able to defend themselves for more than a week without using nuclear weapons and perhaps for no more than two or three days. Removal of half the American contingent would probably reduce that to a maximum of four days and a minimum of one unless the Russians reduce their own army proportionately or the West Europeans are able to make up the difference."
So the doctrine of flexible response is most constructive in extending the pause period before any confrontation in Europe turns into a nuclear holocaust. As the "Economist" noted, a week is the maximum pause period that any European really feels the NATO structure could undertake. This is basic realism. It is public knowledge that over 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons that are in position in Western Europe some of them reported very near the frontier. In view of this wide proliferation of nuclear warheads in Europe and some so near the frontier, it is hard for me to envision any serious conventional war scenario that doesn't go nuclear in less than two days. Our "tactical" nuclear weapons will be either "captured" or "detonated."
The "hot line" was installed in Washington and Moscow to permit wise use of the pause period. If a full-scale conventional war is the NATO strategy – then all the nuclear weapons – whether called tactical or strategic – should be removed far to the rear where there might then remain the option of not using these weapons.
It is a total inconsistency to have tactical nuclear weapons – some of them anchored into the ground near the frontier and to be preparing for a sixty-ninety day conventional war of the World War II variety in Europe.
But still it is our premise that the American forces must be structured for a long war in Europe. Supply and logistic levels of American troops in Europe are for sixty-ninety days, putting an added burden on manpower and supplies well beyond the realm of reason.
But even more significant is the European reaction to any removal of U.S. troops from the Continent. It is an accepted axiom that the Europeans would follow suit and reduce their conventional forces as well.
What is the threat, then, that requires so many U.S. forces on the Continent? If there is a truly perceived threat of a conventional war from the East, would not our European allies who are closer to the "threat" then respond by an accelerated commitment of resources? But no, they would relax as well, accept the detente, and devote more resources to non-military ventures.
Then why should we, 3,000 miles away, assume such arrogance as to perceive a greater threat to Europe than do the Europeans?
I think the question presumes a rational answer but there is none. It does highlight, however, the dominance of the military posture in Europe by the United States. Since the formation of NATO, there has never been a Supreme Allied Commander who was not an American. U.S. perceptions of the threat are tolerated by the Europeans and why not – the U.S. is footing the greatest share of the cost. Since it is really our nuclear response that the Europeans wish committed, their tolerance for our eccentricities – including the World War II conventional war contingency – is very high.
Should the unlikely contingency of a mass movement by Warsaw Pact forces take place, it is inconceivable to me that the President of the United States would not be in immediate contact with his counterpart in the Soviet Union. In any event, to pile inconsistency upon inconsistency, if the NATO military scenario calls for a defense of a massive move from the East, that move must necessarily come across the north German plains, the likely area for a swift move because of the terrain. For this conventional attack the U.S. forces are stationed in the wrong part of Germany. The U.S. forces are positioned in central and southern Germany within an enormous back-up capacity and with a consistently top-heavy command structure which still has one flag officer for roughly every 2,200 men.
It baffles me why a properly structured U.S. military force of one or at the most two lean, mobile divisions, in position to move rapidly along the German frontier, would not be even greater insurance against any form of pressure from the East.
It would be more realistic to the type of improbable attack that might conceivably come from the East. It would permit American forces to be engaged from the beginning, thus allaying any fears on the part of the Europeans that the United States would not be involved in the event of a quick thrust into Western Europe.
THE MBFR
Again and again over the years we have been told both by our own officials and those in Europe that some decrease in U.S. military presence should take place.
But the time is never right for such action. Two years ago the argument was the policy of detente was underway and that nothing should be done that would disrupt the process, including the U.S.-USSR SALT negotiations and the goals envisioned by Chancellor Brandt's "Ostpolitik."
Today we find ourselves in a new situation. Success has been achieved in the first and most important round of SALT talks; the Warsaw and Moscow treaties have been concluded; the status of Berlin has been regularized; through the exchanges of visits between President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev a new and better climate has been created which allows us to talk about the Cold War in terms of the past.
Despite this movement, we are being told that this is the "worst possible time" in which to take any action on the question of our forces in Europe. The bargaining chip is back. Negotiations on mutual force reductions are to begin on October 30th of this year.
At the outset we were told by all the experts that MBFR negotiations will be even more complicated and lengthy than the first phase of SALT. Most informed and optimistic speculations are that the outcome of such negotiations after perhaps two to three years might be a reduction of no more than 10–15 % on the part of those countries involved.
Nothing has happened in the interim since President Nixon's letter of November 22, 1971, which has given us any different picture of this argument. Indeed, since the preliminary talks – i.e., talks as to whether there should be talks – were expected to take roughly five weeks and took about five months, my skepticism has been increased rather than diminished about MBFR. I really doubt that the United States can remain immobilized on the troops question for a minimum of two and possibly even four to five years. So the argument to wait for MBFR really is a postponement of significant action indefinitely.
UNILATERAL ACTION
The questions of MBFR are immensely complicated even if they were undertaken in a bilateral framework. The positioning of forces, the proportionate reduction of one side as opposed to the other because of different logistical requirements will generate solutions equal to the number of participants at the conference. So the complexity of MBFR is magnified 19 times.
The wisdom of the North Atlantic Treaty which left the question of specific troop commitments in the NATO command to be decided unilaterally by each country is abandoned in MBFR.
Unilateral action on such a matter is the only practical method. Any nation entering into negotiations whether bilateral or multilateral only agrees in those negotiations to what she determines unilaterally she can do or must do in her own national interest. No negotiation with the Soviet Union would cause the Soviet Union to reduce any of its troops from Eastern Europe if the Soviet Union determines that those troops are needed in the Eastern European countries for other than protection against an external threat. In like manner, if the Soviet Union senses a greater need for its troops on other frontiers, or if she desires to divert a greater proportion of her resources to non-military interests, then the appropriate reductions by the USSR will be made – but only then.
So unilateral action on our part to reduce U.S. troops in Europe, while still maintaining our commitment with a more wisely structured but significantly reduced level of troops could very well stimulate a similar independently arrived at response on the part of the Soviet Union. This is not unprecedented in recent history. Unilateral and independent actions taken by the United States and the Soviet Union for moratoriums on nuclear tests in the atmosphere precipitated similar constructive independent responses on each side which ultimately led to the nuclear test ban treaty. So the arguments that unilateral action cannot lead to constructive responses are unwarranted.
Unilateral action on the part of the United States might produce surprising and constructive results. What people fail to realize is that the Soviet Union, ever since World War II, has not only been acting, but reacting, within its military establishment. Much of the Soviet force was created at a time when the United States had clear nuclear superiority. Most informed observers, here and in Western Europe, agree that the Soviet Union is considerably more conservative and suspicious than the United States because of its historical experiences and the character of its society.
Yet no one seems willing to make allowances for the inertia of this military conservatism in the USSR. We forget that the speeches by our NATO Commanders, as well as our political leaders, regarding need for NATO strength and readiness are read in quite a different light by the Soviet leadership than we intend. It seems a simple proposition, that they trust us no more than we trust them, but we do not seem to be able to absorb this view and act upon it.
THE FINANCIAL BURDEN
Mr. Chairman, I have not dwelled upon the question of budgetary drain and balance-of-payments costs of our troops stationed overseas. I have deliberately left this point to one side in considering these questions because I believe the United States will bear the necessary costs to fulfill its international obligations. Our history will show that. But I believe it is clear that the United States can fulfill its international obligations abroad with a significant reduction of U.S. forces on foreign soil.
I believe a focus on this issue can be gained at last because of the competition for resources at home. But these resources will be saved, not by trimming our sails on our international obligations but by trimming the waste from years of inattention to a rational international policy.
This Committee is well aware that the overall costs of our commitment to NATO amounts to something in the neighborhood of $17 billion, including everything except strategic forces; that the direct annual operating costs for the approximately 300,000 U.S. forces actually located in Europe amounts to approximately $4 billion; that the net balance of payments drain because of the U.S. forces in Europe is approximately $1.5 billion annually; and that these figures are growing daily because of the United States' disadvantage because of inflation, successive devaluations of the dollar and other weakening.
A return to rationality on the part of the United States and its forces abroad would yield a very significant savings in resources to the United States. I have deliberately, Mr. Chairman, not addressed myself to the issue of whether the troops that should be removed from foreign soil should be demobilized. It is my opinion that a very sound international policy for the United States could be implemented with a reduction of 50% of the over 500,000 troops stationed on foreign soil.
The return of over 250,000 military personnel would reflect the judgment that they were not needed to fulfill existing international and domestic obligations and therefore appropriate for demobilization. But I don't think that the question of demobilization has to be directly addressed at this time since I believe the pressures of obtaining a military armed force without the draft will to a great extent resolve the issue of demobilization.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest a course of action which I hope you will agree is most reasonable and desirable. I believe it is a course that provides the appropriate civilian guidance to our military leaders and gives them sufficient latitude in adjusting for themselves the specific reduction which would stem from this proposal.
I believe that we should move in the direction of a 50% reduction of our total forces stationed in all overseas territories. I believe this reduction should be accomplished within a three-year period and in a carefully structured way which would not necessarily entail the same percentage reduction in each of the three years or in any one area of the world, but would provide that not less than 25% of the total envisioned cut would take place in each of the three years. I prefer to do this on a worldwide basis because I believe the United States is overextended precisely on that basis.
Secondly, I would suggest confining the cuts to land-based units in order to permit our fleets to operate at appropriate strengths, but at the same time not excluding home ported naval units from the overall computation.
Finally, I am proposing to leave as much discretion to our military commanders as is commensurate with our foreign policy interests.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, the wasteful expression of our external power – expression well beyond any reasonable need – has begun to erode our internal freedom. The disclosures of recent months might very well be interpreted in part as the methodology of the American Empire returning home to undermine the fibre of our republic.
I believe we have talked, debated and quarreled long enough about this whole problem of U.S. foreign policy as it is implemented abroad. The time for action is long overdue and action is what I hope this Committee will recommend.
[Footnotes omitted]
TESTIMONY OF DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH, BEFORE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL, JULY 25, 1973
U.S. TROOP LEVELS IN EUROPE
Mr. Chairman: I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you the level of American forces in Western Europe. Since the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, Congress has supported the continued presence of U.S. forces in Europe. I believe that there are convincing reasons to continue that presence and to avoid unilateral cuts in our European troop strength. I should like to discuss these with you today.
Our forces in Europe serve several objectives of U.S. policy. In my remarks I will address each of these in some detail. But at the start I think it would be useful just to go over them.
First: Our European forces play an important role in deterrence. Relations between East and West in Europe have not been smooth these past 25 years. But they have not come to military conflict. It is our defensive posture and the incalculable consequences of war for an aggressor that have time and again turned us back from war in Europe and toward negotiation.
Second: U.S. forces in Europe make a significant contribution to defense. In the unlikely event of military conflict, they would pose a formidable fighting force. NATO's conventional strength – to which we make an important contribution – must be capable of meeting a Warsaw Pact attack without early use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear strength is not enough.
Third: The presence of U.S. forces plays a vital political role in our relations with Western Europe. It is the visible evidence of our commitment to NATO's security. Our Allies, confident of that commitment, are making significant strides in assuming an increasing share of the common defense burden. But if we pull our troops out prematurely, that process will be jeopardized. And the goal of a strong, united Europe, self-reliant but closely allied to the United States, may never be realized.
Finally: Of special interest to this subcommittee is the role of our forces in East-West negotiations. We have made significant progress in the past several years toward our goal of a stable and secure world at lower levels of cost and risk to the United States. SALT I, the Berlin Agreements, the Vietnam accords, new relations with China – all these are tangible evidence of progress. But much remains to be done. We are engaged in the second phase of SALT, in CSCE, in MBFR. To succeed in these negotiations, we cannot withdraw from the world. We cannot negotiate from a posture of weakness and retreat.
In my opinion, we should not consider unilateral withdrawals of our troops from Europe when we are only 90 days away from negotiations to lower these forces mutually. For the first time since the cold war began the Soviet Union has agreed to negotiate about a reduction of its forces in the heart of Europe. This is a remarkable accomplishment – almost unthinkable just a few years ago.
There are good reasons for believing that the Soviets are entering these talks with serious intent. But it is obvious that they will have no incentive to negotiate with us if we cut our own troop strength unilaterally. The essence of negotiations is that you must have something to give in order to get something you want.
The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks are an example of this rule familiar to all members of this subcommittee. Last year we reached agreement with the Soviet Union to limit offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. In that agreement we halted our ongoing ABM program, and in exchange the Soviets agreed to limit their own ABM deployments and the further deployment of their giant SS-9 missiles.
If we had followed the advice of some to give up the ABM program unilaterally or to reduce our offensive strategic programs unilaterally, I do not believe there would have been a SALT agreement last year, let alone prospects for a follow-on agreement next year.
This same natural logic applies to our forces in Europe. Unless we enter the force reduction negotiations this fall with our troop strength intact, the Soviets will have no incentive to bargain. And the process of normalization and reduced confrontation in which we have invested so heavily over the past 25 years will be placed in jeopardy.
As you well know, arms control discussions can yield not only substantial military results but a continuing political discourse of considerable value. In SALT, our candid discussions with the Soviet Union did much to dispel common misconceptions and to create a new atmosphere of greater confidence and trust. That same possibility lies before us in the mutual force reduction talks. Thus proponents of unilateral American force withdrawals would not only sacrifice the military benefits of negotiating Soviet force reductions but also the significant political benefits of such negotiations.
I have tried to determine in my own mind why there is such a strong urge at this particular time to reduce our forces unilaterally.
Part of the reason is clearly that after our long and frequently frustrating experience in Vietnam there is an understandable desire to bring our forces home. But our problems and policies in Europe are clearly different from those in Southeast Asia. The stability and prosperity made possible by our postwar commitment to Europe have taught us the wisdom of this commitment. Any reduction in our force levels must take account of this approach and not come as reflex action to our policies in some other part of the world.
The Vietnam experience is clearly not the only reason for the current disenchantment with our contribution to NATO. It seems to me that the drive to cut our forces substantially derives in large measure from some basic misconceptions about current international realities.
At the risk of over-simplification, let me briefly list what I believe to be the major misconceptions:
First, that with progress towards detente a strong defense is no longer required.
Second, that our balance of payments problems and pressing domestic needs leave us no choice except to cut our forces substantially and unilaterally.
Third, that our European allies are getting a free ride by not making a significant contribution to the common defense, and
Fourth, that our conventional forces are merely a symbolic "trip wire" and not a serious military machine, and that in any case they are unnecessary as we can rely upon a nuclear deterrent.
Let me deal with each of these in turn:
There are some who argue that in fact no military threat in Europe exists, that progress in moving towards detente removes the need for a strong defense.
The military facts of life provide no justification for this point of view. Over the past decade the Soviet Union increased its total military manpower by 30%, doubled its published military budget and vastly increased its nuclear forces.
While the United States has decreased the number of its forces in Europe over the past decade by over one-third, the Soviet Union has since 1968 increased the number of its division from 26 to 31. In recent years we have observed an increase in the number of Soviet tanks in eastern Europe, the introduction of new air defense missiles for the protection of Soviet ground forces, and an increase in nuclear-capable rocket launchers and cannon artillery. Thus the military forces posing a potential threat to NATO, rather than diminishing, have substantially increased both in quantity and quality.
If the military facts provide no justification for unilateral American withdrawals, do political realities permit such a step? We have made substantial progress in moving from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiations. Tensions in Europe have declined.
But we have made this progress not by wishful thinking about our adversaries nor by abandoning commitments to our allies. On the contrary, we have reduced tensions by demonstrating to our adversaries that our continuing strength and determination left them no alternative but to negotiate.
The progress we have made in recent years is not irreversible. In fact Europe's history gives more grounds for pessimism than optimism about the possibilities for a durable peace. Throughout a large part of modern history, Europe has been either preparing for, actually fighting, or recovering from war.
We do not believe that this periodic recurrence of war in Europe has to continue to be the case. But to change Europe's history we must understand the continuing realities of international life.
In President Nixon's words "War is caused not by the strength of one nation alone but by the weakness of one nation in relation to another. Strength and resolution are an incentive for negotiation leading to peace. Weakness and naive sentimentality are an open invitation to pressure tactics and aggression leading to war."
Some seem to believe that the western Europeans are strong enough to provide for their own defense without a significant American presence.
History refutes this contention. Twice in this century we have had to intervene militarily in western Europe to protect freedom and our own security.
It was our decision in 1949 to change course and to maintain a tangible and significant defense commitment in western Europe which has made the past quarter of a century one of Europe's most stable and prosperous eras. This stability and prosperity have been of great benefit to us as well as to the Europeans. Why should we abandon such a successful policy?
It is simply fostering a misconception to talk about our forces being in Europe for the defense of Europe alone. Our contribution to NATO must be understood for what it is: a matter of U.S. self-interest. Western Europe is the second greatest economic power in the world, linked to the United States by innumerable strategic, political, cultural and economic ties. It is American security which dictates the necessity to deter not only a full-scale Soviet attack on Western Europe but also the application of Soviet political pressures – for such pressures could give the Soviets veto power over western European cooperation with the United States.
There is another dimension as well. A primary objective of American foreign policy this year is to reinvigorate our relationship with our Allies, and to establish a framework within which we can deal with pressing problems of trade, finance and security.
We and our NATO allies have been able to forge a prosperous and dynamic world economy from the ruin of war because we worked together, not only to rebuild the world economy, but also to provide for our common security. There can be no prosperity without security just as there can be no security without a sound economy.
We cannot abandon cooperation in one sector without gravely damaging the other. It is that knowledge which has always provided the common sense bounds to our differences on any matter.
That is a reality that I hope you will take into account as you consider proposals to act unilaterally to reduce our contribution to the common defense. It would not be prudent to assume that the good will and constructive effort that our Allies have brought to the solution of our common trade and monetary problems could be quite the same if our cooperation in our common defense had been eroded by substantial unilateral troop reductions.
Let me turn now to another source of pressures for unilateral American reductions. We are all agreed that this country has a serious balance of payments problem and. pressing domestic needs.
But we have been moving vigorously on both these fronts and with considerable success.
The results of our monetary actions are beginning to take effect. We believe the currency realignments provide the basis for elimination of the long-standing U.S. deficit and restoration of international payments equilibrium.
Department of Commerce data show a drop in our balance of payments deficit from $3.8 billion for the first quarter of 1972 to $1.2 billion this year. That is a very impressive improvement.
Plainly the [sic] speed our return to equilibrium, and we can do so with economic policies which leave us with a significant military capability overseas.
There is considerable misunderstanding about the impact our troops in Europe have upon both our balance of payments and the federal budget. The result of our having 300,000 men and their dependents in Europe in FY 1972 was a payments deficit of $1.5 billion. That is, after subtracting the value of our military exports and services to western Europe from the value of our military expenditures in western Europe, there was a difference of $1.5 billion. This figure includes West German purchases of U.S. military equipment in fulfillment of the US-FRG offset agreement.
But it does not take into account this two billion dollar agreement's assistance to our payments burden in the form of substantial West German purchases of U.S. Government securities and West German rehabilitation of U.S. military facilities.
Equally important, the 1.5 billion dollar figure must be looked at in the context of our overall balance of payments. It is comparable, for example, to the $1.2 billion deficit caused by the larger number of American tourists visiting western Europe than western European tourists visiting the United States. And it was only a sixth of our total basic payments deficit of over $9 billion in 1972.
Moreover, the deficit in the military balance of payments was not a major cause of our deteriorating balance of payments situation. The major problem was the increasingly adverse balance in non-military goods and services.
And while the decline in value of the dollar increases the cost of our troops abroad, it has a more significant and favorable impact upon the competitiveness of our exports. Thus while the local costs of our troop deployments in Europe have increased, this increase is small compared to the favorable impact the new exchange rates are having on our $80 billion annual exports of goods and services. It is in this non-military area where our increasingly successful efforts to reestablish payments equilibrium must continue to be focused.
We have also been told that pressing domestic needs force us to cut our forces in Europe unilaterally. But surely this is a false choice. We always have had and always will have both domestic and national security needs. The point is that we must devote adequate resources – in a carefully balanced way – to both.
Let us look at the record. In 1968 almost one-half of the federal budget went for defense, while only a third was devoted to human resources. Today these proportions are reversed with human resources receiving half the federal budget and defense receiving less than a third.
In 1968 the defense budget was nine percent of GNP. It is now just six percent.
Surely this is not an unacceptable burden for a country with a GNP of well over one trillion dollars.
Since 1968 we have reduced the size of our armed forces from 3.5 million to 2.3 million. And in Europe over the past decade, we have reduced our armed forces by a third, from 465,000 to 300,000.
I believe that this is a remarkable record of force reduction and cost control. It certainly demonstrates our commitment to spend no more of the nation's limited resources on defense than is absolutely necessary.
Some seem to believe that by bringing our forces home from Europe we would not save money unless the forces that are returned home are demobilized. But our military establishment today is already at its lowest level in two decades and trails well behind those of the Soviet Union and China. If we demobilize large numbers of our standing forces, we cannot maintain our NATO commitments or keep our pledges under the Nixon Doctrine.
The budgetary outlay for keeping our 300,000 men in the European theater, and that includes the Mediterranean Sea, is $4.0 billion for Fiscal Year 1974. That is the cost of pay and maintenance of these men and their dependents in Europe.
However, if we consider the cost of the support facilities in the United States for these forces and the cost of their arms and equipment, the cost rises to $7.7 billion for Fiscal Year 1974. That includes the $4.0 billion figure.
Within these costs there is an incremental cost to the stationing of our forces in Europe additional to the cost of similar forces in the United States. It runs to about $400 million per year and is composed largely of such expenses as transportation.
However, if you bring these men home and maintain our NATO commitment, you will have to keep them in uniform, and provide the added transport and duplicate heavy arms in Europe so that they can be rapidly returned to fight there. In that case, the annual budget cost will actually be more than at present. Thus, those whose aim is reduced budget costs must be speaking not about unilateral reductions from Europe but rather about unilateral demobilization. This Administration rejects such an approach.
You will also have heard the figure of $17 billion. That is the cost of all the U.S. armed forces, wherever located in the world, that are committed to NATO and would be deployed in the event of hostilities. It is not the cost of our troops now in Europe, nor would this amount be saved even if we withdrew all of our forces from Europe.
In sum, I hope you will agree with me that even substantial reductions of our forces in Europe will neither save money nor resolve our balance of payments problems.
Let me turn now to the role of our allies. We are urging our partners in NATO to do more for the common defense, but we by no means carry the entire burden. While the U.S. contribution is highly significant, our allies contribute to NATO nearly 90 percent of its ground forces, 80 percent of its sea power, and 75 percent of its air power. In central Europe, the allies supply 25 of the 29 combat-ready divisions. They have over three million men in active service today – one third more than the United States has throughout the world.
Perhaps most important, our NATO partners have substantially increased their defense effort in recent years. Since 1970 they have raised their defense expenditures by 30 percent to a level of $35 billion in 1973.
Through the European Defense Improvement Program they are fulfilling their commitment to procure major new items of military equipment and to construct installations, in order to achieve a more effective conventional defense.
Our allies are also taking a number of steps to help the United States with both its military balance of payments and budgetary problems.
As I have already noted, the German Government, in addition to substantial arms purchases in the United States, has also purchased $621 million in U.S. Government medium term securities on which it pays the interest and has put $186 million into the rehabilitation of U.S. barracks in Germany, benefitting both our balance of payments and our budget costs. The total value of this offset agreement to the U.S. has been approximately $2 billion over a two-year period.
We are now negotiating another offset agreement with the Federal Republic.
In addition, and important for the long run, NATO's defense ministers last month agreed to examine the problem of finding additional multilateral means to reduce the adverse economic consequences borne by the United States as a result of its stationing forces in Europe. We consider this a major step that can reduce the balance of payments impact and the incremental budgetary burden of stationing forces abroad rather than at home.
Let me turn now to the fourth basic area of misunderstanding. Some argue that American and NATO forces are not a serious fighting force and could not withstand a Soviet assault. This is simply not true. NATO is a formidable defensive force and not just a "trip wire" as some believe.
In central Europe, for example, NATO has available roughly the same number of forces as the Warsaw Pact. And NATO is now engaged in developing a further program of specific force improvements that will ensure an adequate defense for the rest of this decade.
But NATO could be forced into a "trip wire" posture, into having to resort to nuclear weapons in a matter of days or even hours, if the United States were to unilaterally withdraw a substantial number of its forces.
This would be an extremely dangerous situation in today's world. The doctrine of "massive retaliation" became inadequate when the Soviet Union became a real nuclear power able to retaliate in kind. That is why it is surprising to hear proposals to defend western Europe by dependence upon nuclear weapons alone. This backdoor revival of the doctrine of massive retaliation coincides with the emergence of something like parity in strategic weapons systems between the United States and the Soviet Union. But nuclear parity makes massive retaliation less believable as a means of deterring all forms of aggression in Europe. The proposed return to this concept, whether it is called "massive retaliation" or "trip wire", as a substitute for NATO's agreed flexible response capability reflects one of two things: either a misunderstanding of the implications of strategic parity, or a cavalier dismissal of the possibility of less than all-out war in Europe.
Let me conclude. We are not asking the Congress to agree that we should retain the present level of our forces in Europe indefinitely. We are convinced that this is neither wise nor necessary.
But we are equally convinced that the manner in which we reduce these forces is at least as important as the reductions themselves.
We want to bring about these reductions in a way which will neither damage the Atlantic Alliance nor tempt our adversaries to return to a policy of aggressive confrontation.
As I have already noted, we are moving vigorously on three fronts:
First, in NATO we are developing a multilateral mechanism for more equitable burden-sharing and we are revising some basic defense concepts to allow for more efficient use of scarce defense resources.
Second, in this Year of Europe we are seeking to resolve the inter-related issues of trade, finance and security in a cooperative and mutually beneficial manner, and
Third, in slightly more than 90 days we will begin unprecedented negotiations with the Soviet Union and the nations of eastern Europe to mutually reduce the forces still confronting one another in the heart of Europe.
Surely this is a program worth this Congress' most serious consideration. We ask only for the time to carry it out.