September 28, 1973
Page 31939
FEDERAL ACT TO CONTROL EXPENDITURES AND ESTABLISH NATIONAL PRIORITIES – AMENDMENT NO. 539
(Ordered to be printed and referred to the Committee on Government Operations.)
BUDGET REFORM
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I am introducing today on behalf of myself, Senator BROCK, and Senator MAGNUSON, an amendment, in the form of a substitute to S. 1541, the Federal Act to Control Expenditures and Establish National Priorities, on which the Government Operations Committee will begin markup sessions next week.
This amendment is a revised version of the amendment to S. 1541 Senator BROCK and I introduced in the Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures. That amendment was defeated in subcommittee by a 5-4 vote.
The revised Muskie-Brock amendment calls for far-reaching, but workable, reforms of the system by which the Congress considers the Federal budget.
This amendment would provide for both a meaningful debate on budget priorities and for firm controls on Federal spending. It would, in fact, call for Congress to have completed all of its actions on the Federal budget before the beginning of each new fiscal year.
There is little dispute that the present congressional system of considering the budget is in need of reform.
Under the present appropriations process, Congress lacks both the staff and the information it needs to consider the budget comprehensively. Congress, to be sure, is at a disadvantage compared to the President in making budgetary decisions. It does not have its own budget staff, and it must rely on the executive branch for much of the information, the judgments, and the evaluations it needs to make fiscal decisions.
Under the present appropriations process, the Congress does not have the time it needs to consider the budget adequately. This time problem is twofold: Congress gets a late start on its budget consideration, and it cannot complete action on the budget in time to avoid forcing the executive branch to run on continuing resolutions for many months.
Under the current appropriations process, major spending decisions are fragmented. Presently, only 44 percent of the budget goes through the Appropriations Committee. And it is generally recognized that a principal cause of increased Federal spending is an ever-increasing use of backdoor spending measures which do not go through the regular appropriations process.
Mr. President, the challenge before the Congress is to solve those readily acknowledged problems with the appropriations process. S. 1541 would not do that. Rather, it is an overreaction to these admittedly serious problems which could, in the long run, complicate the process of congressional consideration of the budget even more.
First, S. 1541 would needlessly complicate the appropriations process by adding another committee. It is ironic that a budget reform aimed to do something about fragmentation of the budget process would further fragment that process by layering still another committee into the process.
The logical outcome of the creation of the Budget Committee – under S. 1541 it would be a virtual Executive Committee of the Senate – is the abolition of the Appropriations Committees. If the Budget Committee decides the priorities and reconciles spending with macroeconomic realities, the role of the Appropriations Committee would be substantially diminished and perhaps unnecessary.
Second, S. 1541 would establish by April 15 binding ceilings for all spending measures – ceilings that can only be changed by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. S. 1541 would enforce those binding ceilings by creating a hopelessly complex system of Senate rules that would tie up the Senate in its consideration of spending bills.
Those ceilings would be so binding that the Appropriations Committee would be prevented from reporting to the Senate floor an appropriations bill that it had approved if it exceeded any of the ceilings in the concurrent resolution. That means, for example, that if the Appropriations Committee after careful deliberation decided to cut $5 billion from the HEW appropriations bill, and add $4 billion to the Defense appropriations bill, the Defense bill could not be reported to the Senate floor even though the total spending for the two bills would be $1 billion less than the combined ceilings for the two bills in the concurrent resolution.
And the ceilings would be so binding that the full Senate would be prevented from passing an appropriations bill that exceeded any of the ceilings in the concurrent resolution – even if it voted to do so.
The proponents of S. 1541 argue that a simple majority of the Senate could change the ceilings in the first concurrent resolution by passing another concurrent resolution. But that would be unlikely since all concurrent resolutions must be reported by the Budget Committee.
Third, S. 1541 would require the Congress to make its most important decisions on budget priorities at the time it is least equipped to do so – at the beginning of its consideration of fiscal measures. Under S. 1541, Congress would set binding ceilings on expenditures before it has had the benefit of complete hearings on either authorization or appropriations bills. This approach would make a mockery out of the appropriations and authorization processes since all the most important decisions would be made long before either is completed. And it would effectively cut the public out of a significant role in the budgetary decision process of its government since it is through appropriations and authorization hearings that the public now gets its input.
Fourth, S. 1541 addresses neither of the critical timing problems with the current appropriations process. S. 1541 does call for the President to submit his budget to Congress by November 15, but as a practical matter, the period during which Congress would consider the budget would be the same as it is now – the period between the time it got back in January until it finished consideration. And even the proponents of S. 1541 project that under the procedure in that bill Congress would not complete action on the budget before October 30, a full 4 months after the beginning of the fiscal year. This timetable would put Congress in the ridiculous position of cementing into law the fact that it cannot complete its consideration of the budget on time – before the beginning of the fiscal year.
In contrast, the substitute amendment we are offering would make some basic reforms in the current appropriations process to give Congress a firm handle on budget consideration.
First, it would provide Congress with more time to consider the budget by shifting the beginning of the fiscal year to October 1 – a move recommended by the Comptroller General.
This would increase by a full 3 months the time Congress has to work on the budget. And in addition, our amendment would require that the action on authorization bills be completed by June 30 so that the Congress could spend the period between July 1 and September 30 working on appropriations bills.
Second, our amendment would not further fragment the appropriations process by adding another committee to it. Rather, recognizing that backdoor spending is the practice which accounts for the fragmentation of the budget process and the inability of Congress to maintain effective control over spending, our amendment would return control over backdoor spending measures to the Appropriations Committee and rename that Committee the Committee on Budget and Appropriations.
Third, our approach would require the Congress to establish initial targets for spending before it begins consideration of individual appropriations bills. In fact, under our amendment, the Congress would pass a concurrent resolution on the Budget similar to the one it would pass in S. 1541. However, our amendment would give Congress the flexibility to readjust those targets as it further considered spending measures.
Then, under our approach, after all individual appropriations measures had cleared Congress – but before the beginning of the next fiscal year – Congress would make whatever adjustments it thought necessary to reconcile its actions on individual spending measures with the initial targets set forth in the first concurrent resolution.
This approach would provide for a meaningful debate on budget priorities both at the time the first concurrent resolution was considered and, more importantly, at the end of the budgetmaking process when Congress adjusts its actions on individual spending measures.
Most importantly this procedure would allow Congress to make its final decisions on budget priorities at the end of its process of consideration of the budget rather than forcing it to make that final decision at the beginning of the process.
Mr. President, this amendment is a workable alternative to S. 1541. It would provide real and meaningful reforms of our appropriations process. And it would allow Congress to get a firm handle on Federal spending.
I ask unanimous consent that Senator BROCK'S remarks, a copy of the amendment, and a summary and explanation of the amendment be inserted in the RECORD at this point.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR BROCK
I am pleased to join with the distinguished Senator from Maine, Mr. Muskie, in offering an amendment, in the nature of a substitute, to S. 1541, a bill to control spending and upgrade priorities.
No subject before the Congress is closer to my heart than thoroughgoing reform of the Congressional budget making process. We simply must do a better job of allocating the people's money than the current haphazard system.
There is substantial agreement on that point. And yet, agreement on the details of any particular reform system has been complicated by the extremely complex nature of the subject itself, and by the plethora of new ideas and suggestions that have been brought to the fore.
The procedural system which would be established under this amendment is an effective and workable one. It is a system which can engender wide support from this body. I believe, in short, that it is a practical avenue to the early achievement of the reform we need so badly.
In addition, it corrects three principal trouble spots in S. 1541, as reported out by the budgeting and management subcommittee. First, it avoids adding another layer of committees to the budget consideration process, with the inevitable slowing of the process which that brings. Second, it does not inhibit the ability of Senators to seek the flexibility of change in spending priorities. History has shown us that when reasonable flexibility is lacking, ceilings, goals and deadlines very quickly find themselves ignored.
Third, it avoids putting Congress into the ridiculous position of writing into law the fact that it cannot complete its budget deliberations prior to the beginning of the fiscal year.
A particularly noteworthy feature of this amendment is the new control it would give the Congress over backdoor spending, by requiring these items to be processed through a new Committee on Budget and Appropriations.
In addition, the amendment changes the beginning of the fiscal year from July 1 to October 1, and establishes a budget development schedule which assures that final action on the budget will be completed prior to the start of the fiscal year, thereby ending the supplemental appropriations system which has ill-served the country, creating an administrative nightmare for local and state recipient agencies.
Throughout the budget development process there are safeguards against exceeding agreed-upon spending limits, a crucial feature, and there are also required of both the Executive and Congressional budgets, five-year spending projections on all programs. This feature is one of the most important elements of any reform, for we must have a way of knowing whether newly- sought programs are going to balloon in cost, as some have during the last decade.
Another important feature is the creation of a Congressional Office on the Budget, the professionally staffed "legislative OMB" which will give us, for the first time, the expertise and resources to do the job effectively.
In short, this amendment represents a workable system of budget reform, one that can be supported by Senators of all persuasions. I am pleased to join with Senator Muskie in offering it, and urge quick action on it.
SUMMARY AND EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED MUSKIE-BROCK AMENDMENT
The substitute amendment to be offered by Senators Muskie and Brock is designed to strengthen and to reform the Congressional budget process.
It would give Congress the firm handle it needs to control the budget process and to control Federal Spending by returning jurisdiction over all spending measures – including backdoor spending – to one committee, a Committee on Budget and Appropriations.
It would provide Congress with the resources it needs for efficient and expeditious consideration of the budget by creating a Congressional Office on the Budget and by requiring the President to submit a current services budget to Congress two months in advance of the submission of his final budget.
It would provide for a meaningful debate on budget priorities both early in each session and, more importantly, at the end of the budget decision-making process, the time when the full Senate is best informed about the spending priorities decisions it must make.
It would move the beginning of the fiscal year to October 1, to insure that Congress completes consideration of the budget prior to the beginning of each fiscal year.
Most importantly, it would insure members of Congress and Congressional Committees maximum flexibility during consideration of spending measures, and, at the same time, provide for firm spending controls on both the Congress and the Executive Branch.
And, unlike the subcommittee bill, it would do all of these things without adding another layer of committees to the budget consideration process, without unnecessarily reducing the flexibility of Congress to set spending priorities, and without putting the Congress in the ridiculous position of cementing in law the fact that it cannot complete its consideration of the budget on time – before the beginning of the fiscal year.
REVISED AUTHORITY OF THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE AND CONTROL OF BACKDOOR SPENDING
This amendment would return control over backdoor spending measures to the Appropriations Committee and rename that Committee the Committee on Budget and Appropriations.
The Joint Study Committee on the Budget presented conclusive evidence that backdoor spending is the practice which accounts for the fragmentation of the budget process and the inability of Congress to maintain effective control over spending. The record of the Appropriations Committee has, in fact, been one of cutting spending below the level recommended by the President in his budget.
At the present time, however, more than $100 billion in spending does not go through the Appropriations Committee. One of the main reasons for this is the upsurge in backdoor spending in recent years.
If the backdoor spending is again policed by the Appropriations Committee, it will be possible to control spending and set spending priorities within the regular Appropriations process.
CHANGE IN THE FISCAL YEAR
Under this amendment, the fiscal year would begin on October 1 rather than on July 1. An October 1 date would enable the Congress to adequately consider the budget, and it would enable the President to submit a budget using actual prior year figures. As Comptroller General Staats has said:
"It is clear that the Congress cannot reasonably be expected to complete appropriation action on the budget by July 1."
Moving the fiscal year to October 1 would eliminate one of the most serious budgetary problems the Congress now faces – that of having to run the country on continuing resolutions from July 1 until the appropriations process is completed. And, moving the fiscal year to October 1 would eliminate the incredible circumstance that would result from the subcommittee bill of the Congress writing into law the fact that it cannot finish consideration of the budget before the beginning of the fiscal year.
CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE ON THE BUDGET
Like the subcommittee bill, this amendment will create a Congressional Office on the Budget to give the Congress the resources it needs to consider the budget. The Congressional Office on the Budget will serve the Budget and Appropriations Committee. The Congressional Office on the Budget will be basically the same as it is in the subcommittee bill.
EXECUTIVE SUBMISSION OF THE BUDGET
This amendment would provide the Congress with additional and more timely budget information by requiring the President to submit his budget in two parts.
First, by December 1, the President would be required to submit to the Congress a current services budget. This would provide the Congress with an estimate of spending for the next fiscal year based on current spending levels. A current services budget will ordinarily be a 90 to 95 percent reflection of the final budget, and will provide the Congress basic budget information to start its own budget consideration process.
Second, the President's final budget would be submitted to Congress at the same time he does now. With the current services budget as a base, Congress will be in a better position to analyze the budget impact of policy changes by the Executive Branch as soon as the final budget is submitted.
FIRST CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET
Like the Subcommittee bill, this amendment would require enactment of the First Concurrent Resolution on the budget. This Resolution would set out the following:
1. Total budget authority and total outlays;
2. Revenue estimate;
3. Estimated surplus or debt; and
4. A breakdown of individual spending measures by budget authority contained in regular appropriation bill categories and in permanent appropriation categories (backdoor and mandatory spending measures) by functional areas.
The timetable for consideration of the First Concurrent Resolution would be somewhat different than that in the Subcommittee bill. And the First Concurrent Resolution, under this proposal, would be reported to the floor by the Budget and Appropriations Committee rather than by the Budget Committees. The Budget and Appropriations Committees would be required to report the Resolution to the Senate by June 1. By June 15, the Senate shall complete its action on the Resolution, and by July 1, final Congressional action on the First Concurrent Resolution shall have been completed.
This timetable will provide Congress with a reasonable amount of time in which to consider the First Concurrent Resolution. Congressional hearings on the budget will be well under way – and some of them perhaps completed – by the time the Budget and Appropriations Committee reports the First Concurrent Resolution to the Senate. Under the Subcommittee bill, in contrast, the Senate committees would be forced to supply their input to the budget committee by February 15, a date by which in every other year some committees have barely even organized.
AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION
All authorization legislation for the next fiscal year must be enacted prior to June 30. If action on regular authorization bills is not completed by June 30, Congress may move directly to consideration of appropriations measures in those areas where authorizing legislation has not been enacted.
CONSISTENCY IN THE FIRST CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Before action on the First Concurrent Resolution can be completed it must be consistent in that the sum of the budget authority contained in the breakdown of individual spending measures must equal the total budget authority in the Resolution. In the event that is not the case after action on all amendments is completed, the Resolution shall be recommitted to the Budget and Appropriations Committee to be made consistent. A consistent First Concurrent Resolution must then be reported within three days.
REPORT ACCOMPANYING FIRST CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
The report accompanying the First Concurrent Resolution should include the following items:
1. A comparison of the figures in the Resolution with those in the President's budget;
2. A statement of the economic objectives underlying the Resolution; and
3. Five-year projections of expenditures, revenues, surpluses and deficits.
SCOREKEEPING PROCEDURES
This amendment would add extensive scorekeeping provisions. The purpose of the scorekeeping provisions is to keep the Congress informed during its consideration of authorization and spending measures of how its actions correspond to the appropriate spending levels set forth in the First Concurrent Resolution.
The elements of the scorekeeping provisions include:
1. All reports of all committees shall include a section written in consultation with the director of the COB detailing:
a. how that bill would compare with the figures in the Concurrent Resolution; and
b. a five year projection of the impact of the bill on expenditures.
2. The COB shall prepare daily tabulations of Congressional progress on spending bills.
3. After reconciliation COB shall prepare a report detailing a five year projection of the impact of Congressional action.
REAFFIRMATION OF CONGRESSIONAL SPENDING PRIORITIES AND RECONCILIATION
By September 30, Congress shall enact a bill that reconciles the actions it has taken on individual spending measures with the appropriate levels for spending it set out in its latest Concurrent Resolution.
This process will not only allow the Congress to adjust its spending actions, but it will also permit the Congress to take a final look at its overall spending priorities and either reaffirm or adjust the priorities it established in the First or succeeding Concurrent Resolutions.
The process would work like this:
All Congressionally approved spending bills would have written into their enacting clause a provision triggering their going into effect upon the passage of the reconciliation bill.
If the sum of the individual spending measures approved by the Congress is equal to or less than the total spending ceiling in the most recently enacted Concurrent Resolution, then the Budget and Appropriations Committees would report and the Congress would enact a bill to trigger the previously approved spending measures.
If the sum of the individual spending measures approved by Congress exceeds the total spending ceiling in the most recently approved Concurrent Resolution, the Budget and Appropriations Committees would report and the Congress would enact a bill that makes the spending total in individual bills consistent with an overall spending ceiling.
That bill can raise the overall spending ceiling to equal the total of the spending in individual bills; it can contain cuts in individual bills to meet the spending ceiling in the latest Concurrent Resolution; or it can make adjustments somewhere in between. In the case that floor amendments make the reconciliation bill inconsistent, the same recommital process should be followed as during consideration of the First Concurrent Resolution. The reconciliation bill, when enacted, would automatically trigger previously approved spending bills.
A key element of this reconciliation process is that it be completed before the beginning of the fiscal year.
The reconciliation bill is reported by the Budget and Appropriations Committee which has jurisdiction under this amendment over all spending bills, including backdoor spending.
Under this procedure, the Congress would send to the President at one time all of its spending action for the year. This procedure would give the Congress a stronger hand in dealing with the President on spending matters. However, unlike an omnibus appropriations bill, this procedure would mean that individual spending measures would go to the President as separate bills. That means he could veto one spending measure without vetoing the entire budget.
But most importantly, this approach gives Congress the opportunity to deal with the problems setting budget priorities in line with economic realities at a time in which the members of Congress are best equipped to make that kind of decisions – at the end of the budget decision- making process, not at the beginning. It would parallel the construction of the President's own budget which, after all, is the sum total of a great many individual decisions. The Congressional determination of budget priorities would be what it should be – an end-product of the decision-making process – not an early stage, running, flying guess based on little specific information.