February 9, 1972
Page 3363
SENATOR MUSKIE'S PLAN
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, Crosby S. Noyes, in an excellent editorial in Tuesday's Evening Star, has described the recent actions of one of our "presidential Senators" to a tee.
I commend this interesting and well-thought out piece to the attention of my colleagues and ask that it be inserted in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
MUSKIE'S PLAN CALLS FOR A SELLOUT IN VIETNAM
(By Crosby S. Noyes)
Sen. Edmund S. Muskie of Maine has indeed staked out a position on a Vietnam settlement that goes beyond the peace plan outlined by President Nixon. He is proposing nothing less than complete surrender, the betrayal of South Vietnam and the delivery of that country's 15 million people to Communist control in the shortest possible period of time.
Muskie complains that the administration plan for peace in Vietnam is cluttered with too many conditions. His own plan is beautifully simple. It boils down to two propositions: Get the hell out and then force the Saigon government to surrender to Communist terms.
The front-running Democratic candidate for President doesn't say it quite that way. In his own words:
"First, we must set a date when we will withdraw every soldier, sailor and airman and stop all bombing and other American military activity, dependent only on an agreement for the return of our prisoners and the safety of our troops as they leave.
"Second, we must urge the government in Saigon to move toward a political accommodation with all elements of their society. Without such an accommodation the war cannot be ended, and it is clear that the American people will not support an indefinite war, either by our presence or by proxy."
The words are weaselly but the meaning is perfectly clear. After we are safely out (assuming, of course, that the Communists will buy the simple prisoner-for-pullout deal) we will then inform the leaders in Saigon that unless they settle with the Communists we will withdraw all further support.
In these circumstances, for "accommodation" read "capitulation." And for "all elements of their society" read the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the National Liberation Front which would inevitably and speedily emerge as the real and undisputed master of South Vietnam.
After all the promises that have been made to the South Vietnamese, the billions that have been spent and the thousands of lives lost, it all adds up to a beautifully simple, homespun, forthright sellout. As for Muskie, who is selling his candidacy as a man to be trusted, one wonders how much trust he inspires in, say a South Vietnamese soldier.
In some ways, in fact, the Muskie proposals are harsher than the latest demands of the Viet Cong. They at least still are calling for a political settlement that theoretically would give the South Vietnamese a chance at the polls.
If President Nguyen Van Thieu gets out, they say, and various other elements of the war are stopped, they will "immediately discuss with the Saigon administration the formation of a three-segment government of national concord with a view to organizing general elections in South Vietnam, to elect a constituent assembly, to work out a constitution and set up a definitive government in South Vietnam."
In earlier proposals the Viet Cong have defined a three-segment government as including "political, social, and religious forces in South Vietnam aspiring to peace, independence, neutrality and democracy," reserving to themselves the right to pass judgment on the extent to which individuals possess these qualities.
At best, it is not a very hopeful proposition, but it may not be entirely hopeless either. As between what the Nixon administration is proposing in the way of a political settlement and what the Viet Cong is demanding, it is at least conceivable that an accommodation could be found.
Obviously, the timing of Thieu's resignation is open to negotiation. And the differences between the Viet Cong proposal for a provisional government and the Nixon concept of an election commission "representing all political forces in South Vietnam" may not be unbridgeable. The major business of government in the interim period, after all, would be the organization of elections.
There is, therefore, some hope, however faint, in the course that the administration offers. There is none at all in what Muskie is proposing.
A government in Saigon, threatened with the withdrawal of American support, would be in no position to negotiate about anything and the Communists, for their part, would have no inducement to make the slightest concession. They could impose their terms in the certain knowledge that South Vietnam, without American support, would quickly collapse, while they can continue to count on the most massive support and supply from the Russians and Chinese.
It is incredible that Muskie, as an aspiring president of the United States, would pledge himself to deliberately engineer what his country has fought for seven bloody years to prevent. It is even more incredible that his plan for a sellout should commend itself to very many American voters. If a candidate can sell himself on this kind of platform, the country and the world are indeed in a sorry condition.