September 14, 1972
Page 30712
THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, on August 11, 1972, President Thieu told an audience in Quinhon, South Vietnam, that–
(O)ur Government has allowed us to enjoy too much democracy too soon.
Eleven days later, the Saigon regime addressed itself to the problem of "too much democracy" by issuing an executive decree abolishing popular election of officials in South Vietnam's 10,775 hamlets. Henceforth those officials will be appointed by province chiefs who in turn are appointed by General Thieu.
The man whose claim to the presidency of South Vietnam rests on a rigged, one-man election has extended the tentacles of totalitarian rule into every corner of his beleaguered land.
What justification has been put forward for this brazen move to strip the South Vietnamese people of their right to vote? The Saigon regime has apparently offered none. Instead, the Department of State undertook to explain away the decree as a temporary expedient occasioned by the North Vietnamese offensive. This was the position taken by State Department spokesman Charles Bray on behalf of the United States in a September 7, 1972 news conference.
Mr. President, every tyrant invokes the doctrine of necessity to justify his repressive actions. I do not think the State Department is so naive as to believe the decree is temporary – particularly in the light of published reports that it received intelligence dispatches indicating that prior to the North Vietnamese offensive Thieu planned to abolish hamlet elections.
Mr. President, the abolition of hamlet elections coupled with other recent events including Thieu's efforts to emasculate the National Assembly and rule by decree, Thieu's arrest and persecution of his non-Communist opponents, and Thieu's muzzling of the press, present us
with a clear and stark choice: will we help the people of South Vietnam achieve a measure of freedom and self-determination, or will we aid and abet a military dictator in his efforts to demolish even the rudiments of self-government?
The administration has again chosen to back its client in direct contravention of our stated policy and its only justification for the war: self-determination for the people of South Vietnam. When we thus align ourselves with the petty tyrants of the world, we subvert our own purposes – and our own best ideals. We deflate the hopes of hundreds of millions of human beings who yearn to be free and live in peace.
We cannot sit idly by while a regime we put in power destroys the liberties we say we are trying to safeguard. For that reason, I and 11 of my colleagues have today written the President to express our concern and urge that the United States use all available leverage to rescind the decree of August 22. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of our letter, a portion of the transcript of Mr. Bray's news conference, and several news stories be printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
SEPTEMBER 14, 1972.
THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR Mr. PRESIDENT: We write to express our concern about the Executive Decree issued by the Saigon regime on August 22, 1972. That Decree abolishes popular elections of local officials in South Vietnam's 10,775 hamlets and provides that henceforth such officials shall be appointed by province chiefs who are in turn appointed by President Thieu.
The Decree represents yet another illicit step toward consolidation of power in complete disregard of the popular will. The abolition of hamlet elections, coupled with other recent Thieu actions such as the rigged Presidential election of 1971, press censorship, political arrests and rule by decree, make it clear that the longer we fight to preserve the difference between a "free" South Vietnam and a "totalitarian" North Vietnam, the less of a difference there is to preserve. In its repression of peaceful dissent, its aversion to popular self-government, its expansion of military influences into all aspects of civilian life, the Thieu regime continues to obstruct the legitimate aspirations of the South Vietnamese people.
We reject the position of the Department of State, as expressed by Mr. Bray on September 7, 1972, that the abolition of hamlet elections is an internal matter for which the United States bears no responsibility. The stated purpose of our involvement in South Vietnam is to protect the right of self-determination for the people of that nation. Because Mr. Thieu's Decree frustrates that purpose, it is not an "internal matter" which the United States can ignore.
Rather than denouncing Mr. Thieu's flagrant usurpation of individual liberties, the Department of State has attempted to explain away the Decree as a temporary expedient occasioned by the North Vietnamese offensive. By thus acting as an apologist for the repressive acts of a totalitarian regime, the United States turns its back on its own ideals and further degrades itself in the eyes of world opinion.
U.S. support for the totalitarian actions of the Thieu regime points up the tragic irony of our Vietnam policy: both the Hanoi regime and the Saigon government are acting in derogation of the South Vietnamese people's right to govern themselves, yet we bomb the one and subsidize the other.
For all of these reasons we urge you to issue a public statement disapproving the Decree abolishing hamlet elections and to use all available leverage to rescind the Decree.
With best wishes, Sincerely,
Adlai E. Stevenson III, Birch Bayh, Daniel K. Inouye, Frank Church, Philip A. Hart, Harold E. Hughes, Alan Cranston, John V. Tunney, Edmund S. Muskie, Stuart Symington, Claiborne Pell, Frank E. Moss.
EXCERPT FROM NEWS CONFERENCE OF CHARLES BRAY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
SEPTEMBER 7, 1972
Q. Charles, there's a report in the Times this morning from Saigon which states that the South Vietnamese Government has dispensed entirely with the process of elections at the hamlet level in a general elimination of elections in the South Vietnamese system. Does this accord with the United States viewpoint concerning the development of self-determination in South Vietnam?
A. Well, this decision was taken entirely by the Vietnamese Government. As I understand it, hamlet elections are not specifically provided for in the Constitution, although those at the village level and province level are and, as I understand it, are not affected here.
I suppose one must assume that the North Vietnamese offensive was a major factor in the decision taken. The North Vietnamese are using not only what I suppose you would call conventional military forces but the whole range of unconventional warfare, as the story itself noted. And I assume that, in view of this present danger, the South Vietnamese have felt constrained to do what they could to provide stability at the extreme local level in the country.
It may be, as we hope it would, that when the situation is somewhat more normal than it has been in recent months the restrictions adopted in this emergency could be relaxed.
I don't know what more I can say, Murray.
Q. You could say one more thing if you care to. Did this Government have advance notice of this?
A. No, we were not consulted.
Q. Informed?
A. I don't think so, but I can't tell you off the top of my head, Tad.
Q. Well, I believe you said that there was no change in the elections at the village and province level. I believe the story does say there was a change in the election procedures at the village level, that the order also has eliminated many of the elected officials at the village level which the United States often has taken pride in as an element of democracy in South Vietnamese life.
A. I don't know that we can flog this usefully, Murray. As I said, "as I understand it at this time," and that's as I understand it. I think it has to be acknowledged that South Vietnamese society has been under extreme pressure in recent months.
Q. Well, there is one question which remains, at least in my mind. Ambassador Porter in Paris today, I understand, informed the North Vietnamese that they have already lost the offensive. If this is the case, why, in your judgment–
A. Oh, I'm sorry, I'm not going to parse that one.
Q. But, Charlie, if you are explaining it in terms of this extreme pressure, how do you reconcile the official judgments that come out, such as Tad just alluded to today, suggesting that the communist offensive has sort of sputtered out.
A. It has not been successful. That is not to say that there do not remain extreme pressures within South Viet Nam on the social, political, military infrastructure. I think that the judgment that Ambassador Porter was making in Paris was that the North Vietnamese objective has not been reached. I think that is a matter of fact.
Q. In what way does the abandonment of hamlet elections help to achieve the American objectives?
A. I am just not going to parse this any further.
Q. Another subject?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Excuse me, before we go on to the other subject, you said, Charlie, that this decision was taken entirely by the South Vietnamese Government. Are we to deduce from that, then, that there is no American influence being exerted in terms of what has happened or what is likely to happen in terms of internal politics in South Vietnam?
A. No comment, Ted. I must say, you know, that I get a bit impatient with the focus of criticism on the South for measures they are taking in the wake of this offensive and the absence of any comparative analysis of institutions in the North. That's all I have to say about it.
Q. We are not supporting the North, are we? Is there any effort by the Ambassador in Saigon to obtain a clarification from that Government?
A. I've just said all I am going to say on the subject, Ted.
Q. Charles, just to clarify a question, Murray's question was whether this step was in accord with the U.S. viewpoint. Now, you have given what you understand to be the rationale.
A. And I said at the close of that that we obviously hoped that when the situation stabilized itself, etc.
Q. So that the steps are not as permanent a thing in accord with the U.S. aims? I'm trying to clarify it.
A. Yes. I'll go on with the next subject.
[From the New York Times, Sept. 7, 19721
SAIGON DECREES END OF ELECTIONS ON HAMLET LEVEL
(By Craig R. Whitney)
SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, Sept. 6.– The South Vietnamese Government, by executive decree, has abolished popular democratic election of officials at the most basic level in the country's 10,775 hamlets.
Under the new system, which is going into effect now and will be complete within two months, nearly all the country's administrative officials – from the province chiefs down to the hamlet level – will be appointed.
The decree ends six years of popular election at the grass roots level of the hamlets. It was issued, without publicity, on Aug. 22 by Premier Tran Thien Khiem. It orders the 44 province chiefs, who are military men appointed by President Nguyen Van Thieu, to reorganize local government and appoint all hamlet officials and finish the job in two months.
AIDES TO BE APPOINTED
The new system calls for either two or three officials in each hamlet, depending on its population. They are the average Vietnamese citizens' closest contact with his government – the men he complains to, goes to when he needs help, or hears from when the Government wants to enforce its laws.
At the next highest level, the village – villages in Vietnam are administrative groupings of hamlets, not villages in the American or European sense of the word – village chiefs and their staffs have been elected by provision of the South Vietnamese Constitution. But now, according to the Premier's decree, their deputies and staffs will no longer be elected. They, too, will be appointed by the province chiefs.
In the space of a few months – since President Thieu began ruling by decree in June – he has centralized power in his hands and through men appointed by him to a degree unknown in Vietnam since the Americans came here in strength in the nineteen-sixties and gave South Vietnam the forms of democratic government and popular elections.
Since 1967, the country has been governed by an elected President and a two-chamber legislature. President Thieu, who ran alone last Oct. 3 and won 94.3 per cent of the vote for his second term, controls a majority of the legislators in both houses but has been ruling by decree since June 27. On that night he wrested from the Senate authority to govern by fiat for six months in the fields of security, defense, economy and finance.
But it is clear, from this latest decree as well as from earlier ones by President Thieu that placed restrictions on the South Vietnamese press and stiffened the penalties for common crimes and for dereliction of duty, that the forms of democratic government are being weakened at a time when the United States is pulling troops out and, correspondingly, losing influence here.
SPEECHES NOT TRANSLATED
President Thieu has been saying as much in recent speeches, which his Government has not been translating into English or disseminating to the foreign press.
For example, on Aug. 11, in a speech in Quinhon, capital of Binhdinh Province which the United States Government monitored and then translated into English he said:
"I have never denied independence and democracy. As President of South Vietnam I have always observed democracy. However, if I [may speak as] a citizen, I must complain that our Government has allowed us to enjoy too much democracy too soon. This is like – if you will excuse me for my comparison – a small baby that is given an overdose of medicine or like a weak person who takes up physical exercise so that his health cannot endure.
"I have always respected the people's democratic rights and freedoms as basically outlined in our Constitution. However, these rights and freedoms must be properly practiced, such as simultaneously respecting the Constitution and responding to the demands of our nation."
"WE ARE TOO COMPLACENT"
"The Communists try to infiltrate our anti-Communist political parties, which are strong and which they cannot topple," Mr. Thieu said. "The Communists try to infiltrate our anti- Communist religions and our political parties. The Communists are now spending money buying newsmen, publishing newspapers and taking advantage of the disorderly and broad democracy and freedom in the south. When an election is held, the Communists try to benefit from it."
In a key passage he told his audience "Our political parties are still in small number and are not united; second, we are too complacent and are often disunited, and third, the most important is our disorderly democracy. Our democracy presents many gaps."
Mr. Thieu has often cited the extraordinary situation created by the Communist offensive, which began at the end of last March, as justification for restrictive measures. But the move to abolish election of hamlet officials and centralize total administration under the appointed province chiefs was in preparation even before the offensive.
An American Government interpretation of the Premier's decree says, for example, "These changes have been in the wind for the past several months" and were noted by the Americans in reports of Feb. 28 and March 7.
It says, of the effect of the decree on the only local officials who will continue to be elected, "The village chief, though still elected, will be in a much less commanding position since the officials who work under him will now be appointed by the province chief."
The province chiefs appointed by the President are military men – usually colonels – who owe their jobs to Mr. Thieu's patronage and are personally loyal to him. Often they do not even come from the provinces they serve. Last year Mr. Thieu said he intended to gradually put into effect the popular election of province chiefs beginning in 1972 but this has not happened.
"GUIDELINES" ALSO ISSUED
Along with the Decree, Premier Khiem also issued to the country's province chiefs "general guidelines for the explanation and implementation" of it. It says, in the American Government's translation, "In sum, the administration in villages and hamlets is advanced but not quite adequate, and it does not satisfy the needs of the nation in the present phase of the struggle against the Communists."
"You must use your authority as fixed in Articles 3 and 6 of the new decree to screen the ranks of village and hamlet officials including hamlet chiefs because now they will be appointed by you. You must release those who are unqualified, negative, or who have bad behavior."
ELECTION OF OFFICIALS AT THE HAMLET LEVEL
"In choosing which village officials and hamlet chiefs to keep," the Premier's explanation says, "you have to consider his anti-Communist achievements, services and training courses in national or local training centers.
"Especially to cope with the present situation if localities don't have enough personnel and there are no civilian candidates after the screening, I will approve the use of popular forces, regional forces (militia) including lieutenant officers, in the village and hamlet administration."
The changes in the village administrations – there are 2,130 villages in South Vietnam – limit the number of officials per village to a maximum of eight, including the elected village chief.
The decree also provides that, where there is a police station in a village, the police chief will assume the function of the formerly elected deputy village chief for security, an important post because it includes such powers as determining who in the village may be a Communist sympathizer or a member of the Vietcong.
The Premier drew on Article 70 of the Constitution for his authority to issue the new decree. It provide that "the organization and regulation of local administration shall be prescribed by law."
Premier Khiem's explanation to his province chiefs says that, since the promulgation of such a law was still pending, a draft having been sent to the National Assembly, he was now issuing a decree superseding the one in 1966, which established the election of hamlet and village officers.
The Premier's measure goes beyond instructions that President Thieu issued to the province chiefs a few weeks ago. Then he told them that they could replace elected village and hamlet chiefs at their discretion.
The reason, according to American officials, was the discovery during the offensive this year that many locally elected hamlet chiefs were in fact Communists, who voluntarily provided valuable assistance to enemy forces.
[From the Washington Post, Sept. 8, 1972]
UNITED STATES ADMITS END OF VIET HAMLET VOTE
(By Stanley Karnow)
The Nixon administration has confirmed with apparent embarrassment that South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu has abolished the electoral process in his country's more than 10,000 rural hamlets.
Reacting to the Thieu decision, which effectively ends six years of democratic activity in South Vietnam's lowest administrative levels, U.S. Department spokesman Charles W. Bray III said yesterday that the United States was not consulted in advance about the move. He added that the U.S. government is "not responsible for the internal affairs" of foreign states.
But another U.S. official, who declined to be identified, described the degree as "a step backward in terms of representative institutions" in South Vietnam.
The Saigon government's decision, which was issued without publicity by Premier Tran Thien Khiem on Aug. 22 and revealed yesterday by The New York Times, seemed to rebut assertions by Thieu that he has "always observed democracy."
The move also dealt a blow to contentions that the Thieu regime is encouraging "self-determination" while the Communists threaten totalitarian rule.
Bray speculated at his press briefing yesterday that the North Vietnamese offensive against the south was "a major factor in prompting Thieu to put an end to hamlet elections."
"The North Vietnamese are using a whole range of unconventional warfare;" Bray said. "I assume that in view of this present danger, the South Vietnamese felt constrained to do what they could to provide stability at the extreme local level of the country."
Bray expressed the hope that "the restrictions adopted in this emergency could be relaxed" when the situation in South Vietnam is "somewhat more normal."
Other U.S. sources voiced the belief that Thieu may have made his move because he anticipates the possibility of a cease-fire and is "trying to put himself in a better position."
While acknowledging that the decree would tarnish Thieu's public image internationally, one of these sources suggested that conditions on the ground inside Vietnam would probably not change.
The source explained that hamlet chiefs in areas under Saigon government control have tended to be elected if they enjoy the favor of senior province officials rather than on the basis of popular choice.
Under the new system which is going into effect, nearly all of South Vietnam's administrative officials will be appointed. The decree orders the country's 44 province chiefs, all of whom are officers responsible directly to Thieu, to reorganize local government and appoint hamlet officials.
Elections will no longer take place in villages, which are groupings of hamlets. Village chiefs were formerly elected but, like their counterparts at the hamlet level, they will henceforth be appointed by province chiefs.
Thieu, who won re-election in October in an uncontested election, has been ruling by decree since June 27. Within recent months, he has been tightening restrictions on press freedoms.
During the past few weeks, while denying that he is seeking to stiffen his rule, Thieu has explained that South Vietnam cannot afford an excess of democracy. In a speech delivered on Aug. 11 in the Binhdinh province capital of Quinhon, for example, he said:
"I must complain that our government has allowed us to enjoy too much democracy too soon. This is like ... a small baby that is given an overdose of medicine or like a weak person who takes up physical exercise so that his health cannot endure."
Thieu went on to argue that the Communists were infiltrating South Vietnamese political parties, religious groups and newspapers. "When an election is held," he added, "the Communists try to benefit from it."
[From the New York Times, Sept. 8, 1972]
VIETNAMIZING DEMOCRACY
The abolition of popular elections in South Vietnam's 10,775 hamlets by the stroke of an executive order from Saigon once again underscores the futility of the war and the fatuousness – in today's context – of professed American war aims. The blood of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese and American soldiers and the suffering of millions of civilians has been rationalized by lofty commitments to assure for the South Vietnamese people the right to democratic self- government. In explaining his war policy, President Nixon has insisted that when the United States leaves Vietnam, it must be "in a way that gives the South Vietnamese a reasonable chance to survive as a free people."
The immediate result of the new decree is that President Thieu will determine who is to be in charge of local government, from province chiefs to the officials of the smallest village. The extraordinary lesson in democracy thus continues. President Thieu, having demonstrated that it takes only one candidate to stage a democratic election, has more recently indicated through stringent rules controlling the press that in his version of democracy the right to know is as unnecessary as free political choice – in Saigon no less than in Hanoi.
If the experiment in popular government without the ballot works out to Mr. Thieu's satisfaction in the local communities, he will undoubtedly "recommend" it for the national level as well, further emulating the democracy to the North. The fact that the abolition of local elections in the South is to be accompanied within two months indicates that Vietnamization is working more smoothly in politics than in defense.