February 9, 1972
Page 3366
VIETNAM
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, in this week's Newsweek magazine, Stewart Alsop writes about what he refers to as "the real issue" in Vietnam. I commend it to my colleagues for their consideration and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in today's RECORD.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
VIETNAM: THE REAL ISSUE
(By Stewart Alsop)
WASHINGTON.– It is now entirely clear that Vietnam will be a major issue in this presidential election year, despite the fact that all Americans are tired unto death of the very name of the place.
The real, underlying shape of the issue is emerging, moreover, from under a cloud bank of rhetoric and political semantics. Sen. Edmund Muskie's speech on Feb, 2, unveiling his "peace plan" for Vietnam, and the Administration's fierce response to the speech, make it certain that the basic issue will be fought out, eyeball to eyeball, between the President and the Democratic front runner.
The underlying issue is this: given the fact that the Russians and the Chinese are providing the North Vietnamese with plentiful logistic and economic support, should the United States force the South Vietnamese into a settlement acceptable to Hanoi, using the threat to cut off American logistic and economic support as the chief instrument to that end?
Senator Muskie's reply to that question is, in effect, "yes" – although he would doubtless word the question differently. His position, as summarized by The New York Times, is that this country must "make it clear to South Vietnam's government that it must seek a political accommodation with the Communists or lose even indirect United States military support after American forces withdraw."
PRESSURE ON SAIGON
Senator Muskie, reached by telephone by this reporter, was asked whether this formula did not mean that we should put pressure on Saigon to accept a Communist-front government. The suggestion seemed to irritate him. He simply wished to indicate to Saigon, he said, that the American public would not go on paying for "an indefinite supply line for an indefinite war." He did not want to "impose a political settlement or draw a blueprint ... of course, if they want to go on fighting, they can do so with their own resources."
But wasn't it obvious that the South Vietnamese could not defend South Vietnam "with their own resources"? Those tanks and long-range guns the North Vietnamese were using weren't made in North Vietnam, after all.
Again, Muskie seemed annoyed. "Look, all I say is that Saigon has to be made aware of the political reality of American public opinion today. You should hear the applause, from any audience, conservative or liberal, when I say just one line: 'We must get out of the war.’”
Muskie's one line is certainly popular, and President Nixon, who is not a fool, is aware that this is so. He is also aware that any reasonably honorable settlement of the war would make his own re-election almost inevitable. Moreover, the difference between what he has already offered the North Vietnamese and what Senator Muskie would offer them is – except in the one vital respect – largely semantic.
SURPRISE
This reporter read to Senator Muskie Henry Kissinger's description of the offer made to the Communist side last spring: "On May 31, we proposed ... to set a deadline for the withdrawal of American forces in return for a cease fire and the exchange of prisoners." The senator had apparently never heard of the May offer, and he was clearly surprised. "Then what are they knocking me for?" he asked. "That's just about what I proposed."
The senator is being knocked for the one difference between his position and the President's which is decidedly not semantic – the issue of continued logistic support for the South Vietnamese. It was because of this issue that the North Vietnamese flatly rejected the May 31 offer. The offer, they said, lacked "political elements." The chief "political element" asked by the Communist side was defined by Henry Kissinger:
"They [the Communists] have asked us to withdraw all equipment, all future military aid, all future economic aid, and the practical consequence of that proposal, while they are receiving close to $1 billion worth of foreign aid, would be the indirect overthrow of the government of South Vietnam, something about which there can be no question."
No question, at least, in Mr. Nixon's mind. The President instructed Kissinger to refuse even to discuss this "indirect overthrow," and it was on this issue that the talks finally broke down. There was a time, between Oct. 25 and Nov. 17, when the President, Kissinger and the handful of officials who knew about the secret talks had high hopes that they would succeed.
At a secret meeting on Sept. 13, the Communist side, instead of insisting on the formula for "indirect overthrow" of the South Vietnamese Government, promised to be "forthcoming" if the United States was "generous" on two points. They wanted assurances that the American withdrawal would be "total," with no residual force; and that the Saigon government would not be in office in case of an agreed election. An American message in early October met both points – there would be no residual force, and Thieu would resign before an election. On Oct. 25 a courteous message from the Communist side proposed a meeting on Nov. 20. Then, on Nov. 17, came the brush-off: "special adviser Le Duc Tho is suddenly taken ill."
What happened between Oct. 25 and Tho's diplomatic illness? The answer seems obvious. On Oct. 28, the Senate very nearly passed the Cooper-Church amendment, which would surely have caused the "indirect overthrow" of the South Vietnamese Government. On Oct. 29, in the most irresponsible vote in modern times, the Senate voted to cut off all foreign aid.
HANDING IT TO HANOI
No one can prove it, of course, but it is an article of faith in the White House that these votes queered the negotiations. If the Senate was ready to hand to Hanoi what Nixon and Kissinger had refused to discuss, why negotiate further? Why not, instead, mount an offensive to make the pressure on Nixon intolerable, as the first Tet offensive had made the pressure on Lyndon Johnson intolerable?
Another offensive is now in prospect, and it may strengthen Senator Muskie's hand. The senator is an honorable man, and he may well be right, moreover, about "the political reality of American public opinion today."
And yet, are we Americans really ready to force a "political accommodation with the Communists" – for which read a Communist-front government – on a small ally, by threatening to cut off that ally's means of defending itself?
Perhaps we are. Perhaps South Vietnam will fall to the Communists anyway, because the South Vietnamese lack the will to defend themselves. But for this country to deny them to means, thus forcing a Communist regime on them, would be an act of crass betrayal, the crowning tragedy of a tragic war, and a long farewell to all our greatness.