July 27, 1972
Page 25696
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, while we are discussing the Trident, it is essential to bear in mind the impact that this particular weapon system can have on arms control, particularly on the most recent Moscow Agreements. Article III of the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms commits both parties, the United States and the Soviet Union, to limit SLBM launchers and modern ballistic submarines to the numbers operational and under construction. A ceiling has been placed on the numbers of ballistic missile launchers permitted under the Protocol of the Interim Agreement. Admittedly, article III and article IV of the Agreement provide for modernization and replacement, but that does not mean going full steam ahead with a new weapon program that could not possibly be even initially deployed before 1977, the year in which the Interim Agreement is scheduled to expire, unless it is replaced by another formal or informal agreement. And the parties are committed in article VII to continue active negotiations for further limitations during this time period so there is a real likelihood that ceilings and qualitative controls may be worked out in upcoming SALT negotiations.
Why, then, should we accelerate the development of the Trident? By so doing, we seem to be endorsing the ultimate of skepticism that further arms control talks will not succeed; that our present Polaris/Poseidon conversion program which is not scheduled for completion before 1976 will not be sufficient, and that the Soviet Union will be doing all it can to work against the spirit of the Interim Agreement.
The amendment we are discussing today takes full account of the necessity to prepare for every eventuality and to provide an ongoing defense program to meet the modernization and replacement requirements of our Armed Forces. It opts for the prudent approach which assures this Nation that its defense requirements will be met and transmits to the Russians our intentions of remaining alert and fit, should the interim agreement be abrogated for any particular reason or should our two governments fail to come up with an agreement on SLBM's before the expiration of the present agreement.
And most important, it demonstrates to the Soviet Union that the United States is pursuing only an R. & D program for the Trident in keeping with its replacement needs and in keeping with its commitment to put a halt to the nuclear arms race. The door remains open if the Congress accepts this amendment; otherwise, I fear we will have to face with chagrin the feeling we have had in the past with MIRV and ABM, the feeling that we have been down this path before and it has led us nowhere except to a spiraling costly arms race.
It is my firm belief that the administration's request for an accelerated Trident program is, if anything, a bargaining chip on our shoulder, and an invitation to the Soviet Union to grease up their nuclear machinery for some more heavy production.
I think it is most regrettable that the administration has chosen to make this request at a time when we are about to consider the SALT agreements. The attempts to link the Trident and other weapons programs to the fulfillment of these agreements is, I think, most unfortunate. In fact, I personally would have preferred to consider the agreements first in this body so that Senators and Representatives would not be subjected to pressures which they would not otherwise face in their consideration of the defense budget. We are all anxious to pass these agreements because they are extremely important as a joint Soviet-American effort to move closer to halting the arms race.
Many of us, and I hope the majority, are less anxious to approve particular weapons programs which will work at cross purposes with the agreements and will not serve to enhance our defense capabilities at this time.
Now that we are faced with the consideration of the military procurement bill, I urge that we consider the actions we are now taking in light of the SALT agreements and our defense requirements.
I suggest that a discussion of the presentation of the agreements to Congress is, therefore, in order at this time. We ought to keep in mind the background of the treaty and the agreement, their substance, and their ultimate significance when we consider the Trident program.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, the Trident system has been the subject of extensive discussion in the press, in committee and on the floor of the Senate. Many of my distinguished colleagues believe that because of the recently concluded SALT agreements we can safely delay – perhaps drastically – the development and deployment of this vital new system. Like most Americans, I applaud the President's accomplishments on strategic arms limitations. But these important agreements must not blind us to the continuing necessity of maintaining a strong and credible strategic deterrent.
We have accepted quantitative inferiority in both land-based and sea-based missiles. Only if Congress and the Nation display the will and the wisdom to maintain our qualitative superiority can the arms limitation agreements be truly stepping stones to peace rather than stepping stones to disaster. I am convinced that the Trident program, as proposed by the President, is an essential part of maintaining that qualitative superiority.
Some distinguished Senators have suggested that there is no need for this system and that our present strategic, offensive forces are so strong that they will deter any aggressor. We do not know what will deter them. What deters them today may not deter 10 years hence and we must remember that in this authorization bill we are shaping our strategic force not for today but for the future.
Even on the accelerated schedule proposed in the pending authorization, the Trident system will not be available in significant numbers before the end of the decade. At that time our Polaris submarine fleet will be 20 years old. Through the years we have improved the missiles carried by these submarines. The Poseidon missile represents a major advance over the first Polaris. Had we not had the foresight to make these improvements we might even now be faced with a force incapable of insuring the security of our country. But we have not been able to make similar improvements in the ships in which these missiles are carried. As these ships age, it is inevitable that they will become more vulnerable and less reliable. We must replace them with an improved submarine which can insure the continued effectiveness of the sea based missile force. In considering the Trident submarine, we are providing today for our defense in the 1980's. We must assure the American people that they will not be faced with nuclear blackmail in the years ahead because we allowed others to gain both a quantitative and qualitative advantage.
The views of the Secretary of Defense on the importance of proceeding with the Trident program are well known. But we need not depend solely on the views of administration spokesmen. The Trident program has been examined in detail by the Senate Armed Services Committee and by the House of Representatives. As a result of this searching examination, we have before us in this bill a program with only minor changes from that proposed by the Department of Defense. After such searching examinations, I say to my colleagues that if we fail to approve this program we will be playing with the security of this country for decades to come.
Fifteen years ago Congress had the wisdom and the foresight to approve the Polaris program which has played such a vital role in deterring aggression. But in today's complex world no weapon, no matter how well conceived, endures forever. We must now display similar wisdom and foresight and authorize the Trident program as the committee has recommended it.
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, this Senator will vote later this afternoon against the amendment offered by the Senator from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN) to cut $508.4 million for the Trident submarine program from the pending bill. I have concluded that I shall cast my vote in this manner after listening to the arguments presented by both sides on this question. It has not been an easy decision because the statements made by Senator BENTSEN and Senator SYMINGTON have been most compelling.
However, Mr. President, I feel quite strongly that the United States must proceed with the accelerated development of the Trident in order for this country to be in a strong position with regard to upcoming SALT negotiations. The President has indicated that he feels that the funding of this program will be helpful to our interests during the upcoming discussions with the Soviets. I agree.
But it is not for this reason alone that I believe that this amendment should be defeated. First, this acceleration will in no way increase the cost for the Trident program – it will merely make the submarine available to the Navy at an earlier date – 1978 rather than 1981.
Second, the growing size of the Soviet attack submarine fleet requires us to speed up our own programs. The Soviets can confront our 41 Polaris-Poseidon submarines with over 300 attack submarines, and an increasing proportion of these Soviet submarines are modern, quiet, and nuclear-powered. It is extremely important for us to do everything necessary to continue to have the most modern missile submarines to be safe from this potential threat to our deterrent at sea.
This is one area of military technology with which we must not gamble. We must be absolutely certain that our sea based deterrent, which may well come to be the backbone of our strategic force, will not become vulnerable in the future. In short, we need the Trident submarine – which will be significantly quieter than and technologically superior to the Polaris-Poseidon submarines – as soon as we can get it.
It is for these reasons that I shall vote against the pending amendment and urge my colleagues to do likewise.
Mr. BOGGS. Mr. President, I wish to announce my intention to support the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN) which would reduce funds for the Trident submarine missile program from $906 million to the $398 million necessary to complete research and development work on this project.
I favor continued development of the Trident program, which will provide a new submarine- based long-range missile capability to replace the Polaris-Poseidon weapons as they are retired.
However, it is my feeling that planning for this project should be completed and reviewed by the Congress before we commit the full $900 million for its production. In this way, I believe we can avoid costly miscalculations in the development of this new weapons system.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN).
I am a cosponsor of that amendment. I spoke on its behalf in my introductory remarks on this bill. I put forth a very similar proposal for dealing with the Trident program in a research report I issued back in April. Accordingly, I give the amendment my wholehearted and enthusiastic support.
I believe that the amendment presents to the Senate a very easy, yet very important, decision.
It is an easy decision for several reasons.
First, the amendment does not propose to kill any military program. Every Senator in this Chamber recognizes our need for a follow-on to the Polaris and Poseidon fleet. All the amendment seeks to do is to return the Trident program to an orderly development schedule.
Second, the amendment does not propose to throw anyone out of work. It does defer a few job opportunities, but only until a few remaining questions have been thoroughly explored. Once the questions have been answered, the jobs opened up by the Trident program will be much more secure in nature than if we rushed ahead now and made mistakes.
Third, the amendment does not propose that we take any military risks. As the Senator from Texas has so ably explained, our present submarines are not ravaged with age. They are not vulnerable to Soviet antisubmarine warfare capabilities. They face no ABM penetration problems. They are, in fact, qualitatively superior in many, many ways to the Soviet Yankee submarine fleet. And the Senator's amendment, by allowing the Trident 1 missile program to proceed at the same pace as proposed under the accelerated Trident submarine program, has guaranteed that we will move forward immediately with significant improvements in this already formidable submarine force.
Fourth, the amendment is directly in line with President Nixon's call yesterday for congressional restraint in approving new Federal spending programs. The President's statement yesterday recognized that inflation has not been halted, that we face a deficit in fiscal 1973 which could reach $35 billion, and that if restraint is not shown new taxes will be needed in the next 12 months. The proposed amendment would cut half a billion dollars in unneeded and therefore wasteful funds from fiscal 1973 expenditures.
For all these reasons, the amendment offered by my colleague from Texas presents the Senate with a straightforward and easy decision.
But the easiness of that decision does not detract in the least from its importance. It is the most important weapons procurement decision we will be called upon to make in 1972. And because our sea-based deterrent is the heart of our whole strategic force structure, it is one of the more important procurement decisions that we will make in the entire decade of the 1970's.
The Navy's accelerated Trident request includes advance procurement funds for the first four Trident Submarines and funds to purchase the site for a new Trident base. If these funds are approved, we will be locked into the crash development of a successor to our Polaris and
Poseidon force. As I have said, such program is not needed and would be very wasteful. More important, such a program would be positively dangerous.
It would be dangerous, first, because it would require us to begin construction of a new submarine fleet before development has been completed. It would be a flagrant violation of the prohibition of concurrent development and production work which constitutes the essence of the "Fly Before You Buy" policy announced by the Defense Department and endorsed by the Armed Services Committee in recent years. If the history of other recent procurement programs has any meaning, we can rest assured that approval of this accelerated Trident program would be a strong Congressional go-ahead for the same kind of cost growth and schedule slippages which all of us have condemned in older programs.
An accelerated Trident program would be dangerous, too, in another way. It could lead to a Soviet submarine force twice as large as ours. Under the recent SALT agreement, this Nation is limited to 44 submarines and 710 sea-based missiles, while the Soviets are allowed 62 submarines and 950 sea-based missiles. The now anticipated Trident design calls for 24 missiles per boat. This means that if we were to replace all of our existing submarines with Tridents we would limit ourselves to only 29 submarines in our total fleet. In contrast, the latest modification of the Soviet Yankee class submarine is designed to carry 12 missiles. If they continue to follow this course, the Soviets could achieve the maximum of 62 submarines they are permitted. That would give them a 2 to 1 numerical advantage over the United States.
Do we really want to endorse cost overruns and schedule slippages on this important program?
Do we really attach less importance than the Soviet Union to the survivability of our sea-based deterrent?
These are the important questions raised by the Bentsen amendment. Surely we can provide the right answers with our votes today.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I heartily applaud the efforts of the distinguished Senator from Texas to return the Trident program to its original schedule. There has somehow arisen the fallacy that being concerned about national security means voting in favor of every single weapons program offered on the military menu, regardless of its merits. But as the late Dwight D. Eisenhower observed so keenly:
Every addition to defense expenditure does not automatically increase military security. Because security is based upon moral and economic, as well as purely military strength, a point can be reached at which additional funds for arms, far from bolstering security, weaken it.
I want to raise a few facts about what America's strategic posture will be without an accelerated Trident program. Some of this resembles a scenario right out of "Dr. Strangelove." I think I should mention these facts before going into the details of the proposed acceleration itself.
Fact 1. A 1976 strategic submarine force without a stepped-up Trident program could destroy 219 Soviet cities populated by 88 million people, nine times over.
Fact 2. At hearings on the fiscal year 1972 budget, Rear Adm. Robert Kaufman, ULMS/Trident Program Coordinator, stated that–
Polaris/Poseidon today we feel is invulnerable.
It is almost inconceivable that the U.S.S.R. could strike all the submarines in our Polaris/ Poseidon fleet simultaneously. But in the event of a nuclear disaster, even if only one submarine survived, that submarine could destroy 160 Soviet cities.
Fact 3. The current U.S. Polaris/Poseidon fleet is armed with eight times the number of weapons on Soviet Y-class submarines – 3,800 of ours to 480 of theirs.
Fact 4. The range of our Polaris A3 and Poseidon missiles – roughly 2,500 miles – is almost twice as great as that of their Soviet counterparts. The range of the new ULMS-I missile, whose deployment date will be unaffected by Senator BENTSEN'S amendment, will be almost four times as great.
Fact 5. By 1976, without a stepped-up Trident program, the United States will have a staggering total of 14,000 strategic weapons, including Poseidon missiles, Minuteman III ICBM's with MIRV's – multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles – and SRAM missiles in our strategic bombers.
Fact 6. The Pentagon tends to draw attention to comparisons between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in terms of numbers of launchers. But what counts more is numbers of warheads, and here the United States is already far ahead. Thanks to MIRV technology, the United States is converting 31 of its 41 Polaris submarines to carry missiles capable of carrying 10 to 14 warheads each. The Soviets have only just begun testing MIRV's and are literally years behind.
Fact 7. Our oldest strategic submarine is only 12 years old, while our youngest is a mere 5 years of age. According to Navy spokesmen, the life span of a submarine is 20 to 30 years. Thus, if there is indeed need for Trident, the first Trident submarine certainly is not needed until 1981 at the earliest – the projected deployment date on the original Trident schedule.
Mr. President, all these small facts stacked on top of each other add up to one towering fact:
There is no pressing need for an acceleration of the Trident program. Our existing Polaris/ Poseidon fleet is already formidable and will remain so until the 1980's. Even Navy witnesses agree that there is no known Soviet threat which could endanger even a fraction of our strategic fleet.
So far I have tried to show that the burden of proof should fall on those favoring a stepped-up Trident program, not on those who oppose it.
The amendment offered by my distinguished colleague from Texas, Senator BENTSEN, would cut $508.4 million out of a total request of $926.4 million of authorized funds. An extra $53.8 million does not require authorization, bringing the total cost of the Trident/ULMS program in fiscal year 1973 to almost a billion dollars. Funds deleted by the proposed amendment would be used for the advance procurement of the first four Trident submarines and a new Trident base.
The money remaining after passage of the amendment would be used for research and development of both the new submarine and the first of the two new missiles, ULMS I.
A central point to remember is that the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Texas does nothing more than return the Trident program to its original schedule. This schedule does not change the so-called "IOC date" or initial operational capability date of the ULMS I missile. This date remains set at 1977. The amendment does postpone the date of submarine deployment from 1978 to 1981. In the meantime, the ULMS I missile can be fitted into the existing fleet. And these missiles have roughly twice the range of our existing missiles.
Mr. President, the request for a stepped-up program was not even received until January of this year, at which time the Navy more than doubled its request. As yet I have seen no satisfactory military explanation for the acceleration. What we have instead is a political explanation of dubious merit. In his fiscal year 1973 statement to Congress, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird held that–
The continuing Soviet strategic buildup, with its long-term implications, convinced us that we need to undertake a major new strategic initiative. This step must signal to the Soviets and our allies that we have the will and the resources to maintain sufficient strategic forces in the face of a growing Soviet threat.
Mr. President, politically motivated arguments for a stepped-up Trident program add up to military muscle-flexing designed to impress the Soviets at the expense of the taxpayer.
And the expense of the taxpayer will be considerable. Total cost estimates are in the neighborhood of $11 to $13 billion, or an astounding $1.3 billion per ship. As the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri has pointed out, this exorbitant price tag does not include such items as: research, development, and procurement of the ULMS-II missile; the cost of the missile warheads; the second Trident base; and the prototype test facility needed for the nuclear propulsion plant.
These items may well be worth the price, if our national security demands them in the future. But before we get ourselves locked into a costly program, we should remember that we do not even have a complete set of blueprints for the submarines. We are not entirely sure what we are committing ourselves to. And experience has shown that where development and procurement proceed simultaneously, there are almost sure to be unforseen cost overruns and later deliveries. As the saying goes, we should "try before we buy."
There are other reasons besides cost for thinking over our options carefully before committing ourselves to procurement. At present, for example, both Soviet and American strategic submarines are armed with 16 missiles each. But whereas plans for the Trident call for 24 missiles per submarine, the Soviets are making an effort to reduce the number of missiles per submarine to 12. The theory is that a larger number of submarines with a smaller number of missiles each will be harder to detect. Our Trident submarine, by contrast, will be twice as big as our present Polaris submarines, and two-thirds as big as a World War II carrier.
Now, perhaps our theory of optimum submarine size is better than theirs. I am not certain. I do know that under the SALT agreements, the United States could replace its 10 oldest submarines with eight submarines carrying 24 missiles each or 13 submarines carrying 16 missiles each. I think that the decision in favor of eight submarines with 24 missiles each has not been adequately explained. I am not suggesting for a moment that we are being deceived, but simply that these issues are too complicated for hurried decisions. For all of these reasons – our strategic posture without an accelerated Trident program, the cost involved, the optimum size for submarines, and the optimum number of missiles per submarine – I strongly favor acting now to keep the Trident/ ULMS program on its original schedule.
I urge swift and overwhelming passage of the Bentsen amendment.
Mr. MUSKIE. I support the amendment of the Senator from Texas to reduce the authorization for Trident by $508.4 million. I do so as a strong supporter of our submarine deterrent forces – recognizing that this is the most important element of the nuclear triad of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and strategic bombers. I strongly support the Trident concept as a natural follow-on to our existing Polaris/Poseidon submarine force.
But I cannot support the Navy's request for a greatly accelerated Trident development program this year. There are still too many unanswered questions concerning the best kind of new submarine force. For example, do we really know the nature of a future threat to our submarine force that Trident must be designed to counteract? Do we really know whether we should produce larger boats with more missiles or a larger number of smaller boats with fewer missiles?
Until these questions are answered, I do not believe we should plunge ahead on Trident simply because this administration feels it would add to the bargaining chips in the next round of arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Senator BENTSEN's amendment would reduce the Trident authorization in this bill from $906.4 million to $398 million for fiscal year 1973. The remaining funds would still permit an increase in R. & D. money for the ULMS-I missile by five times over that of fiscal year 1972. Available funds for actual submarine development would double over that of last year. In supporting this amendment, I am supporting an orderly increase in the Trident development program which would still not commit us in fiscal year 1973 either to a final submarine design or to actual production.
Our existing submarine deterrent is already an awesome force. When the Poseidon conversion program is completed in 1976, our 41 Polaris/Poseidon submarines will provide us with over 5,000 independently targeted warheads. The effectiveness of this force as a deterrent to nuclear war has now been greatly magnified by the SALT treaty limiting Soviet ABM deployment to only two sites. With Soviet ABM's under control, the rationale for a large number of deliverable warheads has been correspondingly reduced. Moreover, the SALT agreement on offensive weapons has established a ceiling on Soviet submarine development which was cited by Secretary Laird as a primary original justification for an accelerated Trident program. It is worth noting that the Soviets have no new submarine program of their own equivalent to Trident.
It is true that our Polaris/Poseidon force will eventually be replaced. It was first deployed between 1961 and 1967, with an expected lifetime of between 25 to 30 years. But even if we assume a 20-year lifetime, the first Trident submarine will not be needed for replacement until 1981 – which is the projected deployment date of an un-accelerated Trident development program.
The most important role for a new generation submarine is to counter any new antisubmarine warfare threat from the Soviet Union. Even official Navy spokesmen admit that there is no identifiable Soviet theat which could endanger even a small fraction of the Polaris/ Poseidon force for the foreseeable future. In any event, the Bentsen amendment leaves intact the funds authorized by the committee for development of the ULMS-I missile which can be retrofitted into existing nuclear submarines. This missile, with its 4,500-mile range, will enhance the survivability of our existing force by expanding several times the ocean area in which boats will be able to operate yet stay within range of their targets.
It is clear to me that accelerated development of Trident is not necessary for fiscal year 1973. Not only is it unnecessary, but it may be unwise from the point of view of our own security. Since we know so little about the future of antisubmarine warfare, we cannot yet know clearly enough the kind of new generation submarine that will best counter such a threat. I believe it is best to preserve our options on a final Trident design for the near future. The Bentsen amendment would accomplish that for fiscal year 1973.
The administration has tried to make a case for an accelerated Trident program also on the theory that it would provide additional bargaining chips in the next round of SALT. I have spoken at length on the absurdity of this position in the past – an arms control effort that serves only to accelerate the arms race and waste billions of taxpayer dollars.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD at this point my speech at Town Hall, Los Angeles, on June 16, entitled "Making SALT Work." I also ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD an article which appeared yesterday in the Washington Post by Leslie Gelb and Anthony Lake, which sets out the case against the bargaining chip theory of arms control negotiations, and the Washington Post editorial this morning on Trident.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
MAKING SALT WORK
In the wake of events both encouraging and discouraging, to our hopes for peace, I believe it may be useful to summarize in simple terms my own convictions about our national defense at this critical time.
I am convinced that the basic points to which I subscribe represent the views of the overwhelming majority of the American people. Naturally, we all have strong emotional biases about our national security. But underneath the emotion, I believe there is a strong undergirding of reason and practicality. In other words. I believe the national consensus is a rational consensus.
First, we want out of Vietnam – now. For me – and I am convinced for most Americans – military face-saving and perpetuation of the present regime in Saigon are clearly secondary to the imperative need to stop the killing and bring our troops and prisoners safely home.
Second, we want a good-faith, continuing effort on the part of our government to curtail the arms race. The SALT accord was a good beginning. We want to build on this beginning for long-range arms reduction – not to use it as a rationale for escalating weapon systems not covered by the accord.
Third, we want to cut the fat out of our military spending – the billions that represent waste and unnecessary overkill – now. I am talking about the fat, not the essential muscle. I am talking about cutting with an informed scalpel not a blind machete. But I am talking about substantial reductions in excessive military spending.
Fourth, we want to strengthen our economy and our society here at home so that our American community will not cave in internally while we are pursuing military interventions in foreign lands. We want to recast this society in the image of peace – to prove to the rest of the world, communist and non-communist, that our economy can function successfully without perpetual war.
There is a Chinese proverb that precisely describes the gap between pronouncement and performance that we see in this Administration's defense policy.
It goes like this:
"There is a great noise on the stair ... but no one enters the room".
Four years ago, the President pledged that he would end the Vietnam war. We have changed the form of that war, the methods of killing. But the war goes on – with the most intensive escalation yet seen.
Haiphong Harbor is mined and blockaded. The bombing of civilian targets in Indochina has reached its highest point. An Air Force General testified earlier this week in Washington, that between November 8, 1971, and March 8. 1972, as many as one out of four "protective reaction strikes" were actually offensive strikes in defiance of orders. Whether or not these unauthorized bombings may have had an adverse effect on secret peace negotiations is a question that is being asked.
Remembering the Gulf of Tonkin, it is a question that should be asked.
We have the bitter with the sweet: Dramatic initiatives for peace. Unprecedented escalations of war. The war goes on. Where will it all end?
This is no time for inflammatory rhetoric or mutual recrimination. No responsible American – including Presidential candidates – wants to surrender to the Soviets or the Chinese. No responsible leader wants to convert the United States into a permanent security state.
But the direction in which we are moving is fraught with more danger than security. It is time to move towards that rational national consensus to which I alluded earlier.
I welcomed President Nixon's visits to the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union and publicly commended him for them. The question now is: Will these initiatives be followed by constructive implementation towards arms reduction and peace?
We were all encouraged by the SALT agreements which, for the first time in the nuclear age, provide for significant limitations on the deployment of strategic weapons. President Nixon told Congress on his return that "we have begun to check the wasteful and dangerous spiral of nuclear arms." But that remains to be seen.
If the SALT agreements are to have lasting effects that will benefit the U.S. and the other nations of the world, we are going to have to face up to our own responsibilities for making them work.
What do we have on which we can constructively build?
First, the limit on ABMs – two sites on each side. This single treaty is by far the most significant agreement signed in Moscow. It means that both sides have recognized that they will remain vulnerable to retaliation in a nuclear exchange. It provides the foundation for nuclear stability.
Second, the ABM treaty also means that both sides can suspend development of various offensive strategic systems, many of which, such as MIRV, were originally designed to penetrate a large ABM defense.
Third, the interim agreement on offensive weapons has placed a ceiling on numbers of offensive missiles.
This agreement would permit some margin of numerical superiority for the Soviets in missiles and submarines but it would be balanced by our own offensive superiority in the number of deliverable warheads, bomber forces, and advanced technology.
If the SALT agreements are to be more than symbolic, they must produce greater stability in the arms race and they must provide tangible, immediate benefits to the American taxpayer in reduced defense expenditures.
Yet no sooner were the accords signed than the Secretary of Defense told Congress that as a result of the SALT agreements we must increase defense spending – not reduce it. We are told that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot support the SALT agreements unless Congress votes more money for nuclear weapons not covered by the accords – advanced bombers, new generation submarines, a new strategic cruise missile, and a variety of other technological improvements.
The American people will not accept that. If we have stunted the Soviet offensive weapons development – as the President has assured us – how can we justify to the world, to ourselves, new efforts to breed new giant species of nuclear weapons?
The concept of arms limitation is a simple one that the American people understand very well. It means a limit on arms.
But if it is truly to mean that, if it is to produce a solid ceiling over our balance of terror, we must be willing to contribute a degree of mutual restraint as our share of the bargain with the Soviet Union.
Instead, how have we responded? Consider the convoluted logic behind the flurry of announcements from the Defense Department during recent days:
That the Vietnam escalation will add three to five billion dollars to the new defense budget.
That the two ABM sites permitted under the SALT treaty are going to cost us half a billion dollars more than the four sites previously authorized.
That we must have $20 million more to begin development of a new strategic cruise missile for no other apparent reason than that such missiles are not prohibited by the offensive agreement.
When you add this shopping list to the nearly $1 billion request for accelerated development of Trident, the new submarine system, and the half billion dollar request for the B-1 bomber you have a defense request which is at least $13 billion more than Congress appropriated last year.
This is a budget designed for a generation of war rather than a generation of peace ... for an era of continued confrontation rather than a new era of negotiation.
In the Soviet Union, as in the United States, there are those who want to increase defense spending and there are those who want to divert more resources to pressing domestic needs.
When the militarists in our country dominate our policy, they strengthen the hand of the militarists in the Soviet Union. This is the stuff that arms races are made of.
This is why I urge restraint in our defense programs – the kind of restraint that signals to the Soviets our intention to treat the Moscow agreements seriously.
If the Soviets do not respond in like manner, we may be faced with the need to accelerate certain defense programs in the next few years. But we are strong enough today to take that rational risk for peace without suffering damage to our own security. The question is whether we are wise enough.
Secretary Laird assures us that "a major new strategic initiative" is needed to spur the Soviets toward agreements in the next round of SALT and to provide a hedge against a possible failure in the next phase of negotiations.
In other words, we must escalate the arms race if we want future agreements to slow it down. The bargaining chips have come home to roost. At prices like these, who can afford arms control?
Later this summer, Congress will be considering not only the SALT agreements but also the defense budget for the 1973 fiscal year. I will do everything within my power to persuade my colleagues in congress to reject Secretary Laird's thesis that signing an arms control agreement means we must have more arms.
I have previously recommended that Congress cut approximately $11.5 billion from the Administration request of $83.7 billion for FY 1973. Even without the SALT agreement, I thought we were wasting that much on excessive military forces.
The largest item in my proposed $11.5 billion cut is about $4 billion for the war in Vietnam – a figure that the Administration says will now be considerably larger because of the recent escalation.
Ending the war will eliminate only one source of waste in the defense budget. I have also recommended cutting $299 million for a new nuclear carrier we do not need .
$400 million for a new air warning system ... $900 million for the F-15 aircraft and $734 million for the F-14 . . and $2 billion for the six redundant military commands such as CINCPAC and CINCEUR.
But it is in the area of strategic weapons programs that the potential for substantial savings is clearest.
First, ABM: The primary justification in 1969 for the Safeguard ABM was to protect our land-based missiles from attack by a potential Soviet force not yet in being. That potential force was estimated at 500 Soviet heavy ICBMs equipped with multiple warheads. That force does not yet exist. The Interim Agreement restricts them to 313 such missiles, and they have not had their first test of a true MIRV.
Consequently, I believe that the prudent course is to suspend all development of ABM at this time and to direct research efforts instead toward the development of a more effective "hard-site" ABM system for defense of the Minuteman missile site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, saving $1.5 billion.
As for any proposed ABM system around Washington, I agree with my colleague Senator Jackson, a long advocate of ballistic missile defense, who has argued that a Washington ABM of the type described in the treaty would be "useless." Over and over again we have pointed out that the Moscow ABM system has no military value and can be easily overwhelmed by a U.S. retaliatory attack. It makes no sense to spend billions of dollars to emulate a Russian mistake.
Second, we are presently deploying multiple warheads on more than 500 of our land based missiles. This program bas been justified on two counts: First, the need to have additional warheads to insure penetration of a large Soviet ABM defense system, and second, to increase the number of warheads available for retaliation in the event that the Soviets destroy a large part of our deterrent force in a first strike. Yet, the Moscow treaty prevents the Soviets from acquiring either a large ABM system or an increased number of large ICBMs. Moreover, our fixed ICBMs are potentially the most vulnerable element of our nuclear deterrent.
I believe we should therefore suspend our Minuteman III (MIRV) program, saving $500 million.
Third, the B-1 bomber: The B-1 bomber has been justified as a follow-on to the B-52 to provide a capability for low altitude supersonic penetration of the Soviet Union in the late 1980's. The Soviet long-range bomber force is far inferior in both numbers and quality to the present U.S. force, and there is no evidence that they have under development a new, truly intercontinental bomber.
We are presently equipped with three nuclear deterrents – often referred to as the "Triad" – land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, and the B-52 bomber force. Each – independently of the others – has the capability of inflicting unacceptable destruction upon the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, retention of all three has been urged in the past because of a fear that in the future one or more of them might become vulnerable.
But, as a result of the SALT agreement, the viability of both our submarine and, to a lesser extent, our land-based missile forces has been guaranteed for the indefinite future, so that a major up-grading of the bomber force is not necessary at this time. Our interests would be adequately served by research on advanced airborne weapons systems and on our B-52's to prolong their lives and enhance their usefulness, saving $445 million.
Fourth, Trident: The Trident program consists of two parts – a 4500-mile missile which can be deployed in the existing Polaris submarine as well as in a future submarine, and a new, very, large quieter and faster submarine equipped with 24 missiles, each with a range of about 6000 miles. Secretary Laird has recently sought approval for a program of 10 Trident submarines at about $1 billion each.
The Administration has not explained any threat which would jeopardize our present submarine deterrent, either from antisubmarine warfare or from ABMs.
Our present system is far superior to anything the Soviets have deployed, or even have under test, at the present time, and the ships will not require replacement until at the very least the late 1980's.
It is premature, therefore, to commit ourselves to a new, large submarine at this time. It may well be that if the need arises, Trident will not be the answer. I, therefore, believe that the Trident budget should be cut back to research on a wide variety of alternative submarine systems.
We could provide an increase of nearly $50 million in research and development funds over last year's budget for this purpose . . and still save $300 million.
We live in a real world in which we have real security. needs. And I commit myself, if I am elected President, to a sound, secure, and strong defense.
At the same time, we can not afford wasteful spending for defense ... for weapons systems we do not need, and which do not give us real security.
It is my conviction that we can make these substantial reductions in our military outlays without detriment to our defense capabilities. It is my further conviction that the reductions proposed represent a realistic and reasonable program that a united American people would support.
There is still a tendency to put national military security first in our budget planning. In spite of the lessons of the arms race, we tend to overbuy military weapons, looking for the perfect defense against our prospective enemies. We should have learned by now that piling up arms does not buy security.
Only when we had a nuclear monopoly did we feel clearly "superior," and that did not last for long. As the nuclear arms race proceeded, the more arms we stock-piled, the less secure we felt.
The Soviet Union reacted to our growing nuclear stock pile by piling up their own, and the escalation brought insecurity for both sides.
How do we get this turned around? First we must identify our real security needs in terms of a suitable defense and agree upon what it will take to meet our real needs, not exaggerated claims.
Second, we must engage in negotiations with other nuclear powers in the mutual interest of stabilizing the arms race and reducing costs. Arms are the conventional route to security, but arms alone do not do the job. That does not mean that we dispense with them. It means that we insist on becoming more reasonable and rational about what is needed for defense and what resources can be released for other needs and goals.
That is the sort of question that leads to a more fundamental problem, the issue of what America's role should be in the world of the immediate future. Since World War II, we have been the most powerful nation in terms of arms. Indeed, we have been more powerful than any nation in the world's history, and we have tended to use our military power more visibly than any of the other great nations.
What gives America its greatest influence, I think, is our actions at those times when we most closely reflect our national ideals. Our influence and true power were greatest when America was a place of hope for her own people and for others abroad. Our example was best set not by attempts to impose our system on others, but by offering the model of people living in reasonable harmony, which was reassuring to others who found in it hope and a chance for their own improvement. It was hope that brought forty million immigrants on a journey to this country, and hope that animated the nation itself. People came here and found reason for hope, and people lived in their own lands and found heart in our hope.
I do not believe this view of history is naive. The basic forces that create history – and that will have an even greater impact in the years ahead – are the elemental needs and emotions of hunger, hatred, love, fear, and frustration. These are the forces that move the vast majority of people on this planet. It will not be the sophisticated consideration, power, diplomacy, chess games, or cold-war relationships that determine people's attitudes about war and peace or drive them toward either. The situations in Northern Ireland, in Southeast Asia, and in Bangladesh, arose out of the fact that people found themselves living in circumstances they could no longer endure.
Human beings can endure a great deal, but not without hope. Sooner or later we must come to grips with these truths and understand that we cannot contain or control such forces by the force of America's nuclear arms.
THE COST OF THE BARGAINING CHIPS
(By Leslie H. Gelb and Anthony Lake)
Every once in a while, an idea about foreign affairs comes along that has simplicity and force. It has force because it is simple. And also because it is simple, it is usually both wrong and costly.
Nevertheless, these ideas come to dominate political debate. The domino theory was one such idea. It held sway over U.S. strategic thinking for 20 years. It was major rationale in American involvement in Vietnam.
The bargaining chip idea is the new vogue. It is presently holding sway over the U.S. approach to negotiations generally and SALT in particular. It will result in the needless expenditure of billions of dollars on new weapons systems.
Both ideas, to be sure, possess kernels of truth. The domino theory preyed on the fact that U.S. action in one area does produce reaction to the U.S. in another. The bargaining chip gets at the fact that negotiations among nations require more than goodwill. The trouble has been that both ideas have been stretched well beyond their value. They are used – and quite successfully so – to justify actions that would otherwise be indefensible.
The political dynamics work like this. The owner of the simple idea, usually the President seeking to get his way, imposes his definition of the idea on the debate. Its opponents usually respond by rejecting the whole idea rather than pointing out the misleading way it is being used.
In order to make their case understandable to the public, the opponents oversimplify as much as the President. They thus trap themselves by pitting their authority against the authority of the President. The President wins every time.
The domino theory is an historical case in point. For 25 years, Presidents have been telling us that other nations are watching what we do in Vietnam, that they are judging the American commitment to them by our actions in Vietnam, and that these judgments would determine their policies toward Communist nations – to help determine whether they became "dominoes." Critics denied this. Pro or anti domino theory, neither side could be proven wrong, and the country went along with the President.
Foreign leaders were watching us in Vietnam, but they were not all watching us in the same way.
It is highly doubtful that more than a handful wanted or expected us to become increasingly involved in a situation where our interests were so tenuous. Indeed, as we became mired down, more foreign leaders must have been more impressed by our stupidity than our courage. Nevertheless, the American public accepted the President's reading.
Right now, President Nixon is taking the country down a similar garden path with his bargaining chip idea. He says he needs certain chips – some new weapons systems and some old force deployments – to deal with Peking and Moscow. Some critics say this is just the same old dangerous cold war thinking. It was an easy task for the President to turn these arguments to his advantage by playing precisely on old public cold war fears. What the critics should have been doing was not to deny that the President needs chips, but to challenge his definition of the chips he needs to bargain.
President Nixon has fronted his version of bargaining chips in the current debate on SALT. For three years, he has told us that he required the Safeguard ABM system to have leverage on Moscow's offensive nuclear forces. The Congress essentially gave him what he wanted on Safeguard – billions of dollars for deployment at four sites. Now the administration says it needs a new bomber force (the B-1) and a new submarine force (Trident, formerly ULMS) for the next stage of SALT. Indeed, the Secretary of Defense has said that even the SALT 1 agreements would be unacceptable unless the Congress approves these new weapons systems for SALT 2.
The President's political hand is strong in making these arguments because he brought home an arms control agreement from Moscow. The House has already passed the administration's new requests, and the issue is now coming to the Senate floor with all signs pointing to approval. In effect, Mr. Nixon's argument is: "Look. It worked. Without those Safeguard deployments, I wouldn't have been able to get Moscow to compromise." It is hard to argue with success.
But wasn't there a better way? The President had two alternatives. He could have proposed a mutual freeze at the outset of the talks. This way, neither side would have had to bear the costs of new deployments – Safeguard for us and offensive missiles for the Russians. Or if Moscow rejected the mutual freeze proposal, he could have asked the Congress for research and development funds and authority to put deployment funds in escrow – without actually deploying Safeguard.
President Nixon tried neither approach and got his treaties, but with three unfortunate results.
First, Safeguard was partially deployed – not on its own merits (which were highly questionable), but for its presumed value in bargaining – thus setting a precedent for buying new systems even when they are not needed. Second, we ended up retaining one Safeguard site defending our Minuteman missiles that makes no sense and holding the option to build a second site in Washington that we did not want, thus setting the precedent of keeping the bargaining chips that we built rather than negotiating them away in return for Soviet reductions. Third, we ended SALT 1 with both sides promising to build new generations of weapons, thus setting the precedent of arms control agreements that fuel the arms race rather than control it. If SALT 1 is a precedent, succeeding rounds will again ratify increased revels of armaments.
This is a waste. Of course, the President needs bargaining chips. But there is a fundamental fallacy in his approach: new weapons systems do not actually have to be deployed in order to give him bargaining power. This power derives from the American potential to deploy, not actual deployment. Continued research and development and the placing of funds in escrow would give the President the same leverage without the cost.
We are at a point where decisions on the B-1 and the Trident will shape U.S. force posture and arms competition with Russia for the next five years. Acceleration of their development in this budget would make virtually inevitable their deployment. An alternative is simply to maintain a basic research and development program, without deciding now on the specific new submarine or bomber forces we might someday need.
We can act sensibly or repeat the mistakes of the past. The Congress would do well to entertain this idea: if the Russians know we are now developing the technological capability to deploy, and we set the money aside at some point for purposes of deployment, we can achieve the same bargaining position as by actually spending the money. The difference for Americans is billions of tax dollars. The difference for Soviet-American relations is a little more sanity.
THE SENATE VOTE ON TRIDENT
"Gentlemen, I'm talking about a boat that's going to cost $1.3 billion each. It is a crucial issue involving a totally new weapons system that requires thorough research. All options must be carefully weighed so that we can arrive at correct decisions on all aspects of developing this system. The Administration has not done this in their hurry-up effort to push development of the Trident system. Therefore, I plan to offer an amendment to the Military Authorization bill to delete some $508.4 million for accelerated Trident development. Let me make clear at the outset that, in offering the amendment. I am not opposing the Trident program. I am convinced that we must have the next generation of nuclear submarines it will provide."
The quotation comes from a statement made by Sen. Lloyd Bentsen of Texas – not exactly your ordinary garden-variety radiclib – and the amendment he has proposed, which would slow the rate of acceleration of the prospective new sea-based missile system (Trident), comes up for a vote in the Senate today. That Senator Bentsen's amendment very nearly carried in the Senate Armed Services Committee, where the vote was 8-to-8, may or may not say something of its chances of passage today. What that earlier vote does make indisputably plain is the fact that this amendment does not represent some conventional conflict between the super-armers and the super-disarmers or one that hinges on stark differences in judgment as to either Soviet intentions or US. obligations. The Trident issue, as drawn by Senator Bentsen, concerns the means of ensuring the long-range security of the American sea-based deterrent – not the end.
The senator and those who support him on this proposed fund cut argue that the administration has not made the case for the dramatic acceleration in expenditure this year that has been requested and that to grant it would be to commit us to production of a new submarine /missile system which is still open to serious question in terms of its basic design. The Soviets, as Mr. Bentsen and others have pointed out, "are building more submarines with fewer missiles per sub, while Trident would provide fewer subs with more missiles on each one. Which concept is better? I do not know. And I don't think our military people know at this point." It does not require an excessive imagination or an awful lot of research into contemporary defense procurement history to share the Senator's apprehension that as a consequence of this hasty move into production on a system that has yet to be fully thought out the nation will end up with more cost-overrun than defense efficiency in this project.
What the conflict comes down to in technical terms is the question of whether or not the proposed Trident should be committed to production at this point. Those who argue that it should be tend to cast the issue in terms of present and future SALT agreements, observing that the U.S. must be in a way to proceed quickly with new production and deployments should the five-year agreement on offensive weapons be abrogated by the Russians either before or at the end of the five-year period. They also observe that a production commitment could serve as an earnest of our intention to proceed if the Russians have any doubt on that score or any doubt on the wisdom of arriving at a SALT II agreement. The latter, of course, is the familiar "bargaining chip" argument, and – like the argument concerning the need to be in a position to move if we wish in the future – it is not nearly so overdrawn or melodramatic or wrongheaded as certain administration spokesmen are inclined to make it sound. Among U.S. senators who are not merely trying to appease the Pentagon holdouts on the SALT agreements or make a good political image of "strength" for the election year, there exist serious and respectable doubts that the country should allow itself at this point to continue in a situation where there is no ongoing submarine production and no formalized, statutory commitment to it.
In our view, the question in their mind is legitimate, but the answer provided by the roughly half billion acceleration proposed by the administration this year is not – it is not a serious answer to a serious question. Senator Bentsen seems to us, at the very least, to have put the problem of preserving the security of our sea-based deterrent in its proper light. How does a production commitment undertaken now to an enormously costly system that has a good chance of proving inadequate to our needs – how does such a commitment qualify as a measure to enhance security or guarantee strength? Conceivably, there will be some compromise measure reached on the floor today and conceivably, too, some declaratory commitment to proceed with a new sea-based system of replacements will come out of the debate: there is, as a matter of fact, fairly widespread agreement crossing classic left-right lines on the importance of submarine-based missilry in our nuclear future. We would argue, however, that in a plain up-down vote, Senator Bentsen's amendment should be passed. It embodies prudence and good sense concerning not only the nation's pocketbook, but also concerning its security.