August 3, 1972
Page 26769
Mr. HUMPHREY. If the projections in the Monitor are Correct, the United States is still decidedly in an advantageous position. If Admiral Moorer's testimony is more accurate, there is a virtual identical balance in our two arsenals, projected over the 5-year period during which these agreements are intended to remain in force. Whichever evaluation one accepts, they both substantiate the proposition that the United States has a sufficient nuclear arsenal to meet the demands of nuclear warfare and diplomacy. Certainly we should strive to retain this position of sufficiency which is in fact what we are told the agreements are designed to do. But we must also be coldly realistic about Soviet capabilities and behavior. Now that we are in a position of approximate military equality, we must assume that the Soviet Union would find any attempt of the United States to regain its former position of nuclear superiority as completely unacceptable.
Not only would the Russians find such an attempt unacceptable, but, based on their reactions in the past and their present capabilities, they would strive to catch up and, perhaps, even surpass the United States. Hence, the arms race.
Finally, in approving these agreements, both the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union should be reminded that the Congress views these agreements as a serious effort to create the proper climate for halting the arms race. It would, therefore, consider it incumbent upon the two countries to exercise comparable self-restraint in other areas of weapons development which are indirectly related to the agreements. In its approval, the Congress implicitly would also be expressing its support for the continuation of SALT talks to cover such questions as qualitative controls and further armaments reductions and its support for other arms control and disarmament agreements.
The commitment for further armaments limitations and reductions is written in both agreements. It should be written indelibly in all our minds and actions. Then the interim agreement on strategic offensive weapons will not be interpreted by either side as a carte blanche for a new kind of arms race. Instead, it will be an obligation to be solidified and expanded in treaty form.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Unanimous consent is required.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I ask unanimous consent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I wish to speak on behalf of Senate ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty – or SALT, as it is more commonly known.
This agreement is a great breakthrough in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. We have been waiting since World War II for the tension to ease sufficiently for us to enter into negotiations with the Soviets. The SALT agreement, therefore, represents tangible evidence that both sides have moved into an era of negotiation and both sides now have an important investment in cooperation.
Although the SALT agreement is a significant step forward, it is only a small beginning. We should not delude ourselves into believing this agreement serves as a panacea to the numerous hurdles which remain to be overcome in the relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. – the world's two superpowers. Far more important will be phase II of the SALT negotiations and that is ahead of us. Phase II will require even harder bargaining on the part of both sides than the phase I negotiations.
With this in mind, let us not forget that the history of our relations with the Soviet Union is replete with instances of respect for strength in bargaining and an unwillingness to negotiate when signs of weakness become apparent.
Therefore, while it is important that we ratify the SALT agreement, we must couple this step with an awareness that we got where we are today because we maintained a balance of capabilities with the Russians. The SALT agreement has put a limitation on the nuclear capabilities of the United States and the U.S.S.R. Basically, we are acknowledging a balance of terror in a world which remains bipolar in structure. The SALT agreement means that the key factor of this bipolar structure of the traditional balance of power – nuclear capability – has been frozen. Yet, the bipolar structure remains.
Therefore, if we are to even consider taking steps toward disarmament or de-escalation of capabilities, we must insure that we preserve our position of strength. It would be foolish of us to be carried away in euphoria by this agreement. We cannot permit an erosion of our bargaining position with the Soviets. The incentive to negotiate on the part of the Soviets would rapidly deteriorate if they approached bargaining with all the chips on their side of the table. Such an imbalance of strength could only result in preventing future negotiations to be carried on.
Mr. President, what I am saying is that we should not allow ourselves the delusion of over-expectation with the ratification of this agreement. We must be realistic regarding its limitations. This is a significant first step in a long chain of steps to come in the future which is within the realm of possibility only if we preserve our position of strength.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I will vote for the treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems. This treaty which limits both ourselves and the Soviet Union to two ABM sites each with no more than 100 interceptors, is potentially the most important arms control measure in recent years. The significance of this treaty is that both sides have recognized that they will remain vulnerable to retaliation in a nuclear exchange, and this, in turn, greatly diminishes the prospect that either side might ever seriously consider launching nuclear war. The limit on ABM's provides the foundation for nuclear stability.
I said on the day the SALT agreements were signed that these first steps symbolize our ability to construct a world which will be safe for ourselves, and future generations. But if the SALT agreements are to be more than symbolic, they must produce greater stability in the arms race and they must provide immediate benefits to the American taxpayer in reduced defense expenditures.
In President Nixon's own words, they must check "the wasteful and dangerous spiral of nuclear arms."
I had hoped that the ABM treaty would mean that both sides would suspend development of various offensive strategic systems. Many of these systems, such as MIRV, were originally designed to penetrate a large ABM defense. Now that ABM has been limited to low levels, the rationale for pushing ahead with new strategic initiatives has largely disappeared.
The SALT agreements are a sound beginning. But to make them work in the long run, both sides must implement them in a spirit of achieving mutual benefit through mutual restraint.
It is ironic and bitterly disappointing that the Senate should now take up the SALT agreements in the wake of a military procurement bill that continues the momentum of our offensive strategic weapons buildup. Too often in the past, arms control agreements have simply accelerated the arms race in areas not covered by the formal agreement. It appears that we may be following the same pattern today.
Nevertheless, I am supporting the ABM treaty in the hope that its potential benefits will eventually be realized. I will continue to oppose any efforts to accelerate strategic weapons programs that are not necessary for our security. It is the American taxpayer who must bear the burden of irresponsible defense spending.