September 14, 1972
Page 30639
AMENDMENT No. 1498
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 1498 to the Jackson amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment.
The second assistant legislative clerk read the amendment of Mr. Muskie, for himself and other Senators, to the Jackson amendment, as follows:
On page 2, line 15, strike out the word "not" and language following up to and including the word "Union" on page 2, line 17, and insert in lieu thereof: "maintain an overall equality between the United States and the Soviet Union in nuclear strength and guarantee the sufficiency of United States defense".
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes on my amendment, and I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, earlier today, in connection with the Fulbright amendment, I made a statement expressing my thoughts as to what our objectives ought to be in the follow-on SALT talks, which hopefully will begin before too long and after we have completed consideration of the instruments before us.
The purpose of my amendment is to put the Senate on record in support of overall equality between the United States and the Soviet Union in nuclear strength. It would put the Senate on record in support of U.S. sufficiency in defense. These two objectives, it seems to me, are objectives about which Senators are in agreement. So I ask Senators, what is wrong with supporting overall equality? What is wrong with supporting sufficiency? If Senators do not wish to support overall equality, what do they support – overall inequality? And if there is inequality,. does that mean American superiority in nuclear arms? If that is our commitment, what conceivable hope can we have of persuading the Soviet Union to accept such a U.S. objective? How can we expect the Soviet Union to continue in SALT negotiations with the United States if our side goes on record supporting overall superiority over the Soviet Union?
As I have said previously in this debate, Mr. President, I strongly believe that the objective of our policy in future arms control negotiations must be to stabilize the arms race on the basis of equality in the deterrent capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is only on such a basis that both powers will feel sufficiently secure to refrain from further strategic arms build-ups. I emphasize that unless both powers feel secure in that respect, we cannot expect future agreements on nuclear arms.
I cannot imagine a more important goal of U.S. policy than the achievement of this kind of equilibrium that preserves our security, guarantees the sufficiency of our defense, and frees us from the dangers and debilitating expense of a spiraling arms race.
My amendment, Mr. President, would strike language in the operative clause of the Jackson amendment, which I read:
The Congress recognizes the principle of United States-Soviet equality reflected in the antiballistic missile treaty, and urges and requests the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United states to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union.
Now, if what we mean is real equality in the deterrent capabilities of these two powers, we must recognize that equality must be established in the context of asymmetrical nuclear weapons systems on each side. We have not opted for the same kinds of weapons. We have not opted for the same kinds of strategic posture. And so we have different nuclear systems, and each power regards its own security interests as requiring a different kind of nuclear posture than does the other power.
With that difference in approach to what each power regards as its nuclear needs, obviously numerical equality with respect to any component cannot serve the purposes of further arms agreements. I think that must be clear.
The Jackson amendment, by focusing on only a fraction of the strategic balance, could, in my judgment, especially if it is regarded as binding upon our negotiators or determinative of the attitude of the Senate on any future treaty, prevent the negotiation of a follow-on treaty based on overall strategic equality. The administration, in my judgment, blundered by not determining at the outset what was meant by intercontinental strategic forces, and many Senators have been confused by the administration's premature endorsement of the Jackson amendment, an endorsement from which the administration later retreated in part.
If we are to advise the President on strategic arms negotiations, therefore, I believe we should advise him on the objective of such negotiations – the objective of stabilizing the arms race on the basis of overall equality and the preservation of U.S. sufficiency in strategic defense. I do not think it is wise for us to prejudge the negotiations and set minimal conditions with regard to reaching that objective. To believe in a congressional voice in foreign policy does not mean that the Senate should prescribe an exact technical form for a follow-on treaty. Strategic arms negotiations are extraordinarily complex, and agreements are reached only after numerous proposals and packages are put forth by both sides and their implications fully analyzed by technical experts. For us to deny our negotiators that flexibility will not further the prospects of a follow-on agreement.
Therefore, I urge the Senate to revise the Jackson amendment in accordance with my amendment to stress the need to assure in a future treaty overall equality in United States-Soviet strategic nuclear strength rather than numerical equality in intercontinental strategic weapons systems alone. In introducing this amendment, I do not wish to prejudge Senator JACKSON's own view that overall equality may at some future date require rough equality in ICBM's, SLBM's, intercontinental bombers, and missile throw-weight. The purpose of my amendment is not to exclude the Jackson formula from consideration at SALT II, but rather to broaden Senate advice to allow consideration of alternative proposals as well – proposals that would insure an overall equality and U.S. defense sufficiency. The strategic balance is not so sensitive as to require mathematical precision in any single component or set of components. Insistence on such precision means that the negotiations will fail, or that both sides will build to parity across the whole spectrum of nuclear weapons, which is the road to an accelerated arms race.
In my judgment, the Senate today ought to make it clear whether it is really committed to the goal of a stabilized arms race, that will decrease the heavy burden of arms on the backs of our people. We can do it and insure our security needs by insisting on overall equality of deterrent capabilities and on sufficiency of defense, without so strait-jacketing our negotiators as to minimize the prospects for follow-on agreements.
In 1970, Mr. President, the nations of this globe spent $202 billion on arms. I do not have the latest figures, but I know billions could be added to that figure. $200 billion on arms – arms that do not feed people, arms that have not brought security even to the world's most powerful nations, arms which have not eliminated quarrels between smaller nations, arms which have not brought peace to this globe but, rather, increased the prospects of shattering that peace.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield myself 2 additional minutes.
I think we have a responsibility, as the world's most powerful nation, to indicate clearly that we are committed to a reduction of this burden and that we are willing to negotiate with the other great world power on the basis of true equality of deterrent capability.
Is there any Senator in this Chamber who believes that our interests will be served by our initiating a nuclear war? I think every Senator believes that our security interests are best served by a defense posture that deters the other side from engaging in that initiative and that our interests are best served if the other side is committed to a similar policy.
My amendment is aimed at that kind of equality of deterrence. There are no if's or and's about it. I am not asking for overall U.S. superiority or inferiority. I am not trying to straitjacket us in any
kind of nuclear defense policy that prevents a stabilizing arms treaty. My amendment is committed to overall equality, which is the world's best hope that the Soviet Union and the United States will never be at each other's throat with nuclear weapons. That is my objective, Mr. President.
I understand that there already have been two votes, and I can count, so I have some idea of what will happen to this amendment. But my conscience would not permit me to withhold my argument on this amendment. It is too serious a matter. The implications for the future and for the peace of mankind are too important.
So I urge my colleagues to give consideration to this amendment. Let us think about phrasing our policy in such flexible, cooperative, and understanding terms that the policy we state here will be a reaching out to the other side in a plea to urge a rational approach to the security needs of the world's two greatest powers.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I cannot refrain from congratulating the Senator on his most powerful statement on this subject, especially the latter part. This is a serious matter, very serious.
The United States has been a powerful Nation, and I think it still is. However, the way to undermine its strength and cause it to cease being a powerful Nation, would be to continue to waste our resources on weapons systems which serve no useful purpose.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield whatever time I need from my remaining time, and I would like not to be interrupted.
I must say that I am moved by the Senator's speech. He pinpoints exactly what is involved. The strength of the United States is involved.
We have wasted much of our resources in this country. We have expended about $1,400 billion ourselves on military affairs since World War II, according to the best calculation last year of the Library of Congress. The amount is so enormous that nobody can understand it. If we continue to inspire the Russians and ourselves to an ever-escalating arms race, we will no longer be the strongest Nation in the world.
The only hope, as the Senator has eloquently stated, is for us to come to some agreement in which we and the Soviet Union – these very big countries, very dangerous and powerful countries – can stop the upward spiraling arms race.
I think the Senator has put it extremely well. If the Senate is insensitive to his arguments, then there is little we can do to prevent the waste of further spiraling arms spending.
One other comment: Our decisions today are, of course, not binding upon anybody. The votes are an expression of the views of the Senate, only reflecting, in my opinion, upon the judgment of the Senate. The President will do as he pleases. The real danger is that the Senate action will discourage the Russians from thinking we are serious about any further negotiations. That is the real danger which the Senator points out. Both parties must be serious to get an agreement. Without that we will end up with no further agreement, and both powerful nations will continue as they have during the past 10 or 20 years.
The Senator has described the situation extremely well; and I congratulate him on the very fine statement of what is involved in this argument.
Mr. MUSKIE. I thank the Senator from Arkansas,
I should like to make one further point, if I may do it on his time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. MUSKIE. The Jackson amendment is concerned with numerical equality. When we began this nuclear arms race following World War II, we believed that we could outspend anybody on arms. So we were not too discontent with the situation in which we kept piling arms on arms, spending more and more money. We felt that we had so much wealth that no other nation, however much it tried, could conceivably match us in the production of nuclear weapons.
Now we find ourselves, much to our surprise, facing a potential adversary who has caught up with us numerically in some categories of weapons and has surpassed us in others. That disturbs us. So we seek to do something we have not been able to do – as I read the Jackson amendment – since World War II. We have not been able to create a situation which would insure our superiority, and not even our great wealth now makes it possible for us to outbuild the Russians in nuclear weapons if they are convinced that we intend to continue to travel the road we have traveled for 20 years.
So now what are we trying to do? By an amendment of this kind, by an expression of Senate opinion of this kind, we are undertaking to do something we have not been able to do with all our spending on arms in a quarter of a century – to put a lid on the Soviet Union's ability to construct nuclear weapons, while not restricting ourselves.
Is it going to work? The only thing that is going to work with the Russians, who are as wise and perceptive and knowledgeable as we in this field, the only thing we can hope to achieve – if we can achieve that – is a mutual deterrent capability, considering an asymmetrical balance of nuclear weapons that will finally act as a deterrent not only with respect to attack by the other side but also with respect to a continuation of the arms race.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is entirely correct.
Mr. JACKSON. I yield myself 1 minute. Mr. President, I greatly respect the comments made by the able Senator from Maine. I think we all express many of the same concerns.
Under my pending amendment, joined in by 43 other Senators, I would look forward to a situation in which we would hopefully get the Soviets to cut back their forces – their intercontinental strategic forces – following the precedent we have set in cutting back our ABM's from four sites to two sites.
The Muskie amendments share the defects of the Fulbright amendment in that they substitute a vague reference to "overall equality" and "sufficiency" for the much more precise Jackson language calling for the principle of equality agreed to in the already approved ABM treaty. This principle is clear and simple in the Jackson amendment: both sides accepted the same, equal limits in the ABM treaty and both should accept the same, equal limits in a treaty on offensive weapons in SALT II.
The Muskie amendments would nullify the Jackson amendment. Like the Fulbright amendment they are deceptively similar to the Jackson language when they are, in fact, quite opposite. The Muskie amendments would also, in several important respects discussed below, undermine the American negotiating position.
The legislative history of the last several weeks makes it clear that the words "overall equality" and "sufficiency" have been used by their proposers to justify enormous Soviet advantages in ICBM's, submarine-launched missiles and long-range bombers in SALT II. This is so because it is claimed that our forward based weapons in Europe, our carriers at sea in the Mediterranean, and even the forces of our allies are adequate "compensation" for our numerical inferiority in the central, truly strategic forces.
The terms "overall equality" and "sufficiency" have also been used to suggest that we can accept numerical inferiority in SALT II – which is not yet even underway – because we have technological superiority in SALT I. But (a) this technological superiority on our side cannot be guaranteed by the treaty while the numerical superiority of the Soviets would be guaranteed by the treaty; and (b) in fact the Soviets have always been able to catch up with our technology when they have considered it important.
Both Muskie amendments, explicitly in the case of the longer version, would call for the inclusion in a follow-on SALT treaty of a number of factors that cannot possibly be verified. The notion that we can negotiate, for example, on the assumption that we can know and verify and prevent improvements in Soviet "technical reliability" is absurd. Moreover, the enumeration of factors to be included in the longer version are vague, confusing, and overlapping. How does one negotiate a treaty that freezes "overall quality of weapons systems" or "survivability?" What are "deliverable" as opposed to non-deliverable warheads? And does it refer to the number of "deliverable" warheads before or after a possible preemptive strike? One does not have to be an expert in strategic policy or arms control to recognize the confusion in this amendment and the impossibility of applying its terms in practice.
In substance there is little difference between the Muskie amendments and the Fulbright amendment. Because the Muskie proposal, like the Symington amendment, deletes the word "intercontinental," it would undermine our national policy on the issue of forward-based systems.
Mr. President, as the amendment of the Senator from Maine has the same basic purpose as the previous two amendments and shares the same defects, I hope the Senate will reject the amendment.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may take. I do this for the purpose of asking the Senator from Washington to get down to the point. What is his objection to the word "overall"? It seems to me it makes a lot of sense. I had always thought, until someone raised the question – perhaps it was the Senator from Washington – that it referred to what he was talking about. What does the Senator mean, that we must have numerical equality in every weapon, in every method of delivery and in megatonnage, as well in every other category? Why does the Senator object to the use of the word "overall," if the Senator will answer on my time?
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, obviously we should retain freedom to mix the forces as we and the Soviets may desire. What I am objecting to is the suggestion that we should adopt language that would compromise the forces dedicated to the defense of our allies.
We should not simply count a total of weapons of all sorts and then equate those weapons that do not have intercontinental capability with intercontinental strategic forces. I am confining the forces to be balanced in a follow-on treaty to intercontinental strategic forces which means intercontinental bombers, land-based missiles, and sea-based missiles.
Mr. CASE. If the Senator will yield further, on my time, this does not answer the point of the amendment, of which I am a cosponsor. I supported this very view in committee and on the floor, and I must say that nothing else makes any sense than that we should regard the overall position of the two nations, considering all weapons. To do otherwise cannot lead to anything but the most extraordinary acceleration of the arms race, as the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) has suggested.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator from New Jersey yield?
Mr. CASE. I yield, on my time.
Mr. MUSKIE. This will be useful for the RECORD, referring to the second amendment which I had introduced, No. 1499. In my judgment, amendment No. 1498 and amendment No. 1499 are equivalents. Amendment No. 1499 is useful, from my point of view, in identifying what I regard as the factors which should be taken into account in measuring the overall nuclear balance between us and the Soviet Union.
Let me read from amendment No. 1499:
"... maintain an overall equality between the United States and the Soviet Union in nuclear strength, taking into account such components as numbers of delivery vehicles, numbers of deliverable warheads, accuracy, throw-weight, gross and equivalent megatonnage, technical reliability, geography, deployment, survivability, overall quality of weapons systems, and other factors recognizing that inequalities in individual components of the nuclear balance are acceptable providing that the overall balance of nuclear power is preserved."
The distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), I regret to say, is not in the Chamber at this moment – he was here when I began these comments – but apparently he would exclude some of those factors.
I would concede that those factors change in terms of their significance, their weight, and so forth, on the overall balance; but to try to strike that balance now and repeal the future over the next 2 or 3 years during which the talks would take place, is a disservice to the objective of arms negotiations.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator and, Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STAFFORD). The Senator from North Carolina is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, the word "equality" in and of itself means absolutely nothing, as the Senator from Washington has so well stated. What the United States needs for a certain deterrent or a defense in the precarious world in which we live, are weapons which we can use on an intercontinental basis.
There are only three kinds of these weapons. One consists of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The second consists of nuclear powered submarines, and the third consists of the big bombers, the planes that carry the bombs to drop on the other continents.
The interim or temporary arms limitation agreement accepted inferiority on the part of the United States in two of those fields. We agreed that the Russians might have 62 nuclear-powered submarines and we would have only 44 during the 5-year period covered by the agreement. We agreed that Russia could have a vast number of missile launchers additional to the ones we could have during the 5 years.
All that the Jackson amendment says is that we do not want, in the next SALT talks, negotiators who will accept permanent inferiority on the part of the United States in any of the three intercontinental deterrents or offensive weapons.
That is what the amendment says. To my mind, talking about counting everything is like counting cap pistols against cannon.
Who would be willing to say that we should make an agreement with Russia on a permanent basis similar to that which is made on a temporary basis in the arms limitation agreement? Who would be willing to say that the United States should accept inferiority on the seas by letting the Russians have far more nuclear-powered submarines than we could have?
The Jackson amendment does not mean that we have to have absolute numerical equality in intercontinental strategic weapons, but it does mean that we ought to have the right to have equality in respect to such weapons if we want it. The Jackson amendment merely gives our negotiators to the next SALT talks the good advice that our national security is dependent on the three intercontinental deterrents, long range bombers, nuclear submarines, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and that they should not make any agreement with Russia which deprives us of the right to have these intercontinental strategic weapons on an equality with Russia.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from North Carolina yield, on my time?
Mr. ERVIN. I have plenty of time I will not use and the Senator may use my time if he wishes. I am glad to yield to him.
Mr. PASTORE. It was clear to me, when we attended the briefings at the White House, that one of the factors determining why we agreed on the exchange of 62 as against 44 of our own, was the argument that the Russians already had the facilities and that if we did not reach an agreement in 5 years, they would go on to 99 or to 100.
That is the reason why the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that they would be amenable to this agreement at this time because it would bring a halt to the Russian submarines at 62. That is the reason why we limited ours to 44.
Now the distinguished Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN) makes a logical argument. The name of the game is deterrence. Where is our deterrence? The deterrence is not so much on those bases that we have in Europe. The deterrence is, as we well know, in the intercontinental ballistic missiles and the power and the thrust that they can bear.
I want to say at this point that it does not make any difference who can destroy whom. The fact is, once it gets started, we will all be destroyed.
What we are trying to do here is to maintain the power and the posture that will give notice to the other side that they dare not make the first move because we do not intend to do so. That is exactly why we signed that temporary agreement.
The telling thing here is that the very people who negotiated the agreement are for the Jackson amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STAFFORD). The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 additional minutes.
On the interim agreement, we picked up the short end of the stick. I am perfectly willing to go along with it, but we were told time and time again that we needed the Trident. All those who are for the Muskie amendment voted against the Trident. We were told, point blank, at the White House, that unless we got ourselves into the Trident, unless we got ourselves in the B-1, in 5 years we would be placed at a disadvantage.
That is the reason why this administration has taken the position that they are backing the Jackson amendment. The answer has been given here, "Well, but they do it for a different reason. I will tell the Senator why they are doing it "for a different reason." It is because they do not want to admit publicly that they picked up the short end of the stick.
That is the reason why they are disagreeing. But they want the substance of the amendment.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I do not know who has the floor.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I have said all I want to say on the subject.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, the Senator from Rhode Island has said in far more eloquent terms than I could exactly what I wanted to say.
From the testimony I heard before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the subject, I am satisfied that virtually every man who had any part in the negotiation of this interim agreement and the ABM treaty is in favor of the Jackson amendment, all of those who testified said that they would be unwilling for the United States to accept any limitation on the United States similar to those in the interim agreement as a basis for a permanent treaty and a permanent settlement.
We certainly cannot protect the security of the United States by giving Russia permanently a superiority in launchers and in nuclear submarines similar to that which the interim agreement provides for one 5-year period. That is what the Jackson amendment is trying to make plain to those who participate in future SALT talks.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, we had our negotiator, Gerry Smith, come before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy some months before this interim agreement was ever heard of. We were told point blank that an agreement with the Russians was difficult. We began talking about two installations, one in North Dakota and the other in Montana. Then they compromised by saying, "We will only take one in defense of your missiles and one around Washington" which was unacceptable to us at the time.
Earlier we had testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy they needed four. At that time we said that we were not interested in building an ABM ring around Washington. We would not buy that idea. Then when we went to the White House, we were told that when this proposal was put to the Joint Chiefs of Staff they went along with it.
I am talking about something that happened only a matter of weeks before the deal was consummated. And Mr, Nixon went to Moscow and came back with the agreement.
One might say, "Mr. PASTORE, why are you going to support it?" I am supporting it because I supported the Trident. I supported the B-1. I am going to support it because I voted for the Jackson amendment.
I am surprised at the fact that we are trying to tell our negotiators that they did not make a mistake and did not pick up the short end of the stick when, in fact, that is the reason they back the Jackson amendment, both the White House and the State Department.
And I challenge anyone to dispute that.
Mr. MUSKIE. First of all, I say in response to what the senator from Rhode Island said, my message to the negotiators is not anything like his description. My message to the negotiators is this: We have two objectives, to achieve equality of deterrent capabilities, which the Senator himself articulated eloquently a few moments ago, and we are to negotiate it in a way that preserves the sufficiency of our defense. That is my message to these negotiators and I refuse to say that there is one option they are not to consider. We are not writing the next SALT agreement here on the floor. We cannot write it here on the floor.
If the policy represented by the Jackson amendment, as interpreted by Senator JACKSON, had been our policy in the SALT negotiations, we would have no agreement today. If that is right–
Mr. PASTORE. Well–
Mr. MUSKIE. If the Senator will let me proceed–
Mr. PASTORE. All right.
Mr. MUSKIE. If that is correct, then the supporters of the Jackson amendment loyally will oppose this agreement and not try to write the next one.
Now, with respect to the Trident, my vote on Trident had nothing to do with this agreement.
May I say to the Senator, I am just not persuaded that the present Trident design is the one best designed to serve our defense needs. I am opposed to the greatly accelerated Trident program which locks us into a fixed concept.
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. MUSKIE. I will in my due course.
Mr. PASTORE. I will use my turn.
Mr. MUSKIE. I would like to finish my thought, just as the Senator wished to finish his thought a few minutes ago. I am not persuaded that now is the time to commit ourselves to a particular Trident design which the accelerated program will do.
I am a firm believer in the nuclear submarine deterrent as being the most credible, the most survivable, and most meaningful in the long run. And so I am for that.
I just do not buy an accelerated Trident at this time for reasons that are unrelated to this agreement.
Now, let me say this: The Senator was not on the floor this morning or this afternoon when I made my speech. I made the same one twice. So, it might be helpful to the Senator if I would repeat something I said this morning. In offering my amendment, I do not wish to prejudge Senator JACKSON'S own view that overall equality may, at some future date, require rough equality in ICBM's, SLBM's, intercontinental bombers, and missile throw-weights. My purpose is not to exclude the Jackson formula from consideration in SALT II, but rather to broaden Senate advice to allow consideration of alternative proposals as well to assure an overall equality and the maintenance of U.S. defense sufficiency. And the strategic balance is not so sensitive as to require mathematical precision in any single component or set of components.
Mr. President, the Senator from Rhode Island made one other point that I think requires response.
I have heard it on the floor several times. That refers to the administration's support of the Jackson amendment. I am interested in knowing what it does support. The White House Press Secretary, Ronald Ziegler, stated this on August 9:
Senator Jackson said that his amendment excludes a consideration of European nuclear forces in future SALT negotiations for achieving equality in intercontinental strategic systems ... The United States does not endorse that elaboration ... Any elaboration of the type I just referred to, we feel, is something that should be properly discussed and determined at the negotiating table as we proceed to SALT 2.
The last part of that statement is on all fours with what I have been saying this morning and this afternoon.
I now yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I do not question at all the quotes that the Senator from Maine has just recited. I think he has misunderstood the thrust of my rationale. The point I am making is this. At the time, and at the same time, we are being asked to endorse this interim agreement, we are being told categorically that unless we have these other things we are going to be placed at a disadvantage.
Now, when we get to these other things – and I and not criticizing the Senator from Maine because he did not vote for the Trident – all I am saying is this–
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I did not base my vote on Trident on considerations that relate to the merits of this agreement.
Mr. PASTORE. All I am saying is that I voted for it because it was made clear to us that in the process of accepting this temporary agreement we have to accept the fact that we need the Trident. That is what they said to us at the White House.
Mr. MUSKIE. They say a lot of things to us at the White House that I do not buy.
Mr. PASTORE. I know the Senator is not buying it. I am not buying all of it myself. All I am saying is that that makes the Senator from Rhode Island a little suspicious, because here we are, we are boasting about this agreement, which I am willing to accept as a temporary agreement, and at the same time we are saying we need a sub that can shoot a missile about 6,000 miles.
What does that mean to me? It comes right into the fold of the amendment of the Senator from Washington. We are talking about a missile that will go about 6,000 miles, and we need it 5 years from now. That is what they said to us.
Mr. MUSKIE. Would the Senator from Rhode Island like my explanation?
Mr. PASTORE. Yes, in just a minute.
Mr. MUSKIE. This is my time, I say to the Senator.
Mr. PASTORE. Now–
Mr. MUSKIE. In just a moment. The Senator told me not to interrupt him.
Mr. MUSKIE. May I ask the Chair on whose time this is?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will say that the time is being charged to the Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. MUSKIE. We are now on the time of the Senator from Rhode Island?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. PASTORE. I yield to the Senator from Maine.
Mr. MUSKIE. I will tell the Senator my explanation of this dichotomy in the White House. It is political. In order to sell this arms agreement to the right wing of his party, the President took a hawkish stand on his defense budget and said, "Sure, we are going to sign this, but spend no less on arms as a result of this agreement," but more than he had in his budget this year. That is my explanation. But that is irrelevant.
Mr. PASTORE. That may be the Senator's explanation, but from where I sit, and from what I heard, and from what they told me week after week when they explained how far we had gone at the strategic SALT talks, we were told the picture was bleak; then all of a sudden the President decides to go to Moscow and suddenly the picture begins to blossom and the light is beginning to shine again. They come back with this agreement and we get a little double talk here and a little double talk there.
Finally we are told by those who negotiated the agreement, "We need the Jackson amendment to do us any good."
That is why am not buying this double talk.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. PASTORE. I yield.
Mr. MUSKIE. As chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations I have had briefings from Mr. Smith and others. My picture of what we heard was that a very hard negotiation was going on, as one would expect; yet continuing through all those briefings, Mr. Smith expressed optimism that we were going to get an agreement. So it is not a question of blackness before the storm turning to brightness at dawn. I understand hard negotiations finally yielded an agreement. Now, what we are trying to do on the floor of the Senate is to write the next agreement. If the Jackson amendment is to be binding, and I do not believe it is, the prospects of a follow-on agreement are diminished by that much.
Without the Jackson amendment, as I said over and over again, all of our options are open, including the option of not agreeing to any follow-on agreement at all; including the option of not extending this agreement, if no other agreement is negotiated; including the option of escalating the arms race, if we wish, and if our people desire.
All the Jackson amendment does is to close the options; if it is binding. If it is not, it is meaningless and only playing a mischievous role in this serious business of stabilizing the arms race.
Mr. PASTORE. I respect the Senator's point of view but I do not get the picture exactly that way. All we are saying is, "When you write the next agreement make sure you insist on those things that count for the security of this country and the deterrence of nuclear or thermonuclear war."
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I join in support of the Senator from Maine's comments. All this Jackson amendment does is to play a mischievous role. As the Senator so eloquently said, all the options are present. The President of the United States directs and controls our negotiators. They are his men. He can do as he pleases. That is what the committee unanimously said and the Senator from Maine said.
One of the great flaws in the argument of the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE) is this assumption that there is something very significant about numbers of missiles beyond a certain minimum. When we agreed to the ABM Treaty we signed it in good faith, in my opinion. We all accepted it as an agreement that no defense could protect either side from an all out nuclear attack. The Senator from Rhode Island continues to say the name of the game is deterrence. But deterrence is not 1,600 missiles, it is not even 1,000.
The best testimony we had time and again before this particular matter came up was that somewhere around 300, 400, or 500 ICBM's is ample to destroy the other country, assuming there is no effective defense. It was then thought by some that an ABM might give effective defense.
In 1968, the then Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, discussed before Congress the power necessary to deter. He said:
In the case of the Soviet Union, I would judge that a capability on our part to destroy, say, one-fifth to one-fourth of her population and one-half of her industrial capacity would serve as an effective deterrent. Such a level of destruction would certainly represent intolerable punishment to any 20th century industrial nation.
Mr. McNamara then went on to say that this destruction could be accomplished by a force of the equivalent of from 200 to 400 megatons. Such a force when delivered would be capable, he said of destroying from 52 to 74 million Soviet people and from 72 to 76 percent of Soviet industrial capacity.
At the same time, the Secretary assessed the destructive potential of greater amounts. A fourfold increase from the equivalent of 400 megatons delivered to the equivalent of 1,600 would yield fatalities only about half again as great. And the industrial capacity destroyed would increase only 1 percent, to 77. This demonstrates the modest gains that sizable increases in destructive power yields. Yet both arsenals will go well beyond the 400 or 1,600 equivalent megatons mentioned to a total of around 4,000. This should leave few doubts about the abilities for mutual destruction.
It is clear then even small parts of our arsenal or that of the Soviet Union should be more than enough. Even if a single U.S. deterrent force were destroyed in a first strike, or even if both our bomber and our missile fleets were heavily damaged, we would have enough to deter. Small parts of our forces can do a great deal.
The Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) told the Senate in June:
The missiles from one Poseidon submarine – this is from the whole submarine, now detonating on target, could destroy about one-quarter of the industry of the Soviet Union. The missiles from ten such submarines could destroy nearly three-quarters of the Soviet Union's industry.
These are not figures picked out of the thin air; this is not just a guess.
Ten B-52 bombers – about 2 percent of our bomber force – could destroy about 40 percent of Soviet industry.
Fifty Minuteman missiles could destroy nearly half of Soviet industry.
Honestly, it is an absurdity to be talking about deterrents, and to be arguing we have to catch up with the Russian 1,618 missiles from our 1,054 missiles, when there is no effective defense against these missiles, and nobody alleges there is. We have so many intercontinental ballistic missiles, to say nothing of the Polaris and Poseidon submarines and the bombers. The Senator from Mississippi says that missiles from 10 submarines can destroy nearly three-fourths of Soviet industry. We have not 10, but 41, submarines now, and we could have 44.
What is the deterrent? If each country has 400 megaton equivalents, that is all they need to destroy the other country. They could wreak unacceptable damage. That is the word – unacceptable – unacceptable damage which is so terrible they are not going to tempt the other country to engage in an exchange. This is what we forget. There is no defense. When we played with the idea of the ABM, we conceived almost anything could have been possible.
There was always the possibility you could shoot them down, and therefore you have to have more and more. The Senate accepted almost unanimously the proposition we are not going to have any effective deterrent. Congressional committees have already refused that ABM around Washington, for which I congratulate them. They are very wise in rejecting that second ABM.
We are finally admitting that it was a big, stupid mistake to spend $10 million on a big ABM that would serve no useful purpose.
What is deterrence? It is about 400 delivered megatons or the equivalent, if one likes to put it in that way. According to the Senator from Mississippi, 10 Poseidon submarines should be enough to deter. It will destroy 75 percent of the industry of Russia.
What earthly motive or cause could make Russia wish to destroy 75 percent of its industry when she is struggling now to buy a little wheat from us? This is a dream world. It has nothing to do with reality.
I think the proposal of the Senator from Maine is unanswerable. The numbers game has absolutely no relevance to the current problem that faces both countries. To quarrel or argue here that we have got to make up the difference is pointless. We have 2½ times the deliverable warheads now, to say nothing about bombers, submarines, forward-based aircraft, aircraft carriers, and so on.
In this argument everybody has completely forgotten about our aircraft carriers, of which we have 14, each with 45 to 90 airplanes, many of which can deliver a nuclear weapon to Russia. That is completely ignored in the equation.
The Senator from North Carolina did not mention aircraft carriers. He mentioned only the intercontinental ballistic missiles, the ICBM's, and the submarines, but aircraft carriers are a very significant weapon system, and the Russians do not have one single aircraft carrier.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I will yield on his time.
Mr. ERVIN. I have the time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Surely, I yield.
Mr. ERVIN. The Senator from North Carolina may not have mentioned aircraft carriers, but, in listening to the Senator from Arkansas, the Senator from North Carolina very vividly recalled that the day before Pearl Harbor the United States had the greatest Navy on earth, but that the day after Pearl Harbor we had virtually no Navy at all. The Senator from Arkansas talks about weapons we already have, but he ignores the fact a substantial part of those weapons can be destroyed in a surprise attack just as the major portion of our Navy was destroyed at Pearl Harbor. The possession of warheads of low yield in Europe by the NATO forces means nothing to the Senator from North Carolina as far as giving the United States a viable deterrent is concerned. We need at least an equality with Russia in intercontinental strategic weapons.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from North Carolina has a vivid imagination. I have never heard any responsible person suggest that 40 submarines could be destroyed in a surprise attack, or even 10. Relating what happened at Pearl Harbor to conditions today is really going beyond credibility. It has nothing to do with the problem today.
Mr. ERVIN. I cannot understand why the Senator from Arkansas says there is no relevancy. The fact is that the day before Pearl Harbor we had the greatest Navy on earth and the day after Pearl Harbor we had practically no Navy.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not know what that has to do with nuclear submarines or aircraft carriers. The Senator seems to suggest that the Russians could, by a surprise attack, wipe out all aircraft carriers, situated all over the world, and submarines under the ocean, when they do not even know where the submarines are, and even to knock out our ICBM's, many of them in hardened sites. Anyway, in this kind of argument, one can always imagine fantastic possibilities and imagine every type of situation. That was done with regard to the ABM. They imagined we could develop the fantastic capacity to shoot down all incoming missiles and then they decided to go ahead with it. Thank God they have given that up as an impossibility.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. PASTORE. That is exactly the point I am making. The ABM has never proved its operability. Yet we were told that if we had not had the ABM, we would not have had the agreement. That is what we were told. We were told by Henry Kissinger that if it had not been.
for the ABM that we voted for, we would not have had the SALT agreement.
If the ABM is such a useless weapon – and maybe it is – and if the House voted against it because it is a useless weapon – and maybe it is – the fact remains that that is the crutch of the administration. They have said that if we had not approved the ABM, we would not have had this agreement at all. Apparently they are trying to tell us that it was the ABM that scared Russia into signing the agreement.
That raises a certain amount of suspicion in this Senator's mind. First we were told this and then we were told that.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the Senator. We were told this and we were told that. The function of the Senate, if the Senate has any function left under the Constitution, is not to act solely on the basis of what we are told by members of the executive branch. We are supposed to make up our own minds based on our own experience and information.
Going back some years ago, what we were told about the ABM was a falsehood. Obviously it was not the whole truth. We have been misled time and time again. I do not deny that at all. But the administration having gone all out to persuade us to put $8 billion to $10 billion in a weapons system that was no good and has been proved to be no good, had to have something to salvage their position. So they said, "Well, the ABM plans served a good purpose. Although it is not a good system, as a bargaining chip it gave us this agreement."
They got the agreement which in May was good. But now they tell us that the agreement was no good and they must have the Jackson amendment because it negates the agreement the administration signed in May. This is the ambivalence we have in this administration. They tell us anything they want to when it comes to wanting to win votes.
We are not trying to pass here on which administration statement to believe. We are trying to decide for ourselves, not simply on the basis of what Dr. Kissinger says. Dr. Kissinger many times tells us what he is told to tell us, because that is characteristic of that kind of job. But the Senator from Rhode Island does not have to tell us what somebody tells him to tell us. We all should make up our own minds, no matter what they tell us. Administration statements on this subject have been so ambivalent I have gotten to the point where I do not care what they tell us.
I shall not bore the Senate with quotations, but in the former discussions of the ABM the evidence was very clear, without regard to this agreement, that this kind of deterrence Senator JACKSON wants was not necessary. If we removed the ABM, it was not a question of constantly escalating and unlimited numbers. "Sufficiency" was the word. I used to think that meant that sufficiency, regardless of what the weapons were, was all we should aspire to. That is what I am talking about.
Mr. PASTORE. The Senator is being somewhat inconsistent. He says he does not think we should accept what is said by the Nixon administration
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Not everything.
Mr. PASTORE. Well, not everything said, and at the same time he is willing to accept a temporary agreement without changing a word in it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. PASTORE. That is what the committee did. If the Senator relies on the administration that much, why does he say to me I do not have the authority to vote for some changes?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not say the Senator did not have the authority. The Senator from Rhode Island does as he pleases on every occasion.
Mr. PASTORE. Of course I do, but I am being told here that we become the handmaidens of the administration because the administration wants the Jackson amendment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. No.
Mr. PASTORE. I think the Foreign Relations Committee is the handmaiden of the administration, because they took that agreement as it was sent up here – every "i" and "t" and period that was in it, without changing a word.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That was my position, and it was the position of the committee, and it was the position of the House of Representatives by a vote of 328 to 7. I think they were very wise in their decision.
In any case, I would say the Senator is not obligated to do anything. He is one of the most independent-minded and one of the strongest-minded men in or out of the Senate, and he expresses himself with equal vigor.
I am not giving my support to the treaty and interim agreement on the ground that we were told this or that in connection with this particular agreement. The information I have based my judgment on, which I assure the Senator is official, was obtained under other circumstances, and was not designed for the particular purpose of passing or not passing the resolution on this agreement. I think, in that sense, it can be a little more reliable than it might have been if obtained under other circumstances.
As to the power or danger of nuclear weapons, very few people can imagine the power of nuclear weapons. When we get beyond a certain number, there is no sense in having an endless number of them. A certain number has been called sufficient for deterrence.
That is why the ABM Agreement was so significant. It has removed the doubts that arose over the possible effectiveness of an ABM system. Now a "sufficiency" really is the most appropriate word, I think, for what we should aspire to, a sufficiency for deterrence. This is certainly less than any 1,618, or other high numbers. Those numbers are meaningless, if the equivalent of about 400 megatons is enough to maintain a deterrent effect.
This Senate action is not binding on the President. The danger is not that it is going to bind the President of the United States. He will do as he pleases. The danger is that it evidences a doubt and suspicion on our part. It signifies that we do not believe in this whole process, that we are still committed to the arms race, that the so-called military-industrial complex is all-powerful, that no matter what this administration or anyone may say, we are not going to stop the arms race, because there are too many jobs and to much money involved.
The effect is on the minds of the Russians. Are they going to be willing to proceed to a fruitful second stage? That is where the danger is. Mr. Nixon is not going to say, "My hands are tied," but he is liable to reach a point when the Russians will say: "There is no point in our negotiating; look at what you have done. You are now deciding to change the rules from overall equality to superiority. You want all your aircraft carriers, all your other weapons around the world, and in addition, you want the same number of intercontinental missiles. We can only interpret that to mean that you think you want to have first strike capability." If this is the result, nothing will happen in the next step.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STAFFORD). The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE). On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk called the roll.