July 26, 1972
Page 25414
Mrs. SMITH. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I oppose this amendment because I think it would impair our national security and would be false economy to delete the nuclear aircraft carrier from the bill.
I have withheld final judgment on this issue for some time because I did not feel that the Secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been sufficiently definitive and positive on the future plans of the aircraft carriers.
Finally, this year they have shed what I have considered to be vague and nebulous ambivalence in the past on future plans. They now say without equivocation or qualification that this proposed carrier is desperately vital to our future national security. I believe them. I do so because of the following reasons:
First, whether most of us will admit it or not, the Vietnam experience has driven the American people more and more toward a new isolationism – and a part of the result of that isolationism is the rapid decrease in our overseas land bases and our pull-back to a neo-Fortress American policy.
This leaves us no choice but to rely on the aircraft carriers as our floating, highly mobile bases that we can project and withdraw at will according to our defense needs and not leave us at the mercy of some foreign country telling us to close our land bases and get out as France did so abruptly and recently.
Second, we need the aircraft carriers to keep the sea lanes open. Very frankly we cannot rely completely on the submarines and the surface ships to do this.
Third, of course, this proposed carrier is expensive. But there simply are not any basement bargains in national security. Money saved from false economy means nothing if a nation is so weakened in its national defense that it can be, and is, taken over by an enemy because of the economizing on national defense.
Fourth, we need the submarines but they are no substitute for the carrier. Do not underestimate the psychological importance of the visibility of the carrier in the Mediterranean, the Pacific, the Atlantic, or the Indian ocean as a stabilizing deterrent to aggression.
Fifth, nor is the proposed sea control ship a complete substitute for the carrier. Its top speed is limited. Its role is limited to low threat situations. Its offensive and defensive capabilities are much less. It is supplementary, not an alternative, to the carrier.
For these reasons, I urge the defeat of this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may suggest the absence of a quorum, and that what time is used be charged equally to both sides.
Mr. SAXBE. That is agreeable.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, after a conference, the Senator from Ohio and I find that not much more time is needed, and we have agreed that we will ask unanimous consent that the vote on this amendment occur at 2:15 p.m. and that the time between then and now be equally divided between the proponent of the amendment and the manager of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.
Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Illinois.
Mr. STEVENSON. I thank the Senator from Ohio for yielding.
Mr. President, the $299 million the Navy is asking for this year for CVN-70 is only the down payment on the most expensive ship in the world – a billion dollar carrier. Eight years from now, when this ship is launched, I am certain it will have cost well over a billion dollars. For this staggering investment, we will have purchased just one ship. That $1 billion cost does not include the additional cost, perhaps as high as $2 billion, for its complement of aircraft and supporting ships.
Before Congress can sensibly accept the Navy's arguments in behalf of this carrier, it must also accept the Navy's perception of its military role in the world. The Navy perceives for itself four necessary naval capabilities. Such capabilities ought to be based on a realistic appraisal of the American military role, the American strategy and policy in the world. But we have no clearly perceived strategy in the world. The Navy's capabilities are instead based on ancient habits and old, discredited policies.
The Navy assumes four necessary capabilities: "assured second strike," "control of sea lanes and areas," "projection of power ashore," and "overseas presence."
There can be no doubt about the first capability. We must have a capable nuclear deterrent. But the carrier has nothing to do with deterrence. It contributes almost nothing to our nuclear defense.
We are told by the Navy that it is "consonant" with the Nixon doctrine to "project power ashore" from the sea. That is the second capability. But I question whether that really is the meaning of the Nixon doctrine – that American forces must be stationed around the globe on carriers for fighter and bomber missions. Are we going to be in brush fire wars everywhere, prepared to put them out at all times and in all places in the world? I doubt that. I doubt that even if this were a necessary capability, the carrier would be an effective means of implementing it. Half of our entire carrier force off Vietnam could not prevent a massive invasion from the north.
It is said, also, that this billion-dollar carrier is needed for another essential naval capability – “overseas presence," deploying force worldwide and showing our flag. That assumption, too, should be tested against the changing realities of the 1970's and 1980's. I believe gunboat diplomacy is a thing of the past. We last tried it in the Bay of Bengal during the India-Pakistani conflict, and we accomplished three things – we prolonged the war, we angered the Indians without benefitting the Pakistanis, and we made ourselves look, in President Nixon's words, like a "pitiful, helpless giant." By showing the flag, we accomplished nothing more certainly than our own humiliation. This kind of gunboat diplomacy is, at best, obsolete; and even if it were not, it is a capability which could be fulfilled with other and less expensive vessels.
Last; it is said that the billion-dollar carrier is required to "control the seas." But must we control the sea lanes to every corner of the world? Is it necessary? It is even possible in an age of nuclear submarines, guided missiles, and nuclear weapons. It is said that we must be able to control the sea lanes in order to import oil. At the same time, we are proposing eventually to import Russian oil in Russian ships. And in the case of oil imports would not any enemy cut foreign oil production at its source?
This carrier's missions simply do not make sense. They are based on 19th century naval capabilities which have little or no relation to the political and military realities of the late 20th century. It is instead, I fear, a monument to inter-service politics and rivalry; and, as many naval men are quick to concede privately, it is little more than a multi-billion dollar status symbol for naval men who belong to a different era.
Even if this billion dollars should be spent on the Navy, it should not be spent on another nuclear carrier. We have a dozen carriers already which have many years of life remaining.
We expect to build an entire fleet of "sea control carriers" which will be able to perform all the missions of this carrier. For what we are paying for this carrier, we could get nine "sea control carriers."
By buying one huge platform, we compound the vulnerability of the carrier by giving an enemy one target to aim at. Carriers are vulnerable. Thirty-eight percent of carriers hit once during action in World War II were forced out of action. Seventy-five percent of carriers hit twice were forced out of action. The average time these crippled carriers were out of action was over 2 months.
Carriers are vulnerable to nuclear submarine attack. Repeatedly in naval exercises, including exercises with allied forces, submarines have been able to penetrate carrier defenses undetected.
The carrier is a sitting duck for the nuclear submarine. It is also vulnerable to attack by surface-to-surface missiles; and, as Senator GOLDWATER conceded a moment ago, it is vulnerable to attack from the air. Its vulnerability will continue to increase as technology continues to increase the effectiveness of offensive weapons without compensating improvements in defensive weapons.
It has been said in the course of this debate that all ships are vulnerable to submarine attack. That is true. But nine ships are harder to attack and to knock out than one. Nine smaller ships, at the same price of the CVN-70, could provide more flexibility and more firepower, with far more safety against attack.
Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield so that we can ask for the yeas and nays at this time?
Mr. STEVENSON. I yield.
Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment. The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. STEVENSON. Its cost is greatly augmented because it is nuclear. Why? It must be provisioned regularly with food, fuel for its planes, and ammunition. Why not with oil for its engines? Its newly acquired antisub role could be performed less expensively by existing land-based planes and new, less expensive multi-purpose vessels, including sea-based planes and helicopters. Its sea control mission could be performed less expensively by destroyers, patrol frigates, and other less expensive surface vessels – if sea control against the most modern nuclear submarines is possible by any means. Its shore support mission might be performed by surface- to-surface missiles launched from less expensive naval platforms or by planes launched from existing carriers or additional less expensive carriers. Why must we place so many of our eggs in this one most fragile and expensive basket? It is vulnerable to destruction and heavy damage from attack by airborne missiles. The Navy's own exercises demonstrate that it is vulnerable to attack from the nuclear submarine. The Navy has better ways of spending this billion dollars.
Mr. President, I could go on at some length but time is running out. Let me conclude by saying that each new arms program, including this carrier, brings a response from the other side, leaving us by and large in the same relative position military, but a little closer to the flash point, and always poorer economically. If we do not pass this amendment, the billion dollars for the carrier will be lost forever. That money will never be available for public safety, pollution control, or education here at home.
Nor will the billion dollars for this carrier ever be available for development and humanitarian assistance in the rest of the world. All this carrier will ever contribute to the world is "showing the flag" or "projtection of power ashore." We have better things to do with our money than to build a fourth nuclear carrier.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment to the one under consideration and ask that it be printed.
I also ask unanimous consent that the name of the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS) be added as a cosponsor of my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment will be received and will be printed; and, without objection, the Senator from South Carolina will be listed as a cosponsor of the Senator's amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 8 minutes, or so much thereof as I may use.
I am not going to detain the Senate but a few minutes. We have already agreed to vote at 2:15 p.m. today. I want to refer to the fact that I stated this morning since the Department of Defense's firm decision to set the carrier force in the 1980's at 12, that this has cleaned up the situation considerably. It is a firm figure. We know where we are. The debates on this subject for the past several years have demonstrated that there should be a firm clearing up of the situation. It is a strengthening. It makes it much easier to vote for this carrier with confidence.
We all assert that we must have a carrier fleet. Most of us agree that it should be modern. That means nuclear power and, thus, increased range and time saving and all the other things that go with it.
So I want to say to those who have opposed the carrier, who are now suggesting a reduction, as well as to those who have opposed the idea of a modern fleet, that I think this is a fine illustration of what debate, planning, and re-planning can do. The result is strength.
As I said this morning – and I go now to what I think are some of the most important and knowledgeable responsible sources on many of these matters – I conferred yesterday with Admiral Zumwalt. I hold in my hand a letter dated yesterday from him. I asked him to summarize some of the advice he had given me.
Let me read one paragraph from it:
My strongest initiatives over the past few years have been aimed at the development of small, low-cost systems. It is precisely the umbrella of our more capable, more sophisticated forces such as the CVN-70 that make it possible for us to recommend a mix, including these low-cost systems.
Mr. President, I said this morning that there are many other ships and ship systems in the bill because we are having to strengthen our Navy in a variety of ways. There is no doubt about the correctness of what Admiral Zumwalt said in that paragraph, when he said it serves as an umbrella – the carrier does – protecting the other necessary ships we have in order to make for a balanced Navy.
The Senator from Rhode Island made a telling point this morning, with reference to nuclear- powered carriers, when he vividly portrayed the need for two in the Pacific and two in the Atlantic, to be the leaders, so to speak, in modernity and everything else, for the two carrier fleets, one to the west and one to the east.
This will be the fourth nuclear-powered carrier that will give just that leadership. It will be the fourth part of the umbrella to which I have referred.
I had a conference yesterday, frankly, to review and bring out again in his own vivid way, the recommendations of Admiral Rickover. I read a few of his remarks this morning.
Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent, in view of the pressure of time, to have printed in the RECORD additional remarks and paragraphs from Admiral Rickover as well as the remainder of the letter from Admiral Zumwalt.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
July 25, 1972.
Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN: I wanted to provide you with our latest views on the nuclear aircraft carrier (CVN-70) at this critical time in the Senate's consideration of the ship. As I have stated previously, I consider CVN-70 the highest priority program in the Navy budget. While we are moving out imaginatively on many fronts with new technology – from satellites to lasers – to develop more effective and less expensive ways of accomplishing the vital missions of the Navy, all our work shows clearly that the aircraft carrier will remain the fundamental element of naval forces for the foreseeable future – without which no strategy is viable and no other forces will be effective.
As you know, in recent years our carrier force has experienced the most severe reduction of any major U.S. weapon system, declining from 23 at end FY68 to 16 at the end of the current fiscal year. Included in the current force of 16 are 7 carriers built during World War II which are of limited combat effectiveness even now, and are near the end of their service life. Our sense of great urgency regarding CVN-70 derives from the fact that this ship has now been delayed three years past its planned start date, and with approval of advanced funding now it will still not join the fleet until FY 1981! By that time, our carrier force level will have dropped to about 12, half that of a few years ago. One of those 12 will be USS MIDWAY, in her 35th year of service, and well beyond any possibility of significant extension. Thus, I would emphasize that CVN-70 represents an absolute minimum replacement effort, already overdue, in a force level that is declining at a dangerous rate, is seriously low now, and is projected to continue dropping. In fact, due to the 8-year construction period, funding of CVN-70 now is essential even for maintenance of carrier force levels below 12 in the 1980s.
Our past experience, our fleet exercises, and our analyses, all show the carrier to be the most basic building block of this country's naval forces for the future. As a maritime nation, leader of the Free World's oceanic coalition, we must have control of the seas to survive.
While a navy oriented strongly to submarines, as is the Soviet Navy, can be effective in denying sea control to others, it cannot exercise this control – as this country must. The carrier force, and CVN-70, are essential both to gaining control of the seas and to projection of forces from the seas. CVN-70 will be vital in major wars, such as a NATO conflict with the Warsaw Pact, and in peripheral wars and confrontations. In fact, in the face of our forced reduction in carrier force level to 12, CVN-70 becomes even more crucial as the linch-pin of our rapid-reaction nuclear carrier task forces. With CVN-70, we will have two nuclear carriers in a ready status on each coast. These fast, powerful, high-endurance ships will offset to a considerable degree our reduced force lever, allowing rapid reinforcement of deployed forces in crisis, and serving as a deterrent to escalation through early arrival on the scene of a confrontation. The Jordanian crisis of 1970 was a classic example of the utility of carriers – often the only U.S. forces that can reach the scene in time to prevent outbreak of violence. As this country gradually reduces its overseas forces, carriers provide the flexibility and mobility that allow employment of tactical air power wherever needed, world-wide.
As you know, my strongest initiatives over the past few years have been aimed at development of small, low-cost systems. Yet it is precisely the umbrella of our more capable, more sophisticated forces, such as CVN-70, that make it possible for us to recommend a mix including these low-cost systems.
While it is fashionable to regard the carrier as being vulnerable to cruise missile and torpedo attack, this is true only in a relative sense. In most foreseeable types of confrontation or conflict, the threat to the carrier will be non-existent or minimal. Even in a full-scale war at sea with the Soviet Union, a carrier task force is harder to find, tougher to attack, and more difficult to damage, than almost any other military force. Charged with the responsibility for carriers, I am completely confident of their survivability or I would not recommend them. If our carriers cannot survive, no other U.S. military force is viable.
Finally, as regards cost, I would like to reemphasize that CVN-70 is, in all particulars, essentially the same ship as USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and USS Eisenhower (CVN-69). The increased cost of CVN-70 over its sister ships is almost entirely attributable to the escalation which has been common to all U.S. industry, and has been most significant in shipbuilding. All possible actions have been taken, and will continue, to acquire the essential capability of CVN-70 at minimum cost.
Warmest regards,
E. R. ZUMWALT, Jr.,
Admiral, U.S. Navy.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington, D.C.,
July 25,1972.
Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR STENNIS: Your letter of July 25, 1972 requested my current thoughts as to why we should proceed immediately with the CVN 70 and TRIDENT program requested by the Administration and the Secretary of Defense in the FY 1973 budget now before Congress.
I have attached two point papers which reflect my current views on these programs. I hope they are responsive to your needs.
I would be pleased to respond to any other specific questions you may have. Respectfully,
H. G. RICKOVER.
JULY 25, 1972.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL RICKOVER
NEED FOR THE NUCLEAR CARRIER CVN 70
A primary mission of our Navy is to insure that our first line naval striking forces can carry out their mission against the threats the Soviets are presently developing.
Our major surface warships must have this capability, or we may end up without a credible deterrent to Communist encroachments which do not warrant escalation to a nuclear war. The all-nuclear carrier task force with nuclear powered carriers as the heart of the task force, has the best chance of countering the non-nuclear naval threat the Soviets are developing.
For the foreseeable future the aircraft carrier will be the principal offensive striking arm of the Navy in a non-nuclear war. No other weapon system under development can replace the long-range, sustained. concentrated firepower of the carrier air wing. Torpedo-firing nuclear submarines, cruise missile-firing nuclear submarines, nuclear frigates and anti-air and antisubmarine capabilities, all are needed to supplement and augment the capabilities of the nuclear carrier. But it is the carrier which provides the offensive punch.
It is widely understood that American nuclear superiority over the past 25 years has deterred nuclear war; it is not as widely understood that our naval superiority over this period has deterred lesser wars. If we do not maintain the capability to operate our first-line naval striking forces in all areas required by our national interests, we will have given up the ability to carry out sustained military operations away from our shores, not only by the Navy but by the other services as well. The nuclear powered aircraft carrier CVN 70 is essential to this capability.
The number of U.S. overseas land airbases is declining. We had 105 in 1957. We have less than 50 now, 14 of which are in Vietnam and Thailand. 8 more are in Turkey, Spain, Japan, the Philippines, and Okinawa where political forces are already trying to throw us out, leaving only 28. Sea-based tactical aircraft are required when land bases are not available or do not have the capacity to meet the required tactical needs. The aircraft carriers can provide this sea-based tactical air power.
The only reliable long range weapon system our surface ships have is carrier based aircraft. As new aircraft and aircraft weapons are developed they can be added to a carrier air wing.
Our carriers are vulnerable to attack by Soviet cruise missiles – as are all surface ships and land installations within range. However, the best defense our surface ships have against such missiles is carrier based aircraft. Without the carriers and the aircraft they carry, all other surface warships, replenishment ships, and amphibious forces, will be more vulnerable. The nuclear carrier task force, with the advantage of nuclear propulsion to permit unlimited operation at high speed is the most powerful, least vulnerable surface ship force in the history of naval warfare.
If an opponent is successful in developing weapons that can sink large numbers of our carriers and we are not successful in developing adequate counter weapons – or if we simply do not build sufficient modern carriers to protect our sea lanes – the United States will have to change its national objectives to be consistent with the inability to conduct overseas military operations.
The CVN 70 is needed to replace an aging World War II design carrier which cannot cope with the Soviet threat of the 1980s and beyond. The CVN 70 will be able to operate the most advanced models of tactical aircraft. She will increase the number of nuclear powered carriers in the fleet by one-third. She will be operating with the fleet well into the 21st century.
Older carriers have no growth potential left. Even with the extensive modernization accomplished in each class, deficiencies remain in relation to carrier requirements for the 1980s.
If the Navy retires carriers at 30 years of age – the current Navy estimate of useful life of a carrier – we will have a carrier force of 11 to 12 carriers through 1985 with no new carrier construction. Funding CVN 70 now will allow a force of 12 to 13 carriers between 1980 and 1985. The range in force estimates depends on the age when the Midway is retired.
It is not clear how long the Midway can be retained in service, as no carrier has ever been extended in operation beyond 29 years. She underwent an extensive modernization beyond 1966 and 1970. When the CVN 70 joins the fleet in 1981, the Midway will be 36 years old.
Attack carriers are being operated harder than any surface ships in naval history. As the number of carriers is reduced, the requirements placed on each carrier is increased. No carrier to date has been in service more than 29 years. The carriers in the fleet today were designed to specifications which assumed a 20 year ship life. Therefore the assumption that all of our present carriers can provide 30 years or more of reliable operation is questionable.
The reasons for building the CVN 70 now are the acute need for force modernization and the fact that while carrier force levels have decreased sharply, the world-wide tactical air strike requirements have not. In addition, for the first time in the quarter century since World War II the United States is faced with a naval threat challenging our ability to maintain free use of the seas. The mobility and sustained fire power available only in a nuclear carrier is required to counter this threat.
With the CVN 70, the number of carriers less than 30 years old in 1981 will be half the number the Navy had in operation in 1966. The declining number of overseas bases coupled with the decline in the number of carriers requires each carrier in the active force to be the most capable, least vulnerable ship it is possible to build – a CVN.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I revert now to where I started. Someone referred to what kind of diplomacy does the carrier carry in peacetime. May I suggest that it is a silent diplomacy. The carriers speak loudly by just silently finding their way around all over the sea lanes of the world carrying our flag. It is also a preparedness diplomacy which has been proved over and over again.
I frankly worried about this matter of getting a carrier fleet to a definite size. We planned for it and talked about how many ships would be necessary to do what and how many modern ships we would have. I am very happy to see this one now in the bill and I hope it stays there because I think this is the minimum number of nuclear-powered carriers with all the modernity of equipment and facilities and everything that goes with it. This is the minimum number that we should settle for, for the time being. I hope that "for the time being" means it will prove to be several years.
So I urge my colleagues to vote against the pending amendment.
I yield the floor.
Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I believe for me to make my concluding remarks it would be necessary for the Senator from Mississippi to yield me some time.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes. I yield the Senator whatever time I have remaining.
Mr. SAXBE. As I recall, the vote is set in 5 minutes and I certainly intend to conclude my remarks by that time.
Mr. STENNIS. I am delighted to yield to the Senator such time as I have remaining.
Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, I believe that we have had full exposure today on this carrier question. I think we could talk a whole lot longer about it and not say a great deal more.
The issue is one of cost effectiveness. There has been no serious debate on this floor of the fact that we consider the carrier an essential part of our defense system, at least for the time being.
However, I think that we must also recognize the serious question of how long can we continue to build carriers as sea control ships when they are not cost effective for this job. Not only are they inefficient as sea control vessels, but they are vulnerable to "smart" missiles which are carried by aircraft and by ships smaller than the carrier. Our competition on the high seas continues to build these efficient sea control tools in increasing number and effect. We will have to assess whether we can afford to put a carrier out there at a cost of $1 billion, and a cost of $3 billion for the air wing, to be a target for these cheaper tactical missiles and delivery systems.
We talk a great deal about the use of these missiles in North Vietnam and say that we can knock out the third plank in a bridge, put one in the mouth of a tunnel, or down a chimney.
With those weapons available to us I am relatively confident that the Soviets possess the know how and the hardware to penetrate even the sophisticated defenses of our carriers should they choose to do so.
So, here we are putting all of our money into this great big carrier. I have never believed that the amendment would carry because too many people are directly interested in getting the carriers going. I prophesy that this carrier will never be completed because sooner or later it will sink in that with the smart missiles that we have, either airborne, seaborne, or submarine carried, we cannot afford to put these targets out there. These smaller, cheaper more cost effective weapons can do the job better. And, I am just talking about conventional warfare. Now, when we get to nuclear warfare, the fact is obvious that a carrier is not meant to survive any kind of nuclear attack. And the fact that it can move 20 miles while an ICBM is in the air is not significant when we think that they are not going to waste a 50-megaton warhead or even a MIRV warhead in hitting a carrier when they can do the same thing with a cruise missile launched not more than 300 miles away.
These are facts that will become increasingly prominent as the years go by. I prophesy that what we are saying today is the last argument of the Senate on the floor as to whether to build a carrier, because even those who support the carrier will not be brave enough to do it on another go-round. Obviously we are pricing ourselves out of business, $10 billion down the hole with a carrier that can be sunk with a motorboat.
Mr. President, I just think it is a good thing that we have discussed this matter today and brought it up. I think these arguments will be repeated many times and there will be arguments from now on because we point out the fact that the carrier is the dodo, and though there is a great nostalgic feeling among Navy men about the carriers and among the admirals who want to sail them, this nostalgia is not worth $10 billion.
It is great to fly the flag. However, we do not need 3 foot of armor on a flag deck to take it around with a happy crew on it and park it in Hong Kong or in a Mediterranean port when we can do the same thing with a cheaper ship.
For these reasons we have offered our amendment. And, as I say, we have done so without much hope of its being passed. This is the last time the carrier will be debated on the floor. And, as I prophesy, this is a carrier that will never be used. And I hope it never will be used.
I thank the Senator and I believe the hour has come to vote.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, the national budget for fiscal year 1973, now being considered by the Congress, allocates $299 million to long lead time funding for a third nuclear-powered aircraft carrier of the Nimitz class, CVN-70. Approval of the long lead time funds this year and of the balance funding in fiscal year 1974 will permit the Navy to proceed with a construction schedule which calls for delivery of the ship in 1980.
Since this ship requires a significant capital investment, its place in our future defense needs is being closely examined and carefully analyzed. The facts emerging from these considerations this year are verifying that principal conclusion known from previous studies – an adequate number of modern aircraft carriers are essential to our national security.
When a prudent man, with concern for his family's future, purchases a new home, his first concern is for insurance coverage sufficient to protect his investment against foreseeable losses. After he has provided this protection, then he may decide what he can afford for his home – necessities, conveniences, and even luxuries. The home air-conditioning unit comes after the insurance policy has been paid for.
The same principal applies to our concern for the future of this Nation. If we are to survive we must provide, with first priority on our resources, an adequate assurance of national security. Only after we have provided for the national defense can we allocate resources to the many desirable projects for improving our way of life.
The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in this budget is a key element of the forces we will provide for national defense in the 1980's and beyond.
To realize just what this carrier will mean to the Nation we should look at the types and numbers of naval forces we will need in the future. For the past 30 years aircraft carriers have been the principal surface ships of the Navy. They have forged their reputations in war and in peace as mobile, powerful, versatile weapon systems ready for any challenge. As we look to the future, we see we must maintain this type of strength. The aircraft carrier will continue to be the principal conventional weapon that will permit our Navy to exercise its unique capability to respond to threats, to protect our citizens, to deter war.
Our present force of proven aircraft carriers is facing serious limitations due to obsolescence. We have 16 carriers in active service today – and they are responding to all requirements from the Mediterranean to the western Pacific. But of these 16, seven are old World War II-designed ships rapidly nearing the end of their expected 30-year service lives. Our replacement program is limited to three ships – two carriers are being built and will be completed in 1973 and 1975; the third is the ship whose funds are in the budget now, a ship that cannot join the fleet before 1980.
These three ships are members of the same class. They will have the same nuclear propulsion system, the same hulls, the same major components. They will serve as replacements for worn-out World War II veteran carriers. In effect, these three ships will replace seven old carriers in the front lines of our naval forces.
These numbers – three new carriers requested or under construction to replace seven aging veterans – underscore the concern we have for the adequacy of our future level of national defense. We are reducing the numbers of ships we will have to lead our Navy, but we must maintain a solid nucleus of these powerful, versatile, aircraft carriers. The carrier in this budget represents a construction program stretched out and deferred to the point that our naval strength for the 1980's and beyond is in serious jeopardy.
We cannot permit the forces we have for our protection to become ineffective and weak through unrestrained obsolescence. The duty of Congress is to provide and maintain a Navy – a Navy strong enough to make a key contribution to our total national defense. The nuclear-powered carrier now in the budget will be a vital member of the Navy of the 1980's and beyond. It is part of that essential insurance policy we must provide.
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, three of the administration's top economic policy makers gave their views Monday on how to reduce spending by the Federal Government.
Herbert Stein, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Treasury Secretary George Shultz, and Budget Director Casper Weinberger, warned the Nation that our economy is reaching a critical point and urged control of Government spending to prevent another rise in the inflationary spiral.
Mr. Stein was quoted in the Washington Post as declaring that one of the first ways to hold down spending is to "stop some of those bills that are floating around Congress." While Mr. Stein did not specify what bills he was referring to, the inference was apparently directed at the categories of health and education, two areas where Congress is voting bigger outlays than the President asked.
Well, Mr. President, I suggest that contrary to Mr. Stein's views, the health, education, and general well-being of the people of this Nation are crucial matters that should not be relegated to offhand treatment either by this Congress or by any administration truly concerned with the direction our country is headed.
Yet to a certain extent I can agree with Mr. Stein. There are some bills "floating around Congress" which do contain great and unnecessary expenses. Congress, as I am sure Mr. Stein would agree, should seek out these specific areas of excess and make reductions accordingly.
It, is indeed, ironic that 2 days after the administration's call for economy the Senate is debating the military procurement bill, H.R. 15495.
The administration does not approve of the Senate appropriating $31.3 billion for labor, health, education, and welfare. At the same time we are urged to rubber stamp a defense budget of over $80 billion and a military procurement outlay of $20.5 billion which includes $299 million for a nuclear carrier, $171.4 million for the SAM-D missile, and more than $900 million for the Trident submarine.
Today we are considering the nuclear aircraft carrier. The Navy is requesting $299 million in the fiscal year 1973 budget for long-lead items for the CVN-70.
Of course, we all know that this is just the beginning. The Navy estimates that the final cost of this ship will be nearly $1 billion. Obviously this does not include a second billion for aircraft to fly from the ship, or a third billion for other ships needed to support it at sea.
There are two major factors for opposing the CVN-70. First, defense planners have realized the true role of the carrier in quick response tactical situations. Rejecting the idea that carriers are strategic strike platforms, they have accordingly reduced the desired force level for carriers from 16 to 12.
Fundamentally, we have learned a cruel lesson from Vietnam: that our foreign policy should be less interventionist. This in turn should lead to even lower requirements for the carrier – the most easily used tool of tactical intervention.
I realize that this is essentially an argument based upon far-ranging and basic questions of our view of the world and our role in it. There is room for disagreement.
But the second factor is far less complicated: nuclear carriers cost a lot of money. We should pause and examine whether there really is a reason to unnecessarily raise costs to such a high level. Now that the CVN-70 has been delayed 3 years, it is more economical to wait approximately 5 more years to begin replacing our aging Forrestal and converted Midway carriers. In 5 years we could begin, if necessary, an entirely new program of replacing carriers thereby gaining cost savings due to concurrent construction of replacement carriers.
As I pointed out in a statement June 2 in this body, less than 2 years ago the Navy spent $202 million to refurbish the carrier Midway. At that time Navy press releases ballyhooed the accomplishment as extending the 25-year-old ship's life span "through the 1980's."
But in the past 2 years the Navy's position has, to put it mildly, become more modest. Now the Midway's life span is put at "to 1980."
So what is the Senate to think? Was the Navy guilty of deliberate distortion in order to justify a 240-percent cost overrun on the refurbishing of the Midway? Or was it simply a matter of pie-in- the-sky optimism that had no justification in reality?
Either way, the Senate should not be duped again.
I think we would do well to heed Mr. Stein's advice. And I think we should begin today by voting to delete $299 million for the nuclear carrier. Then we should go on to cut $578 million from the Trident and $171.4 million from the SAM-D missile.
By deleting these three items the Federal Government can save more than $1 billion in money that otherwise would not feed one single person, house one single family, or cure one single illness.
Mr. Stein is correct in wanting to trim the budget. But he is wrong in his priorities.
We must stop spending too much money for weapons or capabilities that are redundant at best or harmful at worst.
I suggest that the right way to cut spending is to save a billion dollars in unneeded weapons that do not add a single significant link in our Nation's security. Let us begin today by voting against the nuclear carrier.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I will vote for the Saxbe amendment to delete the $299 million authorization for a new nuclear carrier. I do not believe it is necessary to begin procurement of a new nuclear carrier at this time.
The proposed carrier, CVN-70, is an impressive ship. The cost is equally impressive – a billion dollars. An additional $2 billion will be required for aircraft and escorts that make up the total carrier weapons system. Projected costs over the expected 30-year lifetime of this nuclear carrier are estimated at over $10 billion – 30 times more than the initial investment on long lead time items that we are voting on today.
An investment of this magnitude requires the closest possible scrutiny. I do not believe it is yet clear what our carrier requirements will be during the coming decades. The administration only recently reduced its estimate of force level requirements for carriers from 16 to 12 – consistent with the principles of the Nixon doctrine and in keeping with the trend toward more limited security commitments abroad.
It is clear that aircraft carriers today do not have a strategic role – that is, they are not part of our nuclear deterrent force of ICBM's, SLBM's, and strategic bombers. Moreover, it does not seem to me that aircraft carriers have a cost-effective role to play in a sea control mission – even though an antisubmarine capability is now being contemplated for the CVN-70 in addition to its attack role. I believe that this mission would be better handled by the projected new sea control ship – SCS – and by guided missile launching cruisers and destroyers.
The primary mission of aircraft carriers is as a mobile tactical air field for immediate limited response. In view of our changing foreign policy priorities, it is not clear how many carriers will be required to satisfy this primary mission in the future. But even assuming that the administration's estimate of 12 carriers is justified, we would not need to begin replacing existing carriers for at least several more years.
I therefore believe it is premature to commit ourselves this year to procurement of a new nuclear carrier. We will have a much clearer idea in future years whether this very expensive investment is truly justified. In the meantime, our security and our interests abroad will be more than adequately protected.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I am pleased that my distinguished friend and colleague from Ohio has taken the lead on the issue of the CVN-70. I see no reason for supporting a stepped-up timetable for an enormously expensive project whose value is already in doubt.
The planned force level for carriers is 12. But we already have 16 carriers. Until the mid-1980's, the U.S. fleet will still consist of 12 fully modern attack carriers. These are: the nuclear attack carrier U.S.S. Enterprise, two more nuclear carriers already under construction, the U.S.S. Midway, and 8 Forrestal class carriers. The Soviets and the Chinese have none.
It is true that by 1980 only four of these carriers will be less than 15 years old, and only two will be less than 10 years old. But carriers are designed for at least a 30-year life span, not counting major improvements, modifications, and retrofit programs carried out along the way. Assuming that the Navy is correct that a carrier is obsolete after 30 years, the oldest of the present carriers will not reach the 30-year limit until 1980. And allowing an 8-year lead time for construction and development, maintaining that force level of 12 would still not require funding the CVN-70 until 1977. So why all the rush?
Mr. President, it seems to me that we are always being told that some fancy weapon or another is the last word, or that some costly improvement program will solve any problems for a long time to come. No sooner do we vote the money than the Department of Defense comes up with the discovery that our national security requires some vast new expenditure.
The case of the CVN-70 offers a typical example. When the carrier U.S.S. Midway rejoined the fleet in January 1970 after a 4-year conversion costing $187.2 million, the Department of Defense stated in a press release that:
The Midway ... will be capable of handling the largest and most complex carrier aircraft and weapons systems in the Navy's arsenal through the 1980's," (Emphasis added.)
But suddenly we are told that our national security requires a new commitment to a multi-billion-dollar program this year. So I ask again: Why all the rush?
Mr. President, this years' authorization bill includes $299 million for long lead time items for the carrier. This money will be mainly for the nuclear propulsion plant. The $299 million is merely an initial commitment. The total construction cost of the CVN-70 will be approximately $1 billion.
But this $1 billion figure does not include operating costs, basing costs, and other logistical ships. If these costs are added, the total figure is at least $2.3 billion. Based on actual experience with the U.S.S. Enterprise, estimates of annual operating costs for the CVN-70 are at least $49.5 million. Over a 30-year span, the total operating costs for the carrier alone would be $1.5 billion. Counting the costs of a total carrier air wing – including fighter-bombers, tankers, reconnaissance planes, helicopters, and so on – the total cost of procurement and operating costs over a 30-year period is over $8 billion, and this figure does not even include the cost of escort ships.
Proponents of the carrier have argued that the CVN-70 is necessary to defend Israel. Now, the same thing can be said about any number of different weapons systems. But the truth is that we already have the planned force level of 12 carriers, of which three are or will be nuclear. These three are the U.S.S. Enterprise, the U.S.S. Eisenhower, and the U.S.S. Nimitz.
Surely it does not take much military imagination to see that we could meet any conceivable threat against Israel. I have not yet heard it argued that our present force level is inadequate for Israel's safety. If 12 carriers are enough – and they certainly should be – then the issue of Israel is a red herring.
Mr. President, we should remember that the carrier has no strategic value to speak of. In the event of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, the CVN-70 is a billion-dollar "sitting duck". It is highly vulnerable to missile attack. It would most likely be used in an offshore operation, for which there are already enough carriers.
I am not saying that carriers in general are useless. I am saying that the CVN-70 in particular is simply too much, too soon – and too expensive. The time may well come when it is worth the cost. But that time has not arrived.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, since World War II, the maintenance of a stable and peaceful world has depended to a large extent upon the military capability of the United States. For a variety of reasons, I believe that we must maintain our posture of defense preparedness. Among other things, the present uncertainties of world politics entail too much risk for us to do otherwise.
But I am also convinced that we must engage in a continuing reevaluation of the extent to which the United States can maintain the military capability to which we have come to consider necessary. Frankly, the cost of individual weapons has become so great in the past few years that it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a viable force at a reasonable cost. The $1 billion cost of CVN-70 is a perfect example of the incredible financial expenditures which are required to perform the role which the United States has assumed.
Appropriating such large sums becomes increasingly difficult to justify when placed in the context of a Federal budget which was in deficit of $26 billion for fiscal year 1972, and which for 1973 has a projected deficit of around $30 billion. Such deficits require that we exercise restraint in Federal spending in the defense as well as the domestic sector. I believe that the administration has provided a framework in the Nixon doctrine which will allow us to realistically evaluate our military requirements while we move into an era of increased understanding and economic cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and China.
Nevertheless, the diminished value of the defense dollar and the difficulty of finding funds for military forces, makes it increasingly imperative that those of us in the Congress understand the military requirements which dictate the selection of one weapons system rather than another. Furthermore, we must insure that the money we appropriate is spent and managed efficiently and effectively.
I believe the nuclear carrier, CVN-70, for which $299 million is requested for long lead time items is an excellent case to illustrate some of the points which I have made. A carrier in World War II cost about $83 million. That cost had risen to $181 million by the Korean war. The two sister ships of CVN-70, CVN68 and 69, are now expected to cost $628 million and $676 million respectively. CVN-70 itself is estimated to cost slightly less than a billion dollars. This, of course, does not include the aircraft complement at about $500 million and annual operating costs at about $100 million, and the costs of escort vessels.
If a force level of 12 carriers is planned, it appears that for the foreseeable future we must plan on about $1.5 to $2 billion a year for replacement and operation of our carrier fleet. Truly an impressive sum.
Mr. President, I do not believe that we can afford that kind of annual expense continuously for the foreseeable future, and I would like the Navy to take a harder look at how they can provide Naval air power without the kind of price tag that the large nuclear carriers entail. Specifically, I believe that more serious consideration should be given smaller carriers which when mixed with the nuclear CVA's might provide a more flexible and survivable naval air arm for the control of the seas mission. The Navy should be commended for its innovation of the sea control ship which is certainly a step in the right direction.
In spite of my deep concern about the cost of CVN-70 and the long term plan for our carrier forces, I believe that we should provide the funds for this program from the point of view of replacing existing carriers which will be exceeding their useful life by the time CVN-70 becomes operational. To do otherwise would entail reducing our carrier force size below the level of 12 which is currently planned, a reduction which I do not believe has been sufficiently justified, or depending on a naval vessel which has exceeded its useful life, which I think would be unwise.
Mr. President, I support the request for the funds to initiate the CVN-70 program, but in so doing serve notice that I believe that less expensive ways of supplying naval air power must be found and I encourage the Navy to look for them.
CVN-70 AND THE FUTURE CARRIER FORCE
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I fully support the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee in the need to start construction of another nuclear-powered carrier now.
The genesis of the Navy's fourth nuclear-powered aircraft carrier has been lengthy and uncertain. This carrier, whose initial funding was originally planned for the 1970 budget, has been delayed by fiscal constraints and high level analyses until now its approval has become a matter of greatest urgency. As these delays have occurred, we have watched both inflation and the interruption of vital component assembly lines act to drive the construction cost up. And we have viewed with increasing concern the now rapidly approaching retirement dates for the World War II carriers in our Navy.
One cannot help but be alarmed when he considers the recent reductions in our naval carrier forces and contemplates the further inevitable reductions in the next few years. Since 1965 the number of carriers in active service have been reduced by one-third, from 24 to 16 operating today. But with ominous implications of future weakness is the fact that seven of our 16 operating carriers are World War II designed ships, ships now in the last years of their expected 30-year active service lives.
Our replacement program is certainly a limited one – two carriers are building, one is requested.
For these ships decision time occurs several years before active service time. The carrier whose advance funds are requested now cannot be completed before 1980. By that time obsolescence will have removed or severely restricted our older ships, and the effective carrier force will be only 12 ships – half the number of 1965.
Will the world situation have changed to reduce our need for a Navy? I doubt it. There is no indication now that our Nation can forego the flexible strength provided by carrier forces. Their ability to move in international waters to nearly any scene of tension or crisis will continue to be essential.
We can look at the Mediterranean for ready examples of this naval requirement. There the carriers serve as visible reminders of U.S. strength. They symbolize our interest in that critical but turbulent region. And they actually provide the balanced force that, in many situations, could only come by sea to aid our friends in their time of need.
This fourth nuclear-powered aircraft carrier will be a key member of our Navy of the future. It will replace an overage carrier in the fleet. In effect, as obsolescence takes its toll of so many of our older carriers, a new carrier will have to do the jobs of more than one of our present ships.
We must maintain a powerful and versatile Navy. We must provide effective naval carrier forces for our defense.
For these reasons I urge my colleagues to defeat the pending amendment so that we can continue to maintain our sea strength at the needed level.